公 法 评 论 你们必晓得真理，真理必叫你们得以自由。
1
November 24, 1999
FEDERALISM, SELF-ORGANIZATION, AND THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE
STATE
By Gus diZerega
转自宪政文本
This paper began as a joint project with
the late Aaron Wildavsky. Unfortunately,
Prof. Wildavsky was unable to contribute
appreciably to its writing, and so it
would be inappropriate to list him as a
joint author. I also do not know that he
would agree with all of the
interpretations given herein. On the other hand,
without his initiative and our
discussions, this project may never have been
undertaken at all.
Federalism
seems almost a quaint notion today, a charming, and sometimes
irritating,
holdover from our political infancy, when we fancied ourselves more residents
of
particular states than of the United States as a whole. Its reputation has not
been
enhanced
when its rhetoric is used by state leaders seeking to defend the most
distasteful
and
exploitative practices against their own citizens, as was long the case in the
American
South.
This
centralist prejudice is mostly just that - a prejudice. There is more to
federalism
than a justification for cracker politics. And racist politics Southern style
cannot be justified by a theory of democratic
federalism. This essay will outline a theory
of
federalism which argues it is necessary for understanding a coherent model of
democracy
and constitutes a practical alternative for dealing with contemporary political
problems.
More speculatively, I will argue that the unitary nation state is showing
increasing
signs of declining importance, and that the most desirable alternative will not
be
world government, but rather an increasing devolution of power within
increasingly
federalized
states.
The
widespread failure of political scientists to appreciate the implications of
federalist
politics is due largely to the modern history of our discipline. We have grown
up
around the study of the sovereign state. Hobbes is more influential than Locke,
and
his
positivist conception of law and sovereignty strengthens this bias. Our
discipline has
generally
sought to make states more "rational" in their operation, and has
sought to
apply
models of instrumental organization in analyzing how they function and how that
functioning
can be improved. All these biases encourage a misunderstanding of the
nature
of federalism in a democratic context.
Historically
the modern nation state has its roots in undemocratic polities where,
regardless
of the rhetoric, regimes ruled primarily for the benefit of a small and
distinct
portion
of society. Modern undemocratic polities share the same characteristic. These
forms
of government are most appropriately grasped as institutions of domination
where
one
group rules over others for its own benefit. Much modern political theory takes
this
model
of politics as universal, and so is intrinsically incapable of adequately
grasping the
democratic
federal principles initially developed in the writings of Alexander Hamilton
and
James Madison.
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November 24, 1999
On
these matters the bulk of modern writers have advanced little beyond Thomas
Hobbes,
who saw sovereignty as an attribute of power, the supreme power within a
society,
one able to dominate all others. Most democratic theorists seem, often
inconsistently,
to agree with Hobbes about the nature of sovereignty, but disagree with
him
as to the best form of government for exercising it.
A
politics of domination, if done effectively, requires the polity to be ordered
as an
instrumental
organization wherein the politically relevant sectors of society are organized
to
serve the interests of those who rule. People become resources to be utilized
with
greater
or lesser degrees of efficiency in attaining the leadership's goals. It is this
model
of
the polity which flows from the traditional model of sovereignty as the supreme
source
of
law. A state is considered sovereign when it is the final authority for making
law
within
its borders.
Democratic
Federalism
Federal
political systems, such as that developed within the U.S. Constitutional
Convention,
divide governmental power among several authorities, each possessing only
a
portion of the power to make laws. Each government is autonomous in the sense
that it
cannot
be abolished by another level, its leadership is selected from its own
citizens, and
it
has independent authority to tax, and to make and enforce laws. Each acts
directly on
the
citizen. Within this conception, ultimate authority rests with "the
people," a complex
entity
I will examine below. In such a political system there is no body which can
claim
more
Constitutional authority than its rivals to represent "the people."
Rather, each part
of a
federal system represents different aspects
of the people - a unity incapable of
adequate
representation by any single body. Indeed, even if everyone voted in a
referendum,
"the people" would not be fully represented, for they comprise a
political
community
which exists over time.
In
such a system there is no single apex of power in the Hobbesian sense. What
meets
the eye, instead, is that decision making arises out of many different
autonomous
centers.
It is a polycentric rather than unitary polity.1
This view of
federalism makes
little
sense from the perspective of much modern political thought which has been
overly
impressed
by the historical character of most states as instruments of domination,
reinforced
by a theoretical framework conceiving sovereignty as domination. For
example,
Robert D'Amico and Paul Piccone write that
A
contradiction between centralism and particularism was reluctantly embedded
in
the U.S. Constitution when, because of the fragility and disorganization of the
newly
independent states, this federal document
had to be based democratically
1 On
polycentricity see Michael Polanyi, The
Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951). For a more recent discussion, see Vincent
Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert
Warren, "The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical
Survey" and Vincent Ostrom, "Polycentricity: The
Structural Basis of Self-Governing
Systems," both in Vincent Ostrom, The
Meaning of
American
Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society,
(San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies, 1991) pp.
137-161; 223-244.
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November 24, 1999
on
"the people" rather than the federating units, as is normally the
case in
federations.2
In
fact there was no contradiction of this
sort. The tensions which ultimately
brought
on the Civil War had less to do with the weaknesses or contradictions within
the
federal
principles underlying the Constitution than with the attempt to unify two
different
types
of society, one of which, the ante-bellum South, developed increasingly in
directions
fundamentally antithetical to free democratic principles.3
That flaws in the
federalist
conception as such were blamed for this tragedy is largely due to the fact that
even
today, more than two hundred years after The
Federalist was written, most political
theory
has not caught up with the largely intuitive innovations which underlay their
work.
Federalism
and Democracy
The
central problem, both theoretical and practical, with applying federal
principles
in a
democratic polity has been succinctly put by Carl Schmitt
Both
democracy and federalism presuppose homogeneity. The necessary result of
a
federation of democratic states is the correspondence of democratic and federal
homogeneity.
Thus it is only natural in the development of democracy that the
homogeneous
unity of the people transcends the political boundaries of member
states
and replaces the equilibrium between the federation and the politically
independent
member states with a general unity.4
Indeed,
it is not going too far to say that both Hamilton and Madison anticipated
(and
hoped) that this unity would be to some extent the long term outcome of a
successful
American
union. Madison personally favored the new constitution giving the general
government
the right to veto any state law, and obviously believed such a power in no
way
violated federal principles. Hamilton noted in Federalist 27 that "I
believe it may be
laid
down as a general rule that [the people's] confidence in and obedience to a
government
will commonly be proportioned to the goodness and badness of its
administration."
Revealingly, he added that
Various
reasons have been suggested in the course of these papers to induce a
probability
that the general government will be better administered than the
particular
governments. . . .
2 Robert
D'Amico and Paul Piccone, "Introduction" to a Telos issue devoted to federalism.
Telos,
No. 91, Spring, 1992, p. 4. D'Amico and Piccone's history is in need of
correction as
well. See, for example, Forrest
MacDonald, Novo Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual
Origins of
the
Constitution. (Lawrence, Kansas: University of
Kansas Press, 1985) and William Lee
Miller, The Business of May Next: James Madison and the Founding,
(Charlottesville,
Virginia: University Press of
Virginia, 1992).
3 For
a pro-slavery argument which illustrates this point, see George Fitzhugh, Cannibals
All!
Or Slaves Without Masters, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960). For a
discussion of this issue during the
Constitutional Convention, see Miller, op. cit., pp. 117-141,
178-179.
4 Carl
Schmitt, "The Constitutional Theory of Federalism," Telos, No. 91, Spring, 1992, p.
54.
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November 24, 1999
I
will . . . hazard an observation . . . that the more the operations of the
national
authority
are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government, the more the
citizens
are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their
political
life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the
further
it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible and put in
motion
the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will be the
probability
that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. . . .
The
inference is that the authority of the Union and the affections of the citizens
towards
it will be strengthened rather than weakened, by its extension into matters
of
internal concern. . . .
In
Federalist 46 Madison observed
If .
. . the people should in [the] future become more partial to the federal than
to
the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and
irresistible
proofs of a better administration as will overcome all their antecedent
propensities.
And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from
giving
most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due. . . .
Hamilton
and Madison rested their case for federalism within a democratic
republican
foundation. They both preferred that the central government be given more
authority
over taxes than in fact it was. Yet Madison in particular is rightfully
regarded
as the American theorist of federalism.
Usually this judgment ignores Madison's evident
lack
of concern with growing national supremacy over the states. Indeed, many making
it
would be profoundly discomfited by his true views, for Madison's
anti-federalist critics
adopted
the rhetoric of "states' rights" a rhetoric Madison opposed.
States
have no rights, only people have rights. This was why Madison and
Hamilton
emphasized that "the people" rather than "the states" would
adopt the
Constitution.
However, theirs was a much more subtle sense of how "the people" are
comprised
than is usually the case in democratic theory. Madison argued in Federalist 39
that
"assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals
composing
one
entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which
they
respectively
belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived
from
the supreme authority of each State - the authority of the people
themselves." The
people
exist in two capacities: as citizens
of respective states and as citizens of the nation
as a
whole. In this way they sought to reconcile the independent states of the
Articles of
Confederation
with the national government they sought.
It is
not going beyond their meaning to say that "the people" also comprise
the
polity
over time. No single election could
give working control of the national
government.
At a minimum, it would take two elections to change a majority of Senators
since
one third are elected every two years. Even in this case the Supreme Court
could
still
stand as a barrier to rapid and precipitate changes in basic policy. Nor could
the
Constitution
be easily or quickly amended without overwhelming public support for
change.
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November 24, 1999
Because
the people existed over time, their interests were best represented in large
and
highly complex polities which made any simple polling of opinions a difficult
task at
best.
The most un-American way possible of referring to the people is "the
masses" for,
in
fact, it is no mass at all. The people constitute a complex unity whose
intricate internal
structure
and differentiation is rendered invisible by such crude terminology. Madison's
classic
statement of this view was in Federalist 10, and recent research has suggested
it is
even
more complex a unity than he envisioned.5
The people were
not simply a collection
of
individuals, they were the society as a corporate entity extending over time -
"the ages"
the
Founders hoped.
American
federalist theory's foundation in popular sovereignty rather than on the
sovereignty
of the states or the nation as a whole marked a major innovation and advance
in
political thought. By comparison, the thinking behind the Confederate Constitution
marked
a giant step backwards - even without taking the issue of slavery into account.
The
Confederate Constitution was not a "restoration" of Constitutional
principles
supposedly
violated by the North, but rather a rejection of them and a return to an older
view
that federal unions arose from the coming together of sovereign states.6
The
Confederacy
was exactly the sort of federation which Madison and Hamilton described in
Federalists
18, 19, and 20 as ultimately doomed to failure.
The
complex conception of popular sovereignty which Madison and Hamilton were
developing
led to a profound break from earlier ways of conceiving political power.
According
to the Founders, the people themselves belong to more than one political
community,
and no single such community enjoys theoretical precedence over another.
The
model of relations between the State and General governments which the Founders
described
is not a hierarchical one, even if they personally would have preferred it to
be
so.
Indeed, they were at a loss of words for what they were describing. In
Federalist 39,
Madison
pointed out how every major aspect of the Constitution possessed both
"federal'
and
'national' aspects. Later, in 1824, he wrote that "It is a system of
government
emphatically
sui generis for designating which there consequently was no appropriate
term
or denomination pre-existing." In 1831 he still argued that "the
Gov't of the U. S.
being
a novelty and a compound, had no technical terms or phrases appropriate to it,
and .
. .
old terms were to be used in new senses, explained by the context or by the
facts of the
case."7
Theory
from Practice
At
this point a reader might reasonably ask, "Wasn't the Constitution a
document
growing
out of compromises and hard bargaining? Isn't it a bit fanciful to read a
coherent
5 See
for example, Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years
of
Trends in American's Policy Preferences, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992) and
Gus diZerega, "Elites and
Democratic Theory," Review of
Politics, Spring, 1991, pp. 340-372.
6 See
Roy Franklin Nichols' discussion of the provisions of the Confederate
Constitution in
his The Disruption of American Democracy, (New York: Collier, 1962) pp.
462-463.
7 James
Madison to Robert S, Garrett, February 11, 1824, Works, Vol. IX, p. 177; Madison to
N. P. Truist, December, 1831, Works, Vol. IX, p. 475; see also Madison
to Edward Everett,
August 24, 1830, pp. 384-85; Madison,
"Notes on Nullification," Mind
of the Founder: Sources
of
the Political Thought of James Madison,
Marvin Meyers, ed., (Hanover: University Press
of New England, 1981), p. 437.
6
November 24, 1999
theoretical
framework into a document which was regarded by Madison and Hamilton
alike
as deeply flawed? The answer is "no" and the reasons for my answer
are important.
Compromises
can take two forms. First, the different parties can come to an
agreement
upon rules for cooperation which they regard as generally fair. Because their
interests
will differ, and occasionally clash, fair rules will have to be procedural,
like the
rules
of a game which seek to give no particular advantage to any player at the
outset.
Alternatively,
the compromise can seek to safeguard particular interests in advance, by
giving
them a privileged position. The
Constitution mostly exemplifies the first sort of
compromise.
The second kind can be found in the provision prohibiting the national
government
from banning the slave trade for ten years. Other privileges incorporated
into
the document, such as giving the vote to men and the weighted representation
given
slave
states in the House of Representatives, were susceptible to amendment. As
suffrage
was
widened, these privileges were removed, further strengthening the
Constitution's
purely
procedural character.
Procedural
rules for action that apply to a wide variety of interests on the basis of
fairness
carry their own internal logic. This logic was picked up on and developed by
Madison
and Hamilton, even if they were not personally enamored by all its provisions.
The
internal logic of such a system of fair procedural rules results in what I term
a selforganizing
system, a concept largely lacking at the time
they wrote.
Self-Organization
It is
a historical irony that the principles ultimately able to make theoretical
sense of
America's
federalism were first extensively discussed in the year 1776, but in George
III's
England,
not the New World. Adam Smith's Wealth of
Nations was the first major study
of
what today we term social self-organizing processes.8
Smith's subject,
of course, was
the
rapidly developing market economy. But with the advantage of over 200 years of
hindsight,
we can see that the market is in fact a single instance of a broader process
which
was transforming the societies of Western Europe and North America. This
transformation
rendered their basic institutions increasingly incapable of being grasped
by
traditional ideas about instrumental organization, status, and hierarchy. More
and
more
the modern West has been characterized by the dominance of the self-organizing
systems
of the market, science, and liberal democracy. I suggest that the modern age is
not so much the age of organization as it
is the age of self-organization.
Smith
and the economists who came after showed how orderly social processes
could
arise out of individuals pursuing personally chosen, and often narrowly
defined,
purposes
by means of abstract procedural rules of contract within a framework of clearly
specified
property rights. The result of their actions was a complex and ever changing
network
of economic coordination able successfully to handle more information and
harmonize
more diverse aims than could ever be the case by attempting consciously to
organize
the whole from a single center.
8 Although
its roots are in Hume. See F. A. Hayek, "The Legal and Political
Philosophy of
David Hume," Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, (New York: Simon
and
Schuster, 1967), pp. 106-21. Hume was
also a pioneering thinker on federalism who
significantly influenced Madison. See Miller,
The Business of May Next, op. cit.,
pp. 55-60.
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November 24, 1999
Unlike
an instrumental organization, the market process pursued no specific goals
or
hierarchy of goals. This meant that, strictly speaking, no guarantee existed
that any
particular
person's project would be attained. On the other hand, this same process
increased
the likelihood that any randomly selected participant's goals would be more
likely
to be attained within a market order than would be the case if all economic
transactions
took place within the framework of an instrumental organization.
As
with other self-organizing social institutions, the market places minimal
demands
upon the knowledge and judgment of those participating within them. A
principle
characteristic of self-organizing systems is that they economize enormously on
the
knowledge people need in order to act effectively within them. No one needed an
overview
of the whole in order for a coherent framework of relationships to arise within
which
people could cooperate, even with strangers whom they would never meet. No
one
needed a view of the whole in order to be able to successfully attain their
ends and do
so in
ways which assisted others in attaining theirs.
As F.
A. Hayek, perhaps the most important theorist of social self-organization,
observed:
"The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the
whole
field, but because their limited individual fields sufficiently overlap so that
through
many
intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all."9
As a result, it
became
easier for individuals to cooperate together in increasingly intricate networks
ultimately
spanning the globe. Consequently, a much greater complexity of information
and
relationships could be integrated within a market order than could ever be the
case
within
an instrumental organization.
The
very complexity of such interactions make its order impossible to grasp without
the
aid of theory. Too many factors are integrated in a continuing kaleidoscope of
change
for
anyone to be able to grasp them deliberately in their particulars. Yet as we
act within
a
self-organizing system we nevertheless are easily able to make use of local
manifestations
of this order. We need not be economists to act effectively within the
market,
even if we need to study economic theory to understand how the market works.
We
can now generalize beyond the market to other self-organizing institutions. All
self-organizing
social processes possess basic core characteristics which differentiate
them
from instrumental organizations. Four are particularly important: they are
unusually
open rather than relatively closed systems, they possess a certain sort of
complexity,
they have logical depth, and it is impossible to make predictions about their
future
specific characteristics, although "pattern predictions" are
possible.
Strictly
speaking, all social systems are open. Indeed, so are all systems within the
universe.
However, within these parameters systems may be relatively open or relatively
closed.
A hierarchical instrumental organization is relatively closed, for there is
only one
legitimate
center for decision making and innovation. In so far as this is the case, all
external
influences impinging upon the system must be brought to the attention of the
top
9 F.
A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," Individualism and Economic Order,
(Chicago: University of Chicago,
1948), p. 86.
8
November 24, 1999
leadership,
or to those to whom limited authority to act has been expressly delegated, if
the
system is to respond to them effectively.
By
contrast, a self-organizing social system possesses multiple centers for
innovation
and decision making. Each is relatively independent of the others. Each is
free
to interpret and act upon external influences by its own lights. The system can
respond
at any point to any influence seen and acted upon by any participant. By
contrast,
a hierarchical organization will seek to maintain strong boundaries, limiting
the
impact
of external influences, in order to protect itself and successfully pursue its
leadership's
goals. A self-organizing system, on the other hand, possesses very
permeable
and open boundaries for it has no goals or purposes requiring defense against
outside
influences. This leads us to a second distinguishing characteristic of a social
selforganizing
system:
its complexity.
In a
hierarchical organization decisions are made by one or a few individuals.
Consequently,
there is a clear limit to the complexity an organization can develop,
beyond
which it becomes too complicated and unwieldy to manage effectively.10
In a
self-organizing
social system no theoretical limit exists to the complexity of the
relationships
which can be incorporated within it. Each participant has limits, of course,
just
as with the leaders of an instrumental organization. But there is no limit to
the
number
of possible participants, and so long as each overlaps with the others, the
intricacy
of the whole can grow. Each person possesses different information, different
desires
and plans, and confronts the same event from a unique perspective. Insofar as
these
differences are incorporated into a self-organizing process, its capacity to
make
useful
use of diverse data dwarfs that of a hierarchical organization.
The
enormous complexity of social self-organizing systems means they possess
tremendous
logical depth. This term, which
originated in information theory, addresses
the
quality as well as the quantity of information needed completely to specify a
particular
system. Paul Davies writes that in an organized system the quality of
information
is determined by the time needed "to compute the message from the shortest
program
that will generate it."11 Davies explains that
Simple
patterns are logically shallow, because they may be generated rapidly by
short
and simple programs. Random patterns are also shallow, because their
minimal
program is, by definition, not much shorter than the pattern itself. . . . But
highly
organized patterns are logically deep, because they require that many
complicated
steps be performed in generating them.12
10 Robert
N. Langlois, "The Capabilities of Industrial Capitalism," Critical Review, Fall,
1991, pp. 513-30. See also John
Kotter, A Force for Change: How
Leadership Differs from
Management,
(New York: Macmillan, 1990).
11 Paul
Davies, The Mind of God: The Scientific
Basis for a Rational World, (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 137. See
also Charles Bennett, "Dissipation, Information,
Computational Complexity and the
Definition of Organization," Emerging
Syntheses in
Science,
(ed.) D. Pines, (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1987).
12 Ibid.,
p. 138.
9
November 24, 1999
Far
from being random or disorganized, the "anarchy of the market" and
other
social
self-organizing systems constitute the most intricate achievements of human
society.
One important implication flowing from this observation is that social
selforganizing
systems
are perhaps the most valuable creations of human cooperation.
Shallow
systems, lacking logical depth, can be easily reconstructed whereas
selforganizing
systems
possessing great logical depth are impossible to reconstruct, and
creating
new ones is by no means an easy undertaking, as Eastern Europe is discovering.
That
it can be done at all is because the rules which generate social
self-organizing
systems,
particularly those systems characterizing liberal modernity, are remarkably
simple.
Indeed, they are simpler than the rules characterizing most instrumental
organizations.
Because they apply to everyone while leaving each person free to apply
them
as he or she will, they are purely procedural, and open to any purposes which
may
be
encompassed by them. By contrast, instrumental organizations tend to create
specific
rules
covering specific contingencies. They are justified in terms of their ability
to aid
the
organization attain its goals. The Forest
Service Manual is many volumes in length
adding
up to may hundreds of pages. The U. S. Constitution is only a little over 100
paragraphs.13
As a
result, we cannot predict the specific characteristics of any particular
selforganizing
system.
All we can do is make what Hayek calls "pattern predictions" that
certain
kinds of patterns will appear, but we can say nothing about their specific
details.
As
Hayek noted, "the range of phenomena compatible with [such predictions]
will be
wide
and the possibility of falsifying it correspondingly small." He added that
"While it
is
certainly desirable to make our theories as falsifiable as possible, we must
also push
forward
into fields where, as we advance, the degree of falsifiability necessarily
decreases.
This is the price we have to pay for an advance into the field of complex
phenomena."14
This problem is
by no means unique to the social sciences. One of the
greatest
of all theories in the natural sciences, the theory of evolution, possesses
this same
characteristic.15
As we
indicated above, the market is not the only social self-organizing system
which
has transformed the world. Liberal modernity's other two most unique
institutions,
science
and democracy, are also of this nature. The scientific community is able to
make
use
of and constantly revise and enlarge a body of knowledge vastly exceeding the
capacity
of any scientist to grasp because of science's self-organizing nature.
Scientific
knowledge
gains its coherence because the community of practicing scientists pursues
their
research while honoring a small number of general principles which are purely
abstract
and procedural. These principles we often term the "scientific
method" although
it is
not such a tidy package as this term suggests.16
13 A
classic study of such an organization, and its many hundreds of pages of rules,
is
Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior, (Washington,
D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1986).
14 See
F. A. Hayek, "The Theory of Complex Phenomena," Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
and
Economics, op cit., p. 29.
15 Ibid.,
pp. 31-34.
16 Even
more than Hayek, Michael Polanyi deserves perhaps to be considered the father
of
contemporary social self-organization
theory. With regard to science, see his Logic
of Liberty,
10
November 24, 1999
Democracy
as a Self-Organizing System
Liberal
democracies share these same general characteristics as well. Citizens
participate
in politics by following a small set of abstract and procedural rules which
determine
how they are to act politically if they want to be involved. Being abstract,
these
rules apply equally to all in a formal sense, although their impact upon
specific
individuals
can and will vary. Being procedural, they are silent as to the particular
political
goals citizens may wish to pursue by making use of them. Indeed, often these
rules
will govern pursuit of mutually exclusive political projects, just as is the
case in the
market
and science. This is how competition arises in self-organizing systems. The
rules
which
generate a liberal democracy are freedom of political speech, freedom of
organization,
free elections, and equality of the vote.17
"Self-Organizing"
should not be confused with "self-governing." Vincent Ostrom,
whose
work is in most respects in harmony with the views I am developing, seemingly
does
this when writing that "Self-organizing capabilities exist at the village
level in all
societies."18
Yet the broader
picture he is developing is of federalist democracies as selforganizing
polities.
A village's political life is constituted largely of face-to-face
relationships.
As such, it can be self-governing, a term Ostrom also uses.
I
believe that much is gained in terms of clarity, and nothing is lost, if we confine
"self-organizing"
to those social processes characterized by complexity
- where no person
or
group can grasp much about the system as a whole, except in a formal abstract
sense.
Order
must therefore rely on processes which are to some degree impersonal, and
independent
of the particular wishes and desires of participants, no matter how much
their
actions may contribute to these processes. Self-governance, however, means that
we
have a significant say in the outcomes of a particular political process.
Self-governance
and self-organization are not opposites, however. In fact, in a
complex
order self-governance can exist at the local level only if the broader features of
the
political system are largely self-organizing (or, alternatively, central
government
ignores
local events). This relationship has parallels in science and the market. It is
the
largely
impersonal market process which enables people to have such latitude in
pursuing
their
self-chosen goals economically. It is the largely impersonal scientific
community as
op. cit., and "The Republic of
Science: Its Political and Economic Theory" in Knowing and
Being:
Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed., Marjorie
Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1969), pp. 49-72. Physicist John Ziman
has continued Polanyi's work, see particularly his
Public
Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1968) and Reliable Knowledge,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978); see also David Hull, Science
as a Process:
An
Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science,
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988).
17 For
a more extensive discussion of democracies as self-organizing systems, see Gus
diZerega, "Elites and Democratic
Theory," The Review of Politics,
Spring, 1991, pp. 340-372;
"Democracy as a Spontaneous
Order," Critical Review, Spring,
1989, pp. 206-240;
"Liberalism and Democracy:
Spontaneous Order, Information, and Values," Wirtschaft's
Politische
Blatter: Friedrich August von Hayek zum 90, Geburtstag, Vol.\36,
1989, pp. 158-
169.
18 Ostrom,
Meaning of American Federalism, op.
cit., p. 213.
11
November 24, 1999
a
whole which enables individual scientists to choose and pursue their research.
Were
either
chaotic, it would be hard to know what avenue of pursuit promised to be
productive.
Were either an instrumental order, local plans would have to be harmonized
with
those laid down by higher authority. It is the same in democracies.
Self-governance
and
self-organization in complex orders are different sides of the same coin.
Because
their rules apply to everyone, all social self-organizing systems are
equalitarian. However, because these rules are purely
procedural, and say nothing about
who
will use them, or how successful they will be if they do, some people will be
more
successful
in achieving their plans than will others. Therefore, rules able to generate a
democracy
cannot be egalitarian. They cannot lead to identical outcomes for all who act
within
their framework. In fact, in a complex order a rule cannot be both equalitarian
and
egalitarian.
At the systemic level procedural rules serve primarily to discover and
coordinate
what is unknown. Consequently, when they are followed, we cannot depend
on
any particular outcome. Inequality of input and outcome is essentially
unavoidable for
participants.
The
general outcome served by well-functioning democracies is the public good.
We
can better understand this often misused term by first examining its better
understood
equivalent
in economic theory. The theoretical ideal which the market process is
supposed
to approach is called general equilibrium. It is the state of affairs that
would
exist
if, as Hayek put it, everyone operating within a market order enjoyed perfect
knowledge.
Hayek preferred the term "order" for "equilibrium" for it
"has the advantage
that
we can meaningfully speak about an order being approached to various degrees,
and
that
order can be preserved throughout a process of change."19
The
market generates a coordination process which approximates this never - to - be
- perfectly
- attained and always changing state of affairs of perfectly coordinated
knowledge.
Thus, the market process is fundamentally a discovery process. If the
market
process were to decline in its capacity to coordinate cooperation, that is,
decline in
its
capability to make knowledge available to those who can use it effectively, it
would
also
decline in its capacity to self-organize. Fewer people would be able
successfully to
pursue
their plans within its framework.
Science
has an equivalent concept, also based upon a standard of perfect
coordination
and knowledge. This is universal agreement among scientists about the
nature
of the phenomena able to be studied scientifically. Science is a process by
which
scientific
knowledge - knowledge able to be justified and defended by the scientific
method
as interpreted by the scientific community - is discovered. As with the market
process,
this perfect agreement is unlikely ever to arise, but it is only the impetus
towards
it
which enables us to speak about a body of scientific knowledge at all. Both
science
and
the market are discovery processes.
In
democratic politics the public good is the same sort of concept. It, too, must
be
discovered.
Often the public good is considered to be some specific state of affairs or
19 F.
A. Hayek, "Competition as a Discovery Procedure," New Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
Economics,
and the History of Ideas, (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1978), p. 184.
12
November 24, 1999
hierarchy
of ends which "the people" are supposed to favor. This is to
misconstrue its
nature.
Beyond the most general formulations, there is substantial disagreement as to
what
measures are, or are not, in the public good. Given the enormous complexity of
contemporary
political issues, any reasonable person would admit of considerable
uncertainty
as to what specific programs will be most in keeping with the public good.
This
has lead some political scientists to deny that the concept carries any
theoretical or
practical
weight at all.
From
the perspective of a theory of self-organization, the public good is that
assortment
of public policies which would be adopted by perfectly knowledgeable
citizens
agreeing unanimously among themselves when asking themselves "What is best
for
the community in which I live?" As with general equilibrium and the
scientific ideal
of
perfect agreement, the political process should always generate an impetus
approaching
such circumstances, even though there is no reason to believe it will ever be
completely
attained. This is particularly the case because the public good incorporates,
in
principle,
all of what counts as scientific knowledge and the structure of the market,
plus
much
more. In terms of specific policies, the public good will be a moving goal
whose
content
is only partially known.
This
conception of the public good, and the Founders' observation that we live in
more
than one political community, gives us a different basis for applying
federalist
principles
than do traditional theories. Further, it is one in harmony with democratic
principles.
As Madison and Hamilton stressed, citizens often think of themselves as
belonging
to more than one political community. In thinking so, they make it so.
Further,
the complexity of public issues renders no single political community equally
capable
of addressing all issues effectively, from street maintenance to education to
national
defense.
Indeed,
Madison's argument in favor of extended republics incorporating a great
variety
of factions and interests is basically an argument that stable and just
democracies
must
be established in complex societies. It is their complexity which prevents a
majority
faction from arising and turning the polity into an instrumental organization
dominating
its members for the enrichment of its rulers, which would constitute a coup
d'etat
by the majority against the polity. Complexity takes many forms in an extended
republic.
Insofar as it is territorially based, the case for federalism is implicit
within
democratic
republican theory.
At
the basis of many contemporary conflicts over public policies and the
institutions
that produce them are differences of a more fundamental kind. Some see
democracy
as an instrumental organization designed to secure substantial goals such as
greater
equality of condition.20 Others, like myself, envision
democracy as enabling
people
to get together to decide what to do, that is, as a set of facilitating
procedures.
Central
to those procedures is that they apply to all citizens equally. Procedural
equality
is
predicated on equal legal respect for all citizens. Thus, equal opportunity
leads to
20 See
for example, Robert Dahl, Preface to
Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1956 ) p. 56; and Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (Berkeley:
University of
California Press, 1982 ) pp. 84-5.
107.
13
November 24, 1999
unequal
results. If one insists upon substantive equality of resources as necessary for
legitimating
democratic institutions, neither American nor any other kind of democracy
can
qualify.21 Worse, if agreement on policy is required for agreement on
procedures,
democracies
will be chronically unstable because under such a requirement they will be
incapable
of approaching the public good. They will not promote the political
cooperation
of all citizens.
The
Constitution and the Articles of Confederation
From
a perspective enriched by the theory of self-organizing social systems, both
the
Constitution and the Articles of Confederation which it replaced offered
potentially
viable
frameworks for a large scale democratic order. However, the reasons supporting
each
differ, and insights derived from both are of continued relevance today.
The
Constitution created a federal polity where the people were conceived as
citizens
of at least two political communities, neither of which could lay sole claim to
speak
for "the people." This was not the case with the Articles, where
independent
sovereign
states came together for certain common purposes. The central government
could
not act except through the states. Any measure passed by the Continental
Congress
required
nine of thirteen states to agree, and delegates were more ambassadors than
independent
decision makers. Amending the Articles required unanimity.
The
Articles established a great deal of political equality among the separate
states.
All
their citizens enjoyed rights to travel and trade, each state recognized the
same
privileges
and immunities for the citizens of other states as they did for their own. All
maintained
reciprocal respect for extradition and judicial proceedings.
The
Articles had been established during the crisis of the Revolutionary War. In
the
eyes
of many, with the coming of peace much of the need for closer relations
dissipated.
Quorums
became increasingly hard to obtain. Attempts to give the Congress independent
taxing
authority failed. Amendments were all but impossible to pass. When John
Hancock
was elected President of the Congress he never bothered to show up to take
office.22
Had
the Articles persisted, the Confederation not been dissolved due to foreign
entanglements
or dissension between the states, and the new governments remained
basically
democratic, over time a stronger sense of national community would probably
have
grown again. We will never know. But unlike earlier confederations, the Articles
created
a framework with substantial self-organizing capabilities.
Where
the Articles differed from earlier confederations was that the members states
were
all democratic in the sense that most white men could vote. It is only because,
and
to
the extent, the member states were democratic (particularly in the North) that
the
Articles
created a self-organizing framework. The reason is that when both internal and
21 Gus
diZerega, "Equality, Self-Government and Democracy: A Critique of Robert
Dahl's
Political Equality," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 41,
No. 3, pp. 447-468.
22 On
the Articles see Grant Wood, The Creation
of the American Republic, 1776-1787; (New
York: Norton, 1972), pp. 354-63; and
Forrest MacDonald, The Formation of the
American
Republic:
1776-1790. (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967).
14
November 24, 1999
external
relations are based upon procedural rules applying equally to all, the same
selforganizing
processes
existing within each state will progressively blur the boundaries
they
have with their neighbors. The distinction between internal and external
relations
will
progressively diminish as trade and travel increase, leading to ever more
economic
and
cultural interpenetration. Identification with one's own state, and
particularly with its
leadership,
will be diluted by other loyalties. We see this happening today among
sovereign
democracies in Europe, and increasingly in other parts of the world as well.
It is
the strength of these and related processes which shed light on why
selforganizing
polities
act differently within the international arena than do undemocratic
ones.
This explains why liberal democracies, alone of all forms of government, do not
war
with one another, have mutually demilitarized borders, and tend to be more
cooperative
within international organizations.23 Given these characteristics of
the new
confederation,
so long as they remained democratic, the fears of Hamilton and Jay that
the
states would ultimately recapitulate the miseries of European warfare were
probably
overblown.
However, it takes time for a society to be transformed by self-organizing
processes.
Old habits had to change. The first decades would have been the riskiest.
Certainly
anti-federalist sentiment was strongest in the least developed portions of the
states.
Even today political scientists have only just begun to appreciate the peaceful
characteristics
of democratic polities, so it is hard to fault Hamilton and Jay for being
mistaken
about something political scientists 200 years later have only just begun to
appreciate.
When Hamilton wrote in Federalist 6 "Let experience, the least fallible
guide
of
human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries" there was
no
experience
of an international system of self-organizing polities. Western Europe today
is
perhaps our best example.
Despite
even greater cultural, historical, religious, and linguistic differences than
were
the case with the original thirteen American states, Western Europe has been
evolving
towards ever greater integration economically and judicially. Her example
suggests
the transformative power inherent within societies where self-organizing
characteristics
have become dominant in overcoming barriers which once separated them.
(How
wisely Western Europeans will react to the changes taking place in their
interrelationships
is another question. The analysis here suggests that to the extent they
rely
on self-organizing rather than hierarchic and organizational institutions to
achieve
greater
integration, their results will be better.)
That
the Articles might in the long run have proven adequate to their task does not
mean
that we were worse off adopting the Constitution. The central weakness of the
new
nation
- its incorporation of free and slave states - would have bedeviled the
Confederation
as well, had it lasted. Indeed, in such a case the ultimate problems might
have
been worse, for the Constitution allowed the slave trade to be abolished in
1808,
which
it promptly was. Under the Articles it would likely have continued much longer.
The
Constitution also solved the dangerous and divisive problem of overlapping
land
claims by the various states, eased admission of new states, guaranteed their
23 Gus
diZerega, "Democracy and Peace: The Self-Organizing Foundations of the
Democratic
Peace" unpublished manuscript.
15
November 24, 1999
democratic
republican character, and adopted a Bill of Rights - which even many member
states
of the time did not have. The Constitution also provided a more sophisticated
framework
for a self-organizing order because it institutionalized the truth that we are
members
of more than a single political community, whereas most of the states adhered
to a
unitary conception of political power.
Today
as we read the debates between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, we are
struck
by the seemingly prophetic utterances of the latter when they warned of the
threat
of a
large centralized state.24 But before becoming overly
impressed with their
prescience,
we should consider that it took over 140 years from the Constitution's
adoption
to the beginning of the New Deal, for such a state to begin to take decisive
shape.
The Anti-Federalists thought the problem was just around the corner. They were
wrong.
When centralization did begin in earnest, for better and for worse, the large
national
government enjoyed substantial and prolonged popular support, The evidence is
most
easily seen in FDR's unbroken string of Presidential victories. It was not
imposed
upon
a largely unwilling country, as the Anti-Federalists imagined would happen.
Madison
and Hamilton proved far more prescient than they.
Even
if the Articles had been maintained we cannot be sure but that a similar
development
might not have taken place in one of two ways. It is precisely because
selforganizing
processes,
economic and political alike, tend to enlarge and integrate the
community
that even a nation formed on the Articles would likely have come in many
respects
to resemble our own today. Including the possibility of a substantial welfare
state.
Nothing
could be more plain as a limitation on governmental power than the 9th
Amendment
that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."25
This is
particularly the
case
when read in conjunction with the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not
delegated to
the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the
States
respectively, or to the people." Yet they did not prevent centralization
and
consolidation.
One hundred forty years of increasing close economic, cultural, and
political
ties could easily have led to a similar outcome even with the Articles as a
starting
point.
We
should also consider that even very small European democracies have
established
extensive welfare states. Denmark, with just over 5 million citizens, and
Sweden,
with nearly 8 and one half million, have proven quite capable of establishing
welfare
states far more ambitious and inclusive than our own. It is wishful thinking to
argue
that a United States with greater state autonomy would have avoided such an
outcome
on that basis alone. Indeed, historian Joyce Appleby suggests that adopting the
24 See
Herbert J. Storing (ed.) The
Anti-Federalist, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1985) and Ralph Ketcham (ed.) The Anti-Federalist Papers and the
Constitutional
Convention
Debates, (NY: Mentor, 1986).
25See
the collection of essays in Randy Barnett, (ed.), The Rights Retained by the People: The
History
and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, (Fairfax,
Virginia: George Mason University
Press, 1989)
16
November 24, 1999
Constitution
actually inhibited the rise of
powerful welfare states at the state and national
levels.26
Finally,
even had the Constitution not been adopted, sooner or later the issue of how
to
order an extended republic incorporating a complex and diverse community of
interests
would still have needed to be addressed. The larger states would have faced
this
problem
as their population grew. In 1790 the entire population of the United States
was
just
under 4 million, smaller than Denmark, but slightly larger than Kentucky today.
In
fact,
the population of the United States in 1790 was approximately that of the San
Francisco
Bay area in 1990. The issues the Founders addressed would have had to be
addressed,
and we can reasonably doubt whether they would have been addressed better.
Indeed,
the tendency of state constitutions to try and safeguard specific special
interests
suggests
that a new Constitution would be inferior to the present one.
In
short, rehabilitation of many aspects of the original Articles of Confederation
need
not undermine the case for the Constitution and the reasoning developed in its
defense
at the time. On the other hand, the present day might be a more propitious time
for
self-organizing frameworks established along the lines of the Articles because
several
of
the worst threats that could have torn the federation apart early in our
history are now
all
but absent. Today's democracies recognize one another's boundaries. Democracies
are
now the strongest economic and military powers in the world. Finally, their
societies
have
now been fundamentally transformed by self-organizing processes, something only
in
its incipient stages in the early American states. The longer a polity is
ordered
primarily
by self-organizing processes, the more fundamentally it diverges from those
which
are not.
Polycentric
Communities
A
democratic polity of any considerable size necessarily constitutes more than a
single
political community. A political community may be defined in terms of the
principle
political relationships among its members. Democratic political communities
are
defined by equalitarian political relationships within a given territory. The
size of the
territory
can vary, however, and in so doing will render the community more or less able
to
deal with various types of political issues.
Given
that no single size is optimal for all legitimate political purposes, the
common
good of a democracy will necessarily be a complex affair. Some specific
characteristics
will apply to the polity as a whole, whereas others will apply to smaller
democratic
units within it. The more complex and diverse the polity, the greater the
likelihood
that federal principles will be necessary to serve the common good.
When
thoroughly considered, a self-organizing model of democracy implies at least
a
minimal federal principle. There are those matters most appropriately decided
by the
people
directly within small face - to - face communities, and those matters best
addressed
by more inclusive bodies which are necessarily representative. This minimal
26 Joyce
Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in
the Historical Imagination, "The
American Heritage - The Heirs and the
Disinherited" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1992). p. 220.
17
November 24, 1999
model
is perhaps best suited for very small independent polities, such as Iceland,
Liechtenstein,
and Luxembourg - each of which has well under one million citizens.
Most
liberal democracies far exceed these polities in population, diversity, and
complexity.
The greater the population the more complicated the task of serving the
public
interest. The more diverse the population, the greater the possible
disagreements
about
the values, and particularly the relative ordering of values, to be served by
public
policy.
Complexity refers to the division of knowledge within a society. Greater
complexity
means greater diversity of knowledge and therefore the more complicated the
social
field within which public proposals have to be enunciated, gather support, and
emerge
to policy.
Countries
with diverse populations will stand in greater need for federal structures
than
will countries of similar size but more homogeneous populations. For example,
Switzerland
and Denmark are both quite small. Switzerland has a little over 6,600,000
citizens
and Denmark about 5,100,000. Their physical territories are also quite small.
Denmark,
however, is ethnically quite homogeneous, while Switzerland is unusually
diverse,
including German, French, Italian, and a small Romansch speaking population.
Although
each is a political community with a genuine public good, the public good of
the
Swiss is more complicated than that of the Danes. At a minimum it must seek to
respect
and harmonize the different Swiss linguistic groups, a problem the Danes do not
face.
It is
unlikely that Switzerland could successfully exist without its federal system
allowing
for substantial cantonal autonomy. The German speaking Swiss make up by far
the
largest portion of the population. They would dominate any unitary Swiss state.
Further,
the French and Italian speaking cantons border on France and Italy,
respectively.
Were
Switzerland a unitary state, this situation would be very likely to be unstable
since
whenever
the French and Italian speaking portions of the country felt aggrieved, they
would
be tempted to switch allegiance to countries where their language was dominant.27
These
first two reasons for federalism are easily grasped. The third is more
abstract.
Complexity and the division of knowledge are important, but hard to grasp.
The
Middle Ages is often considered a time of enormous complexity, as social and
political
units were quite small and dialects and ethnic identity varied dramatically
over
small
distances,. But these elements are not central to what I mean by the social
division
of
knowledge. In other respects, compared to the present day, the Middle Ages were
quite
homogeneous. Overwhelmingly, the dominant religion was Catholicism. The
small
number of educated people not only spoke the same language, Latin, they also
had
read
pretty much the same material. At the local level economies were quite simple,
and
variation
in technical knowledge from person to person was far less than it is today. In
such
a society the ideal of a "Renaissance Man" could be not only
appealing, it could be
attainable.
27 Leopold
Kohr has important insights as to why the Swiss federation has worked so well
while many other federations broke
down or were taken over by a dominant member. See his
The
Breakdown of Nations, (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).
18
November 24, 1999
Today
the portion of knowledge a person has, compared to that needed to sustain
the
contemporary world, is infinitesimal. Complex interconnected economies generate
problems
as fast as they solve them. Many of these problems are relatively unique to
modern
times. What constitutes adequate solutions for them is often highly contested
and
proof
for what does or does not work is hard to come by. Yet, as we have seen, a
viable
public
policy must tend to use that information necessary most successfully to address
these
shifting and uncertain issues.
A
comparison with the market and science will be useful. Both market and
scientific
orders could function if relevant actors were all large organizations, and
there
were
only a few in each area of production or interest. But internal organizational
politics
favors the status quo and existing leadership. Such market and scientific
orders
would
be relatively slow to adjust to changes from outside the order and would tend
to
repress
changes from inside the system. It would "self-organize" slowly and
hesitantly.
As
the number of active participants increases, there will be an expanding
opportunity for
someone
to take advantage of new insights and promote new avenues of production or
research.
The order will become more quick to adapt and more creative in its activity.
Today
both science and the market tend to have hundreds of thousands and millions
of
independent participants, linked together by the self-organizing process within
which
they
act. In democratic politics the norm is quite different, with many participants
forced
to
act within the orbit of only a relatively few large institutions. To the extent
that
federalism
exists, more avenues for creative action are opened up, and the process can
make
more effective use of the dispersed and complex knowledge of its citizens.
In
short, federalism increases the opportunities for successful political
entrepreneurship.28
Entrepreneurial
action is the source for all coordination and much
change
within self-organizing systems. Entrepreneurs take advantage of opportunities
they
see to act within the system, by its rules, to gain their ends. In doing so
they will
continually
adjust the circumstances around them to take advantage of changes they
perceive
or anticipate. And in so doing, they will change the conditions existing for
other
people,
creating new entrepreneurial opportunities for others.29
This is why
selforganizing
systems
do not settle down towards perfect coordination of knowledge and
plans.
Usually
the ends entrepreneurs pursue will include amassing more systemically
defined resources. In the market economy money is
the primary systemic resource, for
the
more of it one has, the more avenues of participation are opened up. In science
reputation
and renown count for more than money. Those scientists most recognized as
28 Robert
Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1961), p.227.
29 This
model has been most completely worked out in economic theory. See F. A. Hayek,
"Coping With Ignorance," Imprimis, 7, no. 7, 1980 , p. 4; Ludwig
Lachmann, The Market as
an
Economic Process, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) p.
124; Jack High, "Equilibrium and
Disequilibrium in the Market
Process," Subjectivism,
Intelligibility, and Economic
Understanding,
ed. Israel Kirzner, (New York: New York
University Press, 1986) pp. 113-
119; Ulrich Fehl, "Order and the
Subjectivity of Expectations: A Contribution to the
Lachmann-O'Driscoll Problem" also
in Kirzner, ed., 1986, pp. 72-86.
19
November 24, 1999
creative
contributors to their field will have the most influence in their field.
Political
entrepreneurs
will also generally seek to amass political influence and reputation.
With
regard to the issue of federalism, political entrepreneurship has two
dimensions.
First, a multiplicity of governments addressing similar problems at a similar
scale
enlarges the likelihood for successful innovation and discovery, even within
relatively
homogeneous societies. In the U.S. many innovations at the state level have
later
been adopted at the national level. In addition, often public programs and
policies
are
such that it is difficult to determine whether they are failures or whether the
issues
they
address are simply very intractable. Unlike scientific theories or market
ventures,
winnowing
out failures and determining how to improve existing programs is relatively
difficult.
Perhaps more than with these other self-organizing orders, the powerful
interests
that develop in favor of any particular status quo can use these ambiguities to
maintain
their position. Multiple points for innovation increase the likelihood that
improvements
will be discovered and failures abandoned. This observation applies at
every
level of the political community, from that of face to face democracy to state
and
provincial
politics, and even to that of nation states.30
Secondly,
it may not always be clear at what level or scale of inclusiveness a given
problem
might be most effectively addressed. Therefore, relative freedom of action
within
each political community is desirable. There has been a historical tendency for
higher
levels of authority gradually to diminish that of lower levels, usually well
beyond
the
point that the requirements of efficiency demand. For example, while small
European
nations
such as Denmark have proven capable of initiating and maintaining a wide
variety
of social measures, much larger American states are largely prohibited from
exercising
much innovation or initiative in these areas. Similarly, many urban programs
cease
benefiting from economies of scale once they serve a population equivalent to a
small
town. Nevertheless, they are administered in standardized forms over large
populations
by centralized bureaucracies.
Issues
tailor made to particular political boundaries do not usually arise.
Jurisdiction
is intrinsically uncertain. But a general principle that would seem reasonable
is
that the smallest unit able to afford
addressing a problem within its borders should have
wide
leeway in addressing it. More inclusive units can deal with neighborhood
effects,
but
not in ways which seriously constrain the choices at more local levels.
From
these considerations it follows that the more diverse the polity's constituent
units,
the more limited the prescriptive power of more inclusive units should be.
However,
their regulatory and enabling powers do not necessarily encounter such limits.
A
prescriptive power is the power to require particular actions regardless of their
outcomes
in particular cases. A regulatory power, by contrast, sets general goals and
standards,
but does not specify the specific means for attaining these goals and
standards.
An
enabling power either redistributes resources, enabling a person or community
to act
effectively
when it otherwise could not, or eliminates existing legal restrictions on
others'
actions
in order to achieve the same purpose.
30 See
Martin Landau, "Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication
and
Overlap," Public Administration Review, July/August, 1969, pp. 346-358.
20
November 24, 1999
For
example, if assistance to poor children were considered a desirable national
goal
- as hopefully it would be - the national or state authority could require that
every
local
authority develop a plan for minimal medical, educational, and other care, with
the
goal
of turning them ultimately into productive and self-supporting members of
society.
Cities
and counties could have primary responsibility for designing and implementing
the
programs.
To avoid the problem of proliferating unfunded mandates, any level of
government
requiring another to meet standards would provide enabling funding equal to
the
"low bid" required to accomplish that goal.
But
this argument hides a problem. "General standards and enabling" can
be
defined
so broadly as to include prescriptive legislation, defeating the argument's
intent.
John
Stuart Mill encountered the same problem when he tried to argue that liberty
should
be
inviolate when an act influences only the person acting. In fact, everything we do
impinges
in some way upon another. Crashing while riding a motorcycle without a
helmet
could cause extreme suffering for family and friends and, to the degree the
rider
was a
breadwinner, economic suffering for a family and additional demands upon the
social
services needed to support them. The conceptual world of politics provides no
protection
against the wiles of lawyers and ambitious politicians.
The
principle suggested here can provide guidance only when legislation is
considered
as existing on a continuum extending from regulating general standards and
enabling
acts to prescriptive measures prescribing what to do and how funds are to be
spent.
National legislation should usually fall clearly on the general standards and
enabling
end of the continuum.
To
state this point differently, the more inclusive the political body, the more
abstract
its law-making should be - particularly when it limits the freedom of action of
lower
level communities. Abstract principles are general principles and, as such,
allow
for a
variety of particular applications.
Even
so, as the Founders argued, paper principles, no matter how clearly enunciated
(and
this one cannot be clearly enunciated) cannot stand long against power unless it
is in
someone's
personal interest to defend them. American states have consistently lost power
and
authority to Washington because Americans have come to identify themselves more
as
Americans than as residents of the particular state in which they happen to
live.
Further,
in many instances states lost power because of their abuse of it, as with the
case
of
racist legislation by Southern states, and others, which ultimately was
overturned by
national
authority.
However
convincing the theoretical rationale for federalism, if people identify
primarily
with their national government, over time, in a democratic system, that
government
will acquire ever more power at the expense of lower units of government.
Those
who still speak of empowering the states vis-ˆ-vis Washington evidence mostly
their
political and intellectual irrelevance. Hardly anyone will fight for their
state against
the
nation, and so the states will never regain much authority that they have lost.
21
November 24, 1999
This
does not mean that federalism is simply a good theory of democracy for beings
other
than human ones. It does mean that federalism needs to be freed from over
dependence
on any particular institutional form it has taken.
Town
Meetings
The
most fundamental form of democratic self-governance is the democratic town
meeting.
They can only take place effectively within quite small communities. A
Swedish
study suggests that the maximum size for such a community is around 2500 for,
beyond
that size, citizens increasingly do not know who their town leaders are.31
This
number
is not much different from Aristotle's recommendation of the ideal size for a
Greek
polis.32
When a polity
exceeds this size, the representative principle becomes
increasingly
important for maintaining effective government.
When
visiting America, Alexis de Tocqueville was particularly impressed with the
vitality
and importance of town meeting government in New England. He considered it
an
invaluable school in politics and inculcator of civic spirit. The New England
township,
he wrote
possesses
two advantages which infallibly secure the attentive interest of
mankind,
namely, independence and authority. Its sphere is indeed small and
limited,
but within that sphere its action is unrestrained; and its existence gives
it a
real importance, which its extent and population may not always ensure.
. . .
without power and independence, a town may contain good subjects, but it
can
have no active citizens.33
Tocqueville
also perceived the deeper order underlying the confusing profusion of
political
bodies and projects in New England. "The appearance of disorder which
prevails
on the surface leads [the visitor] at first to imagine that society is in a
state of
anarchy;
nor does he perceive his mistake till he has gone deeper into the
subject."34
Tocqueville
believed that the foundation of a viable democratic civilization was
self-government
at the township level. In this he echoed an earlier judgment of Thomas
Jefferson.
Jefferson had been deeply impressed with the energy and strength of New
England's
tradition of town meeting democracy. Even though these small towns had
complicated
his own life while President, for they strongly opposed his policies towards
England,
Jefferson wanted to extend them from New England to embrace the country as a
whole.
He termed this fundamental unit of democracy a "ward republic." In
Jefferson's
words,
"These wards, called townships in New England, are the vital principle of
their
governments,
and have proved themselves the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of
man
for the perfect exercise of self-government, and for its preservation."35
31 Robert
A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and
Democracy, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1973), pp. 62-65.
32 Aristotle,
Politics, III, iii, 5.
33 Alexis
de Tocqueville, Democracy in America,
Vol. I., (New York: Schocken Books, 1961),
p. 62.
34 Ibid.,
p. 90.
35 Thomas
Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816.
22
November 24, 1999
Jefferson's
ideal for the nation was a federal system which began at the township or
small
town level, where politics was face - to - face, and extended upwards to the
county,
state,
and national levels. Each unit was to be responsible for those duties most
appropriate
to it. Wards were to provide their own elementary school, a company of
militia
with an elected officer, a justice of the peace and constable, take care of
their
poor,
construct their own roads, provide their own police, elect one or more jurors
to
serve
in the courts, and provide a means by which people could assemble and make
their
views
heard.
Jefferson
believed that simple voting was not enough to preserve a viable
democratic
order for the long run. Personal involvement was needed not just on election
day,
and not just during times of great abuse of power by corrupt representatives,
but
continually.
Where
every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward - republic, or of some of
the
higher ones, and feels that he is a participator in the government of affairs,
not
merely
at an election one day in the year, but every day; when there shall not be a
man
in the State who will not be a member of some one of its councils, great or
small,
he will let the heart be torn out of his body sooner than his power be
wrenched
from him by a Caesar or a Bonaparte.36
Jefferson
saw the principle of direct democracy as an important element within a
representative
one. He acknowledged that representation must "be substituted where
personal
action becomes impractical. Yet even over these representative organs, should
they
become corrupt and perverted, the division into wards, constituting the people
. . . a
regularly
organized power, enables them by that organization to crush, regularly and
peaceably,
the usurpations of their unfaithful agents. . . ." Ward democracies are
necessary
since, "No other depositories of power have ever yet been found which did
not
end
in converting to their own profit the earnings of those committed to their
charge."37
To
the end of his life, Jefferson lobbied for this extension of federal
principles. For
example,
in 1816 he wrote Samuel Kercheval, discussing recommended changes in the
Virginia
Constitution, that "The article nearest my heart is the division of the
counties
into
wards. These will be pure and elementary republics, the sum of which taken
together
composes the State, and will make the whole a true democracy as to the business
of
the wards, which is that of nearest and daily concern."38
Modern
times have seemingly moved ever farther away from Jefferson and
Tocqueville's
insights. Partially this was because most towns which once had direct
democratic
meetings grew too large for these traditions to be maintained. It was also
because
people became convinced that cities should ideally be controlled by
36 Jefferson
to Joseph C. Cabell, February 2, 1816.
37 Jefferson
to Samuel Kercheval, September 5, 1816.
38 Thomas
Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, Sept. 5, 1816. On ward republics, see also his
letters to John Taylor, May 26, 1810;
John Adams, October 28, 1813; Joseph C. Cabell,
January 14, 1818; and John Cartwright,
June 5, 1824.
23
November 24, 1999
professionals
and the alleged objectivity they bring to their jobs. Democracy at the local
level
was eaten away by the technocratic ideal.
Contemporary
urban problems of crime, and a decline in the quality of urban life
generally,
combined with ever more restrictive financial pressures, are now suggesting
that
this professionalized ideal has reached, or exceeded, the limits of its
competence.
Cities
are not instrumental organizations. They cannot be managed like a corporation,
for
they
do not exist to do the kinds of things corporations do.
Further,
a great many economies of scale cease applying within large urban units.
Citizens
generally report that smaller units of government are more responsive to their
needs
than are larger ones. Costs are often less. It is easier for volunteer groups
to
contribute
to the quality of urban life when politics takes place on a small scale.39
Today
there is fascinating evidence for the growth of increasingly federal features
at
the neighborhood level in many American cities. This is particularly the case
in
Dayton,
Ohio, St. Paul, Minnesota, Birmingham, Alabama, and Portland, Oregon.
Dayton's
7 priority boards and 74 neighborhoods set the annual agendas for the city to
work
on, ensure that the city responds, and work at revitalizing run down areas,
community
development, and responsive services. In St. Paul, neighborhood
representatives
make all initial funding recommendations on all city capital projects.
Each
individual neighborhood is a potent source of political action in its own
right.
Birmingham's
95 different neighborhoods decide how to allocate funds for improving
housing,
sewer, street, and utility services. In Portland, 87 neighborhoods with
independent
administrations influence land use planning, crime prevention, fire
protection,
and transportation and environmental policies. In all these cases, and a
growing
number of others, the entire city is divided into recognized neighborhoods
where
citizens
enter into political action on a face - to - face basis. Neighborhood
newspapers,
block
meetings, and similar activities serve to draw on all who are interested in
participating.
In Portland the city funds neighborhood administrative expenses, but
hiring
and firing of staff is in the hands of the neighborhoods themselves. Finally,
neighborhoods
have often become major initiators of policy. In St. Paul 70 to 80% of the
projects
funded each year are initiated by the neighborhoods.40
These
changes are not occurring because of a sudden ground swell of Jeffersonian
values.
They are responses to the growing complexities and expenses of modern
municipal
government. But studies of neighborhood participation in Dayton, St. Paul,
Birmingham,
and Portland suggest that Jefferson and Tocqueville's insights were
profoundly
accurate. When citizens are empowered by exercising control over their local
affairs,
their sense of their relationships within their community changes. The Tufts
study
concludes that "public opinion polls that are a part of our project have
shown a
strong
relationship between participation in these efforts and development of a sense
of
community
and tolerance for a range of political ideas. [With] average citizens gaining
39 See
The Organization of Local Public
Economies, (Washington, D.C.: Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, December, 1987), Publication A-109.
40 Two
interesting reports are Rob Gurwitt, "A Government that Runs on Citizen
Power,"
Governing,
December, 1992, pp. 48-54; ands White
Paper: New Directions for Community
Empowerment,
(Medford, Massachusetts: Lincoln Filene
Center, Tufts University), p. 6.
24
November 24, 1999
an
understanding of the problems that need to be addressed and coming up with ways
to
address
them. The relationship between citizens and government is altered."41
A
final example is indicative of what can be done in small communities of
empowered
citizens. San Juan Bautista is a small town of 1650 in central California. In
September,
1992, the city was forced to lay off its entire municipal staff. Its government
was
$150,000 in debt, was spending between $15,000 and $20,000 more per month than
it
was bringing in, and couldn't meet its next payroll. Two months later its debt
had
fallen
to $50,000 and public life was doing quite well. Many town jobs, including
cleaning
storm drains, reading water meters, shelving library books, answering the phone
at
city hall, and filling potholes in the roads were being handled by retirees,
the
unemployed,
and volunteers. San Juan Bautista's small size appears critical in enabling
such
an outpouring of local initiative.42 San Juan Bautista is about the
size of an urban
neighborhood,
well within the 2500 number which appears the ideal limit for everyone
having
a sense of participation within their community.
The
Future of Federalism
Most
commentaries on American federalism argue that its long-term prognosis
looks
poor. Some celebrate this diagnosis, others are concerned with the fate of
constitutional
government within a unitary state the size of our own.43
Certainly many
contemporary
political trends seek to make the states errand boys for the central
government
and the cities and counties into errand boys for the states. Even mayors who
delight
in praising the virtues of localism and citizen involvement draw the line as
soon
as
anyone suggests that neighborhoods be formally incorporated into an urban
federal
system.44
Virtually every
politician's definition of political competence emphasizes their
own
level of power and denies it to any which are lower. These trends are real and
worthy
of concern, for they make the political system less responsive, less able to
deal
creatively
with the challenges which confront it, and generate ever stronger interests
opposed
to adaptation. However, this description may be one sided.
Powerful
countervailing forces are at work, and they are fundamentally outside the
power
of bureaucrats and politicians. American cities and towns are subordinate to
state
governments.
They enjoy no protection under the Constitution. But, even without
constitutional
protection, once states had reached a certain level of complexity, and
political
abuses attained a certain level of indefensibility, reform movements arose
which
instilled
federal elements into many state constitutions. Progressive reforms freed many
cities
from domination by the state legislature, and gave them home rule.45
Nor is this
example
alone.
41 White Paper,
op. cit., p. 6.
42 John
Flinn, "Town Cashes in on Self-Reliance," San Francisco Examiner, December 13,
1992, pp. B-1, B-5.
43 Ostrom,
"Garcia, The Eclipse of
Federalism and the Central Government Trap," Meaning
of
American Federalism, op. cit., pp.
99-132.
44 As
I heard passionately expressed by a mayor just as passionately devoted to
greater
municipal autonomy at a symposium on
growth management at Simon Fraser University in
British Columbia.
45 Vincent
Ostrom, Robert Bish, Elinor Ostrom, Local
Government in the United States, (San
Francisco: Institute for Contemporary
Studies, 1988), pp. 27-35.
25
November 24, 1999
British
Columbia is constitutionally a unitary polity. Even so, it has successfully
experimented
with a proto-federalist innovation where regional districts were formed,
composed
of the municipalities within their borders. Twenty nine were created, ranging
from
the Greater Vancouver Regional District to districts encompassing small towns
and
wilderness.
Rather than centrally dictating what these districts would do, they were
established
primarily as enabling frameworks to facilitate independent initiatives by local
units.
Today, over 1500 different service combinations have been created within this
framework.
British
Columbia is not a true federalist system. This arrangement could be
overturned
tomorrow by a new provincial government. But it carries the seeds of a
federalist
framework, and if the experience of many American States is any guide, British
Columbia
may develop genuine federal features as the complexity of its society continues
to
increase.
But
these developments may be only the tiniest harbingers of things to come.
Political
scientists are generally infatuated with the nation state. Countless books and
articles
are written about state building and the like, but in fact, we may be nearing
the
end
of the nation state's usefulness as the primary political entity within the
world. And
not
because we need a world government, either.
The
primary purposes of having a powerful nation state has been military. But as
the
world becomes more democratic, the importance of large size begins to diminish.
Today
there is no serious military threat to the democratic world. This has never
before
been
the case. China could in the future become a threat, but it is at least as
likely that as
she
modernizes she will go the way of South Korea, and begin becoming democratic
herself.
In
addition, particularly in Europe and Japan, the nation state has had a tribal
identity.
But this identity is eroding in Europe and may well do so in Japan as well. The
result
in the short term is enormous stresses on the self-identities of Great Britain,
France,
Germany,
Sweden, and other countries. In the long run it will likely lead to a watering
down
of the remnants of tribalism, further weakening the importance of the nation
state.
The
role of cultural and economic concerns becomes stronger in people's lives, and
these
are not primarily the product of nation states. They are the product of cities.
Hong
Kong
and Singapore attest to the economic viability of cities, even when not
connected
by
sovereignty with a surrounding territory.
Liberal
democracy is the form politics takes as it makes an epochal transition from
the
hierarchical undemocratic state to self-organizing political processes. But in
many
respects,
it is not an ideal institutional framework for political self-organization. It
is too
centralized,
its political units too cumbersome and too vulnerable to exploitation by
higher
levels of political power.
States
as small as Denmark have proven capable of competently and abundantly
providing
the full range of domestic activities we associate with national sovereignty.
26
November 24, 1999
Denmark
has fewer people than the San Francisco Bay Area, or Chicago. There seems to
be no
economics of scale in providing social services once we get to the size of a
large
city.
Jane Jacobs argues persuasively that cities, not countries, are the basic
economic
entity
in human society. Jacobs writes that "in the workings of a city's economy
it makes
no
inherent difference which of its imports or how many originate within its own
country
and
which in others, and the same is true of the destination of its exports."46
We
have seen that the basic unit of democratic government is the small
selfgoverning
town
or neighborhood. Larger units are based upon it. We have seen further,
that
the logic of modern circumstances appears to favor greater neighborhood
autonomy
within
the city. The same logic holds for greater city autonomy within the nation. The
natural
political unit is the city, not the nation.
Even
today some cities are beginning to see that their economic future does not
necessarily
lie with the nation within which it happens to reside. In the Pacific Northwest
"Cascadia"
is the term applied to the economic powerhouse of Portland, Seattle, and
Vancouver.
In many respects the U.S. Canadian border is more nuisance than help.
Nor
is this an isolated development. In Europe four major cities are becoming
centers
for regional economic networks with little relation to national boundaries:
Barcelona,
Lyon, Milan, and Stuttgart. It is quite possible, and probably highly desirable,
for
today's cumbersome nation states to slowly dissolve into networks of cities
with their
connected
regions. Federalism will then apply mostly to urban/neighborhood relations,
and
relations between cities will increasingly become purely contractual rather
than
hierarchical.
At this point the self-organizing potentialities of a democratic society will
have
been largely attained. Many independent participants will maximize both
learning
and
creativity in addressing problems. Politics will be concentrated on human scale
activities.
And elites will be bound by economic and political realities to be responsive
and
open to a degree which today can only be imagined. Perhaps we can look forward
to
a
time when the President of the United States will be as well-known, and as
important, a
world
figure as the President of Switzerland is today.
46 Jane
Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations,
(New York: Random House, 1984), p. 43.