The Idea of Human Dignity in Classical Chinese Philosophy:

A Reconstruction of Confucianism

Qianfan Zhang

School of Law, Nanjing University, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province 210093, P.R. China

Phone/Fax: 025-3592582 (O), 025-3595845 (H)

E-mail: [email protected]

Academic CV:

Qianfan Zhang has earned doctoral degrees in Physics (Carnegie-Mellon University, 1989) and in Government (University of Texas at Austin, 1999), and is currently a professor of public law at Nanjing University in P.R. China. He studied physics at Nanjing University before he first came to the United States through Professor T. D. Lee’s CUSPEA program in 1984, and was a postdoctoral fellow at University of California at Santa Cruz during 1990-1992. He then undertook legal studies at University of Maryland School of Law in Baltimore until 1995, when he was transferred to UT Austin’s Government program, where he studied moral and political theory. He served as a representative for the Inter-Collegial Program of Social Research sponsored by University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in the summer of 1996, and received the Ford Foundation Grant for Asian Studies for a collaborative research project in the summer of 1998. Beginning in 1998 he was a visiting scholar at the Institute of Economics, Law and Politics of Nanjing Normal University and a research associate at the Public Policy Institute at UT Austin in June 1999. He is a member of the American Philosophical Association, American Political Science Association, and American Chinese Philosophical Association, and is now the Chief Editor for Nanjing University Law Review. Professor Zhang is broadly interested in the comparative studies of constitutional jurisprudence, legal and political philosophy, and the moral foundations of liberal democracy and constitutionalism, particularly the relevant enduring values in the classical Chinese thought. He has published a dozen articles and several books on these subjects, including “Constitutionalism and Democracy: The Seperation of Powers and Party Politics in the American Federal Government” (Chinese Social Science Quarterly, 1996), Market Economy and Legal Regulations (Shichang Jingji de Faluu Tiaokong, 1998), The Constitutional Structure of American Government (Meiguo Xianfa yu Zhengfu Jiegou, 2000), and the coming two-volume work, The Western Constitutional Systems (Xifang Xianzheng Tixi). Among other things, he is working on a project examining the relationships between constitutional engineering, social and economic transitions, and the traditional moral values in China.

QIANFAN ZHANG

The Idea of Human Dignity in Classical Chinese Philosophy:

A Reconstruction of Confucianism[1]

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)

1. Introduction

About fifty years ago, the United Nations appealed to the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of equal and inalienable rights of all members of human family” as “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.[2] Except the 1949 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany which honored human dignity as its controlling norm,[3] however, the concept of human dignity did not seem to arouse much political attention among nations of the world. While many developing nations were beset by economic hardships and political repression, developed liberal democratic nations were caught by the explosion of various political, economic, and social rights. The United States, for example, was preoccupied with the Civil Rights Movement in the Sixties and with the welfare rights and rights for women in the Seventies. And, despite the conservative turn, the world continued to be inundated with the “rights-talks” in the Eighties. Individual rights in different realms of human life--rights to free speech and free exercise of religion, rights against legal and political discriminations based on race and sex, right to procedural fairness in welfare hearings, right to physical freedom of woman versus potential rights of an unborn life, and so on--seemed to be the only ground that people in liberal democracies were willing to accept as the basis for good life. Yet rights are not self-justifying, and “rights-talks” would remain groundless without some unifying conception of human beings. Although the postwar rights movements did contribute to improving the social, economic, and political status of disadvantaged sections of the population, they shifted the focus of political, legal, and philosophical debates away from the central question about the meaning of human dignity and, without even attempting to answer this question, many invented rights remained unjustified.[4] Recently, however, there seems to be a renewed interest in the idea of human dignity among philosophers and legal scholars. Within the western liberal tradition itself, some philosophers come to treat dignity as the philosophical foundation for the existence of rights.[5] A U.S. Supreme Court Justice even made effort to found the new constitutional rights on the basis of human dignity.[6] The concept of dignity is also used, though implicitly, as a device to reconcile Confucianism, primarily a duty-oriented ethics, with the rights-based modern liberalism.[7]

The recent rise in references to human dignity has hardly contributed to its conceptual clarity, however. The concept, which Dworkin notes rightly as broad and vague,[8] has caused much confusion in literature. It has been used by authors of different convictions to stand for different meanings and with different implicit assumptions, often never made explicit and articulated. It has been employed variously to mean, among other things, the Kantian imperative of treating human being always as the end and never as means only,[9] the “intrinsic humanity divested of all socially imposed roles and norms”,[10] the inherent worth belonging equally to all human beings,[11] the actually developed and mutually recognized moral status of a person,[12] the act and the capacity of claiming one’s rights or the self-controlled expression of rights,[13] the right to secure inviolable moral status against degradation and disgrace in the context of the Due Process and the Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States Constitution,[14] self-respect implying respect for others as opposed to purely self-centered esteem,[15] the quality or state of being worthy and esteemed which requires respect for one’s physical or psychological integrity,[16] full realization of human power and rational existence,[17] the existentialist “authentic dignity of man” as found in man’s thrownness into the truth of Being,[18] the universally shared human reality as given by God or the unique value of human being created in the image of God,[19] and the all-embracing Confucian ideal of humanity (Ren) composed of “concentric circles” of the self, the family, the state, human society, and the cosmos.[20] While some of the connotations are vague and unclear in themselves (what is meant by the end as opposed to mere means? what is full realization of human power? etc.), others conflict with one another (e.g., human dignity as intrinsic quality universal to all versus extrinsic characters present only in some human beings). It is perhaps not far-fetched to say that the current discussions of human dignity are mired in the stage of conceptual chaos.

In this paper I seek to clarify the concept of human dignity by introducing the contribution of classical Confucianism to this subject. As I indicate in the title, however, it is a reformulation of the Confucian view, for the concept of human dignity was neither explicitly mentioned in classical Confucian text nor systematically explained by traditional interpretations. I nevertheless argue that it is the most adequate concept for understanding and interpreting Confucianism, which discovered the dignity of man in the innate virtues (De) unique to mankind by which every man and woman is enabled to live a morally decent and materially self-sufficient life. The paper is divided roughly into two parts. After a brief review of the conceptual development in the West, I explain, primarily in the words of Confucius and Mencius, the meaning of human dignity as exemplified by a Confucian gentleman.[21] Next, I shall discuss the connection between the Confucian concept of dignity and the western concepts of rights and duties. Conceding that Confucianism failed to espouse the modern ideas of democracy and liberty, as some might contend,[22] I argue that the idea of human dignity, which is firmly rooted in Confucianism, does contain the potential of receiving new interpretations that can bring about basic compatibility between the Chinese cultural tradition and the prevailing western notion of liberal democracy. While human dignity implies a universal demand for its protection and respect, and thus is primarily a duty-oriented concept, the universal duty imposed on the state and society does confer definable rights to the individual. I argue, indeed, that compared to the Hobbesian theory of natural right, on which the western liberal tradition is founded, the Confucian concept of human dignity can accommodate a more balanced and consistent view of rights and duty.

2. The Concept of Human Dignity in the West: An Overview

Like the notion of individual rights, human dignity is surely a western concept. But in the prevalent rights-oriented ethical discussions today,[23] “human dignity” is not among the terms that are often talked about. And in those academic works that do mention the phrase (even in their titles), it is often left undefined and is used to express moral convictions the authors take for granted to be self-evident.[24] Yet, of course, the concept of human dignity is anything but self-evident. Having comprehensively surveyed the conceptual development in the history of western philosophy, Spiegelberg finds it compelling to conclude that the meaning of “human dignity” remains vague and inconsistent, and the clarification of the concept still poses a “genuine challenge” to contemporary philosophers.[25] To facilitate comparison with the Confucian idea of human dignity discussed below, I provide here a brief account of the conceptual development in the West.[26]

Since the Greek philosophers, the concept of human dignity has evolved in the entwined development of two traditions in the West: secular and religious. From the beginning human dignity was implicitly associated with freedom and reason. In the Platonic anatomy of the soul, reason is the best and the highest part; it is the divine substance, the partaking of which elevates the soul and makes it immortal. For Aristotle, men are dignified in virtue of reason because it brings order to their individual and social lives.[27] When it came to the Christian scale of value, however, human reason was relegated to a minor place. For Augustine, human beings are knowing animals, yet reason is not the end in itself, but only the means to a higher end.[28] Fundamentally faith is the precondition to right reasoning, and the faith in God, the perfect and highest good, is to be chosen freely by human will.[29] Free will, then, seems to be the ultimate locus of human dignity.[30] In the same vein, Descartes elaborates further that mankind can be said to partake a part of its Creator, not in its limited capacity for reason, but in the unlimited free will.[31] In a sense man has dignity because he is created in the image of God, and carries within him a portion of divine substance.[32] Under the influence of the humanist movement since the Renaissance, the Christian view of human nature took further positive development. Indeed, one of the earliest clear expression for the “dignity of man” came from a young Medieval priest.[33] Yet the Christian notion of human dignity seems to be necessarily limited in certain aspects. After all, it is precisely the free will that makes men consciously abandon their belief in God and deviate from his commands, thus falling into sin and evil.[34] Consistent with the Christian theological belief, it seems, human dignity could not possibly originate within human being, but must come from some external source.[35]

With the Enlightenment, “the dignity of man” became a general ideal independent of particular religious doctrines and acquired its modern meaning. Most prominently, Kant combines freedom and reason in one to derive a unique notion of human dignity. For Kant, one’s dignity (wurde) comes exclusively from the inner, unconditional worth of moral law and the capacity for autonomous law-making.[36] Everyone is in essence a free and rational being, capable of making for him/herself the moral laws that applies universally.[37] In virtue of the self-legislating capacity, men is able to live in the kingdom of ends, where he treats others as the beings of intrinsic, irreplaceable worth (as opposed to goods replaceable at certain prices), and can expect in turn that he is treated by others in the same manner.[38] The universal, categorical imperative would commands everyone to treat others as well as him/herself as ends in themselves and never merely as means to some other ends.[39] Yet, as several authors have contended, the Kantian notion of dignity is difficult to conceive because it is associated with moral freedom, which exists not in the observable phenomenal world (which Kant, under the influence of the Newtonian and Laplacian view of the cosmos prevailing at his time, believed to be mechanically determined), but only in the non-observable and incomprehensible noumenal world (“the thing in itself”).[40]

Despite its problem, the Kantian conception of man as a morally autonomous and self-legislating creature, who must be treated as the end in itself and not merely as means, remains unsurpassed as the basis for the western concept of human dignity. Indeed it became all the more appealing in light of the traumatic human experience in the twentieth century, especially during and after the two World Wars, in which the dignity and basic rights of millions of men and women were systematically trampled by totalitarian dictatorships. To permanently prevent the resurrection of monstrosities committed by the Nazi regime, the Federal Republic of Germany absorbed the elements of Kantian moral philosophy in its postwar constitutional practice. Most notably, the German Basic Law declares in its unalterable opening article that “The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority”.[41] The clause of human dignity has led to an admirably body of jurisprudence developed by the German Constitutional Court and is treated as the controlling norm by which all individual rights are interpreted.[42] The philosophical cornerstone of the German constitutional jurisprudence remains the Kantian tradition, infused with the Christian natural law and social democratic thoughts.[43]

On the other hand, moral idealism in Kant’s philosophy took a radical subjective turn in the existentialist development during the war period.[44] In searching for a secure place for human freedom and dignity in a hostile human environment, the existentialists turned to the inner world of human consciousness, and identified the dignity of man with the freedom of choosing and making oneself. Radical and unfettered freedom now becomes the sole foundation of all values. In a representative work,[45] for example, Sartre underscores the famous existentialist theme: “Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself”; “Man makes himself; he is not found ready-made; he makes himself by the choice of his morality, and he cannot but choose a morality”.[46] Through free choice a man becomes responsible for his actions. Indeed, Sartre goes beyond Kant’s universality of moral laws when he declares that man not only legislates for himself, but is also “a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind”, and thus become “responsible for myself and for all men”.[47] But, although Sartre seems to agree with Kant that certain form of morality is universal, he rejects any notion of a priori moral laws, and insists that “One can choose anything”,[48] as long as the choice is made freely. He further rejects the Kantian version of humanism, which takes man as the end in itself and as the ultimate value. To the contrary, the existentialists would “never take man as the end, since man is still to be determined”.[49] Of course, at the same time, the existentialists reject the Christian theology as the proper account of human morality. There is neither a God who created mankind with fixed human nature nor the Ten Amendments which inexorably order human beings to refrain from doing certain things; every man is completely free and responsible for every action he takes, even though it is taken without any rational justification. As existentialism treats individual choices as fundamentally groundless, irrational, and absurd, it has often been attacked for advancing moral nihilism. For our purpose, the radically subjective orientation of existentialism seems to have undermined its chance of success in searching for human dignity.[50] After all, it is difficult to make sense of human responsibility without any guiding principle, or to see the dignity in human beings as moral agents whose value choices are entirely without rational ground. A solid basis for human dignity and freedom is yet to be established.

In seeking to provide the philosophical foundation for the respect and protection of individual rights, several attempts have been made recently to reinvestigate the meaning of human dignity. While authors in the Judeo-Christian tradition continue to maintain that human dignity is to be ultimately based upon the theological premise that God created man in his own image,[51] there are encouraging development within the secular tradition. The concept is explicitly discussed in a recent volume edited by Meyer and Parent,[52] which explores the essential relationship between human dignity, constitutional rights, and American liberal values. Perhaps the most systematic and consistent treatment is provided by Alan Gewirth,[53] who seeks to use his “dialectically necessary method” to derive the existence of human dignity. For Gewirth, the concept of human dignity contains both empirical and inherent aspects.[54] While the contingent features of acquired desirable characters (such as gravity, composure, confidence, and self-respect) belong only to certain human beings and to different degrees, the intrinsic worth is shared by all human beings to an equal degree. Questions still exist, however, as to the relationship between the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of dignity and its moral implications. In what sense is inherent dignity shared by all men, making a criminal on the par with a saint?[55] Should individual differences in extrinsic dignity make any difference to one’s political and social rights? Should the notion of inherent dignity impose any duty on the person to acquire extrinsic dignity, besides giving him the right to demand respect from others--an aspect on which almost all relevant discourses so far have focused?[56] Since these questions have not been satisfactorily answered in the existing literature primarily interested in finding justifications for individual rights, I now turn to classical teachings of Confucianism for additional insight.

3. The Confucian Concept of Human Dignity

Although human dignity is explicitly a western concept, it has a close Chinese correlate. Its literal translation today is Zun Yan, a word often used in conjunction with a familiar Confucian term, Ren Ge, which is sometimes translated as “moral personality”. The latter word had a rather tortuous history. It was first used in Japanese to express “persona”, a psychology term. When it was introduced to China, however, it became associated with the ideal Confucian personality and acquired moral and ethical connotations.[57] In expressing the idea of human dignity, it is perhaps better that the two Chinese words be used jointly,[58] so that Ren Ge expresses, in Professor Hare’s terms,[59] the descriptive element, and Zun Yan the prescriptive element, of the normative concept. Although neither word appear systematically in the classical Confucian texts, as I argue below, this concept (denoted as human dignity from now on) best captures the moral teachings of Confucius and Mencius.

In Confucianism, human dignity is a composite normative concept and, as such, implies conceptual elements on three related but distinct dimensions: descriptive, prescriptive, and emotive. On the descriptive (or cognitive) dimension, the concept contains the belief in the basic facts about human life or, more accurately, about the possibilities of human life, based on empirical observations of social interactions among human beings. This is the relatively objective realm of “is” or “can”. The prescriptive (or evaluative) dimension, on the other hand, presupposes the subjective valuation of these facts by human individuals or groups, from which the prescriptive notion of “ought” is derived. On this dimension, the concept implies evaluative determination of what types of human life, actions or dispositions to act are to be regarded as “good”, noble, and praiseworthy, and positively prescribes a duty to develop, maintain, and preserve--at least refrain from harming--the conceived good. Thus, the first two dimensions defines the normative meaning of a value concept. Finally, the emotive dimension entails the behavioral manifestations naturally ensue from believing in and subscribing to the norm. It can include, for example, the exhibited psychological satisfaction and confidence derived from continuous moral practice prescribed by the norm, or the natural sentiments it arouses in common people, such as approbation for what they perceive as conforming (thus desirable) behaviors and antipathy to deviant practices. In this way, the emotive dimension furnishes a partial empirical “proof” for the universal presence of the norm within normally developed human beings.

I shall seek to explain below the term “human dignity” along these three dimensions.

3.1. The Meaning of Dignity as Exemplified in Confucian Gentleman

Descriptively, human dignity stands for a set of beliefs about human life or the kind of life that human beings are capable of living. Here the concept contains two aspects about human nature: potential and actual (which roughly corresponds to Gewirth’s notion of “inherent” and “empirical” dignity, or Stetson’s notion of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” dignity)[60]. The vision of unique human potentials sets the end for a good life, and requires active pursuit to actualize these potentials. The Confucian idea of human dignity is thus closely related to its central concepts of innate virtues, the personality of gentleman (Junzi),[61] and the Principle of the Mean (Zhong Yong). It should be noted that, unlike virtues in the Greek sense which stand for acquired moral habits, “virtues” used here to translate the Chinese word De means potentials in a human being, and is sometimes translated equivalently as potency, power, or capacities. In other words, the Chinese “virtues” are not primary faculties ready to carry out certain types of actions (e.g., the quality of justice as propensity to act justly), but only secondary faculties that enable a person to acquire the primary faculties (e.g., the ability to become a just person through some effort).[62]

The Confucianists believe that men are endowed by Heaven (Tian, equivalent in meaning to Nature) with a set of innate virtues. In one occasion, Confucius makes a remark about himself that “Heaven produced virtue in me”.[63] Mencius further develops this assumption of human nature into an ontological doctrine. Everyone is endowed from Heaven, he says, with four beginnings (Si Duan) of “heart-mind” (Xin); they are the seats for four cardinal virtues: humanity (Ren), righteousness (Yi), propriety (Li), and wisdom (Zhi).[64] While the heart-mind for shame and distaste (for one’s own bad behavior) is the seat of feeling for justice, the heart-mind for compassion is the origin of humanity. Humanity and justice are the inborn moral qualities which defines the essential character of a human being and without which a man would be reduced to a mere animal. With adequate education, learning and self-cultivation, these innate capacities will be actualized in a person, making him a mature gentleman. It is to be noted that, since very early in Confucianism, gentleman became a respectful title for anyone who acquired high moral status. As Liang Qichao points out, “Junzi is not a word denoting one’s social status; it is a word that denotes one’s moral status. In other words, Junzi represents a person who has perfected his Ren Ge”.[65]

To Confucius, one becomes a gentleman when he has succeeded in cultivating balanced virtues based on the central Principle of the Mean. Confucius makes it unambiguous that a gentleman is one who consciously follows the Principle of Mean, by which he unites himself with Heaven. The ability to act according to the Mean becomes the definitive criterion for distinguishing a gentleman from a mean-spirited “littleman” (xiao ren), a “small person” with low moral status.[66] Thus, “a gentleman act according to the Mean; a littleman act contrary to the Mean. Because a gentleman maintains the Mean, he always act to a perfect degree”.[67] As a result, in a gentleman, we find several primary virtues in a harmonious proportion: “Benevolent, he is free from worries; wise, he is free from perplexities; courageous, he is free from fear”.[68] The best example is Confucius himself, who is praised for being “gentle but serious, awe-inspiring but not harsh, respectful but calm”.[69]

Now, one may contend that the Principle of the Mean is too general to guide concrete human conduct, and the specific virtues are either too vague (e.g. what is the meaning of humanity, Ren?) or, once they received a fixed interpretation, quickly become dogmatic and anachronistic (e.g. to be Ren is to respect one’s parents and, thus, when either of them dies, to mourn for three years). Further, even the Confucianists might not agree among themselves as to which virtues (e.g. Ren or Li?) should be placed at the highest hierarchy and govern others, or how they should be interpreted. While these contentions do carry some force, they by no means undermine the basic Confucian idea that man is endowed with a set of unique potentials that characterize him as man; and such traditional virtues as humanity, justice, wisdom, courage, and propriety of conduct, still receive wide approbation today, even though their interpretations may be disputed and modified over time. In other words, while the descriptive content of what constitutes human dignity may vary, there is nevertheless the Confucian consensus that a meaningful content is there. We should reject the dogmatic tendency in Confucianism and admit, with MacIntyre,[70] that our conception of man is not static, but a dialectic progress, which changes with time, circumstances, and the improvement of human understanding. Yet this does not preclude society from accepting, at any given time, a prevailing view about human nature upon which its moral judgment is based.

One essential virtue, whose social acceptance does have withstood the test of time, is justice (Yi). A Confucian gentleman is above all a righteous man, who always directs his action according to justice as required by the Principle of the Mean. Thus, “a gentleman stands erect in the middle, without inclining to either side.”[71] He ties himself fast to that principle, without being swayed by such external influences as profits, power, or financial difficulties.[72] “A gentleman does not give up his righteousness when he is poor; nor does he deviate from the Way when he is prosperous.... If poor, he cultivate his virtue in solitude; if prosperous, he strives to bring virtue to the whole world.”[73] Nor is the principle of his behavior least affected by his socio-political status, as “in a high position, he refrains from treating his inferiors with contempt; in a low position, he refuses to court the favor of his superiors. He rectifies himself, and seeks for nothing from the others”.[74] Nor should the state of politics distract him from following the path of justice: “When good principles prevail in his government, he tenaciously pursues his goal.... When bad principles prevail in the country, he maintains his course to death without changing.”[75]

Firm commitment to righteousness confers physical and moral independence upon a gentleman. By claiming more than one deserves (for example, undue prestige or salaries), the acts of injustice indicate a state of dependence on the others--the signature of a morally inferior mind. On the contrary, a gentleman relies not on the changeable wills of other men, but on his own effort through which he can bring about the actualization of his innate qualities endowed from Heaven, thereby achieving true autonomy.[76] Having identified himself with the Way of Heaven, a gentleman will act on his own initiative, independent from any pressure, power or opinion of other men. He is to act justly under all circumstances, with or without the awareness or presence of the others. For even if nobody on earth knows his virtues and vices, the omniscient Heaven and he himself would know; and an unjust action merely degrades his personal dignity, making him feeling the shame in his mind. For this reason a gentleman must take care of his virtue even when he is in solitude.[77] Meanwhile, once he has sincerely examined himself according to the principle of justice and left his mind free from any sense of moral shame or guilt, a gentleman becomes the most courageous of all men, and cannot be compelled by any external force, least by the fear for other men’s power. Thus, from Confucius’ disciple we learn the master’s great courage: “on self-examination, if I find that I fail to be righteous, I would not threaten a single man, be he in an inferior status; but, on self-examination, if I find that I am righteous, I will go forward even against a crowd of a million men”.[78]

To summarize, a Confucian gentleman is a person who has actualized in a balanced fashion the innate virtues endowed from Heaven as a human being. S/he exemplifies the Confucian ideal moral character that any person can attain through continuous moral learning and practice. In the words of Mencius, a gentleman is “to dwell in the magnificent house of humanity, to stand in the right place of propriety, and to walk on the great path of justice; when he succeeds in obtaining an office, to practice his principles together with his people; when his effort is frustrated, to persist in the practice of these principles alone. Wealth and honor cannot corrupt him; poverty and low status cannot move him (away from justice); and power and force cannot subjugate him”.[79]

3.2. The Prescriptions of Dignity: Individual Cultivation and Universal Respect

The Confucian concept of human dignity, of course, not only implies the factual recognition of the unique human possibility of becoming a gentleman, but also bestow value on the realization of such possibility. And, like every value, it depends on the evaluative effort of the subject itself.[80] An uncultivated person has perhaps the equal potential to become a sage or a villain; it encumbers on human beings themselves to value the former and condemn the latter. The great Confucian authority, Xunzi, once says that “Water and fire have essences (Qi), but not life; herbs and trees have life, but no knowledge; birds and beasts have knowledge, but no sense of justice (Yi). Man has an essence, life, knowledge and, in addition, a sense of justice; thus he is the noblest on earth”.[81] But even if we are convinced that human beings indeed possess the innate sense of justice, it does not necessarily follow that it is the most noble; to thus value mankind above everything else, which gives rise to the unique pride for being a man, is itself a value judgment. It is an anthropocentric view of homo sapiens, individually and as a whole, as it means simply that we value human lives higher than all other things. This (and, to a Confucianist, only this) life is worth living, precisely because it is believed to be a process of continuous actualization of the unique potential worth present in every human life. The “radical world optimism”[82] is the very essence of Confucian and, more generally, Chinese humanism.

The belief in human dignity presupposes an irreducible worth attached to every person insofar as s/he is a human being. This is best illustrated in the Mencian theory of human nature,[83] which enables Mencius to develop a positive doctrine of human value. Mencius assumes that everyone is born with a noble body together with the capacity to develop it. Man is set apart from other animals perhaps by only a slight difference, yet it is precisely this small difference that makes man unique. The unique value of man lies not in his material body--because that he shares with all other animals, but exclusively in his moral faculties as embodied in his heart-mind (Xin). Responsible for moral and rational thinking, the heart-mind is the noblest organ endowed by human being and, unlike the material body whose advantages are unequally inherited by different individuals, the moral heart-mind is endowed equally in all men and women. As a result, “everyone possesses in himself the noble value”.[84] The individual moral differences lie not in the natural endowment, but in the posterior development of the innate potentials. Mencius distinguishes the “noble” or “great” body (the heart-mind where humanity resides) from the “ignoble” or “small” body (sensuous organs giving rise to passion and desire). “While a gentleman follows his great body, a littleman is driven by his small body.”[85] Unlike a littleman who is preoccupied with his selfish material desires, a gentleman takes care to cultivate his sublime moral character by pursuing humanity and justice, which enables him to lead a life that is worthy of his noble nature. Humanity and justice are true nobility, which is endowed from Heaven and cannot be substituted by human nobility (such as high social status and comfortable material life). While the human nobility is contingent on individual fortune and limited necessarily to a few, the inherent nobility of Heaven is absolute and universal to all human beings.

Now it may be contended that the Confucianists valued not so much the potentials inherent in man as the actually developed qualities exhibited in a gentleman. Munroe observes, for example, that traditional Chinese society had consistently rejected the ideas of democracy and mass political participation precisely because of the Confucian emphasis that only those who had actually developed virtues had the right to participate in politics.[86] Merits in arguments of this type aside, however, they cannot support the assertion that the Confucianists did not value the pure potentials in every human life. There are plenty of passages in the classical Confucian texts that point to the contrary. For Confucius, human beings in general worth more than anything on the earth, and cannot be arbitrarily harmed or destroyed even by the highest ruler of the state. He strongly condemned, for example, the custom of using figurines in the kings’ burial because the figurines were made to look too similar to real people[87] (instead of only those with gentlemanly outlook). When a horse stable caught on fire, he asked, without mentioning horse, whether anyone (rather than only men of elevated moral status) had been hurt.[88] Likewise Mencius clearly sees the same worth in a human baby in his famous example where he attempts to illustrate the existence of humanity by the spontaneous feeling of compassion.[89] Suppose we witness a baby approaching a water well, he argues, we would be prompted by our natural compassion to go forward and save her from the danger.[90] Had Mencius not valued the potentials innate in a human being, we would seem to have no reason to save the baby, for she is yet to develop any of her unique human potentials. In this case, an undeveloped human child should not worth more than other animals, and we should not feel more compelled to save her than to save, say, a cat about to fall into a well. But Mencius would argue, I believe,to the contrary: whenever a human life, whose multifarious potentials are yet to be actualized, faces such danger, the matter is of an entirely different order. Thus, although Mencius intended to use this example to illustrate the presence of humanity in every human being as a potential virtue, it can be plausibly extended to show the general Confucian concern and respect for the innate human potentials. Whether a person has actually developed these potentials (as he ought to), they are regarded to have value by themselves and deserve respect from others. In the Confucian view, then, the potential virtues innate in every human being are an inseparable part of human dignity.

On the other hand, as a value concept, human dignity also carries a prescriptive component. It places high premium on certain potentials innate in every human person and treats them as the irreplaceable good, which positively requires the individuals to cultivate these unique potentials by learning and practice in order to become fully developed men and, at the same time, to respect the same potentials in every other man and woman. Further, the concept can be plausibly so construed as to demand that the state and society should respect, protect, and help cultivate the virtues in every individual, thus providing everyone with certain basic rights, both in the negative (liberty) and positive (claims) senses. The prescriptions entailed by human dignity, then, contain three distinct aspects: the self, the other, and the collective.

First, a Confucian gentleman is a person who values his inborn virtues and takes care to preserve and develop what he believes to be noble in him, and he is said to have developed dignity precisely because he act in accordance with his innate nobility. Significantly, the Confucianists did not stop here, but further required the conscious cultivation and actualization of these inborn capacities. To see this we need only mention the classic Great Learning (Da Xue), which prescribes a systematic program for self-cultivation (Xiu Shen). Having cultivated the virtues, a Confucian gentleman practices and displays them overtly in his daily actions, giving rise to an appearance that commands respect from others. Thus, the Confucian dignity combines both the internal and external aspects of a human being; it presupposes the potential unique to mankind and, taking its value for granted, requires every man and woman to make a good effort to develop it in daily life. When the dignity is fully developed, it would spontaneously display itself in one’s appearance and behavior, as a part of acquired habits.

Second, the gentleman’s sense of justice presupposes his conscious recognition of the same basic worth in all other persons that command his respect. The respect for others is the natural extension of his self-respect, since a just man must obey the basic rule of reciprocity, which Confucius takes to be the Way for every gentleman: “whatever you do not wish others impose upon you, nor do you impose on others”.[91] Thus, when his student asks about the practice of virtue, he says: “When you leave home [to govern a people], behave [cautiously] as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting a great ceremony. Do not impose on the others what you do not wish the other to impose on you”.[92] If a gentleman wants himself to be respected, then, he must first respect others and treat them as human beings who, like him, are endowed with moral and intellectual faculties capable of being fully developed. To imitate the absolute justice of Heaven, a gentleman must refrain from doing anything that might prevents anyone from actualizing his/her potential and achieving full dignity. Thus, his respect is due not only to cultivated gentlemen with comparable moral achievements, but also to every ordinary person, whose innate capacities make human improvements always possible.

But even that is not enough. For a gentleman is concerned not only with interpersonal moral conduct, but also with the ideal state and society in which he prefers to live. While he respects every human being in the universe, it would be quite rational for him to require others to pay reciprocal respect for himself. Further, he should also like to be able to require that we all (not only he himself) respect the basic dignity of any other person. Human dignity requires universal respect, from which no one ought to be excluded. For this purpose, recognizing the weaknesses and limitations in individual human beings, a gentleman should concern himself with setting up proper laws and social institutions to secure such an end, that is, to prevent everyone from taking actions that would diminish anyone else’s (and his/her own) dignity. These laws and institutions establish what are in nature private rights, because they protect the dignity of every citizen against private encroachment from others. Last and most important, he should be concerned, above all, with establishing fundamental rules that can prevent these institutions themselves, especially the state, from exercising powers in such a way as to defeat the very aim for which they are erected. We thus need a constitution that can limit the powers of the state and social organizations, and provides basic rights to every individual against public encroachment. Although, historically, the Confucianists were not always conscious of the need for the institutional balance of powers, it seems to be reasonable to derive these basic institutional requirements from the Confucian concept of dignity.

3.3. The Sense of Dignity in a “Shame Culture”

Is there any ground for holding this fundamentally optimistic self-evaluation and for believing that the distinctive virtues in a human being make him/her nobler than all other animals? It is true that, even if we can prove that we are in fact endowed with the Confucian virtues (e.g. the innate abilities to acquire, among other things, humanity and justice), we are by no means logically compelled to confer highest value on them or even regard them as “good” at all.[93] Without endorsing existentialism as a whole, we may nevertheless agree that human beings are free to value or devalue everything existing. Nor is it is feasible to empirically demonstrate--in the strict sense of the word--the universal existence of these virtues in every individual person. Yet at least a partial vindication can be made to support the self-consistency of holding such a belief. That is, for those who have succeeded in developing their virtues, they do feel the existence of the inner worth, as shown in the psychological satisfaction and self-confidence; on the other hand, if they undertake actions contrary to the opinion they hold about their moral nobility, they will have a distinctive experience of feeling degraded. Further, even ordinary men and women do have a sense of dignity within themselves which, though perhaps not consciously articulated, shows itself when their self-esteem is harmed by degrading treatments. Thus, it does seem that some sense of dignity is universally felt in every human being.[94] This leads us to inquire the third and the last dimension of human dignity: the emotive dimension, which contains both positive and negative aspects.

First, as stated earlier, the quality of justice in a Confucian gentleman gives him the sense of moral independence, and allows him to correspond with the Way of Heaven without having to blindly follow others.[95] This presupposes a considerable degree of confidence in his own moral righteousness, which is to be exhibited in easy but dignified outlook that naturally commands respect from others. In the words of Confucius, one becomes a gentleman “when he maintains a dignified ease without being arrogant; when he is majestic without being fierce”.[96] As he explains further, “Whether [the gentleman] has to do with many people or few, or with things great or small, he does not dare to indicate any disrespect;--is not this to maintain a dignified ease without any arrogance? He adjusts his clothes and cap, and throws a dignity into his looks, so that, thus dignified, he is looked at with awe;--is not this to be majestic without being fierce?”[97] The “dignified ease” (Tai) here stands for an appearance of magnificent composure that comes from the gentleman’s confidence in his own worth.

Second, negatively, a gentleman refrains from injustice because he feels the shame in doing unjust things to others--things that do not worth his effort and the commission of which would make him feel degraded. “Hence a gentleman feels no shame upon self-examination, and brings no embarrassment to his own will”.[98] And freedom from any sense of moral shame gives him both the confidence and courage that are found lacking in a littleman. The conscious feeling of self-respect within oneself, as reflected in the sense of shame, distinguishes a gentleman from a littleman. While a littleman can do anything, however low, without feeling degraded, a gentleman is fully conscious of the worth inherent in him and will do only those things that are consistent with or can help actualize his worth.[99] For this reason he regards himself highly.[100] If a gentleman committed a certain action that was not worthy of his nobility, then he merely degraded himself to a level lower than his intrinsic moral quality--a degradation for which he would feel shameful. Thus, Confucius insists that a gentleman should “maintain the sense of shame in his own conduct”;[101] those who would do anything without feeling the shame lack the very moral quality to do the right thing. As Mencius puts it aptly: “A man must first know what he ought not to do, before he can do what he ought to do”.[102] And both Confucius and Mencius have furnished examples for the kind of things that will make a gentleman feel shameful. “A gentleman”, for example, “thinks it shameful if his words exceed his deeds”,[103] because he would then make false claim on something which he did not do. And “a gentleman feels shameful if the prestige he receives exceeds his virtue”.[104] Likewise, “it is shameful if, serving as an official in the court, he cannot practice the principle of good government” because he would then receive many benefits for doing nothing;[105] for Confucius, “a good minister should serve his king through the Way and, finding it impossible, retire”.[106]

It may be objected that the sentiments for dignity is not universal, but present only in those cultivated gentlemen who have succeeded in developing their innate virtues. Most often, however, even for those who do not believe in human virtues or make any conscious efforts to cultivate them, they nevertheless feel offended when they think that they are treated less than what they deserve, implying that they do attribute some worth to themselves--though perhaps unconsciously and inconsistently. This is particularly obvious when they are mistreated by others. Even a beggar would feel degraded if someone throws food on the floor for him to pick up, as if the latter were feeding an animal.[107] As long as one has not lost the minimal sense of self-esteem, he would feel offended if his employer treats him merely as a machine for producing profit or government agents push him around rudely, as if they were taming a wild beast. In these situations one would feel humiliated because he thinks that he deserves better treatment than what a mere animal or machine receives. Although he may purport to ignore or even consciously reject the worth inherent in him, thereby degrading himself and inviting despises from others, his aversion against the maltreatment seems to imply that he still thinks himself to have some value. Thus, it can at least be argued that the sense of dignity is not limited to those cultivated persons; rather, it is universally found in every human being, even though the degree of such sentiment may vary. The apparent availability of such a feeling in every human being may not establish conclusively the existence of innate human virtues, but does suggest the reasonableness of the Confucian belief in the basic worth of human person.

What is human dignity, then? What does it amount to say that human being is a dignified creature? According to Confucianism, man is dignified because he is born with a set of innate virtues unique to human race and the capacity of fully realizing these virtues that make him a mature person, and because he respects himself (and other men and women) by attributing high values to these unique virtues, which lead him to consciously develop them. Human dignity is then a composite idea that consists in the innate potentials believed to be uniquely endowed by every human being and held at the highest irreducible value, plus the extent to which these potentials is practically realized through conscious self-cultivation. An action is dignity-enhancing if it cultivates, practices or exhibits one’s virtues; it is dignity-reducing (thus degrading) if it fails to exercise virtues or prevents anyone from cultivating or exercising virtues. Those who adopt this positive view of mankind, seeing the same worth and virtues in themselves, take life-long efforts to cultivate them so as to better themselves, striving to achieve the highest dignity possible for a human being. Having cultivated these virtues, they take pride in them and display an overt confidence in their daily behavior; on the other hand, if they happen to have done things that tend to diminish or prevent the realization of virtues, they would feel degraded and shameful. They assume that everyone ought to see these virtues in himself and in others as something noble and worthy, and thus make a conscious effort to respect and to cultivate them in order to make himself a better human being; failure to do so would justly invoke moral disapproval from other members of society. Finally, they further require the state and society to not only respect, protect, and refrain from degrading the dignity in every man and woman, but also provide the basic social conditions that makes it possible for everyone to attain a dignified existence.

4. The Double Implications of Human Dignity: Toward a Balanced View of Rights and Duty

It is commonly asserted, however, that the Chinese tradition in general and Confucianism in particular lacked any clear conception of rights. While this appears to be obviously true from even a cursory scan of classical Confucian works, it would be a mistake to infer that Confucianism is inherently opposed to individual rights, including basic political rights. I argue below that the Confucian concept of human dignity can accommodate the notion of rights as a device for cultivating individual virtues. To hold this view may require us to modify the traditional view of personhood and to reject the dogmatic strain within Confucianism which took the legitimacy of tradition for granted. But doing so does not undermine the basic argument that, leaving the descriptive content of human dignity open to future modifications, as mankind acquire more experience and better judgment, Confucianism can adapt itself to changing circumstances and conceptions of human nature. Indeed, with overall optimistic assumptions of human nature, Confucianism can derive a balanced view of duty and rights, and provide a more consistent foundation for the commonly held belief in human worth and dignity than modern liberalism in the West. This section is divided into two parts. First, I briefly review the western liberal theory of individual rights as represented by Hobbes, and point out its deficiencies. Second, I discuss the possibility and the necessity of deriving individual rights from the universal duty of respecting human dignity in Confucianism to make it consistent with the basic social facts.

4.1. The Primacy of Rights over Duty in Western Liberalism

Belief in human dignity is often implicitly assumed in modern liberalism, a dominant ideology in the western liberal democracies. On June 27, 1998, for example, President Clinton made the following remarks in the historic city, Xi’an, the first stop in his recent trip to China: “Respect for the worth, the dignity, the potential and the freedom of every citizen is a vital source of America’s strength and success.... In this global information age ... a commitment to providing all human beings the opportunity to develop their full potential is vital to the strength and success of the new China as well.” Yet, paradoxical enough, modern liberalism seems to be incapable of providing a solid philosophical foundation for the widely held belief in human dignity. It is simply difficult to find any worth or dignity in man from its basically negative view of human nature. And, without dignity and worth, many basic and now widely accepted rights would lose their legitimate ground.

It is well known that the western idea of individual rights is originally derived from the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes.[108] In his Leviathan, Hobbes postulates a state of nature, in which egoistical individuals, with limited resources (including material goods and honor) and without mutual trust and a common government, find themselves trapped in “a war of all against all”. To escape such a miserable condition, every person rationally enters a compact with every other person to put themselves under a sovereign. From such a original promise, enforced by the common power, is derived a set of natural laws which command each individual to keep peace and observe the terms of compact. The duties thus prescribed, however, is strictly conditioned upon the original purpose for which the compact was made at the first place: the preservation of individual life. This is indeed the “inalienable” natural right that Hobbes finds in every rational human being. Every human government must work toward the preservation and security of life; failure to do so constitutes a fundamental breach by the sovereign, which brings back the state of nature, where every individual is absolved of all duties toward others and regains natural liberty. The primacy of natural right over duty is obvious, as there is no equivalent “natural duty”, but only duties derived from rights. The notion of natural right is further extended by John Locke to include the right to liberty and property. Although, in Locke’s theory, the natural laws maintain their binding force in the state of nature, the fundamental asymmetry between rights and duty would remain if the biblical authority of God is left out.

Despite its wide acceptance today, the social contract theory of rights contains several difficulties.[109] First, without presupposing the a priori validity of transcendent divine command, the existence of human duty would depend entirely upon the prudential calculations of one’s self-interest, and is thus made secondary to rights. Among other things, the Hobbesian theory can support only a weak notion of duty, that is, a person observe his duty not for its own sake, but only because it furthers his selfish interest, and his duty stops as soon as the cost of obeying it apparently outweighs the benefits. Prudential considerations, however, depend on the actors’ foresight and circumstances in which they are situated, and the ensuing uncertainty necessarily undermines the binding force of certain basic duties (e.g., “Don’t steal” or “Act justly under all circumstances”). Second, without the sanction of an external divine authority, which requires belief in a particular religion,[110] the primacy of natural right of self-preservation in the Hobbesian theory makes it difficult to even accommodate other widely held rights, such as personal liberty and property. If human beings are by nature selfish, unjust, vile, and rapacious, it seems doubtful whether they are worthy of any rights other than bare preservation. Finally, and most significant for our purpose, it seems to be very difficult to consistently derive from this theory the widely held “recognition of the inherent dignity” in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or respect for “the worth, the dignity, the potential and the freedom of every citizen”, to which President Clinton alluded in his China trip. If everyone is, as Hobbes depicts, an egoistical animal preoccupied with his self-interest, and his apparent observance of law and duties arises only from the fear for the punishments of the sovereign power, then it is difficult to find any worth and dignity in human beings. If men act by nature like thieves and robbers, then the mere appearance of law-abidingness does not change who they really are, and few would find that theft and robbery are worthy or dignified way of life.

The basic problem with the modern liberal theory of rights is, then, its low estimation of human being contrary to the widely held practical beliefs.[111] Such an initial assumption makes it too difficult to derive the notion of innate dignity or worth, and makes basic duties too easily overwhelmed by the prudential concerns of self-interests. For this reason modern liberalism is criticized, perhaps with some justice, for adopting an unnecessarily dim view of human nature and for ignoring the inherent moral potential in a human being. By undermining social duty and legal constraints on personal gratification of desires, it is charged,[112] the radical individualistic tendency in modern liberalism dehumanizes human beings. I argue below that Confucianism, while fundamentally a duty ethics and despite its own problems, provides a salutary correction to such a tendency and, if properly construed, is capable of accommodating a well-balanced theory of rights.

4.2. From Universal Duty to Universal Rights: A Confucian Transformation?

We have already seen that, as a consistent implication of the Confucian belief, the universal respect for human dignity carries the demand that the state and society must protect and help cultivate the innate virtues in every individual human being, and this task is probably best achieved by providing a constitutional system of basic rights. It is nevertheless true that such a system of rights has been conspicuously lacking throughout the Chinese history. It appears as if that, by emphasizing social duty, the traditional China were diametrically opposed to the modern west. The reason for such difference lies partly in the different conception of equality. As Munroe points out,[113] the classical Chinese philosophers recognized only natural equality in the sense that everyone is born with innate virtues as unique human potentials, but denied actual equality that all men could in fact develop their nature to such an equal extent as to entitle them to equal respect. In Confucianism, this view had justified the hierarchical structure of society and the denial of popular participation in government. By focusing on the capacities that the people have in fact developed through learning and education, the Confucianists had limited the participation in government to a small group of elites, and ignored the notion of innate moral rights developed in the West, which entitles every adult to some form of participation. As a result, Confucianism had never developed an explicit notion of “rights”--not modern political right to participation, not the Lockean right to property in virtue of one’s labor, not even the Hobbesian natural right to self-preservation. Similar to the classical and Medieval counterparts in the West, Confucianism was decidedly duty-orientated. In what the Chinese view as a just society, one’s “right” (that is, social, economic and political privileges) was to be made strictly proportional to the degree of actually developed worth and ability. The state and society must be run by the most virtuous and worthy, who almost always remain a small minority, and it seemed to them patently absurd to allow the ignorant, selfish, and morally immature mass to choose their own leaders. To the contrary, Confucius and his followers were simply concerned with how to make men virtuous and, at the same time, make the virtuous men rule.

In a sense the Confucianists were quite right. If one is truly incompetent in a certain vocation (e.g. political participation), then both justice and common prudence require that he should refrain from engaging in it, but leave it instead to those who are capable. And mere rights, freedom and participation are not the only things about which the people ought to care; indeed these things alone are not even sufficient to sustain social and political institutions.[114] Rather, they presuppose something else as their foundation, that is, the development of the people’s virtues and the primary means by which the virtues are acquired: proper education and upbringing. After all, hardly anyone wants to live in a society full of “rights” and “freedom”, but bereft of basic norms, values, and a sense of duty--a society in which everyone feels free to do whatever s/he wants, without any moral constraint. Such a society would be necessarily one of “littlemen”, among whom numerous conflicts, strives, infringements and oppressions are bound to occur. On the other hand, a democracy worthy of its name presupposes a society of gentlemen who, having developed their virtues and become mature citizens, are capable of exercising their “rights” intelligently. Thus, for good reasons, self-cultivation has occupied the central position of Confucianism; it is the very path toward the making of virtuous and dignified citizens.

To be consistent with the Confucian assumption of natural equality, however, even xiao ren (“littleman”) is, after all, a ren (person) and must be treated as a human being with the inborn potential virtues. For those who choose to accept the Confucian view of man must believe that every man and woman is equally endowed with the innate virtues and think highly of them.[115] Even a littleman deserves some respect for his innate nobility in virtue of being a human--better, nobler and more worthy than other animals. Thus, to a Confucian gentleman, it is morally inadequate to treat anyone--littleman, even a criminal, not excepted--like a mere animal.[116] The failure to cultivate one’s virtues should never lead a gentleman to merely despise one’s person, but should rather urge him to help the littleman by all means to cultivate the virtues and become a gentleman. The belief in human dignity may further inspire a gentleman to devise a better system of education, among other things, in order that everyone can have a reasonable opportunity to actualize his/her virtues and to maximize, as it were, his dignity.[117] At least, social and political schemes should never be designed to merely put down a littleman and make him docile simply for the sake of societal peace and order. As everyone is endowed by Heaven with the innate virtues which afford him some basic dignity, everyone is an end in himself, more than a tool for any other end, however grandiose.

Thus, it can be plausibly argued within the Confucian framework that an ordinary person should have some right in discussing and deciding public issues that will ultimately touch upon his life, and many such issues might be plain enough to be understood by a common mind with reasonable education. Further, to become a gentleman presupposes a set of favorable social and political conditions, which had been denied to most ordinary men and women in traditional China. A person need be given the basic education and some opportunity for practice before he can intelligently participate in government. Without these opportunities, he will most likely remain a uneducated and underdeveloped “littleman”--not because he wishes to remain politically ignorant and incompetent, but because he lacks the fortune (at least a reasonably wealthy family, among other things) that is beyond his control but is nevertheless necessary for his moral development. Since the mass of people were deprived of the opportunity to become morally developed gentlemen, the apparently “just” system of merit was based ultimately on injustice. In this sense, a social and political system that guarantees a minimum right--to participate in government or otherwise--seems to provide more fairness because it can afford relatively equal opportunity for personal development of innate virtues.

Still, the notion of “rights” does not so easily fit with the dignity of a Confucian gentleman. The problem of rights lies deeper in the Chinese practice, for even a gentleman seemed to have only duties, but no reciprocal rights, before his parents, rulers and society in general. Somehow it appears inadequate--even distasteful--to a gentleman to fight for his own rights and interests, especially in the form of factions and parties, for “a gentleman is dignified, but does not wrangle”.[118] It is true that the Confucian duties are never unilateral, but always reciprocal.[119] Thus, the king and his subjects have their own duties to perform toward each other. And, if a duty (e.g., benevolence of a king) is insisted and recognized by every member of the society, then it is in effect transformed into a kind of right toward the recipient of its performance. But, in practice, such condition is hardly ever met. Generally, in a relationship between two unequal parties, the moral persuasion of duty alone is seldom sufficient to prevent the powerful party from abusing its power. As a result, contrary to equilibrium and harmony as prescribed by the Principle of the Mean, the imbalance of power frequently took place in the Chinese political history. During that period, no matter how dignified a gentleman was in private life, his dignity would disappear before the state, against which he had no protection.[120] Even private complaints must be made with caution, as Confucius himself taught: “When good government prevails in a state, one should speak and act boldly. When bad government prevails, act righteously, but speak with reserve”;[121] otherwise, one would merely put his life, together with the security and welfare of his family, in jeopardy. Before the state, then, even a gentleman could not maintain his dignity because he was compelled to refrain his action and speech out of fear for an omnipotent power. This is incompatible with the earlier image that, as a mature, just and courageous man, he should be without any fear for actions (including public speeches) he thinks to be just and proper. As a rational being, it seems, he would desire to live in a better social arrangement in which his moral autonomy can be effectively preserved. Indeed, a central theme that continues to preoccupy the contemporary neo-Confucianism has been to extend from “sageliness within” (Nei Sheng) to “kingliness without” (Wai Wang)--a political system that is conducive to the realization of endowed virtues and, thus, the enhancement of human dignity.[122]

Therefore, to consistently follow the Principle of the Mean, it seems necessary for a Confucian gentleman to adopt some institutional mechanism to guarantee his basic right in order to minimize the possibility that his dignity is degraded. Nor should a gentleman feel shame in exercising and defending his rights in democratic politics, as the partisan competitions can now be carried out through entirely peaceful and dignified constitutional procedures, without having to “wrangle”. Quite the contrary, in the spirit of the Mean, the secure independence of a gentleman requires a certain balance of power between an individual and the state, in order that nobody is so overwhelmed by the omnipotent power of the sovereign as to become the mere object of political control. When this independence is endangered by the natural disparity of power between the state and individuals, the Principle of Mean demands the implementation of a system of rights, so that the power of the stronger can be checked peacefully, and the balance restored, secured and enforced by an effective legal artifice. Such a balance can be guaranteed by a rationally designed Constitution based upon a set of fundamental values, which are shared by a people who have commonly agreed to respect the dignity of every member in society.

It may be contended, at last, that such a universalistic notion of respect could not be consistently derived from Confucianism, an ethics primarily concerned with particularistic duties. The Confucian concept of general love (Ai or Fan Ai), for example, is not to be confused with the Mohist notion of undifferentiated, universal love. Rather the Confucian love was graded according to the proximity of natural human relationships, enforced by a hierarchical system of propriety (Li), which prescribed different rules for treating one’s family members, friends and members of society. And the Confucian notion of “intimate love” (Qin) is further restricted, by definition, to be within one’s family. I argue, however, that the clear distinction between particularistic love and general respect constitute the strength rather than weakness of Confucianism. This is best seen in the context of the central concept of humanity (Ren), which the Confucianists define as a radiating process beginning naturally from within one’s family and extending to more remote social relationships.[123] According to Mencius, humanity and intimate love are applied to things of different orders: while a gentleman is humane to whole mankind, he owes special filial duty only to his family members.[124] Humanity for ordinary people (Ren Min) lies between the intimate love for one’s kin (Qin Qin) and the general care for things (Ai Wu): although humanity is above ordinary care for things, it does not carry with it the unique emotional feeling for one’s kin. For Mencius, indeed, the Mohist universalization of social relationship is to ignore one’s parents (wu fu), a fault no less grave than that committed by its egocentric opposite, the Yangist denial of all social duties (which leads to the neglect of one’s king, wu jun).[125] To the Confucianists generally, it would be against human nature to prescribe such universal Christian command as “You should love your neighbor as yourself”.[126] Among other things, love as an intense emotional feeling and obligatory commitment is necessarily limited only to a few, to whom one owes his/her special debt (parents) or who otherwise occupy prominent places in one’s family life (husband, wife, children, and other close relatives). Yet, if intimate love is to be restricted to one’s family and cannot be universalized, general respect as a personal attitude is not constrained by such physical limit, and can be reasonably required to extend over all members of society.

V. Conclusions

To sum up, the Confucian view of human dignity presupposes the potential virtues equally endowed by every human being and their irreplaceable value. Under this view, everyone has the basic dignity due to these innate virtues and deserves some respect. A Confucian gentleman, to be sure, is a person who consciously cultivates, practices and displays his virtues, and his dignified appearance invites general respect. He not only always seeks to perfect his own virtues, but also help others, within his ability, to improve theirs. Although the respect to a particular individual can be made proportional to the extent to which s/he has actually acquired human virtues, the innate human potentials, which constitute the irreducible core of human dignity, entitle everyone to at least a minimum respect. In this sense even an infant has as much innate dignity as any adult, and should receive only those treatments that will help her to develop the inborn potentials as she grows up. A criminal also has the same innate dignity, even though it is manifestly contradicted by his grievous behavior; but even he should be treated in such a manner as to help him to recover his innate virtues and to see the worth in himself, so that he becomes able to develop them on his own initiative. The legitimate actions of a state, society, or private persons are limited to those that do not inhibit anyone from attaining one’s full dignity.[127] A legitimate public institution must fulfill the duty to provide favorable social conditions and a compatible legal framework so that everyone has the basic opportunity to develop the inner worth and become a dignified member of community. To this end, society is obliged to establish an equitable constitutional system of basic rights. Construed in this way, the Confucian idea of human dignity can provide a sound philosophical basis for the modern notions of human rights and freedom, together with a balanced theory of reciprocal duties. Such a reconstruction of Confucianism can help us understand, I hope, the connection between two types of universal ideals to which the United Nations appealed half a century ago, that is, “the dignity and worth of the human person” and “the equal rights of men and women”.[128]

NANJING UNIVERSITY, P.R. CHINA.

Notes

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[1] Parts of this paper have been presented at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy held in Boston, MA, August 1998. I thank Professors Ni Peimin, Li Chenyang, Li Xiaorong, Jiang Tao, and Wang Qingjie for their helpful comments. I also thank Professor David Braybrooke at University of Texas at Austin and Professor Zhang Dainian at Beijing University for their encouragement and support during this project.

[2] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble.

[3] Grundgesetz, Art. I.

[4] The Universal Declaration itself contains several “economic, social, and cultural rights”. For example, “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization ... of economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality” (Art. 22). “Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection” (Art. 23, sec. 3). Similar statements are also contained in the Preamble of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1966. See the collection of documents in Ian Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights (2nd Ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). In all occasions the phrase “human dignity” is left undefined.

[5] See e.g. Alan Gewirth, “Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights”, In Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent (ed.), The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 10-28.

[6] J. William Brennan, “The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification”, University of California at Davis Law Review, 19 (1985), p. 8; see also Jordan Paust, “Human Dignity as Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content”, Howard Law Journal, 27 (1984), pp. 150-158.

[7] See contributions in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming (ed.), Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

[8] Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 198.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Peter L. Berger, Brigitte Berger, & Hansfriend Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 89.

[11] Gewirth, ibid., p. 12.

[12] A.I. Melden, “Dignity, Worth, and Rights”, In Meyer and Parent, ibid., pp. 29-46.

[13] See, respectively, Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of Rights”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 4 (1970), p. 257, and Michael J. Meyer, “Dignity, Rights, and Self-control”, Ethics, 99 (1989), p. 527.

[14] Meyer and Parent, ibid., pp. 47-72.

[15] Charles Murray, In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 112-129.

[16] Louis Henkin, “Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights”, In Meyer and Parent, ibid., p. 210.

[17] Myres S. McDougal’s notion in W. Michael Reisman and Burns H. Weston, Toward World Order and Human Dignity (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 48-51.

[18] Heidegger’s reply to Sartre, see H. Spiegelberg, “Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy”, In Rubin Gotesky & Ervin Laszlo (ed.), Human Dignity: This Century and the Next (New York: Gordon & Breach Science Publishers, 1970), p. 53.

[19] See, respectively, Jurgen Moltmann, On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), p. x, and Brad Stetson, Human Dignity and Contemporary Liberalism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 15-17.

[20] Tu Weiming, “Epilogue: Human Rights as a Confucian Moral Discourse”, In de Barry and Tu Weiming, Ibid., p. 302. In the same collection of works, see also Irene Bloom, “Fundamental Intuition and Consensus Statement: Mencian Confucianism and Human Dignity”, p. 96, and compare with Cheng Chung-ying, “Transforming Confucian Virtues into Human Rights: A Study of Human Agency and Potency”, p. 146.

[21] Of course, this does not mean that other schools, notably Daoism and Mohism, have not made significant contributions to the conceptual development; but to do justice to them would require separate paper(s).

[22] See e.g. Li Chenyang, “Confucian Value and Democratic Value”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 31 (1997): 183-192.

[23] For how the center of natural law doctrine in the West shifted from duty to rights around the resurgence of natural law theories in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 205-210.

[24] For example, Herschel Baker’s book, The Dignity of Man: Studies of the Persistence of An Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), bears “dignity” in the title, but refers to it only sparingly in the entire book; the same is true with Ernest Bloch’s Natural Law and Human Dignity (trans. by Dennis J. Schmidt, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), which does not even have the word in the index. The French book by Thomas de Koninck, De la dignite humaine (Paris: Presses Universitares de France, 1995), has a general title, but is in fact limited only to child treatment (see Hugo Meynell’s book review, “Politics of Human Dignity”, In The Literary Review of Canada, February 1996, pp. 6-7). The most relevant treatment of the concept can be found in two edited works: Gotesky and Laszlo’s Human Dignity: This Century and the Next (1970) is more philosophically oriented (see especially Spiegelberg’s analytical essay), while Meyer and Parent’s Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (1992) is by and large tied to issues arising from American constitutionalism (but see Gewirth’s contribution therein).

[25] Spiegelberg, “Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy”, In Rubin Gotesky & Ervin Laszlo, ibid., pp. 39-62.

[26] For a more detailed review, see J. Prescott Johnson, “Human Dignity and Nature of Society”, In Rubin Gotesky & Ervin Laszlo, ibid., pp. 317-349.

[27] See Baker, ibid., pp. 100-105.

[28] Vernon J. Bourke (ed.), The Essential Augustine (2nd Ed., Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974), pp. 19-32.

[29] St. Augustine, City of God (trans. Henry Bettenson, London: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 190-196.

[30] Johnson, ibid., pp. 330-338.

[31] Discourse of Methods, Book IV.

[32] Augustine, ibid., pp. 458-463.

[33] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (trans. A. Robert Caponigri, Washington D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1956).

[34] Augustine, ibid., p. 195.

[35] See Yu Ying-Shih (余英时), The Modern Interpretation of Traditional Chinese Thought 《中国思想传统的现代诠释》 (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1989), pp. 24-48. For an argument that human dignity is saved by redemption through Jesus Christ, see John Warwick Montgomery, Human Rights and Human Dignity (Dallas, TX: Zondervan, 1986), p. 208.

[36] Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (3rd Ed., trans. J.W. Ellington, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993), sec. 411. See also Thomas E. Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 76-96, and Leslie Arthur Mulholland, Kant's System of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 102-139.

[37] Kant, ibid., sec. 421-423, 452-453. As Kant himself acknowledges, he is indebted to Rousseau on at least two key points: that everyone, however low in social rank, has intrinsic worth and that freedom means self-legislation (which is, for Rousseau, to make the general will one’s own will).

[38] See H.J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 185-198.

[39] Kant, ibid., sec. 428-429. For Kant’s connection between human dignity and treating man as the end, see Yang Zu-han (杨祖汉), Confucianism and Kantian Moral Philosophy 《儒学与康德道德哲学》 (Taipei: Wenjing, 1987), pp. 40-41. This notion of human being is widely accepted among Continental philosophers after Kant. Hegel states, for example, that “Man is only an end in himself (or final end) through what is divine in him--by what has from the beginning been called reason and ... freedom”. In Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 19.

[40] See e.g. Meyer and Parent, ibid., p. 53.

[41] Grundgesetz, Art. I.

[42] See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 308-309.

[43] Ibid., pp. 312-314.

[44] The subjective tendency is already present in Kant, who seems to have established only that human beings can think of themselves as being free.

[45] Sartre never devoted systematic attention to the question of human dignity. His relevant concern is mostly reflected in his Existentialism and Humanism, on which my discussion here is focused. For a book by an existentialist author bearing the title of human dignity, see Gabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 128-135, 158. The discussion on human dignity there is only sporadic, however, and does little to clarify the meaning of the concept.

[46] Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism and Humanism”. In Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre (Cleveland/New York: World Publising Co., 1956), pp. 291, 306.

[47] Ibid., p. 292.

[48] Ibid., pp. 308-309.

[49] Ibid., p. 310. For a thorough discussion on the existentialist view of human existence and freedom, which leads to a peculiar notion of responsibility, see Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology (trans Hazel E. Barnes, New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), pp. 76, 565, 598, 603, 797.

[50] Spiegelberg, ibid., pp. 51-53. For a critique of Heidegger and Sartre in comparison with Confucianism, see Yu Ying-shih 1989: 24-48; about a comparison between western and Chinese philosophy on moral personality, see Xu Fu-guan (徐复观), The Basic Characters of Confucian Spirit, Its Limitations and Rebirth 《儒家精神之基本性格、及其限定与新生》 (Hong Kong: Minzhu Pinlunshe, 1951), pp. 1-10.

[51] Moltmann, ibid., 15-31; Montgomery, ibid., pp. 208-217.

[52] Meyer and Parent (ed.), The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

[53] Gewirth, ibid., pp. 10-28.

[54] For a similar distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” dignity made in the Christian context, see Brad Stetson, Human Dignity and Contemporary Liberalism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 15-17.

[55] Gewirth, ibid., p. 10; compare with Melden, ibid., p. 31.

[56] The only exceptions are those made in the Christian context, see e.g. Moltmann, ibid., p. 10, Montgomery, ibid., p. 192.

[57] See Zhu Yilu (朱义禄), Confucian Ideal Personality and Chinese Culture 《儒家理想人格与中国文化》 (Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1991), pp. 1-18. The earliest source I can find that explicitly attempts to connect the western concept of human dignity with Chinese Ren Ge is Zhang Dongsun (张东荪), Rationality and Democracy 《理性与民主》 (Hong Kong: Longmen Shudian, 1946), pp. 47-82.

[58] See Zhang Dainian (张岱年), “The Concept of Human Dignity in the Classical Chinese Philosophy” (“中国古典哲学中的人格尊严思想”), International Confucianism Study 《国际儒学研究》 2 (1997), p. 18.

[59] R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 10-27.

[60] See, respectively, Gewirth, ibid., pp. 12-14, and Stetson, ibid., pp. 15-17.

[61] “Gentleman” (Junzi) here is gender neutral. Unless specified or made clear by the context, none of the masculine words in this paper suggest any sex bias.

[62] For confining the notion of virtues to socially beneficial human abilities and propensities, see Cheng, ibid., pp. 145-146.

[63] Analects, 7: 22; see Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 32.

[64] Mencius, 6A: 6.

[65] Liang Qichao (梁启超), History of Political Thought in the Pre-Qin Period 《先秦政治思想史》 (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1972), p. 381.

[66] As to the Confucian distinction between “xiao ren” and “Junzi”, see Yu Ying-shih, ibid., pp. 160-177.

[67] Principle of the Mean, sec. 3; also see sec. 4, 5, 9. In addition, “a gentleman follows the path of Mean, and feels no regret even though his virtue is unknown and neglected by the world.” In the Principle of the Mean, sec. 11, trans. James Legge, The Four Books (Hong Kong: Wei Tung Book Co., 1971), p. 7.

[68] Analects: 9: 29; see Legge, ibid., p. 126.

[69] Analects, 7: 38.

[70] Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd Ed., Notre Dame: University of Nortre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 222-223.

[71] Principle of the Mean, sec. 10; see Legge, ibid., p. 7.

[72] Thus, “a gentleman seeks the Way rather than material support.... What worries him is not poverty, but that he fails to attain the Way” (Analects, 15: 32).

[73] Mencius, 7A: 9; see Legge, ibid., p. 305.

[74] Principle of the Mean, sec. 14; see Legge, ibid., p. 11.

[75] Principle of the Mean, sec. 10; trans. Legge, ibid., p. 7.

[76] “A gentleman seeks in himself, while a littleman seeks in the others.” In Analects, 15: 21; see Legge, ibid., p. 137. “A gentleman must first acquire the virtues before he may require them in the others; he must rid himself of the vices before he can prohibit them in the others.” In Great Learning, sec. 10; see Legge, ibid., p. 12.

[77] Shen Du; see Great Learning, sec. 6.

[78] Mencius, 2A: 2; see Legge, ibid., p. 63.

[79] Mencius, 3B: 2.

[80] J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 15-49.

[81] Xunzi, “Kingly Government”, Ch. 9; see Homer H. Dubs, The Works of Hsuntze (Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), p. 136.

[82] That is, the lack of belief in the original human sin and the resulting guilt, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (trans. Hans H. Gerth, New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 235.

[83] See Bloom, ibid., pp. 104-108.

[84] Mencius, 6A: 17.

[85] Mencius, 6A:14.

[86] Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 49-83.

[87] See Mencius, 1A: 4.

[88] Analects, 10: 17. I owe this example to Professor Ni Peimin in response to a question raised by Professor Li Chenyang at the panel discussion at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy.

[89] See Peter L. Berger, Brigitte Berger, & Hansfriend Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 89-95, for an argument of similar conceptual understanding in the West and for an illuminating discussion of how the process of modernity and the disintegration of traditional social institutions led to the transition from the particularistic concept of “honor” to the universalistic concept of “human dignity”.

[90] Mencius, 2A: 6.

[91] Analects, 15: 24.

[92] Analects, 12: 2.

[93] For a general argument that “good” is an indefinable, non-natural quality, see G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1902 [1988]), pp. 2-21, and further discussion in Mackie, ibid., pp. 50-63.

[94] This is recognized even by the utilitarianist J.S. Mill, who argues that the “sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other” is identified with one’s “unwillingness ... to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence.” In Utilitarianism, Ch. 2; from Spiegelberg, ibid., p. 64, n. ii.

[95] “A gentleman is friendly, but do not follow blindly.” In Principle of the Mean, sec. 10; see Legge, ibid., p. 7.

[96] Analects, 20: 2; see Legge, ibid., p. 183.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Principle of the Mean, sec. 33.

[99] “A gentleman can stay with his poverty; but a poor littleman will do anything [to improve his lot].” In Analects, 15: 2.

[100] For a Greek but similar description of the “great man”, see Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (trans. David Ross, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 89-95. Compare Max Weber, The Religion of China (trans. Hans H. Gerth, New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 228-229 for the contrast between “shame culture” and “guilt culture” in the west, which presupposes the original sin in human nature.

[101] Analects, 13: 20; see Legge, ibid., p. 113.

[102] Mencius, 4B: 8.

[103] Analects, 14: 27.

[104] Mencius, 4B: 18.

[105] See Mencius, 5B: 4.

[106] Analects, 11: 24; see Legge, ibid., p. 89.

[107] Mencius, 6A: 10. The distaste for the lack of respect is clearly expressed by Mencius: “To feed a man without love, is to treat him as a pig; to love him without respect, is to keep him as a domestic animal.” In Mencius, 7A: 37.

[108] See e.g. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 80-85.

[109] The “difficulties” here are referred to substantive ones. The logical difficulties, such as the “naturalistic fallacy” which Moore charges the naturalists for committing (ibid., pp. 37-58), seem to be rather minor. If Hobbes can establish that self-preservation is universally desired by every rational animal, then the opposition against defining such desire as a “good” (i.e. the natural right) carries little force. The transition from “is” to “ought” does have a logical problem of violating the “Hume’s Law”. Yet the problem is not so serious if one omits the prescriptive element inherent in the “ought”, so that ethics can be identified with factual inquiry.

[110] For example, the Christian God in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government.

[111] But partial corrections can be found in, among other works, Butler’s Five Sermons, Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith.

[112] Stetson, ibid., pp. 4-8, 165-6.

[113] Munroe, ibid., pp. 49-83.

[114] On defending Confucianism against morally nihilistic freedom without basic values and norms, see Xu Fu-guan (徐复观), Confucian Political Thought and Democracy, Liberty and Human Rights 《儒家政治思想与民主自由人权》 (Taipei: Bashi Niandai Press, 1979), pp. 284-293.

[115] For the common assumption of all classical Chinese philosophers about the natural equality innate in every man, see Munroe, ibid., pp. 1-14, 49-50.

[116] See my arguments in Section 3.2.

[117] Thus, “the Way of great learning lies in the brightening of virtue, in renovating the people, and in the end of the perfect good.” In Great Learning, Ch. 1.

[118] Analects, 15: 22; trans. Legge, ibid., p. 137.

[119] “As a ruler, he abided in humanity. As a minister, he abided in reverence. As a son, he abided in filial piety. As a father, he abided in deep love. And in dealing with the people of the country, he abided in faithfulness.” In Great Learning, sec. 3; trans. Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 88.

[120] The same can be said to have occurred--much more frequently but perhaps at a reduced scale--in the traditional family, which is supposed to be both the foundation and a miniature of the state. Similar opposing arguments made below apply, though with some difficulties owing to the nature of Chinese metaphysics of life, which I won’t get into here.

[121] Analects, 14: 3.

[122] See Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (Derk Bodde ed., New York: The Free Press, 1948), p. 8. For an argument for the possible compatibility of Confucianism with the notion of human rights, see Xia Yong (夏勇), The Origins of the Human Rights Concept 《人权概念起源》 (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 1992), pp. 177-192. For the neo-Confucian effort to derive a compatible political mechanism from the Confucian ethics, see Xu Fu-guan, ibid., Ch. 4. For a critique on the alleged failure of such effort, see Jiang Qing (蒋庆), “From Heart-Nature Confucianism to Political Confucianism” (“从心性儒学走向政治儒学”), In Liu Shu-xian (刘述先) et al., Collection of Papers on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism 《当代新儒学论文集》 (Taipei: Wenjing Press, 1991), pp. 153-178.

[123] Principle of the Mean, sec. 20.

[124] Mencius, 7A: 45.

[125] Mencius, 3B: 9.

[126] Matthew, 22: 39.

[127] This says nothing against setting up penal institutions for those criminals, whose dignity has fallen below the minimum that can be tolerated by the community. But these institutions cannot be created merely for the sake of punishment or the maintenance of public order; they must treat these people as human beings, aim to help them to find their own worth, and make them capable of becoming a gentleman upon their own efforts. This is very much in line with the Confucian thinking of the reformative function of law and punishment.

[128] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble.