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AMA-gi
Volume 1
Number 1
Michaelmas Term 1996
Essay 8
Hayek's Constitutional Political Economy
By
Viktor Vanberg
Updated:31/01/98
Essay 9
Essay 7
Index |
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Hayek's Constitutional Political Economy
Viktor Vanberg Explores Hayek's Ideas on
the Relationship Between Rules, Order and Complex Social
Systems
Two Kinds of Order and Two Kinds of
Rules
Hayek has commented in detail on some of the more specific
characteristics of different kinds of social rules. The most fundamental
and significant distinction which he draws in this regard parallels his
familiar distinction between two kinds of social order (Hayek 1973: 35.).
In his first approximation Hayek distinguishes between spontaneous order
and organisation by characterising the former as rule-governed and the
latter as command-governed: while in a spontaneous order individuals are
'bound only by general rules of just conduct' in an organisation they are
'subject to specific directions by authority' (1976: 85). Hayek adds,
however, that this definition needs to be qualified, not only because, as
rules become more specific and commands more general, it may be difficult
to distinguish between the two, but also, and more importantly, because to
'some extent every organisation must rely also on rules and not only on
specific commands' (1973: 48). This is so essentially for the same 'use-of
knowledge' reason that applies to spontaneous orders. Only by relying on
general rules rather than specific commands can knowledge be used that
exists dispersed among the several members of an organisation, knowledge
that cannot feasibly be collected and processed by a central authority
(Hayek 1964: 9).
However, while acknowledging that not only spontaneous orders but
organisations as well rely on rules, Hayek emphasises that there are
'important differences between the kinds of rules which the two different
kinds of order require' (1973: 48). Indeed, he argues that the difference
between the two kinds of order is systematically related to the difference
between the kinds of rules on which they rest. That is, he suggests that
the conceptual distinction between spontaneous order and organisation is
in part a matter of specifying 'in what respect the rules required for the
purposes of organisation differ' from the 'rules of just conduct' (ibid.:
122).
Hayek's treatment of this issue is not entirely free from ambiguity
because he does not always clearly separate the question of how these two
kinds of rules differ in their nature from the question of how they
originate (whether they 'spontaneously evolve' or are 'deliberately
designed'). Even though it is plausible to assume that some de facto
correlation exists between the two aspects, they relate to two
conceptually different dimensions, and - as Hayek indeed acknowledges -
the difference in nature between the two kinds of rules should therefore
be defined independently of their mode of origin.
In a section entitled 'The rules of spontaneous orders and the rules of
organisations' Hayek (ibid.: 48.) explains the differences that in his
view separate the two types of rules as follows:
What distinguishes the rules which will govern action within an
organisation is that they must be rules for the performance of assigned
tasks. They presuppose that the place of each individual in a fixed
structure is determined by command and that the rules each individual
must obey depend on the place which he has been assigned and on the
particular ends which have been indicated for him by the commanding
authority . . . Rules of organisation are thus necessarily subsidiary to
commands, filling in the gaps left by the commands. Such rules will be
different for the different members of the organisation according to the
different roles which have been assigned to them, and they will have to
be interpreted in the light of the purposes determined by the commands
(Hayek 1973: 49).
By contrast, Hayek argues, the rules of just conduct on which
spontaneous orders rely have a number of characteristics that make them
'logically distinct' (ibid.: 125) from rules of organisation (1976: 31.,
126.). They are universal in the sense of being 'the same, if not
necessarily for all members, at least for whole classes of members not
individually designated by name. They must . . . be rules applicable to an
unknown and indeterminable number of persons and instances' (1973: 50).
They are 'negative in the sense that they prohibit rather than enjoin
particular kinds of actions' (1976: 36). They 'only limit the range of
permitted action' (1973:127;1976:124) and 'protect ascertainable domains
within which each individual is free to act as he chooses' (1976: 36),
thus making 'the peaceful coexistence of individuals in society possible'
(1973: 72).
When one contrasts, in the manner indicated, rules of just conduct and
rules of organisation, it is important to keep in mind that organisations
are 'subject' to rules in two different regards. There are, first, the
rules which co-ordinate the activities of the several members of an
organisation and, thus, constitute the organisation as an operating unit.
These rules concern the internal operation of the organisation, they
govern the behaviour of, and interrelations among, individuals in their
capacity as members of the organisation. In addition, organisations are
subject to 'rules of conduct' which apply to their 'external behaviour' as
operating units or legal entities, in essentially the same sense in which
individuals (natural persons) are subject to rules of conduct in their
behaviour toward others. Only the first category of rules falls under the
rubric of rules of organisation in the sense specified above. The second
category, by contrast, systematically belongs into the same rubric as the
general rules of conduct, they are, in Hayek's terms, 'rules regulating
the conduct of persons toward others, . . . delimiting the boundary of the
protected domain of each person (or organised group of persons)'
(1973:122).
Indeed, organisations as 'legal persons' and individuals as 'natural
persons' can be, and typically are, to some extent subject to the same set
of 'rules of conduct', and it is, as Hayek emphasises, one of the
important issues for constitutional policy' to determine whether and in
what regards it may be necessary or advisable that organisations as 'legal
persons' be subject to 'rules of conduct' different from those that apply
to 'ordinary', natural persons. Hayek is explicitly critical of a view
that he sees behind certain arguments in the debate on the legal status of
corporations, namely 'the conception that, if legal personality was
conferred upon the corporation, it was natural to confer it upon it all
powers which natural persons possessed' (1967: 309). He considers this 'by
no means a natural or obvious consequence' (ibid.). In his view the power
that can be concentrated in organisations or corporate entities, as well
as certain rights that existing law concedes to such 'legal persons' - in
particular the privilege of limited liability (ibid.: 306) - may require
that organisations be subject to 'limitations by general rules of law far
more narrow than those it has been found necessary to impose by law on the
actions of private individuals' (1979: 90).
The Rules of Government
The distinction between the rules of (internal) organisation in the
defined sense and the rules of the (external) 'conduct' of organisations,
deserves special attention where the particular organisation is concerned
that we call 'state' or government'. The fact that the state is the
organisation which is charged with the task of securing the framework of
general rules of conduct upon which the spontaneous order of society is
based, and at the same time is itself, as an organisation, subject to
rules, tends, as Hayek supposes, to cause confusion concerning the nature
of the different kinds of rules that are involved. Several issues ought to
be carefully separated in this regard.
There is, first, the separation between 'state' (or 'government') and
'society'. The social order which we call society is, as Hayek argues, a
spontaneous order (1976: 103), it is 'the spontaneously grown network of
relationships between the individuals and the various organisations they
create' (1979: 140). By contrast, the state is 'the organisation of the
people of a territory under a single government' (ibid.), an organisation
which, in order to carry out its functions requires an organised
apparatus, called government. The spontaneous order 'society' not only
contains, as Hayek explains, many organisations, it also requires 'an
organisation to enforce obedience to (and modify and develop) the body of
abstract rules which are required to secure the formation of the
spontaneous overall order' (1964:10). This organisation, the state,
typically also renders other services to its members, the citizens, such
that 'two distinct tasks' (1973:131) or 'two distinct functions of
government' (ibid.: 48) need to be distinguished which Hayek classifies as
'coercive functions' and 'service functions', a classification that
parallels J. M. Buchanan's (1975: 68.) distinction between 'protective
state' and 'productive state'.
It is, Hayek emphasises, 'most important that we keep clearly apart
these altogether different tasks' because the rationale behind the special
authority which government must be granted in its coercive function does
not extend to its service functions (1979: 42). In particular, while in
its first role, as 'protective agent', government necessarily commands a
monopoly role as referee-enforcer of the 'rules of the game', in its
second role, as 'productive agent', it acts as a player among others
within the game and does not need to be granted a monopoly position in
order to fulfil its service functions. While all citizens are necessarily
subject to the rules which government enforces in its 'protective' role,
individuals are not as such subject to the authority of government in its
'productive' role. The authority that government can claim in this regard
is strictly confined to its control of the limited amount of 'personal and
material resources entrusted to it for rendering services' (1973:131). It
is therefore, as Hayek points out, entirely misleading to speak - as is
sometimes done - 'of a government 'running a country' as if the whole
society were an organisation managed by it (ibid.), a formulation that
would be descriptive only of a perfectly totalitarian society in which
government would claim control over virtually all resources, in which case
the distinction between 'state' and 'society' would become meaningless. In
all other cases the distinction between the spontaneous order of 'society'
and the organisation 'state' can be specified in terms of the distinction
between the 'share of the resources of society' (1979: 16) that is subject
to governmental control and those resources which individuals, separately
or organised in private organisations, are free to use within the confines
of the general rules of conduct enforced by the 'protective state'.
Hayek's general argument on the differences between the 'two kinds of
order' implies that the rules on which the organisations state and
government are based 'necessarily possess a character different from that
of the universal rules of just conduct which form the basis of the
spontaneous order of society at large' (1973:125). As Hayek states, the
latter category of rules essentially coincides with private law (including
criminal law) while the rules of the organisation of government correspond
to what is called public law. The public law which determines the
organisation of government (1976: 31) defines the terms of membership in
the organisation 'state', that is, it specifies the rights and obligations
of individuals as citizens, and it regulates 'the powers of the agents of
government over the material and personal resources entrusted to them'
(1973: 125). Into the 'public law' category fall, in particular, those
rules which in the conventional, more narrow sense of the term can be
called constitutional (1979:100), that is, the 'rules of the allocation
and limitation of the powers of government' (1973:134), rules that are
'chiefly concerned with the organisation of government and the allocation
of the different powers to the various parts of this organisation' (1979:
37). Though, in a general sense, the rules 'comprised in the constitution'
can all be classified as organisational rules, it is more accurate to
distinguish, as indicated above, between two kinds of constitutional
rules, namely, on the one side, those that are concerned with the
(internal) organisation of the 'state' and its apparatus 'government',
and, on the other side, those that limit the authority of government,
rules that constrain the actions of this organisation. Stated differently,
one ought to distinguish between the rules of organisations in the strict
sense, i.e., those parts of the constitution (or of public law) which
constitute the multi-person units 'state' and 'government' as
decision-making and acting organisations, and the rules which impose
constraints on the range and kinds of decisions and actions that the state
and its governmental apparatus are authorised to engage in. The
organisational rules of government in essence determine how or in what
manner the resources that are subject to governmental authority are to be
administered. They determine, for instance, the procedures by which
decisions on various matters are to be made, how representatives and
public officials are elected or appointed, they 'establish a hierarchy of
command' and determine 'the responsibility and the range of discretion of
the different agents' (1973:125) etc. These are rules that apply to
individuals in their capacities as either members, i.e., citizens, or
agents of the organisation 'state'. In a more inclusive interpretation,
they can be said also to include rules regulating the 'private use of
public resources', like the rules concerning the use of public parks or,
more significantly, the 'rules of the road'.
The limiting rules of government, by contrast, are concerned with what
the state may do as an organisation, rather than with how it can operate
as an organisation. They define the limits of governmental authority. They
define and confine the share of the resources of society that is to be
controlled by the state, and they constrain the range and kind of
decisions and actions that the state, through the apparatus of government,
may carry out. The most obvious rationale for such limiting rules lies, of
course, in the principal-agent or Leviathan problem, that is, in the issue
of how those who actually exercise the powers of government can be
effectively prevented from misusing these powers. This problem has been
the principal concern of the advocates of the idea of constitutional
government. There is, however, a further - and less well recognised -
rationale for limiting rules to which Hayek draws attention. The same
reasons, that - as discussed above - make it advisable for a single
individual to submit to rules can, Hayek argues, also be applied to the
realm of collective action in general and to the organisations state and
government in particular. In the same sense in which rules are necessary
to give coherence to the several successive decisions and actions of an
individual person, rules are also needed - and even more so - to guide
decisions that are made by a group of individuals, in order to prevent the
successive decisions from producing incoherent and undesirable overall
outcomes. 'Even more so', because the 'natural unity' and intertemporal
identity which characterises the individual person as decision-maker is
absent in the case of collective decisions, in particular in the case of
majority decisions (Hayek 1960: 110,111;1979: 7, 18,19).
As Hayek points out, the distinction between organisational and
limiting rules of government can be related to the distinction between two
ideals of government, namely, liberalism and democracy, which, despite
their historical interconnections, ought to be analytically separated as
concerned with different issues. The ideal of democracy is principally
concerned with the organisational rules of government, while the ideal of
liberalism is principally concerned with the limiting rules of government.
The former is concerned with the issue of who controls the apparatus of
government, the latter is concerned with the issue of how the power of
government can be effectively limited and constrained - separately and
independently of the first issue. The failure to clearly recognise that
these are two separate issues is, Hayek supposes, at the roots of the
institutional deficiencies that he diagnoses in the prevailing form of
modern democratic government. The 'endeavour to contain the powers of
government' which was the great aim of the constitutionalist movement in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was, as Hayek (1979: 128)
suggests, 'almost inadvertently abandoned when it came to be mistakenly
believed that democratic control of the exercise of power provided a
sufficient safeguard against its excessive growth'. Because of this
'tragic illusion' the primary attention in the formation of modern
democratic regimes has been focused, in terms of the above distinction, on
the organisational rules of government, neglecting the rules that are
designed to limit the powers of government, a fact that, as Hayek argues,
has allowed these regimes to develop characteristics and to generate
overall results with which hardly anybody can be satisfied. What, in
Hayek's judgement, is therefore most needed in order to correct the
institutional deficiencies of modern democracy is the revival of the
constitutionalist ideal 'that the power of all authorities exercising
governmental functions ought to be limited by long run rules which nobody
has the power to alter or abrogate in the service of particular ends'
(1979: l29).
the order of rules and the order of
actions
The interplay between the rules of individual conduct and the social
order of actions is a theme equally central to Hayek's system of thought
as the previously discussed role-of-rules theme. Hayek takes much care to
point out that we have to clearly distinguish between two different
aspects or levels of what we refer to as 'social order', namely 'the
systems of rules of conduct which govern the behaviour of the individual
members of a group . . . on the one hand and, on the other hand, the order
or pattern of actions which results from this for the group as a whole'
(1967: 66). Careful recognition of the distinctiveness of the order of
rules and the order of actions (1973: 98) is, according to Hayek, an
essential prerequisite for our understanding of how rules contribute to
the formation of social order and how differences and changes in the
underlying rules will affect the order or pattern of actions.
In his discussion of the 'connection between the rules men obey and the
order which is formed as a result' (1967:112) Hayek primarily concerns
himself with spontaneous orders, with orders that are entirely based on
general rules of conduct. It should be obvious, however, that the issue of
how different rules affect the resulting order of actions is of relevance
for orders of the organisation-type as well, that is, for orders which are
based on a combination of rules and commands. In fact, Hayek's arguments
on the relationship between the 'two kinds of order' and the 'two kinds of
rules' and, in particular, his arguments on the defects of modern
democratic institutions, exemplify how such analysis can be generalised
across different types of social arrangements.
The ways in which rules contribute to the formation of a spontaneous
social order and in which the character of the rules affects the character
of the resulting order of actions can be illuminated, as Hayek suggests,
by drawing an analogy with ordinary games. The rules, he argues, that
lead...
to the formation of the spontaneous order have much in common with
rules observed in playing a game . . . A game is indeed a clear instance
of a process wherein obedience to common rules by elements pursuing
different and even conflicting purposes results in overall order.
(Hayek 1988:154)
It is in reference to this analogy between the nature of games and the
nature of spontaneous orders that Hayek describes the order of the market
as the game of catallaxy, the game of exchange.
For ordinary games we cannot only clearly distinguish between the rules
of the game and the pattern of actions resulting under these rules, we can
also systematically analyse the differences and changes in the order of
actions that will result under different sets of rules or from changes in
rules, and furthermore, we can systematically compare alternative systems
of rules as to the desirability, for the persons involved, of the order of
actions that different rules will tend to generate. Essentially the same
analytical perspective can be applied, not only to the 'economic game' of
the market as well as other kinds of spontaneous orders, but also to
social arrangements that fall into the category of organisations, private
and public.
In ordinary games as well as in the various arrangements of social
co-operation, Hayek argues, the nature of the 'rules of the game' - in
conjunction with the circumstances that prevail in the respective
environment - will determine whether an order of action will emerge and of
what character this order will be (1967: 71). That in his sense
'appropriate rules' are a prerequisite for the beneficial operation of the
spontaneous order of the market has been clearly recognised, as Hayek
points out, by the eighteenth-century founders of classical liberalism.
The problem that they raised is, in Hayek's account, still the central
issue for social theory and for social policy, namely the question of
'what kind of rules of conduct will produce an order of society and what
kind of order particular rules will produce' (1973: 44).
In discussing the issue of how we can know or find out what good or
appropriate rules are, Hayek applies an argument that parallels his
reasoning on the role of rules (see the first section). Our 'irremediable
ignorance' which renders our reason insufficient 'to master the full
detail of complex reality' not only creates a need for relying on rules,
it also makes it necessary for us, Hayek argues, largely to rely on
unquestioned traditional rules instead of attempting to choose rationally
or construct the system of rules that we want to follow. This argument
has, Hayek reminds us, already been stated by David Hume who reasoned
that human intelligence is quite insufficient to comprehend all
the details of the complex human society, and [. . .] it is this
inadequacy of our reason . . . which forces us to be content with
abstract rules; and further that no single human intelligence is capable
of inventing the most appropriate abstract rules because those rules
which have evolved in the process of growth of society embody the
experience of many more trials and errors than any individual mind could
acquire. (Hayek 1967: 88)
There are, in other words, two dimensions to the 'knowledge problem' as
thematised by Hayek: there is, first, the cross-sectional problem of using
the fractional knowledge that is dispersed among the several individuals
living as contemporaries; and there is, second, the intertemporal problem
of profiting from experiences that previously-living generations have
made. With regard to the intertemporal dimension of the use-of-knowledge
problem, Hayek has advanced a theory of cultural evolution. It is
sufficient to note that this theory is not meant to deny the potential
usefulness of critical rational analysis and deliberate reform of rules.
Hayek explicitly states that the evolutionist -argument does not diminish
our particular interest in 'those rules which, because we can deliberately
alter them, become the chief instrument whereby we can affect the
resulting order, namely the rules of law' (1973: 45), and he deplores the
fact that the important question of which 'rules of individual action can
be deliberately and profitably altered, and which are likely to evolve
gradually with or without such deliberate collective decisions as
legislation involves, is rarely systematically considered' (1967: 72).
The Role of Constitutional
Politics
Rather than denying that there is a role for rational analysis and
deliberate the reform of the framework of rules within which we find
ourselves, Hayek's emphasis on cultural evolution is intended to remind us
of two things that rationalist zeal tends to disregard: we should approach
inherited traditional rules with modesty and caution because they may well
incorporate experience, and perform beneficial functions, of which we are
not aware. And, second, we should keep in mind that an improvement of the
framework of rules can be realistically expected not from rationally
redesigning the entire structure, but rather from experimental, piecemeal
change. As Hayek puts it:
Since any established system of rules of conduct will be based on
experiences which we only partly know, . . . we cannot hope to improve
it by structuring anew the whole of it. If we are to make full use of
all the experience which has been transmitted only in the form of
traditional rules, all criticism and efforts at improvement of
particular rules must proceed within a framework of given values which
for the purpose in hand must be accepted as not requiring
justification. (Hayek 1976: 24)
Advocating, in this sense, 'reverence for the traditional' (1960: 63)
does not mean, as Hayek explains, to 'maintain that all tradition as such
is sacred and are exempt from criticism, but merely that the basis of
criticism of any one product of tradition must always be other products of
tradition which we either cannot or do not want to question' (1976:
25).
As long as we keep these provisos properly in mind, however, 'we must',
Hayek suggests, 'constantly re-examine our rules and be prepared to
question every single one of them' (1979: 167), and 'we must always strive
to improve our institutions' (1960: 63). Hayek's approach does not only
allow for, but explicitly assigns a systematic role to, rational and
deliberate constitutional policy. In fact, constitutional analysis in the
sense of a comparative study of the general working characteristics of
alternative systems of rules, rather than the study of the concrete
effects of particular measures should, in Hayek's view, be the major
concern of economics. By providing such comparative information on the
general characteristics of the outcome patterns that can be expected to
result under hypothetical alternative rules, constitutional economics can
serve as an important informational input for constitutional politics.
Such constitutional policy is what, from a Hayekian perspective, we
primarily have to rely upon in our 'endeavour to make society good in the
sense that we shall like to live in it' (1973: 33).
Hayek says of his own approach that its 'emphasis is on the positive
task of improving our institutions' (1960: 5) and he critically notes
about the 'traditional liberal doctrine' that it has not paid sufficient
attention to this task and has 'never developed a sufficiently clear
programme for the development of a legal framework designed to preserve an
effective market order' (1978: 145). In particular in his 1939 pamphlet,
Freedom and the Economic System, the 'prelude' to his The Road to Serfdom
(1972: xix), and in his 1947 address to the first meeting of what then
became the Mont Pelerin-Society ('Free Enterprise and Competitive Order',
1948: l07.), Hayek defines a quite active role for constitutional politics
or Ordnungspolitik, more so than in most of his later writings. He points
out that the argument against the constructivist rationalist notion of
social planning is not an argument against any kind of rational planning
in social affairs. There is room for the 'construction of a rational
framework of general and permanent rules' (1939: 10), we 'can "plan" a
system of general rules', he argues, 'which provides an institutional
framework within which the decisions as to what to do . . . are left to
the individuals' (1939: 88).
In the 1970's Hayek has commented in the same vein on the then
fashionable notions of 'national planning', stressing that the 'dispute
between the modern planners and their opponents is . . . not a dispute on
whether we ought to choose intelligently between the various possible
organisations of society' (1978: 234) but rather it is about the
constructivist rationalist 'claim that man can achieve a desirable order
of society by concretely arranging all its parts in full knowledge of all
the relevant facts' (1967: 88). While he considers such a claim to be no
more than a fatal conceit Hayek leaves no doubt that in his view we not
only can, but ought to, strive to 'achieve a desirable order of society'
by improving the framework of rules and institutions within which we can
pursue, separately and jointly, our various interests and purposes. There
is according to Hayek, 'ample scope for experimentation and improvement
within that permanent legal framework which makes it possible for a free
society to operate most efficiently', and he adds: 'We can probably at no
point be certain that we have already found the best arrangements or
institutions (1960: 231). The issue of what may be, under ever changing
circumstances the most desirable and effective system of rules, that is,
the question of how the extent and limitations of property rights ought to
be specified, has, in Hayek's view, found less attention within the
classical liberal tradition than it deserves, a fact that, he suspects,
may have contributed to some of the resentment that the liberal doctrine
has attracted. Hayek's 1947 Mont-Pelerin address was clearly designed to
correct this deficiency and to stress the role that the classical liberal
doctrine ought to assign to a constitutional politics that aims at
improving the 'legal framework' (1948: 110). That a functioning market
presupposes the prevention of violence and fraud as well as the protection
of or certain rights is, Hayek argues, 'always taken for granted'. But, he
adds,
Where the traditional discussion becomes so unsatisfactory is
where it is suggested that, with the recognition of the principles of
private property of and freedom of contract . . . all the issues were
settled, as if the law of property and contract were given once and
for all in its final and most appropriate form. (Hayek 1948: 111)
.
The 'real problem' begins, however, as Hayek notes, when we ask what
the specific content of these general principles under particular
circumstances ought to be and how their content ought to be adjusted to
changing circumstances as they may result, for instance, from the
invention of new technologies. The various and manifold issues which Hayek
lists in this context include 'the law of property and contract, of
corporations and associations, . . . the problems of taxation, and the
problems of international trade' (1948: 113), as well as problems
concerning 'the extension of the concept of property to such rights and
privileges as patents for inventions, copyright, trade-marks, and the
like' (ibid.:113.). In all these areas there is, in Hayek's view, a role
to be played by rational analysis and design of rules and institutions or,
in other words, for constitutional politics. In particular, with regard to
the problem of the 'regulation of corporations' that has been briefly
discussed earlier in this article, Hayek stresses the 'need for the
deliberate creation of special legal institutions' and he comments that
'we should not be content to let the market develop appropriate
institutions under the general principle of freedom of contract' (1967:
306).
Conclusion
The interrelation between the legal order or, more generally, the
system of rules and the social pattern or order of actions resulting under
those rules is, as stated at the beginning of this article, not only a
central theme in Hayek's system of thought, it is the central theme of a
constitutional political economy. It is a theme that, as Hayek (1969: 172)
suggests, should have been all along the central problem of the group of
disciplines that, in the German academic system, used to be called the
Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften (the legal and social sciences). The
eighteenth-century founders of political economy, David Hume and Adam
Smith, were, as Hayek points out, 'indeed as much philosophers of law as
students of the economic order, and their conception of law and their
theory of the market mechanism are closely connected' (1967: 136). The
subsequent separation of the legal and social sciences as well as the
disciplinary fragmentation of the latter created, however, in Hayek's
account, a situation where nobody systematically studies any more what was
once the central unifying theme of these various sciences (1969: 173).
Reflecting in retrospect on his own intellectual development, Hayek
supposes that it was his interest in the role of rules in social
co-ordination that led him 'from technical economics into all kinds of
questions usually regarded as philosophical' (1967: 91), and he views his
own work as an attempt to re-establish the systematic inquiry into the
core theme of classical political economy, and to contribute to a renewed
'interweaving of the philosophy, jurisprudence, and economics of freedom'
(1960: 6). Much 'more closer collaboration between the specialists in
economics, law, and social philosophy than we had in recent times' (1967:
92) is, Hayek supposes, required in order to further an understanding of
the interrelation between rules an social order upon which an informed
constitutional politics can be based.
Hayek's efforts to revive - within the context of the contemporary
disciplinary specialisation of law and the various social sciences - the
kind of integrated systematic study of the rules and order problem that
was at the core of classical political economy, provide an important input
to the research programme of modern constitutional political economy, a
field for which the following quotation from Hayek's Rules and Order is an
appropriate motto:
Yet, although the problem of an appropriate social order is today
studied from the different angles of economics, jurisprudence, political
science, sociology, and ethics, the problem is one which can be
approached successfully only as a whole. (Hayek 1973:
4)
(An Excerpt from the Rules and Choice in Economics, Routledge,
London, 1994)
Dr Viktor J. Vanberg, Professor of Economics, Albert Ludwigs
Universitä t, Freiberg
References:
F. A. Hayek,
1. Freedom & the Economic System (Public Policy Pamphlet no.
29), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.
2. Individualism & Economic Order, Chicago: University Press,
1948.
3. The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960.
4. "Kinds of order in society", New Individualist Review, Vol. 3,
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6. Law Legislation & Liberty (Vol I, II, III Rules and Order),
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James Buchanan,
1. The Limits of Liberty- Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975.
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