WHAT CAN FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE LEARN FROM VAGUENESS DOCTRINE?
Tracey Maclin[*]
INTRODUCTION
On April 5, 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that the police search of
Sandra Houghton's purse was constitutional. Houghton was one of two female
passengers in a car that was stopped for speeding and driving with a faulty
brake light. When an officer questioned the driver about a hypodermic syringe in
his shirt pocket, the driver said he used the syringe to take drugs. The
occupants of the car were then ordered out. The police searched Houghton's
purse, which was on the backseat, and they discovered narcotics inside. The
Court held that the search was permissible even though the police had no reason
to believe that the purse contained drugs. It reasoned that probable cause to
believe that narcotics present in a car gives the police discretion to search
all containers in the car capable of holding narcotics.[1]
Two months after Houghton was decided, the Court invalidated
Chicago's gang congregation ordinance. Chicago v. Morales[2]
concerned a law that barred criminal street gang members from loitering with one
another or with others in a public place. The law had four components. First, a
police officer must have had probable cause to believe that one of the two or
more persons present in a public place is a street gang member. Second, the
persons involved must have been "loitering," which was defined as remaining in a
public place "with no apparent purpose." Third, the officer must have ordered
the persons to leave the area. Fourth, any person who disobeyed the dispersal
order would be arrested. Six members of the Court concluded that the ordinance
was too vague because it failed to provide minimal guidelines to control police
discretion when enforcing the law.
The main source of discretionary police power was the ordinance's
definition of "loitering." Under the ordinance, if an officer believed that a
gang member and others were in a public space "with no apparent purpose," such
conduct constituted loitering.[3]
The ordinance provided officers with no guidelines or criteria for deciding
whether a group of persons in a public place had an apparent purpose. According
to the Court, "[t]he `no apparent purpose' standard for making that decision is
inherently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is
`apparent' to the officer on the scene."[4]
The Court was also troubled by the scope of the ordinance. Not only did the
ordinance affect a substantial amount of innocent conduct, but it also applied
to "everyone in the city who may remain in one place with one suspected gang
member as long as their purpose is not apparent to an officer observing them."[5]
In sum, the Court invalidated the ordinance because it did not provide
sufficient minimal standards to guide police.
Viewed doctrinally, Houghton and Morales are like apples
and oranges. Houghton is the most recent application of the Court's
automobile search doctrine. Where police have probable cause that contraband or
criminal evidence may be inside a car, they have unchecked discretion to search
anywhere in the car and anything therein that is capable of holding the object
of the search. The absence of any evidence that suggested Houghton's purse
contained drugs is irrelevant. "A passenger's personal belongings, just like the
driver's belongings or containers attached to the car like a glove compartment,
are `in' the car, and the officer has probable cause to search for contraband
in the car."[6]
Therefore, although the search of a woman's purse is a severe intrusion of
privacy[7]
and the cause for such an intrusion in this case was unjustified,[8]
the Court determined that the search of Houghton's purse was "reasonable" under
the Fourth Amendment.[9]
Ironically, a purse found inside a car is not afforded the protection of a
neutral magistrate's determination of cause to search it, but a briefcase
discovered at a murder scene inside a home is afforded such protection.[10]
Morales, on the other hand, concerns vagueness law. Under the
vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must satisfy two requirements. First, the
challenged statute must provide fair and adequate notice of what conduct the law
prohibits so that the ordinary person can avoid arrest and prosecution. Second,
the statute must not authorize or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement. In Morales, a majority of the Court did not agree whether
Chicago's statute satisfied the fair notice requirement. However, a six-Justice
majority did conclude that Chicago's statute failed the second prong of the
vagueness doctrine and that Chicago's ordinance did not provide clear guidelines
to control police discretion.
Although Houghton and Morales are doctrinally dissimilar, a
comparison of the rulings removed from their doctrinal boxes indicates a paradox
in the Court's thinking: the Court is clearly of two minds regarding the
Constitution's tolerance for police discretion.[11]
Despite an explicit reference in the Constitution's text that limits
governmental intrusions, the Court's Fourth Amendment cases regularly allow
police broad discretion in conducting searches and seizures. At the same time,
the Court's vagueness cases have invalidated criminal statutes--even when they
do not directly affect any enumerated right--when the statutes grant police too
much discretion. This tension in the Court's thinking was highlighted by Justice
Thomas's dissent in Morales. Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that Chicago's ordinance granted too much discretion to police. In
particular, he noted that the ordinance did nothing more than "confirm the
well-established principle that the police have the duty and the power to
maintain the public peace, and, when necessary, to disperse groups of
individuals who threaten it."[12]
In Justice Thomas's view the ordinance maintained the right balance between
providing objective guidelines for police and not constraining their every move.
He noted:
Just as we trust officers to rely on their experience and expertise in
order to make spur-of-the-moment determinations about amorphous legal standards
such as "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion," so we must trust them to
determine whether a group of loiterers contains individuals (in this case
members of criminal street gangs) whom the city has determined threaten the
public peace.[13]
Simply put, Justice Thomas believed that the reasoning and result in
Morales could not be reconciled with the Court's Fourth Amendment
rulings.[14]
Justice
Thomas's conclusions in Morales were both right and wrong. Although his
cursory reference to the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards
hardly makes the point, Justice Thomas correctly noted that the police
discretion authorized by Chicago's ordinance is quite similar to the police
discretion routinely sanctioned by the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
For example, in the two Terms prior to Morales, the Court issued three
opinions affording police substantial discretion to search or seize citizens
during ordinary encounters. In one case, the Court ruled that police could
arbitrarily order passengers out of cars during routine traffic stops.[15]
In a second case, the Court held that a motorist who has been stopped for a
traffic violation need not be informed of his right to leave the scene before
being questioned by a police officer about the contents of his vehicle and his
willingness to allow a consent search of his car.[16]
Finally, in a third case, the Court ruled that pretextual traffic stops did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.[17]
Moreover, during the same Term in which Morales was decided, the
Court handed down two other rulings--in addition to Houghton--that gave
police discretionary power to exercise particularly intrusive conduct.
Florida v. White[18]
held that police have the power to seize a vehicle from a public place when they
have probable cause that it is forfeitable contraband, even though the owner of
the vehicle is in custody and the police give no reasons for their failure to
obtain a warrant authorizing the seizure. In the second case, Minnesota v.
Carter,[19]
which was decided six months before Morales, the Court ruled that
houseguests may not always rely upon the security and privacy of their host's
home to challenge suspicionless surveillance of the home by the police.
If one considers the various types of police power authorized by the
Court's Fourth Amendment cases immediately preceding Morales, the Chicago
ordinance appears to grant a reasonable degree of police authority. Under
Chicago's ordinance, an officer's power to arrest was conditioned upon a
determination of probable cause that a criminal gang member was present in a
public place with no apparent purpose, in addition to a refusal to obey an
unequivocal order to leave the scene. If the Court were applying a
"reasonableness" analysis, surely this degree of police discretion and authority
would be a permissible law enforcement tool, particularly where the record
showed that "a continuing increase in criminal street gang activity was largely
responsible for the city's rising murder rate, as well as an escalation of
violent and drug related crimes."[20]
Indeed, one could credibly argue that the discretion authorized by Chicago's
ordinance fits comfortably within a constitutional jurisprudence that allows the
police arbitrarily to order motorists and passengers out of their cars during
routine traffic stops, that permits the search of a woman's purse without
specific cause, and that allows police arbitrarily to monitor the activities
inside a private home by peering through gaps in closed window blinds.[21]
When seen in this light, Justice Thomas's assertion that the result in
Morales cannot be reconciled with the Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine
seems understated, to say the least.
Although Justice Thomas accurately notes that the discretion authorized
under Chicago's ordinance was similar to the type of police discretion that the
Court routinely sanctions in Fourth Amendment cases, Justice Thomas reaches the
wrong conclusion in Morales. Chicago's ordinance was unconstitutional
because it afforded police too much discretion to order people to "move on."
Instead of shaping vagueness doctrine to mirror the discretion afforded officers
under the Fourth Amendment, as Justice Thomas would have it, Fourth Amendment
doctrine should recognize and adopt "the more important aspect of vagueness
doctrine,"[22]
which is the establishment of "guidelines to prevent `arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement' of the law."[23]
In other words, now that the constitutional norm of controlling police
discretion is an essential feature of vagueness law and provides an independent
basis to invalidate a criminal statute that does not implicate a constitutional
right, then that same constitutional principle can (and should) assist the Court
in determining whether a challenged police intrusion violates the guarantees of
the Fourth Amendment.
Using the result in Morales as a starting point, this article will
examine the constitutional norm of controlling police discretion. My focus will
be on the Fourth Amendment. However, Morales's conclusion that the
Constitution requires the establishment of guidelines and rules to prevent
arbitrary and discretionary law enforcement will be the underlying theme that
connects the discussion of Fourth Amendment cases that might otherwise appear
dissimilar.
Part I examines the legal principle emerging from Morales. First,
because Morales has received heavy criticism from some quarters,[24]
I consider whether the norm of controlling police discretion is a legitimate
constitutional principle that justifies judicial invalidation of a statute.
Next, I assess whether the norm of requiring minimal guidelines to control
police discretion, which is now a robust component of vagueness doctrine, is an
appropriate device for deciding the constitutionality of police intrusions under
the Fourth Amendment. Part I concludes that the norm of controlling police
discretion is not only an appropriate tool for measuring the constitutionality
of police searches and seizures, but actually better promotes the central
purpose of the Fourth Amendment than the "reasonableness" analysis currently
employed by the Court.
Part II of the article considers how some of the Court's most recent
search and seizure cases might have been decided if controlling police
discretion, instead of reasonableness, were the touchstone of Fourth Amendment
analysis. First, I will examine the Court's methodology for deciding whether
Fourth Amendment protection is triggered in a particular context. The Court's
current method for deciding whether police conduct is a "search" meriting
constitutional scrutiny constitutes a malleable, ad hoc test. This
section concludes that the norm of controlling police discretion can do a better
job than the "reasonable expectations of privacy" model currently employed by
the Court. Second, I examine the Court's automobile search doctrine. Here, I
conclude that car search law is based on the practical concerns of the police
and is divorced from the Fourth Amendment's ultimate purpose of restraining
police discretion.
I. WHAT CAN FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE LEARN FROM THE MOST CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE VAGUENESS CASES?
Morales is certainly "a major decision bearing on the problem of
police discretion."[25]
Although it was a fractured ruling, six of the Justices did agree on one crucial
point: the Constitution requires that criminal statutes provide police officers
with minimal standards and clear criteria for enforcing them. These Justices
concluded that the Chicago ordinance violated the vagueness doctrine for three
related reasons. First, the ordinance contained no criteria or clear standards
to guide officers in enforcing the law. Second, the broad scope of the ordinance
covered a substantial amount of innocent behavior. Finally, because the
ordinance lacked clear standards and covered "a broad range of innocent
conduct,"[26]
the ordinance invited subjective judgments by officers and did nothing to
discourage arbitrary and biased enforcement by the officer in the field.
Although the law may have provided sufficient notice to citizens to avoid
arrest, these three concerns were sufficient to invalidate Chicago's ordinance.
Moreover, the Morales majority voided the ordinance without having to
conclude that the behavior targeted by the law--loitering for innocent
purposes--was constitutionally protected conduct.[27]
Lastly, the city's legitimate interest in eliminating or restraining the
criminal aspects of street gang activity was not enough to persuade the Court to
put aside whatever concerns it might harbor about police discretion to allow
Chicago the means necessary "`to preserve the city's streets and other public
places so that the public may use such places without fear.'"[28]
If the Court's concerns about broad police discretion were enough to override
Chicago's legitimate law enforcement interests in these circumstances, then the
principle of requiring minimal guidelines to control police authority must be a
particularly important constitutional norm.
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court concluded that the ordinance
violated the Constitution because it provided no guidelines regarding
enforcement.[29]
Justice Stevens was unpersuaded by the City's arguments that the ordinance
sufficiently limited police discretion.[30]
Although the ordinance did not apply to persons who were moving, that limitation
on an officer's discretion merely begged the question of "how much discretion
the police enjoy in deciding which stationary persons to disperse under the
ordinance."[31]
Nor was Justice Stevens convinced that police discretion would be checked by the
fact that no dispersal order could issue unless a group of loiterers contained a
gang member and that no loiterer could be arrested unless he or she disobeyed
the dispersal order. According to Justice Stevens, the latter requirement "does
not provide any guidance to the officer deciding whether such an order should
issue."[32]
And the requirement that a group of loiterers contain a gang member did not
diminish the broad reach of the ordinance: "friends, relatives, teachers,
counselors, or even total strangers might unwittingly engage in forbidden
loitering if they happen to engage in idle conversation with a gang member."[33]
Justice O'Connor also highlighted the lack of standards within the
ordinance. According to Justice O'Connor, the ordinance "fails to provide police
with any standard by which they can judge whether an individual has an
`apparent purpose.' Indeed, because any person standing on the street has
a general `purpose'--even if it is simply to stand--the ordinance permits police
officers to choose which purposes are permissible."[34]
The ordinance did not require any threat to the public peace; simply presence
with a gang member was enough. The constitutional vice here was plain: any
person standing with a gang member in a public place can be ordered to disperse
at the whim of any Chicago police officer.[35]
Justice Breyer, who joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence, wrote a
separate opinion that emphasized both the scope of the ordinance's reach and the
absence of standards for officers to apply.[36]
For Justice Breyer, "the ordinance violates the Constitution because it
delegates too much discretion to a police officer to decide whom to order to
move on, and in what circumstances."[37]
Thus, "[t]he ordinance is unconstitutional, not because a policeman applied this
discretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but rather because the
policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case."[38]
The combined statements and conclusions of the Justices comprising the
Morales majority indicate that a penal statute may be declared
unconstitutional if it does not provide "sufficient minimal standards to guide
law enforcement officers."[39]
This aspect of Morales has been severely criticized for doing "more harm
than good to the project of placing reasonable constraints on police."[40]
Professor Alfred Hill, for example, believes Morales "has disquieting
implications."[41]
Professor Hill argues that if a criminal statute provides sufficient notice to a
citizen of what constitutes an offense, then that notice is sufficient to guide
the police. "[A] statute that sufficiently defines the offense was traditionally
thought by the Court to furnish adequate guidance to the police."[42]
According to Professor Hill, the principle upheld in Morales is flawed
for at least two other reasons. First, he claims Morales entrenches an
unworkable rule because the issue of whether a law grants too much discretion to
the police "would have to be decided from case to case on what could only be a
subjective basis."[43]
Second, he asserts that the principle affirmed in Morales "lacks a firm
foundation" in the Court's prior vagueness cases.[44]
Professor Hill's criticism of Morales is unpersuasive. He believes
that if a statute gives sufficient notice of what constitutes an offense, that
is enough to satisfy vagueness concerns.[45]
Professor Hill too easily dismisses the constitutional vice inherent in a
statute that grants broad police discretion. Like the "fair notice" norm,
restraining police discretion promotes "rule of law" values.[46]
Providing one explanation of the interests served by "rule of law" values,
Professor John Jeffries writes:
The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the exercise
of government power. In the context of the penal law, it means that the agencies
of official coercion should, to the extent feasible, be guided by rules--that
is, by openly acknowledged, relatively stable, and generally applicable
statements of prescribed conduct. The evils to be retarded are caprice and whim,
the misuse of government power for private ends, and the unacknowledged reliance
on illegitimate criteria of selection. The goals to be advanced are regularity
and evenhandedness in the administration of justice and accountability in the
use of government power.[47]
The interests described by Professor Jeffries are pertinent and
appropriate criteria for determining the constitutionality of Chicago's
ordinance. Indeed, judicial scrutiny of the type of police power and discretion
authorized by Chicago's ordinance is critical precisely because enforcement of
that statute depended upon the subjective judgments of police officers. In this
context:
The power to define a vague law is effectively left to those who enforce
it, and those who enforce the penal law characteristically operate in settings
of secrecy and informality, often punctuated by a sense of emergency, and rarely
constrained by self-conscious generalization of standards. In such
circumstances, the wholesale delegation of discretion naturally invites its
abuse, and an important first step in constraining that discretion is the
invalidation of indefinite laws.[48]
Chicago's ordinance gave police the power to order any person standing in
public with a suspected gang member to "move on."[49]
Even assuming that Chicago's ordinance gave fair notice of what constituted the
criminal offense (i.e. refusing an officer's dispersal order), the ordinance
still gave officers unguided discretion to order people, who are otherwise
violating no law, to leave a public place. Thus, Professor Hill's conclusion
that a statute that gives adequate notice to the offender also gives adequate
guidance to the police, fails to address the potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement. Professor Hill's theory of vagueness would leave
intact a statute that provides adequate notice of an offense but no criteria for
restraining police discretion to order otherwise law-abiding people off the
streets. Thirty-five years ago, the Court adamantly declared that the
Constitution would not tolerate such a law.[50]
Professor Hill's other criticism of Morales, that the ruling
"lacks a firm foundation," is misplaced.[51]
The result in Morales is neither surprising, nor without foundation, in
light of Kolender v. Lawson.[52]
In Kolender, the Court invalidated a California criminal statute "that
require[d] persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a `credible
and reliable' identification and to account for their presence" when requested
by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct to detain
the person.[53]
The Court concluded that the law was too vague because it failed to "clarify
what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a `credible and
reliable' identification."[54]
Writing for a seven-Justice majority, Justice O'Connor described the California
law as follows:
[It] contain[ed] no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in
order to satisfy the requirement to provide a `credible and reliable'
identification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the
hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute
and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to
arrest.[55]
As in Morales, the Court in Kolender was concerned about
the potential for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement of a state statute.[56]
Indeed, when the rulings in Kolender and Morales are combined, a
solid majority of the Court is committed to restraining broad police discretion,
particularly when such discretion threatens the exercise of civil liberties,
like freedom of speech or the right to freedom of movement.[57]
Professor
Hill worries that Morales "promises mischief as courts try to determine
the existence of a statutory potential for police a
buse," and he contends that the "stability of the Morales rule is questionable."[58] Concededly, the Court must be careful to articulate workable rules that can be understood and applied by the lower courts, legislators, and police officers alike. That being said, Professor Hill makes a fair point when he notes that Morales does not provide a precise measuring device for deciding when a statute allows too much police discretion. However, the rulings in Morales and Kolender are unlikely to grant judges a "veto" stamp for all types of criminal statutes. The constitutional vice in both cases was naked police power. Imagine, for a moment, the "mischief" for civil liberties if the Court had upheld the statutes in Kolender and Morales, as Professor Hill suggests the Court should have done. If the statute had been upheld in Kolender, police officers could arrest a suspicious person who failed to provide "credible and reliable" identification or failed to account for his presence to the extent that it would help in producing such identification. "It takes little imagination to perceive that [this law] operates simply as a charter of dictatorial power to the policeman."[59] As noted, if Chicago's ordinance had been sustained, Chicago police officers would be free to order individuals found standing on a city sidewalk or chatting on a park bench with a gang member to leave the area, and they would have had the power to arrest anyone who disobeyed their orders.[60] "Most Americans no doubt would be offended by police orders to move along; they certainly would find it hard to see their compliance with such orders as an exercise of liberty."[61]
Most importantly, the Court in Morales and Kolender was
well aware of the potential that the challenged laws would be enforced in a
racially uneven manner.[62]
When police are given wide discretion to wield power, selective and race-based
law enforcement is likely, if not inevitable--particularly when officers have
multiple encounters with racial and ethnic minorities.[63]
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was specifically designed to
address racial discrimination by state actors. But nothing in the Constitution
precludes the Court from developing other legal norms to address the evils of
selective and arbitrary law enforcement that do not rise to the level prohibited
by the Court's equal protection cases. Of course, as an abstract matter, few
people would want to live in a society where police officers had no discretion
regarding law enforcement. Thus, "[e]very legal system will have some resort to
discretion."[64]
But acknowledging the reality that our legal regime tolerates different levels
of discretion by government officers should not prevent the Court from
recognizing another reality of our legal regime: racial bias. In Morales
and Kolender, the Court properly acted to prevent the evils of racial and
other forms of discrimination that inevitably emerge when police officers are
given unchecked discretion to enforce the law. When the Court acts to counter
selective and arbitrary police enforcement, it promotes rule-of-law values:
Greater conformity to the rule of law discourages resort to illegitimate
criteria of selection and enhances our ability to discover and redress such
abuses when they occur. Lesser adherence to that ideal facilitates abusive and
discriminatory law enforcement and makes that evil more difficult to identify
and control. Thus, the "worst case" breakdown of the rule of law is not random
whim or caprice but hidden bias and prejudice. And the single most potent
concern at issue here is not an abstract interest in the postulates of a just
legal order but a specific commitment to end discrimination based on race or
ethnicity. In the specific historical context in which we live, inhibiting
racial discrimination in law enforcement is very much a part of what the rule of
law is all about.[65]
Finally, one could imagine a variation of Chicago's ordinance that
applied to everyone. If that hypothetical ordinance were enforced throughout the
city, the opportunities for arbitrary or discretionary enforcement might
diminish. But that ordinance would never be enacted, or if it were
enacted, would never be enforced, because evenhanded enforcement would be
politically imprudent. Certainly, police discretion will be restrained if a law
is enforced against everyone.[66]
But if government is forced to target everyone in order to reach a few, the
political process will prevent the government from targeting anyone. Chicago's
gang congregation ordinance operated in the opposite direction. Governmental
power was directed at a small group and left the majority of the population
unaffected. When this type of law is enacted, discretionary police authority
permits the state to pick and choose persons to subject to governmental power
and diminishes regularity and accountability by state actors.
In sum, the norm of controlling police discretion is a legitimate
constitutional principle when applied to overturn statutes like those involved
in Morales and Kolender. Both cases involved penal statutes that
afforded police substantial discretionary power to enforce the law, without
providing concrete standards to guide officers or restrain their authority.
Concededly, the constitutional rule adopted in Morales does not explain
when a statute gives too much discretion to the police. We do know, however,
that the ordinance at issue in Morales provided no means to restrain
police power and gave officers a potent measure to enforce the criminal law in a
selective and arbitrary manner. When the norm of controlling police discretion
is applied in this setting, it properly advances rule-of-law interests of
"regularity and evenhandedness in the administration of justice and
accountability in the use of government power."[67]
B. The Norm of Controlling Police Discretion is
Consistent
with the Fourth Amendment
Morales illustrates that the norm of controlling police discretion
is an important feature of vagueness doctrine. That being true, one could
properly ask whether the norm of restraining police discretionary power can, or
should, be applied in other constitutional contexts.
Currently, Fourth Amendment law is controlled by a "reasonableness"
model. For the modern Court, the main object of the Amendment is reasonable
police behavior when conducting searches and seizures. Reasonableness is
typically determined by balancing the government's interest in effective law
enforcement against the individual's privacy and liberty interests.[68]
There are compelling reasons why the norm of controlling police discretion,
rather than a reasonableness norm, is an appropriate tool for judging the
legality of police searches and seizures.[69]
First, to the extent that history influences constitutional decision making, the
norm of restraining police discretion is consistent, as a reasonableness model
is not,[70]
with the "larger purpose" that the Framers had in mind when they adopted the
Fourth Amendment.[71]
Second, even if historical concerns are put aside, the norm of controlling
police discretion is a superior analytical tool to the Court's reasonableness
model. The Court's reasonableness approach, which is applied in a variety of
settings, is an ad hoc analysis that often lacks standards and rarely is
applied with an underlying vision in mind. When applied to search and seizure
cases, the norm of controlling police discretion can avoid the standardless
decision-making inherent in the reasonableness model. For example, if
restraining police discretion were the touchstone of Fourth Amendment law,
suspicionless police searches and seizures would not be permitted. Finally, if
the Court were to substitute the norm of controlling police discretion in place
of its current reasonableness model, there is the possibility that Fourth
Amendment cases would have an identifiable theme.
1. The Relevance of History for Fourth Amendment Norms
Mining constitutional norms from the Fourth Amendment's complex history
can be a problematic endeavor. As one historian pointed out, the text of the
Amendment "mingles ambiguous and precise language, for it forbids all types of
unreasonable searches and seizures but identifies only one unreasonable type and
that one only implicitly."[72]
Moreover, the historical background surrounding the Amendment's development and
adoption "did not illuminate all aspects of the Fourth Amendment equally, nor
did [it] explain all of its original meaning. Th[e] historical documents,
however, did explain a great deal of that meaning and were indispensable to its
understanding."[73]
Despite the density of the Amendment's history and the uncertainty of its text,
some Justices argue that the Framers intended a "reasonableness" requirement for
all searches and seizures.[74]
And some of these Justices insist that the Amendment's requirement of
reasonableness "affords the protection that the common law afforded."[75]
This manner of legal history will not advance Fourth Amendment interests, nor,
incidentally, the intent of the Framers.
As an initial matter, it is highly unlikely that the Framers intended the
Fourth Amendment to be interpreted in the ad hoc manner favored by the
modern Court. Professor Thomas Davies's detailed scholarship on the history of
the Amendment indicates that the Framers had no intention of creating or
adopting the reasonableness analysis embraced by the Court for judging the
legality of governmental searches and seizures. According to Professor Davies,
the precise aim of the Framers was straightforward and narrow: to forbid
legislation that would authorize the use of general warrants to intrude into
private homes.[76]
More importantly, Professor Davies concludes that the reasonableness model of
the modern Court "is especially distant from the Framers' meaning."[77]
A "reasonableness" construction of the Fourth Amendment "runs afoul of two
historical facts."[78]
First, during the period immediately preceding adoption of the state and federal
constitutional provisions on search and seizure, opposition to discretionary
search authority was pervasive in the colonies.[79]
This opposition manifested itself in vigorous condemnation of general warrants
and writs of assistance. According to Davies, this "opposition is inconsistent
with the use of a relativistic reasonableness standard, which would have
facilitated officers' discretion to initiate intrusions."[80]
The second historical fact that weakens the likelihood that the Framers intended
to adopt reasonableness as the touchstone for Fourth Amendment analysis is their
silence.[81]
According to Davies's research, the few isolated references to "unreasonable
searches and seizures" do not provide convincing evidence that the Framers
intended open-ended reasonableness to be the guiding principle for deciding the
legality of searches and seizures.[82]
When the Framers spoke of the privacy and security of a man's castle and
condemned the evils they experienced with British customs searches, they had a
specific target in mind: forcible intrusions into private homes authorized by
general warrants and writs of assistance.[83]
Having this history in mind, can a legal norm be extracted from the
Fourth Amendment's origins to guide modern interpretation of search and seizure
law? I believe that the norm of controlling police discretion accurately
captures the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.[84]
Indeed, the norm of restraining discretionary police power is the overriding
principle that emerges when one focuses on the Amendment's underlying purpose.
In the Framers' era, that purpose was "controlling the discretion of government
officials to invade the privacy and security of citizens, whether that
discretion be directed toward the homes and offices of political dissidents,
illegal smugglers, or ordinary criminals."[85]
Today that same purpose of controlling discretionary authority can and should be
applied to the various types of police search and seizure conduct.[86]
Furthermore, the constitutional norm of controlling police discretion, unlike a
reasonableness model, works in concert with specific goals that the Framers
contemplated when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. The Framers "banned general
warrants in order to prevent the officer from exercising discretionary
authority,"[87]
and they "believed that specific warrants provided significant protections
against arbitrary intrusions."[88]
In sum, the Framers sought to control the power and discretion of law
enforcement officers. To the extent that the Court genuinely seeks to promote
the underlying vision of the Fourth Amendment, those aims are more likely to be
achieved by utilizing the norm of controlling police discretion as the
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.[89]
2. The Norm of Controlling Police Discretion
Prohibits
Arbitrary Intrusions
Even if one believes that the Framers' intent should not dictate the
outcome of modern Fourth Amendment doctrine,[90]
the norm of controlling police discretion remains superior to the Court's
reasonableness model for deciding the legality of searches and seizures. As
noted earlier, the Court decides whether a challenged governmental intrusion
violates the Fourth Amendment by asking whether officials have acted in a
reasonable manner. This formula lacks content and amounts to nothing more than
an ad hoc judgment about the desirability of certain intrusions.
Consider, as one example, the Court's resolution of an issue that affects
millions of citizens: can police arbitrarily order a motorist out of a car
during a routine traffic stop? In 1977, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,[91]
the Court ruled that police officers possessed unchecked authority to order
drivers out of their vehicles during routine traffic stops. Twenty years later
the "other shoe" fell, when Maryland v. Wilson[92]
extended the reasoning of Mimms to passengers, noting that the same
officer-safety concerns that motivated the result in Mimms also justified
giving police absolute discretion to order passengers out of cars during traffic
stops.
The reasoning of Mimms and Wilson is sensible if
constitutional reasonableness is determined on an ad hoc basis. Police
safety is both a legitimate and weighty factor. Moreover, reasonable minds can
certainly differ over whether a driver's or passenger's interest in remaining in
a car during a traffic stop should trump the interest of police safety. The
Court's balancing model is reasonable in the sense that rational persons could
reach the conclusion that the interest in officer safety outweighs the interest
in protecting motorists from arbitrarily being ordered to exit their cars. But
this type of reasonableness should not be equated with the constitutional
reasonableness demanded by the Fourth Amendment because it permits arbitrary
police intrusion. If the underlying vision of the Amendment is a distrust of
police discretion, then arbitrary police intrusions should never be
allowed. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Mimms, "to eliminate
any requirement that an officer be able to explain the reasons for his actions
signals an abandonment of effective judicial supervision of this kind of seizure
and leaves police discretion utterly without limits."[93]
The rulings in Mimms and Wilson are wrong for another
reason. In the real world, police departments and individual officers will not
exercise the authority conferred by these decisions constantly, or even
frequently. A policy of always ordering drivers and passengers out of
their cars would be politically unattractive and needlessly inconvenient if
applied to every motorist stopped for a traffic violation. Instead, police
officers will exercise this authority based on their individual predilections.
As Professor LaFave comments about Wilson, "the likely impact of
Wilson is not that all traffic stops passengers will be ordered
out of their vehicles as a matter of routine, but instead that police will
sometimes give such an order."[94]
That will mean that certain drivers and passengers will be ordered out of their
vehicles, while the majority of motorists will not be subjected to this
arbitrary order. Because Mimms and Wilson confer an absolute
authority to order occupants of vehicles out of their cars during a traffic
stop, not only will judicial review of this practice be unavailable, it is "very
possible that these decisions will be based on considerations having no
legitimate connection with any risk of harm to the officer."[95]
Thus, Justice Kennedy did not exaggerate when he noted that the practical effect
of the authority conferred in Mimms and Wilson, when combined with
the discretion afforded by Whren, puts "tens of millions of [drivers and]
passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police."[96]
Finally, the judgments in Mimms and Wilson show that the
Court is incapable of applying its own "reasonableness" standard in a consistent
or good faith manner.[97]
As Justice Scalia's questions during oral argument in Wilson revealed,
the crux of the government's position was that the Court not apply any
reasonableness analysis to an exit order directed at a passenger.[98]
The government asked for, and received, the Court's approval to eliminate any
requirement that a police officer explain why a motorist was ordered out of a
vehicle during a traffic stop. Judicial review of exit orders was abolished.
After Wilson, police have the power to order motorists in and out of cars
without having to justify their actions to anyone. In a nation that prides
itself on the rule of law, this is a curious result. If controlling police
discretion were the touchstone of the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis rather
than "reasonableness," then millions of drivers and passengers could not be
seized solely on the arbitrary and unreviewable judgment of a police officer. If
officers were required to justify these seizures, then the nation's motorists
might be "more secure" against unreasonable seizures while travelling the
nation's roads and highways.
3. The Norm of Controlling Police Discretion Should
Guide
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Fourth Amendment law seems bewildering because the Court's reasonableness
model encourages subjective and haphazard results. Consequently, criminal
procedure scholars often deride the Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine as
unnecessarily confusing and disjointed.[99]
Viewed objectively, their comments seem accurate. Fourth Amendment law is
certainly complex, but over the last two decades the trend of the Court's cases
has been to expand police power.[100]
This expansion of police power tends to provide a unifying theme, as well as
guidance to lower court judges and police officers in the field. Of course,
steady expansion of police search and seizure power is not the source of the
Fourth Amendment's complexity. Fourth Amendment law is confusing and complex
because the Court's reasonableness analysis encourages ad hoc, subjective
judgments about the need for certain police intrusions and the nature and value
of Fourth Amendment liberties.
Recall Maryland v. Wilson, which held that police have absolute
discretion to order passengers out of a car during a routine traffic stop.
Wilson explained that officer safety justified this intrusion. The Court
reasoned that encounters involving several occupants of a vehicle increased the
potential threats to officer safety. On the other side of the balance, Wilson
recognized that a traffic stop, which gives an officer reason to seize the
driver, does not provide objective grounds to detain or stop passengers since
they are not responsible for the traffic infraction. Nonetheless, the Court
concluded that the interests of passengers were not sufficiently different to
justify exempting them from the exit order that can be arbitrarily imposed upon
the driver. Logically, seizing the car also meant seizing passengers, and the
exit order simply means that passengers "will be outside of, rather than inside
of, the stopped car."[101]
And once they are out of the car, the Court reasoned:
the passengers will be denied access to any possible weapon that might be
concealed in the interior of the passenger compartment. It would seem that the
possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction of a
motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of
a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop. And the motivation
of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is
every bit as great as that of the driver.[102]
In sum, the possibility that "a more serious crime might be
uncovered" during a traffic stop justified giving officers unchecked authority
to order passengers out of a car. A year later, however, a unanimous Court
concluded that this same possibility did not justify searching the passenger
compartment during a traffic stop. In Knowles v. Iowa,[103]
a police officer stopped Patrick Knowles for speeding. After issuing a citation,
the officer searched Knowles and the passenger compartment of his car,
discovering narcotics inside the car. Iowa law authorizes an arrest for a
traffic violation, but it also allows an officer to issue a traffic citation in
lieu of arrest. If an officer follows the latter procedure, Iowa law authorizes
a search of the driver and car equivalent in scope to a search
incident-to-arrest.
Knowles held that a "search incident to citation" violated the
Fourth Amendment.[104]
Officer safety could not justify this intrusion because the "threat to officer
safety from issuing a traffic citation . . . is a good deal less
than in the case of a custodial arrest." [105]
This response answers the wrong question. The question in Knowles was not
whether the threat to officer safety inherent in a traffic stop is comparable to
the threat surrounding a custodial arrest. Rather, the question in
Knowles was whether the threat to officer safety inherent in a traffic
stop justifies overriding the privacy interest a driver enjoys in the passenger
compartment of his car. The safety interests at stake in Knowles were the
same interests the Court had relied upon a year earlier in Wilson,
namely, the possibility that "a more serious crime might be uncovered"
during the traffic stop and "the motivation of a [motorist] to employ violence
to prevent apprehension of such a crime." [106]
If these potential threats were sufficient to justify subjecting a motorist to
an arbitrary seizure, why were these same threats not sufficient to justify an
arbitrary search of Knowles's car?
The Court's reply was predictable. It explained that a concern for
officer safety "may justify the `minimal' additional intrusion of ordering"
a motorist out of a car, but cannot justify "the often considerably
greater intrusion attending" a search of a car.[107]
Moreover, Knowles noted that officers have other means to protect
themselves when objective evidence of a safety threat is present.[108]
The Court's reasoning illustrates how Fourth Amendment law often turns on
subjective evaluations rather than neutral principles.[109]
Why, in the context of a routine traffic stop, does officer safety justify an
arbitrary seizure, but not an arbitrary search? It is true that Mimms and
Wilson involved seizures, while Knowles involved a search, but the
Fourth Amendment "speaks equally to both searches and seizures"[110]
so the text of the Amendment cannot explain the divergent outcomes.
The Court says a search is a "greater intrusion" than a seizure, but this
ipse dixit is not a neutral principle of law; it merely reflects the
Court's subjective evaluation of the interests at stake. Moreover, in similar
contexts, the Court has allowed arbitrary searches of cars, notwithstanding the
"greater intrusion" associated with searches. The most notorious example was the
search approved in New York v. Belton.[111]
Belton held that when an occupant of a car has been arrested, police may,
as an incident to arrest and without cause, search the passenger compartment of
the car.[112]
Belton authorizes arbitrary searches, and is "based on the transparent
fiction that a person arrested, usually outside the car, will somehow be able to
break away and get back in the car to get a weapon or destroy evidence."[113]
The holding in Belton was wrong for the same reason that the holding in
Knowles was correct: there was no specific cause to search the car.
Instead of deciding on a case-by-case basis as the Court did in
Knowles whether an arbitrary search of a car is a "greater intrusion"
than some other hypothetical intrusion, why not ban all arbitrary
searches of cars? If the point of the Fourth Amendment is controlling
discretionary police power, then arbitrary searches and seizures are
impermissible. If controlling discretionary intrusions is the central purpose of
the Amendment, then comparative judgments regarding whether an arbitrary search
of a car is a "greater intrusion" than an arbitrary seizure of a motorist would
be unnecessary. If there is no cause for a search, and no evidence of a safety
threat, then neither a search nor a seizure should be permitted.[114]
Instead of restraining police discretion, the reasoning of Knowles
encourages police to arrest motorists selectively, which in turn will allow more
arbitrary searches.[115]
Certainly, the divergent results in Wilson and Knowles can
be rationally explained. A reasonable person might agree that an arbitrary
search is a "greater intrusion" than an arbitrary seizure. But for someone who
values officer safety as "both legitimate and weighty,"[116]
the results in these cases may be harder to explain. After all, the Court had
previously permitted arbitrary searches of automobiles in contexts where there
was no objective threat to officer safety, and justified the results primarily
on officer-safety grounds.[117]
Also, the Court has repeatedly denigrated the notion that motorists have a
heightened expectation of privacy regarding property located inside
automobiles.[118]
More importantly, a rational person who places a premium on police safety might
reasonably find that the potential dangers that officers face when
conducting traffic stops not only justify the arbitrary seizures approved in
Mimms and Wilson, but also the arbitrary search at issue in
Knowles.[119]
The divergent views of police safety in Wilson and Knowles
illustrate the subjective nature of the Court's reasoning. In Wilson, a
potential threat to officer safety justifies an arbitrary seizure; but in
Knowles, that same threat does not justify an arbitrary search. Yet, in
Belton, a search greater in scope than the search involved in
Knowles is permitted because of the potential threat to officer safety.
These cases also demonstrate the haphazard way the Court measures the nature and
value of Fourth Amendment interests. The text of the Amendment applies to
both searches and seizures equally. Thus, the interest in being free from
arbitrary seizures is just as important as the interest in being free from
arbitrary searches.[120]
Yet, in Wilson, an arbitrary seizure of a passenger is dismissed as
"minimal" and not permitted to trump a potential threat to officer safety.
Conversely, Knowles pays lip service to the "concern for officer safety"
but concludes that an arbitrary search cannot be permitted even though the
intrusion might advance police safety. If controlling police discretion were the
guiding principle of Fourth Amendment law, neither intrusion would be permitted,
and the reasoning of the Court's cases would make more sense.
II. APPLYING THE NORM OF CONTROLLING POLICE DISCRETION
A. What is a "Search" Under the Reasonableness Model?
A reasonableness model is used not only to decide whether a particular
police intrusion violates the Fourth Amendment, but also to decide the threshold
question of whether police activity triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny ab
initio. Police activity that is not deemed a "search" under the Amendment
need not be exercised in a "reasonable" manner;[121]
intrusions falling into the "non-search" category "may be as unreasonable as the
police please to make them."[122]
In determining whether a police intrusion is a search, the Court decides
whether the person challenging the police activity had a "reasonable expectation
of privacy" in the targeted area. This formula comes from Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in the landmark case of Katz v. United States.[123]
The Katz test consists of a two-part inquiry: first, did the person have
a subjective expectation of privacy in the area targeted by the police? Second,
was this an expectation that society considers reasonable? The Katz test
has been applied in a variety of circumstances. The upshot of the Court's cases
has recently been described as follows:
[T]he police can see and hear only those things that the rest of us can
see and hear [without triggering Fourth Amendment
protection]. . . . The pattern is clear enough: the police can
infringe privacy in ways that anyone else might infringe it, but
not . . . in ways that differ from the sorts of things ordinary
people might do. All these results seem designed to take the privacy people
have, and use it to define the privacy that the police cannot invade without
some good cause.[124]
This description of how the Court defines the Fourth Amendment's
boundaries rightly acknowledges that "police can infringe privacy in ways that
anyone else might infringe it,"[125]
but it omits a critical aspect of the Court's analysis. Like other parts of its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court's "expectation of privacy" analysis
rests on the ad hoc conclusions of the Justices and ignores the reality
of police practices. To put it mildly, "the Supreme Court's conclusions about
the scope of the Fourth Amendment are often not in tune with commonly held
attitudes about police investigative techniques."[126]
More importantly, controlling police discretion is not part of the Court's
analysis. To the extent that society is concerned about "the amount of power
that it permits its police to use without effective control by law,"[127]
omitting this factor is illogical. Restraining police discretion should be
the crucial consideration when deciding whether intrusive activities are
subject to constitutional scrutiny. If police are permitted to intrude at their
leisure, we no longer live in a free society. Thus, the boundaries of the
Amendment define the breadth of our freedom.[128]
For example, many Americans would be surprised to learn that the Fourth
Amendment, as interpreted by the Court, imposes no restraints on the
government's power to infiltrate our homes, businesses, religious organizations,
or social groups with undercover spies.[129]
There are many other intrusive activities that the Court leaves solely to the
discretion of the police on the grounds that the individual has no "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in the place or premises targeted by the police. In some
cases, the Court's conclusion that no "search" has occurred not only defies
common sense, but also gives police officials unchecked power to invade our
personal security. Consider two examples: inspection of one's garbage and aerial
photography of one's property. When a police officer sifts through a person's
garbage looking for evidence of illegal drug possession, or flies a helicopter
over a home to photograph marijuana plants growing in the backyard, what else is
the officer doing, if not "searching" for criminal activities?[130]
Moreover, to the average person, the intrusions that the Court has left to the
unfettered discretion of the police are highly invasive, and they certainly feel
and look like "searches."[131]
Indeed, as Professor Amsterdam has noted, "[t]he plain meaning of the English
language would surely not be affronted if every police activity that involves
seeking out crime or evidence of crime were held to be a search."[132]
If clear thinking and a norm of controlling police discretion were utilized to
decide whether police activity designed to disclose criminal behavior
constituted a search under the Amendment, then many more police investigative
practices would trigger Fourth Amendment review.[133]
Of
course, if controlling discretionary police power were the principal
consideration when defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the police would
be greatly inhibited in the types of investigative activities they could
undertake without prior justification or judicial approval. But controlling the
discretion of law enforcement officers has other benefits in addition to
eliminating arbitrary intrusions into our personal security and privacy. If the
FBI were required to secure a judicial warrant before infiltrating our homes or
businesses with undercover informants, there might be fewer undercover searches.
Those searches that are approved, however, will likely be "better quality
searches"[134]
because FBI agents will be permitted to search only when they have good
reason.[135]
But
the Court has been unwilling to interpret the Fourth Amendment's scope in a
manner designed to restrict discretionary police intrusions. Instead, the Court
has turned to the "reasonable expectation of privacy" model of the Katz
test. As currently applied, the Katz test not only fails to control
discretionary intrusions, it also lacks content and substance. Under the best
circumstances, the Katz test is prone to circular reasoning.[136]
At its worst, Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" framework is a
malleable formula. The Court's precedents are not built upon objective legal
principles; rather, the Court's rulings simply reflect the current sentiments of
a majority of the Justices deciding whether a particular police investigative
practice is reasonable under the circumstances. Lately, a few members of the
Court themselves have acknowledged the emptiness of the Katz test. Last
Term, Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion that Justice Thomas joined,
described the Katz formula as a "notoriously unhelpful" and
"self-indulgent" test.[137]
In Justice Scalia's view, the Katz test means what a majority of the
Court says it means, no more and no less.[138]
The Court's two most recent cases in this area, Minnesota v. Carter and
Bond v. United States,[139]
reveal the accuracy of Justice Scalia's comments and indicate why controlling
police discretion is a superior legal norm for measuring the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
Minnesota v. Carter involved the following facts: an anonymous
informant told an Eagan, Minnesota, police officer that he saw people "bagging"
white powder inside a ground-floor apartment. With only this tip, the officer
went to the apartment and stood outside a window. Although the blinds were
closed, the officer could see through a gap in the blinds. Inside he observed
three persons, two males and a female, placing white powder into plastic bags.
Other officers were notified. The two men, Carter and Johns, were subsequently
arrested outside of the apartment, and the police eventually obtained a warrant
to search the apartment. The female, Thompson, was the leaseholder of the
apartment. It was later learned that Carter and Johns, who lived in Chicago,
came to the apartment to package cocaine. After they were convicted on narcotics
charges, the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the convictions. That court
ruled that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy while inside
the home of their host. Thus, their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
the officer observed their conduct inside the apartment through a warrantless
search. The Supreme Court granted review in Carter to decide two issues.
First, does an invitee into a home enjoy a legitimate privacy interest under the
Fourth Amendment when his connection to the premises is to assist the homeowner
in criminal conduct? Two, is unaided observation of a home that occurs from a
public place outside of the curtilage a search under the Fourth Amendment? The
Court left the second issue undecided because it concluded that the defendants
could not claim a legitimate expectation of privacy in their host's
home.
Writing for a splintered five-Justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
first made passing references to the Katz analysis and the text of the
Fourth Amendment, which, when juxtaposed, appeared to send contradictory signals
about the defendants' constitutional claim. On the one hand, under Katz's
expectation of privacy framework, "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment
protects people may depend upon where those people are."[140]
Since Carter and Johns were invited guests in a private home--a place that
receives the most scrupulous protection under the Court's precedents--one might
have thought that the Court would rule in their favor because "the sanctity of
the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic."[141]
On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the text of the Fourth
Amendment weakened the defendants' claim because it "suggests that its
protections extend only to people in `their' houses."[142]
The Chief Justice explained, however, that this textual limitation was not
automatically fatal to the defendants' claim because the Court's precedents have
"held that in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the house of someone else."[143]
Instead
of relying on the text of the Amendment, the Chief Justice returned to
Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. Two cases were
particularly relevant. First, although it involved the search of a car rather
than a home, Rakas v. Illinois[144]
rejected the previously accepted rule that merely being legitimately on the
premises entitled a person to Fourth Amendment protection.[145]
After Rakas, a person was required to show more than lawful presence to
obtain judicial scrutiny of a police search--he must show "a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place."[146]
The second case on point was Minnesota v. Olson,[147]
which held that an overnight guest had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his host's home. The Chief Justice read these precedents to stand for the
proposition that "an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the
householder may not."[148]
According to the Chief Justice, the facts in Carter were "somewhere in
between" the rules announced in Olson and Rakas. Ultimately, the
Court concluded that the defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the home. This conclusion rested on "the purely commercial nature" of
their conduct, their "relatively short period of time… on the premises," and the
"lack of any previous connection" between the defendants and the host.[149]
Carter indicates the malleability and emptiness of the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" analysis. Recognizing that the defendants were observed
in a location that normally receives the highest degree of protection under the
Fourth Amendment,[150]
the Carter majority ignored that heretofore critical fact and instead
focused on the purpose of the defendants' activities.[151]
This reasoning suggests that if instead of packaging cocaine, the defendants and
their host had been discussing their educational backgrounds or making plans for
an upcoming vacation, the result in Carter would have different. This
reasoning also suggests that if the defendants had been in the apartment for an
overnight stay or had visited the apartment on several prior occasions, then
their claim to constitutional protection would have been stronger. But why
should these alterations matter? If Fourth Amendment rights are "personal," as
the Court repeatedly emphasizes,[152]
and if the defendants were observed in a place accorded the maximum degree of
protection under the Amendment, why should it matter whether the defendants were
"essentially present for a business transaction" rather than a social visit?[153]
In either case, the defendants were relying, as does anyone who uses a telephone
at a friend's house, upon the security and privacy of the host's home to shield
their activities from police surveillance. That security was breached when the
officer, without a warrant, probable cause, consent, or exigent circumstances,
observed their activities. The commercial nature of their conduct should not
undermine their right to Fourth Amendment protection unless the Court is
prepared to say in a future case that a homeowner also lacks an expectation of
privacy in her home once she decides to use her residence for commercial
purposes.[154]
A home does not become any less of a home for Fourth Amendment purposes because
the persons inside decide to violate the law. The commercial nature or purpose
of the defendants' activities sheds no light on the question that should capture
the Court's attention: should police have unfettered discretion to monitor the
activities of persons who have been invited into a private home?
Nor should it matter that the Carter defendants' brief stay in the
home was insufficiently similar "to the overnight guest relationship in Olson
to suggest a degree of acceptance into the household."[155]
Constitutional rights should be assessed in qualitative, not quantitative,
terms.[156]
When deciding whether a visitor or guest is entitled to be secure against
unreasonable intrusions while in the home of their host, the result should not
turn on the length of the visit or whether one stays until the next day's dawn.
Otherwise, a homeowner's sexual partner would have no expectation of privacy in
the home and no standing to object if the police peered through the closed
blinds of a bedroom window, unless that sexual partner spent the night.[157]
While Carter ruled that houseguests may not always rely on the
security and privacy of their host's home, Bond v. United States
confronted the Court with a different aspect of privacy. Steven Dewayne Bond was
a passenger on a bus that left California heading for Arkansas. At a border
patrol checkpoint in Texas, an immigration officer squeezed Bond's canvas bag
that was in the overhead compartment. The officer felt a "brick-like" object
inside. After opening the bag, the officer found a "brick" of methamphetamine.
The issue in Bond was whether the officer's physical manipulation of the
luggage constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court concluded that it was.
In Bond, unlike the fractured opinion in Carter, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote for a majority of seven Justices. The Chief Justice
first rejected the government's argument that by exposing his luggage to other
passengers, Bond lost a reasonable expectation that his luggage would not be
subject to physical manipulation. While acknowledging that the Court has refused
to extend Fourth Amendment protection to activities and places exposed to the
public, the Chief Justice explained that the officer's manipulation of Bond's
luggage was unlike the aerial surveillance that the Court found permissible in
California v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley. "Physically invasive
inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."[158]
After noting that physical inspections are more intrusive than visual
inspections, the Chief Justice then moved to the crux of the matter. Bond
conceded that by placing his bag in the overhead bin, he understood that it
would be exposed to certain types of handling. However, Bond contended that the
officer's handling went beyond the type of casual touching that he expected from
other passengers. The government responded that the officer's touch was similar
to the type of contact a passenger might have with the bag. Applying the
two-part test of Katz, the Chief Justice seemed to conclude that Bond had
established the first requirement of a subjective expectation of privacy. The
Court opined that Bond "sought to preserve privacy by using an opaque bag and
placing that bag directly above his seat."[159]
The more difficult question involved the second prong of Katz: whether
this expectation was one society would find reasonable.
On that question, the
Chief Justice reaffirmed that an officer's subjective intent or purpose behind
the intrusion was irrelevant to whether his actions constituted a search. "[T]he
issue is not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his
actions."[160]
Ultimately, the Chief Justice concluded that a search occurred on the grounds
that a bus passenger, while he expects that his luggage may be handled, "does
not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course,
feel the bag in an exploratory manner."[161]
In other words, an officer's motive for touching a bag--to ascertain whether
contraband might be inside--is unimportant. However, the "manner" or intensity
of his touch is relevant.
The result in Bond is perplexing. The core of the Chief Justice's
reasoning rests on a razor-thin distinction that has no nexus to the realities
of police work. Bond implies that touching luggage in a manner that is
the equivalent of what a passenger might do to create more room in the overhead
rack is not a search. But a squeeze to explore the contents of the luggage is a
search. The practical problem with this distinction is that officers looking for
drugs or guns have no reason to perform the former type of touch. The officer
who squeezed Bond's canvas bag was not helping another passenger create more
space in the overhead rack. He was feeling (or "squeezing") for contraband. Law
enforcement officers do not manipulate luggage to create more room in overhead
compartments. Their squeezing will always be done in an exploratory manner;
otherwise, they are wasting their time and taxpayers' money. If read literally,
the upshot of Bond will either be the elimination of police "squeezes"
(which is unlikely) or a new "constitutional jurisprudence of [Fourth Amendment]
`squeezes'"[162]
that endeavors to distinguish permissible from impermissible touches.
Another puzzling point in Bond is the emphasis placed on the
distinction between visual and tactile inspections. As an abstract matter, the
Court is probably correct when it notes that "[p]hysically invasive inspection
is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."[163]
But why should this difference matter when deciding whether the Fourth Amendment
covers the officer's squeeze of Bond's bag? The Court acknowledged Bond's
concession that "a bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled."[164]
According to the Court, Bond did not argue that he had a reasonable expectation
that his bag would not be felt while on the bus. Thus, the dispute was not about
whether the officer could touch the bag: absent an objection from Bond,
merely touching the bag did not violate any of Bond's rights.[165]
If the officer had touched Bond's bag in a manner consistent with the touch that
a passenger might employ, the officer's actions would not have triggered
constitutional review. Instead, the issue confronting the Court concerned the
intensity of his touch. Viewed this way, the distinction between physical
and tactile inspections is immaterial to the question of whether the Fourth
Amendment covered the officer's squeeze of Bond's bag.
There is an additional
reason why the distinction between visual and tactile inspection seems
unimportant. If, while checking Bond's immigration status, the officer had
coincidentally rested his hand on Bond's bag and immediately recognized the
contour of a gun or a "brick" of methamphetamine, the officer would have been
free to seize the gun or contraband. This is so because in Minnesota v.
Dickerson[166]
the Court extended the "plain-view" doctrine to the sense of touch. "The
rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband is left in open view
and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been
no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no `search' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment--or at least no search independent of the
initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point."[167]
Dickerson explained that the plain-view rule "has an obvious application
by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense
of touch during an otherwise lawful search."[168]
Thus, Dickerson permits a search and seizure when an officer's sense of
touch immediately confirms the presence of contraband. In my hypothetical, the
officer's touch of the bag would not have invaded any constitutional interest of
Bond. This is because the agent was lawfully positioned to touch the bag as
might any other passenger, and his touch revealed "an object whose contour or
mass makes its identity immediately apparent….."[169]
Although Dickerson recognized that "touch is more intrusive into privacy
than is sight,"[170]
that judgment is irrelevant to the privacy expectations of my hypothetical bus
passenger.[171]
If the greater intrusiveness inherent in touch has no bearing on whether a
search occurred in my hypothetical case, why does it matter in Bond? The
Chief Justice's opinion provides no answer to this question.[172]
In sum, Bond's distinction between "visual, as opposed to tactile,
observation,"[173]
and its judgment that "[p]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive
than purely visual inspection"[174]
are beside the point. Dickerson had already established that officers may
rely on their sense of touch to make searches and seizures. Further, the
Bond Court did not hold that Bond had a reasonable expectation of privacy
that his bag would not be touched at all. On the contrary, the Court stated "a
bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled."[175]
Thus, the issue in Bond was not whether the bag could be touched--it
clearly could be; instead, the fight was about the intensity of the touch. When
these factors are added to the mix, one has to wonder whether the ultimate
impact of Bond will be that officers will be more careful during
suppression hearings in describing how they "squeezed" a passenger's bag.
The
final puzzling point in Bond is the role "purpose" played in the outcome.
The Chief Justice confirms that the subjective intent of the agent is irrelevant
for determining whether a search occurred: "the issue is not his state of mind,
but the objective effect of his actions."[176]
As a matter of doctrine, the Court has virtually eliminated an officer's
subjective intent as a factor in Fourth Amendment analysis generally.[177]
More particularly, when determining the scope of the Amendment, the intent or
purpose of the officer is a non-issue.[178]
Despite this consensus among the Justices, the facts in Bond appeared to
raise doubt, at least in some quarters, about the Court's unwillingness to
consider purpose when calculating privacy interests. During oral argument,
Justice Souter noted that an officer's purpose may be highly relevant when
measuring a person's legitimate expectation of privacy:
I mean, our purpose inquiry, again, turns at different levels. We say the
very fact that you may have a law enforcement objective, purpose in mind as
opposed to a private one doesn't matter, but it seems to me that at a lower
level of generality the purpose for which you may engage in touching may very
well matter. Take a nonlaw enforcement example. We both agree that generally
speaking we expose ourselves to being looked at, but we don't expose things that
we carry to being touched, so if somebody comes up to you on the street and
starts feeling the package you have in mind, you'd tell them to get away. On the
other hand, if you drop the package and someone politely comes along and picks
it up for you, even though they're touching it, you'd say thank you. In that
sense, at that level of purpose, purpose matters a very great deal to reasonable
expectation, and that's the suggestion that I'm making about the purpose for
which luggage is touched. It is touched for the purpose of being moved, not for
the purpose of being explored, and I don't see why that is not a relevant
consideration for the law in judging reasonable expectation.[179]
Justice Souter's comments are not only thoughtful, but they also help
illustrate why purpose may be relevant when measuring Fourth Amendment
interests. Justice Souter's remarks reveal that ordinary (as opposed to
constitutional) privacy interests are variable, and their existence may depend
on context, as well as on the actions of third parties. The reasonable person
who drops a package will not be offended when the bystander picks it up for her,
even though the bystander will have to touch it. But if the bystander attempts
to touch the package held by a person, then the expectations and reactions of
the reasonable person will be different. Purpose matters here. But purpose
should also matter in Bond, as well as in Carter, when determining
constitutional privacy interests. And this is where Justice Souter's
comments expose the flaw in the Court's refusal to consider purpose when it
decides the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
The bus passenger who watches
another passenger push his luggage to make additional space in the overhead bin
may not be pleased by the actions of the fellow passenger, but he understands
the purpose for the touch and realizes such conduct is part of modern-day
travel. Thus, he has no ordinary privacy interest or tort claim against that
type of touch. In contrast, the passenger who watches a police officer squeeze
his bag has different expectations and interests at stake. His expectations and
legal rights are different both because the person doing the squeezing is not a
fellow passenger and because the purpose for the squeeze is different. As noted
earlier, police officers do not squeeze luggage to create additional space in
overhead compartments. Officers squeeze luggage for the purpose of exploring its
contents. Therefore, the existence of a passenger's constitutional
expectations and interests are partially linked to both the person conducting
the squeeze and the purpose for the squeeze. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the
passenger's privacy against government officers, not against private parties.
And the officer's purpose is relevant because reasonable bus passengers do not
expect that other passengers or police officers "will, as a matter of course,
feel the[ir] bag[s] in an exploratory manner."[180]
Lastly, although the Court claims that in determining whether a search
occurred "the issue is not [the officer's] state of mind, but the objective
effect of his actions," one suspects that the officer's purpose also influenced
how the Court viewed the "objective effect" of his conduct. [181]
After all, as Justice Souter's comments demonstrate, the "objective effect" of
an officer's action may depend on the purpose as well as the consequences of the
officer's behavior. For example, the objective effect of an officer's touching a
person in a crowded elevator or on a jam-packed subway train will no doubt vary
depending on the purpose of the touch. If measured solely in terms of force, the
objective effect of an officer's grab to prevent a rider from falling as the
subway train lurches forward is more intrusive than the effect of an officer's
glancing touch to determine whether a rider possesses a gun. Yet from a
constitutional perspective, the officer's grab to prevent the rider from falling
is less intrusive than his glancing touch because of the different purposes for
each touch. Likewise, the Court's ultimate judgment about the "objective effect"
of the officer's squeeze of Bond's bag was doubtlessly influenced by the
knowledge that the officer's purpose for squeezing was not to create additional
space in the luggage bin, but to look for contraband.
In sum, the results in Carter and Bond do not turn on an
objective legal principle. Instead, these results are achieved by the Court's
ad hoc, subjective balancing of the police officers' conduct against the
defendants' Fourth Amendment interests. In Carter, if the defendants'
contact with their host's home had been longer and more substantial--for
instance, if they had regularly visited for several hours, discussed personal
matters (as well as their criminal enterprise), and were close friends with the
host--the defendants might have prevailed. In Bond, if the officer's
testimony had been less explicit about the intensity of his squeeze, then the
result in that case might have been different as well. Neither case is dictated
by a constitutional norm connected to the Fourth Amendment's purpose. The
results in both cases are determined by the Justices' subjective views of the
reasonableness of the police intrusion. But even under a traditional
"reasonableness" formula, the results in Carter and Bond seem
disordered: persons invited into a home for a brief visit are subject to
arbitrary search, but police are barred from squeezing luggage that is openly
exposed in the overhead bin of an interstate bus.
B. What is a "Search" Under the Model of Controlling Police Discretion?
If controlling police discretion rather than the reasonableness model
were the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, the results in Carter
and Bond might have been different and more sensible. For example, in
Carter, rather than focusing on the purpose of the defendants' visit or
the length of their stay, the Court might have asked a more basic question:
should police be permitted to monitor arbitrarily the activities of a person or
to seize someone randomly who has been invited into the home of a third party
for a brief visit? The answer to that question should be "no." When this type of
police intrusion is allowed, the rights of the invited guest will not be the
only constitutional interests affected by the intrusion.[182]
The privacy and security interests of the homeowner will also be jeopardized
where the police have unchecked authority to search or seize short-term
guests.[183]
Whatever the purpose for a guest's visit, or however short the length of his
stay, neither the guest nor the homeowner is enjoying the right "to be secure"
within that home if police have unchecked discretion to monitor the guest's
activities while he is inside the home.[184]
Even if the homeowner's interest in sharing her privacy and security is
removed from the constitutional calculus, the Fourth Amendment interests of a
person invited into another's home should not be measured by an hourglass or by
the reason for the visit. The Fourth Amendment gives us a right "to be secure"
at certain times and places against governmental searches and seizures
that are arbitrary and unjustified. The purpose of the Amendment, along with the
rest of the Bill of Rights, is to limit police power. When defining the scope of
the Amendment, the judiciary ought to focus on whether the challenged police
conduct should be free of legal control. Consider, for instance, the argument
advanced by the American Civil Liberties Union in Carter.[185]
The ACLU noted that under the Court's precedents, if either defendant in
Carter had used his host's telephone to discuss a cocaine deal and an
illegal wiretap had recorded the conversation, or if an unlawfully installed
eavesdropping device in the host's kitchen had captured the defendants'
conversations concerning narcotics, the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents
would have invalidated these police searches.[186]
Should the privacy of Carter's telephone conversation turn on the purpose of his
call? Should Carter's and John's right to be free of arbitrary government
eavesdropping depend upon the length of their stay in Thompson's kitchen?
Wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are covered by the Fourth Amendment
because police officials should not have the authority to decide for themselves
whether to monitor an individual's private conversations. The same
principle--controlling the discretion of the police to invade our privacy and
personal security--that bars arbitrary monitoring of Carter's and John's private
conversations while in Thompson's home should also bar arbitrary monitoring of
their private conduct while in the same home.
Similarly, if checking police discretion were the controlling norm of
Fourth Amendment law, then the result in Bond would be the same, but the
reasoning behind that decision would be different. Rather than focusing on the
intensity of the officer's squeeze or on the difference between visual and
tactile inspection of luggage, the Court should be asking whether police should
have the discretion to explore randomly the contents of luggage by tactile
examination. The answer to this question should be "no" for two simple reasons.
First, Bond's bag deserved to be protected from arbitrary intrusions. As the
Court recognized, a "traveler's personal luggage is clearly an `effect'
protected by the Amendment."[187]
Moreover, it was undisputed that Bond "possessed a privacy interest in his
bag."[188]
If Bond's bag fell within the scope of the Amendment's coverage and he possessed
an undeniable privacy interest in that bag, then the bag deserved protection
from a suspicionless police intrusion. No extraordinary governmental interest
existed--such as the fear that a bomb might be smuggled aboard--that justified
an unwarranted police intrusion. Second, a police squeeze for exploratory
purposes is clearly conduct that jeopardizes the constitutional interest Bond
held in the bag. If, while passengers boarded the bus, an officer had squeezed
the pocket of a coat that Bond was holding, or the purse or knapsack loosely
carried by another passenger, that conduct would clearly threaten the privacy of
the targeted passengers. If those squeezes undermined privacy, why is the
squeeze in Bond different? It isn't.
C. The Court's Car Search Cases Fail to Control Police Discretion
Since 1925, when Carroll v. United States[189]
was decided, the Court has decided many cases concerning the Fourth Amendment
and automobiles. These decisions have produced a welter of opinions from the
Justices about the scope and meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In addition to the
views of the Justices, legal academics have written extensively about the
application of the Fourth Amendment to automobiles.[190]
Despite (or perhaps because of) the countless judicial opinions and diverse
commentary on the subject, the Court continues to review cases raising novel
search and seizure issues involving automobiles. The Court's most recent cases
dealing with this subject, Wyoming v. Houghton and Florida v.
White, illustrate new divisions among the Justices[191]
and will surely foster additional legal commentary on the Court's apparent "love
affair" with car searches.[192]
My goal in this section is straightforward. I hope to show that the
Court's automobile search doctrine does not control discretionary police
searches; as such, it is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Fourth
Amendment. I will not review the entirety of the Court's automobile cases. Nor
will I attempt to critique the vast legal commentary that has sprung from the
Court's cases. The latter goal would be a Herculean task; my goal is
considerably more modest. My thesis that automobile search doctrine conflicts
with the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment rests on two premises. First,
automobile search law is built upon a faulty historical assumption.
Carroll, the original car search case, ruled that warrantless automobile
searches were constitutionally valid, and based that conclusion, in part, on the
premise that the First Congress had enacted legislation authorizing the
warrantless searches of ships.[193]
Professor Tom Davies argues that Carroll's historical judgment was wrong
because the Framers did not intend or anticipate that ship searches would be
controlled by the Fourth Amendment.[194]
More importantly, Professor Davies's analysis indicates that the Court
"effectively rewrote the Fourth Amendment in Carroll by imposing a
modern, relativistic meaning on the word `unreasonable.'"[195]
Carroll's shift to a reasonableness model for deciding search issues
undermined the "Framers' larger purpose of foreclosing officers from exercising
discretionary authority."[196]
If Professor Davies's analysis is correct, then the historical foundation of the
automobile search cases collapses. Second, even if the concerns of the Framers
are put aside, the primary underpinnings for the modern view--that warrantless
searches of cars and containers found inside cars are per se
reasonable--rests on a logical framework that defies the notion of restraining
discretionary police searches. The Court's judgments in this area do not rest on
theories connected to the Fourth Amendment's ultimate purpose, but instead are
based on practical concerns of police efficiency and economics.
Carroll v. United States is the cornerstone of modern automobile
search law. Looking to the actions of the First Congress, which proposed the
Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned:
[T]he Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor
boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.[197]
Because the First Congress authorized customs officers to conduct
warrantless searches of ships,[198]
Carroll concluded that a warrantless search of an automobile was
constitutionally reasonable, provided there was probable cause for the search.[199]
Professor Davies contends that Carroll's conclusion that the Framers
intended the Fourth Amendment to govern searches and seizures of ships is
"ahistorical." According to Professor Davies, Carroll's interpreting the
Fourth Amendment to cover ship searches is erroneous for several reasons. First,
it ignores the text of the Amendment.[200]
Second, it ignores "the civil-law character of admiralty law as well as the
First Congress's explicit treatment of revenue seizures of ships as admiralty
matters."[201]
Third, it ignores the fact that the Court's precedents involving ship seizures
by federal officers never "mentioned the Fourth Amendment, let alone applied
it."[202]
Professor Davies concludes that the "Supreme Court had never suggested that the
Fourth Amendment applied to vessels prior to its decision in Carroll."[203]
According to Professor Davies, the Carroll Court committed another
interpretative error by ruling that the concept of "reasonableness" provided an
alternative ground, independent of the warrant process, for validating a police
search. When explaining why a warrantless search of a car was valid,
Carroll stated: "The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or
seizures, but only such as are unreasonable."[204]
Conditioning the legality of a search on "reasonableness," rather than on the
authorization of a judicial search warrant, was a fundamental shift in Fourth
Amendment theory.
[W]hen [Carroll] suggested that the Fourth Amendment only forbade
those police intrusions that were "unreasonable," [it] opened the way for
replacing specific standards of police conduct with the open-ended notion
of "reasonableness" itself. Thus, Carroll set search and seizure doctrine
on a course away from the rules model and toward the generalized-reasonableness
construction [that was later embraced by the modern Court].[205]
The motive for this shift seems obvious: providing law enforcement
officers efficient means to enforce Prohibition.[206]
But whatever the motive, the shift significantly modified Fourth Amendment
theory, and its impact has been enduring.[207]
Carroll's judgment that warrantless searches of vehicles are
constitutionally permissible has been the historical lodestar of automobile
search law for seventy-five years. Indeed, the modern Court has viewed the
Carroll analogy that cars are the equivalent of ships as the Framers'
imputed analysis of automobile searches.[208]
Professor Davies's analysis indicates that Carroll's interpretation of
the Framers' intent may have been misplaced.[209]
More importantly, Carroll's shift to a reasonableness model of Fourth
Amendment theory was inconsistent with the Framers' efforts to control
discretionary police searches.[210]
If Professor Davies is right,[211]
the Court can no longer claim that the genesis of its automobile search law is
based on the intent of the Framers.
When deciding the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection against car
searches, the Court might understandably be unwilling to have framing-era
thinking on ship searches dictate the results for modern automobile searches.[212]
In fact, despite the efforts of Justices Scalia and Thomas, current automobile
search law is not dominated by eighteenth-century legal theory; the foundation
of car search doctrine consists of thoroughly modern judgments regarding the
practical concerns of the police. While the Court's reasoning rests on modern
judgments, those judgments have no nexus with the central purpose of the Fourth
Amendment: controlling police discretion.
Consider, for example, Chambers v. Maroney,[213]
which sounded the death knell for the warrant requirement as it applied to car
searches and, coincidentally, was the Burger Court's first major car search
case. In Chambers, the police stopped and arrested the occupants of a
vehicle who were suspected of an armed robbery. Rather than searching the
vehicle at the place of arrest, the car was towed to a police station and
subsequently searched. Inside a compartment under the dashboard, police found
evidence tying the defendants to the armed robbery. Chambers ruled that
the warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
After conceding that neither Carroll nor its progeny established
"that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an automobile even with
probable cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a
warrant affords,"[214]
Justice White addressed the crux of the issue confronting the
Court.
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only
the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is
obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the
magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which the
"lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a
variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference
between, on the one hand, seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the other hand, carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either
course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.[215]
The upshot of Justice White's logic goes beyond the result in Carroll
by eliminating the warrant requirement for car searches in cases presenting
no exigency for an immediate search.[216]
But there is more to Chambers than simply removing car searches from the
warrant process. Police are given the power to search cars, but the
justifications for this power are not tied to a principle connected to the
Fourth Amendment's raison d'être. Police are given the power to search
based on their own assessment of probable cause because the Court is
unable to decide whether a search or temporary seizure is a "lesser" intrusion[217]
and cannot see a constitutional distinction between a temporary seizure and an
immediate search. These justifications are not connected to controlling police
discretion. Chambers in fact expands police power and discretion.
The Court authorizes police to seize a car and search it later or to conduct an
immediate search. Either intrusion is permissible according to the Court, and
police do not have to justify their choice. Concededly, the mobility of an
automobile presents an exigency that justifies a temporary seizure, and there
may be circumstances where an immediate search is necessary.[218]
But a warrantless search in a context where the occupants have been safely
placed under custody, the car is under the control of the police, and there is
no threat to police safety, cannot be justified by a norm that is relevant to
the Fourth Amendment.[219]
Chambers severed car searches from the warrant process, but it did
not address whether closed containers found inside automobiles could also be
searched based on an officer's assessment of probable cause. That significant
question would be addressed in the tandem cases of United States v. Ross[220]
and California v. Acevedo.[221]
In deciding that closed containers could be searched without judicial approval,
the practical concerns of the police prevailed over a rule that would restrict
discretionary police searches.
Prior to 1982, the Court's cases distinguished between a general search
of a car based on probable cause that evidence was located somewhere in the
vehicle, and a situation where police only have probable cause to search a
particular container that happened to be located in a car. The former search was
permissible, but the latter search was not.[222]
What the Court had not decided was whether police, engaged in a lawful search of
a car, could search closed containers found inside the vehicle.[223]
Ross ruled that police could search closed containers found during a
general search of a car. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens explained that
the "scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower--and
no broader--than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by
probable cause."[224]
Thus, police may search any closed container found during a lawful search of a
car because the scope of a search is not "defined by the nature of the
container," but rather by "the object of the search and the places in which
there is probable cause to believe that it may be found."[225]
In reaching this conclusion, Ross rejected a rationale that had surfaced
in some of the Court's earlier rulings related to car searches. Notably,
Ross rejected the "unpersuasive assertion" that an individual has a
reduced privacy interest in the concealed areas of a car or in a closed
container.[226]
Ross also conceded that a warrantless search could not be justified by
the exigency or difficulty of securing a closed container.[227]
If neither a reduced privacy interest nor an exigency justified a search of a
closed container, what was the justification for such a search? Ross
explained that "practical considerations" justified the search: "Prohibiting
police from opening immediately a container in which the object of the search is
most likely to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire
vehicle would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests."[228]
Moreover, because an officer "could never be certain that the contraband was not
secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle," in many cases "the
vehicle would need to be secured while a warrant was obtained."[229]
Ross concluded that the latter scenario would be inconsistent with the
power and discretion authorized in Carroll and Chambers.[230]
Although Justice Stevens's reasoning in Ross paralleled the logic
of Chambers, he left intact a rule developed during the interval between
Chambers and Ross: police must obtain a search warrant where
probable cause is confined to a particular container located in a car.[231]
Nine years later, however, that loophole was closed in California v.
Acevedo,[232]
over the strong dissent of Justice Stevens. Acevedo reasoned that "it is
better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate
the warrant requirement for closed containers" entirely.[233]
Thus, a search of a closed container found in a car is per se reasonable
if "the[] search is supported by probable cause."[234]
The "clear-cut" rule adopted by Acevedo is not surprising in light
of Chambers and Ross. As Acevedo explained, the Court's
prior precedents had "drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile
that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that
coincidentally turns up in an automobile."[235]
Acevedo concluded that either search was reasonable because "[t]he
protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn on such coincidences."[236]
The Acevedo Court was right to note that the validity of a search should
not turn on such uncertainties. Absent a true emergency or consent, a search of
a closed container should never be permitted without judicial authorization.
This per se rule, and not the per se rule created in
Acevedo, would control discretionary searches. After all, why should a
container, whether found after a general search of a car, or discovered in a car
after a limited search for the container, be subject to search based on a police
assessment of probable cause?
The modern Court's answer to this question is that "practical
considerations" justify searching containers discovered during a general search
of a car.[237]
As noted above, if police could not immediately search a container, they would
be forced to "comb the entire vehicle" looking for contraband, which would
"exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests."[238]
The Court has also noted that if containers were not subject to immediate
search, in some cases, the vehicle itself "would need to be secured while a
warrant was obtained."[239]
What the Court labels "practical considerations" are really "police
considerations." The first concern is easily alleviated: if a motorist does not
wish to experience the additional intrusion that would be occasioned by
"comb[ing] the entire vehicle," he can consent to a search of the container.[240]
But whether a motorist consents to an immediate search or not, in the real
world, police will continue to search the entire car.[241]
The best way to put an end to such discretionary searches is to overrule
Carroll and Chambers, which provided the historical and logical
foundation for Ross[242]
and Acevedo.[243]
Overruling Carroll and Chambers, however, would entail
significant costs for police departments nationwide. Indeed, the avoidance of
these costs is the best explanation for the modern Court's car search doctrine.
Discretionary car searches could be restrained by requiring warrants before a
search.
[But this mandate] would have imposed a constitutional requirement
upon police departments of all sizes around the country to have available the
people and equipment necessary to transport impounded automobiles to some
central location until warrants could be secured. Moreover, once seized
automobiles were taken from the highway the police would be responsible for
providing some appropriate location where they could be kept, with due regard to
the safety of the vehicles and their contents, until a magistrate ruled on the
application for a warrant. Such a constitutional requirement therefore would
have imposed severe, even impossible, burdens on many police departments.[244]
This concern--the costs associated with impounding vehicles and their
contents--is the only legitimate argument available to counter the Fourth
Amendment interests of motorists. The other arguments proffered by the Court
over the years--for instance, the inability to decide whether a search of the
car is a "greater" intrusion than a temporary seizure of the car,[245]
the minimal protection of privacy served by a rule that requires a warrant when
police have cause only to search a particular container found in a car,[246]
and the alleged confusion for judges and police officers generated by automobile
search law[247]--have
been evasions design to mask the Court's unwillingness both to impose
significant economic burdens on police departments and to restrain discretionary
car searches.[248]
Because controlling discretionary authority is the underlying vision of the
Fourth Amendment,[249]
it should be the ultimate focus of the Court. The way to restrain discretionary
automobile searches is to require judicial warrants prior to a search, unless an
emergency or a credible threat to police safety exists.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's vagueness doctrine has traditionally been designed to
promote diverse legal interests. One such interest is to protect the freedoms
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Thus, it has been said that vagueness doctrine
"has very intimate connections both with the substance of individual freedom
from arbitrary and discriminatory governmental action and . . .
with the federal institutional processes established to protect that freedom."[250]
This article has argued that the Court should once again look to vagueness
doctrine to protect a freedom enshrined in the Bill of Rights; namely, the
privilege against arbitrary and capricious police intrusion embodied in the
Fourth Amendment. Search and seizure law should adopt an essential feature of
vagueness law: controlling police discretion. If this constitutional norm were
incorporated into the Court's Fourth Amendment cases, the right of all persons
"to be secure" against unreasonable searches and seizures would stand on
stronger ground.
[*]
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. The author thanks Michael
Harper for reading an earlier draft of this article. He also thanks Kelly
Honohan, Melissa Toner, and Christina Lim for their research and editing
assistance.
[1]
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
[2]
527 U.S. 41 (1999).
[3]
The Illinois Supreme Court had interpreted "no apparent purpose" as "provid[ing]
absolute discretion to police officers to determine what activities constitute
loitering." Id. at 61 (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 63
(Ill. 1997)). The Morales Court explained that it had "no authority to
construe the language of a state statute more narrowly than the construction
given by that State's highest court." Id. (footnote omitted).
[4]
Id. at 62.
[5]
Id. at 62-63.
[6]
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302.
[7]
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 375 (1985) ("The search of a young
woman's purse by a school administrator is a serious invasion of her legitimate
expectations of privacy."); United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir.
1993) ("[A] purse is a type of container in which a person possesses the highest
expectation of privacy."); State v. Johnston, 645 P.2d 63, 64 (Wash. Ct. App.
1982) ("It would be difficult to define an object more inherently private than
the contents of a woman's purse."); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.2,
at 69 (3d ed. Supp. 2000) (remarking that containers such as purses "seldom
contain anything other than the passenger's personal effects"); Christopher
Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738 (1993) (noting
that the search of a high school student's purse was ranked within the top ten
most intrusive "search and seizure scenarios" in a public survey of expectations
of privacy); Marianne Means, A Purse Is More Than a Container,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 10, 1999, at 13A (arguing that a warrantless
search of a woman's purse is an invasion of her privacy).
[8]
The officer who searched Houghton's purse testified at the suppression hearing
that he "had no probable cause to search Ms. Houghton's purse and that men do
not usually carry purses." Respondent's Brief at 1. The Wyoming Supreme Court
found that "there was no probable cause to search [Houghton's] personal effects
and no reason to believe that contraband had been placed within the
purse . . . ." Houghton v. Wyoming, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (Wyo.
1998). In the Supreme Court, Wyoming conceded that the officer who searched
Houghton's purse lacked "probable cause specific to the purse or passenger."
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pet. for
Cert. i). For a detailed discussion of Houghton's treatment of probable
cause, see George M. Dery III, Improbable Cause: The Court's Purposeful
Evasion of a Traditional Fourth Amendment Protection in Wyoming v. Houghton,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 547, 581-87 (2000). Professor Dery argues that
"[i]nstead of maintaining a particularity requirement where an officer may
intrude only where he or she has justification to search, Houghton has
expanded official search powers once probable cause in a general place, such as
a vehicle, is established." Id. at 590-91.
[9]
Arguably, Houghton authorizes a general search. See Erin Morris
Meadows, Case Note, Better-Off Walking: Wyoming v. Houghton
Exemplifies What Acevedo Failed to Rectify, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 329,
349-50 (2000) ("[The upshot of Houghton is] that a general search of a
vehicle and all of its contents is permitted, even if probable cause attached to
only one person or container. Before Houghton, if a police officer had
specific probable cause relating to just one bag, that one bag was all he could
search. With the new Houghton rule, if probable cause exists to believe
that one person is transporting drugs, then the scope of the warrantless search
includes all the occupants' belongings located within the vehicle." (footnotes
omitted)). See also Sara L. Shaeffer, Note, Another Dent in Our Fourth
Amendment Rights: The Supreme Court's Precarious Extension of the Automobile
Exception in Wyoming v. Houghton, 45 S.D. L. REV. 422, 448 (2000). Shaeffer
maintains that in the absence of individualized suspicion, "the search of a
container that belongs to a passenger, whom police do not suspect of a crime,
would be supported only by the theory of guilt by association," which the Court
has previously rejected. Id. (citations omitted). "The Houghton
decision, however, legitimizes the theory of guilt by association and deprives
all persons traveling in vehicles the right to be free from unreasonable
searches." Id.
[10]
See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999) (per curiam). Decided during
the Term after Houghton, Flippo ruled that police violated the
Fourth Amendment when they searched a briefcase that had been found at a murder
scene inside Flippo's cabin without first obtaining a search warrant. For a
fuller discussion of Flippo, see Milton Hirsch & David O. Markus,
Fourth Amendment Forum: The Supreme Court's Latest Word: Get a Warrant!,
THE CHAMPION, Apr. 2000, at 49.
[11]
Thanks to David Cole for helping me see how the Court's thinking can be revealed
by doctrinally dissimilar cases. See, e.g., David Cole, The Value of
Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement
of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31 (exemplifying how a basic
tension in the Court's interpretation of the Constitution may be explored by
comparing two cases that appear to have little in common).
[12]
Morales, 527 U.S. at 101-02 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[13]
Id. at 109-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[14]
Id. ("In sum, the Court's conclusion that the ordinance is impermissibly
vague because it `necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment
judgment of the policeman on his beat,' cannot be reconciled with common sense,
longstanding police practice, or this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
(internal citation omitted)); see also Debra Livingston, Gang
Loitering, The Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP CT.
REV. 141, 179 [hereinafter Livingston, Gang Loitering] ("The Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however, substantially undercuts the
persuasiveness of the majority's position that the `no apparent purpose'
language in Chicago's ordinance conferred on police a `vast discretion' too
extravagant to be endured." (footnote omitted)).
[15]
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). Twenty years earlier, in
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam), the Court ruled
that police could arbitrarily order drivers out of their cars during routine
traffic stops.
[16]
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
[17]
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Whren establishes that a
"decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. at 810. The
officer's motivation for the stop is irrelevant. Id. at 813. Criticism of
Whren is widespread. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual
Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio,
28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145 (1996) (arguing that with Whren drivers and
passengers have lost virtually all of their Fourth Amendment protections);
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 340
(1998) ("In light of past and present tensions between the police and minority
groups, it is startling that the Court would ignore racial concerns when
formulating constitutional rules that control police discretion to search and
seize persons on the street."); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 67 n.229
(1997) ([Whren gives police] a grant of discretionary power to stop,
question, and (in jurisdictions that classify traffic offenses as crimes) search
and arrest suspects based on unarticulated suspicion of other crimes, or worse,
based on the officer's whim or prejudice."); Chris K. Visser, Comment,
Without a Warrant, Probable Cause, or Reasonable Suspicion: Is There Any
Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Driving a Car?, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1683,
1706 (1999) ("For a motorist . . . there is little safeguard left
[against arbitrary police invasions] because, under Whren, a vehicle stop
is `reasonable' whenever it is supported by probable cause that a mere traffic
violation has occurred."); Lisa Walter, Comment, Eradicating Racial
Stereotyping from Terry Stops: The Case for an Equal Protection
Exclusionary Rule, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 279 (2000) (criticizing
Whren for not recognizing that there is no suppression remedy under the
Equal Protection Clause). Because every motorist will commit a traffic violation
sooner or later, Whren effectively overrules Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979), thereby eliminating Fourth Amendment scrutiny of the
decision to make a traffic stop. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The
Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265,
1271-72 (1999) [hereinafter Stuntz, Distribution] ("Traffic violations
are sufficiently common that, if this authority were used widely enough,
automobile stops could become effectively unregulated. In an odd way,
Whren shows how broad police authority over pedestrians is, for
Whren does no more than narrow the gap between Fourth Amendment
protection for drivers and the rules for police-citizen encounters. The police
can, after all, already `stop' pedestrians without cause, given that every
street encounter is functionally a stop."). For additional criticism of
Whren, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4, at 12-28 (3d ed.
Supp. 2000); David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the
Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 558-61 (1998) [hereinafter Harris,
Car Wars]; David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 554 (1997); Jennifer A. Larrabee, "DWB
(Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realities of an
Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 291 (1997); Wesley
MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and
Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409 (2000); David
A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271; Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the
Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999);
Christopher Hall, Note, Challenging Selective Enforcement of Traffic
Regulations After the Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v. United States,
United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police Discretion,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1083 (1998).
[18]
526 U.S. 559 (1999).
[19]
525 U.S. 83 (1998).
[20]
Morales, 527 U.S. at 46.
[21]
Cf. Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 14, at 166-67
("[T]he Court's own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence--its endorsement of
warrantless police actions premised on admittedly nebulous concepts like
probable cause--vests police with a significant degree of street-level
discretion that is hard to reconcile with the Morales majority's
condemnation of the discretion involved in applying Chicago's gang loitering
ordinance.").
[22]
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
[23]
Morales, 527 U.S. at 64-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
[24]
See Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a
Bog, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1999) ("If the statute itself must now
contain additional guidelines to forestall [police] misconduct, what should such
guidelines be? This question is not easily answered . . . . The
Court created this dilemma not by a process of reasoning but by stumbling.");
Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 14, at 164 ("On closer
inspection, . . . Morales evinces a deeper
problem--a real inability on the part of the majority to offer even a facially
plausible account of the role that the vagueness doctrine actually plays in
constraining the opportunity for arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement by
local police."); see also Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares,
Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153,
1167 (1998) (criticizing the Court for closely scrutinizing police discretion
affecting minority citizens because minority communities can protect their legal
rights through the political process). But cf. Dorothy E. Roberts,
Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 780-89 (1999) (applauding
the result in Morales because vague laws give police license to harass
and arrest people based on race-based suspicions).
[25]
Hill, supra note 24, at 1306. The following discussion is not intended to
be an exhaustive analysis of the Court's vagueness cases. Instead, it takes the
ruling in Morales as a point of departure for the Court's current view of
the vagueness doctrine as it applies to criminal statutes. Specifically,
although there was no majority opinion in Morales, six Justices did agree
that Chicago's ordinance was unconstitutional because it failed to control
police discretion. Thus, whatever else can be said about Morales and
vagueness law generally, a majority of the Court now believes that a critical
element of vagueness doctrine is the requirement of minimal guidelines to
control police discretion. For more detailed analysis of vagueness law and its
impact on modern criminal justice issues, see generally Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960); Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal
Statutes--Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1 (1997); Michael K.
Browne, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Loitering Laws: Does Being
"Tough on Crime" Justify the City of Minneapolis' Use of a Vague and Broadly
Constructed Ordinance, Which Criminalizes Our Thoughts in Violation of the First
Amendment?, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 147 (1998); David Cole,
Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999); Bernard E. Harcourt,
Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998); Hill, supra note 24; John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985); Kahan & Meares, supra note
24; Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 14; Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997) [hereinafter
Livingston, Police Discretion]; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan,
The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v.
Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197; Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing
Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491 (1994);
Dorothy E. Roberts, supra note 24.
[26]
Morales, 527 U.S. at 69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
[27]
See id. at 53. The Court rejected respondents' Free Speech argument, because
"[t]he ordinance does not prohibit speech . . . . [I]t is
also clear that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently
intended to convey a message." Id. However, a plurality of the Court
suggested that the ordinance might infringe the freedom of movement protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 52 (leaving
undecided whether the impact of the ordinance would support a facial challenge
under the overbreadth doctrine).
[28]
Id. at 47 (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997)
(quoting CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 8-4-015 (June 17, 1992))).
[29]
Vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The classic treatment of vagueness doctrine is Professor
Anthony Amsterdam's student note. See Amsterdam, supra note
25.
[30]
The City claimed that the ordinance restrained police discretion in three
ways.
First, it does not permit the officer to issue a dispersal order to
anyone who is moving along or who has an apparent purpose. Second, it does not
permit an arrest if individuals obey a dispersal order. Third, no order can
issue unless the officer reasonably believes that one of the loiterers is a
member of a criminal street gang.
Morales, 527 U.S. at 61.
[31]
Id. at 61-62 (footnote omitted).
[32]
Id. at 62.
[33]
Id. at 63.
[34]
Id. at 66 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
[35]
Id.
[36]
In Justice Breyer's view, the ordinance's two limitations did not check police
discretion. The limitation that a group of loiterers contain a gang member did
not narrow the law's reach because non-gang members could still be ordered to
disperse. The limitation that a person must remain in public "with no apparent
purpose," according to Justice Breyer, was "not a limitation at all." Id.
at 70 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This part
of the ordinance invites subjective judgment by officers regarding the purpose
of those remaining in a public place. Id.
[37]
Id. at 71.
[38]
Id.
[39]
Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 72 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
[40]
Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 14, at 145.
[41]
Hill, supra note 24, at 1306.
[42]
Id. at 1307.
[43]
Id.
[44]
Id.
[45]
Id. ("[A] statute that sufficiently defines the offense was traditionally
thought by the Court to furnish adequate guidance to the police. If the police
engaged in misconduct anyway, it was not deemed to be for lack of guidance in
the statute.").
[46]
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the
Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of
Displeasing Police Offices, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 221 (1967)
("[A] vague statute fundamentally affronts the rule of law embodied in the Due
Process Clause by permitting and encouraging more or less arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions.").
[47]
Jeffries, supra note 25, at 212.
[48]
Id. at 215.
[49]
In an attempt to limit arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance, the Chicago
Police Department effectuated General Order 92-4, which confined enforcement to
sworn "members of the gang crime section" and limited enforcement to certain
"designated areas" of the city, which were not released to the public.
See Morales, 527 U.S. at 48.
[50]
See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). This case
involved an ordinance that made it unlawful "for any person to stand or loiter
upon any street or sidewalk . . . after having been requested by
any police officer to move on." Id. at 88 (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GEN.
CITY CODE § 1142 (1944) amended by Ordinance 1436-F). The Court held that
"[l]iterally read, . . . this ordinance says that a person
may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police
officer of that city. The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs
no demonstration." Id. at 90 (emphasis added). Birmingham's ordinance
was not invalidated on free speech grounds, "although First-Amendment issues
lurked in the record." Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 222.
[51]
Hill, supra note 24, at 1307.
[52]
461 U.S. 352 (1983). Professor Hill is not a fan of Kolender, either.
See Hill, supra note 24, at 1302-06. Professor Hill complains
that, prior to Kolender, "the Court had mentioned the role of the
vagueness doctrine in eliminating a potential for police abuse, but had never
suggested that the existence of such a potential was an independent basis for
invalidating a statute." Id. at 1303 (footnote omitted). But he concedes
that "[f]or years the Court had spoken of the vagueness doctrine as addressed to
four concerns," including "avoidance of a potential for discriminatory
and arbitrary enforcement." Id. at 1303-04 (footnote omitted). Indeed, in
several opinions pre-dating Kolender, the Court had stated that a vague
law violates due process because it authorizes the power for "arbitrary street
enforcement, arbitrary arrest and similar harassments" by police.
Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 221 (citing cases). Thus, Professor Hill's
objection that "Morales lacks a firm foundation" rests on the Court's
willingness to rely upon criteria other than fair notice grounds as a basis for
ruling a penal statute unconstitutionally vague. Although Morales and
Kolender represent a change in emphasis, they fit comfortably with the
Court's past pronouncements regarding vagueness doctrine.
[53]
461 U.S. at 353 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 647(e) (West 1970)).
[54]
Id. at 353-54.
[55]
Id. at 358.
[56]
See Jeffries, supra note 25, at 218 ("[The Kolender Court]
focused on the right problem--namely, the susceptibility of the law in question
to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. That is the only rationale that
plausibly supports this decision, and in my view it is the most persuasive
justification for vagueness review generally.").
[57]57
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 ("[Under the California statute, an] individual,
whom police may think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe
has committed a crime, is entitled to continue to walk the public streets `only
at the whim of any police officer' who happens to stop that individual under §
647(e). Our concern here is based upon the `potential for arbitrarily
suppressing First Amendment liberties . . . . In addition, §
647(e) implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of
movement." (citations omitted)); Morales, 527 U.S. at 52-56 (explaining
that the Court need not decide whether Chicago's ordinance had a sufficient
impact on the freedom of movement to justify facial invalidation under the
overbreadth doctrine); cf. Jeffries, supra note 25, at 217 ("The
use of the vagueness doctrine to protect first amendment freedoms is,
. . . closely linked to the rule of law: it presents, if you will, a
special case of the dangers of discretion.").
[58]
Hill, supra note 24, at 1307.
[59]
Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 223.
[60]
See Aaron J. Mann, Casenote, A Plurality of the Supreme Court Asserts a
Due Process Right To Do Absolutely Nothing in City of Chicago v. Morales, 33
CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 629-30 (2000) (asserting that the Chicago ordinance
unjustifiably authorizes a "standardless sweep" that "grants the police too much
discretion and lends itself to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement").
[61]
Roberts, supra note 24, at 812.
[62]
See Brief of Respondents 30-32, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No.
97-1121); Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, et. al. 26-28,
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121); see also
Roberts, supra note 24, at 780 ('"Although this constitutional flaw can
be explained in race-neutral terms, in Chicago it resulted in a particular
racial injury; the gang-loitering law disproportionately violated the rights of
Black and Latino citizens." (footnote omitted)). In Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352 (1983), Edward Lawson, an economically successful, well-educated,
innocent black man was repeatedly hassled, questioned, detained, and arrested by
police officers in southern California. When police officers were harassing him,
Lawson was a thirty-six year old San Francisco business consultant who wore his
hair in dreadlocks. Lawson was detained or arrested fifteen times by the police
while walking late at night in white neighborhoods in San Diego. See Dan
Stormer & Paul Berstein, The Impact of Kolender v. Lawson on Law
Enforcement and Minority Groups, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 105
(1984).
[63]
See Cole, supra note 25, at 1083 ("The problem with discretionary
authority--and the need for judicial control--is that discretion permits law
enforcement to target those whose complaints are least likely to be heard by the
rest of the community. This is true whether the community is heterogeneous or
homogeneous."); Roberts, supra note 24, at 786 ("The discriminatory
impact of discretion is magnified tremendously by laws that leave not only the
determination of suspicion but the very definition of offending conduct almost
entirely to an officer's judgment."). The recent reports of the New Jersey and
New York Attorneys General reveal the nexus between discretionary police
authority and race-based law enforcement:
Police officers necessarily
exercise considerable discretion in performing their sworn duties. This is
especially true in the context of highway patrol . . . .
[T]he legitimate criteria for selecting vehicles in these circumstances have
never been clearly spelled out in written standard operating procedures or
formal training curricula. Rather, the criteria used by troopers in exercising
their discretion have been developed in an ad hoc fashion over the years,
passed on through informal `coaching,' tempered by each trooper's own experience
and enforcement priorities, and strongly influenced by an official policy to
reward troopers who find major drug shipments. This situation may invite both
intentional and unintentional abuse and provides a management environment that
allows the use of stereotypes to go undetected.
PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H.
ZOUBEK, ATTORNEY GEN. OF N.J., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 11-12 (Apr. 20, 1999) available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf; see also id. at
30-31; OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES (1999) (detailing the impact of
the New York City police department's use of stop and frisk practices and other
low-visibility tactics on the everyday lives of minority citizens; explaining
why such practices have caused tension between the police and the minority
communities) available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.html.
[64]
Jeffries, supra note 25, at 213; cf. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE
DISCRETION 119 (1975) ("Possibly most important of all is the idea that
rulemaking can reduce injustice by cutting out unnecessary discretion,
which is one of the prime sources of injustice. Necessary discretion must be
preserved, including especially the needed individualizing--adapting of rules to
the unique facts of each case." (emphasis added)).
[65]
Jeffries, supra note 25, at 213-14. Professor Debra Livingston has
written extensively on the need for police discretion and contends that the
vagueness doctrine should be reformulated to recognize changes in modern
policing strategies. See Livingston, Police Discretion, supra
note 25. Most recently, she argues that the assumption that judges can
constrain capricious police enforcement--"an assumption expressed quite clearly
in Morales"--is "significantly less plausible" when applied to modern
laws like Chicago's ordinance. Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra
note 14, at 166. In support of her thesis, Livingston notes that modern
legal regimes "create substantial opportunities for police arbitrariness that do
not raise traditional vagueness concerns." Id. According to Livingston,
those opportunities exist in three contexts: (1) "broad, but clear laws--such as
[a] juvenile curfew[]" statute; (2) "narrow and specific, but commonly violated,
low-level statutes and ordinances;" and (3) the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which "vests police with a significant degree of street-level
discretion . . . ." Id. I do not disagree with
Professor Livingston's claim that other parts of the legal system create
opportunities for police abuse that are beyond the reach of the vagueness
doctrine. Indeed, a major premise of this article is that the Court's Fourth
Amendment cases provide the means for arbitrary police power. I do, however,
strongly disagree with Professor Livingston's proposal that courts employ a
"reasonableness" analysis when deciding vagueness questions. See
id. at 195-98 ("Simply stated, courts addressing difficult vagueness
questions should consider whether the exercise of police discretion contemplated
in challenged public order legislation will take place under conditions that
provide reasonable assurances that the relevant police department will be
accountable for the way in which it employs this discretion
. . . . Like all tests premised on reasonableness, the one
articulated here will permit many factors to be considered."). A vagueness
doctrine based on "reasonableness" will produce the same degree of discretionary
and arbitrary police power that is currently authorized by Fourth Amendment
doctrine.
[66]
Cf. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 93-94 (1988)
(describing the appropriateness of judicial intervention where the political
process fails to value interests of politically less powerful groups and
explaining that judicial intervention is needed "to assure that the tradeoff
between privacy and law enforcement is that which a hypothetical political
system would strike if everyone's interests were equally represented"); Erik G.
Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 804-18 (1999)
(describing an "anti-discrimination" model of Fourth Amendment theory).
[67]
Jeffries, supra note 25, at 212.
[68]
See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) ("Our cases show that
in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." (citations omitted)); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 299-303 (1999) (finding "that the balancing of the relative interests
weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passenger's
belongings").
[69]
Of course, a "reasonableness" model for deciding search and seizure cases is
consistent with the literal language of the Fourth Amendment, which grants to
the People, a right "to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Nor does a "reasonableness" model
necessarily preclude judicial efforts to control police discretion. See
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the
requirement of a warrant, it is of course textually possible to consider that
implicit within the requirement of reasonableness."); see also Sherry F.
Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness," 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1642 (1998) (proposing a "reasonableness" model that includes
greater substantive and procedural safeguards in Fourth Amendment analysis);
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 8-38 (1991) (arguing that the "reasonableness" of a search or seizure
should be assessed by balancing the state and individual interests and
concluding that government officers be required to obtain third party
authorization prior to any non-emergency search or seizure). Conversely, the
"reasonableness" model typically employed by the modern Court is a balancing
process "in which the judicial thumb apparently will be planted firmly on the
law-enforcement side of the scales." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 720
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 11.01 [C], at 165 (2d ed. 1995)
("Language announcing a broad warrant requirement is now almost exclusively
found in dissenting opinions. The clear and unmistakable trend of the law is
toward the `reasonableness' clause."). When "balancing" becomes the touchstone
of constitutional analysis, the Justices' personal views may affect the outcome
of certain cases. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the
Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1877-78 (1995) ("When one
seeks to balance interests, the result is likely to be distorted to the extent
that one systematically undervalues the interests on one side of the balance
while giving full weight to the interests on the other side."). Rather than
controlling police discretion, the modern Court's "reasonableness" model often
expands police discretion and authority. In other places, I have argued
that the underlying vision of the Fourth Amendment is controlling police
discretionary power. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Informants and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 584-85 (1996) [hereinafter Maclin,
Informants]; Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201, 228-29 (1993); Tracey Maclin,
When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1994). See also William J. Mertens, The Fourth
Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551,
553 (1984) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment "performs a discretion control
function").
[70]
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 591-600 (1999). Detailing the two-fold inconsistency between
the Framers' intent and the modern Court's reasonableness analysis, Professor
Davies writes:
The first is the [Framers'] widespread opposition to allowing
officers to exercise discretionary search authority . . . .
That opposition is inconsistent with the use of a relativistic reasonableness
standard, which would have facilitated officers' discretion to initiate
intrusions. The second fact is a silence: reasonableness was not used as a
standard for assessing searches or arrests in framing-era legal sources, and
there is also no persuasive evidence of the use of any such standard during the
framing of the state or federal constitutional provisions.
Id. at
591.
[71]
Id. at 556 (arguing against a return to the literal, original understandings
of the Framers regarding the Fourth Amendment because that "would subvert the
larger purpose for which the Framers adopted the text; namely to curb the
exercise of discretionary authority by officers"); Morgan Cloud, Searching
Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1729 (1996)
("[T]he Framers acted to eliminate search and seizure methods that permitted the
arbitrary exercise of discretion and were conducted without good cause, whether
or not warrants were employed." (footnote omitted)).
[72]
William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning,
602-1791, at ci (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
School) (footnote omitted).
[73]
Id. at ciii.
[74]
See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (Thomas, J.) (stating
that the proper analysis to construe the Fourth Amendment is primarily by the
reasonableness of the search at the time of the Amendment's adoption);
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and
seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are `unreasonable.'");
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that by "emphasizing the warrant requirement over the reasonableness of
the search the Court has `stood the fourth amendment on its head' from a
historical standpoint" (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 620 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting) ("Our cases establish that the ultimate test under the
Fourth Amendment is one of `reasonableness.'"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 772-73 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "[t]he [Fourth]
Amendment does not proscribe `warrantless searches' but instead it proscribes
`unreasonable searches").
[75]
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). For an
excellent critique of Justice Scalia's view that, when applying the Fourth
Amendment, judges should consider whether the challenged police conduct "was
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the
Amendment was framed," Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999), see David
A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739
(2000). Professor Sklansky argues that "[n]either the text nor the background of
the Fourth Amendment suggests it aims merely to codify eighteenth-century rules
of search and seizure." Id. at 1744. According to Professor Sklansky,
"the Framers' eighteenth-century rationalism offers little basis for concluding
that they intended the opening clause of the Fourth Amendment to
constitutionalize the then-existing rules of search and seizure. The common law
revered by the Framers--the common law they thought timeless and
universal--resided in fundamental principles, not in judicial precedents and
statutory prescriptions." Id. at 1790.
[76]
As explained by Professor Davies:
The historical record indicates that the
Framers perceived the threat to the right to be secure more precisely than we do
today. They did not have a diffuse concern about the security of person and
house--the common-law rules regarding search and arrest authority provided
sufficient protection against unjustified intrusions. Instead, they were
concerned about a specific vulnerability in the protections provided by the
common law; they were concerned that legislation might make general warrants
legal in the future, and thus undermine the right of security in person and
house. Thus, the Framers adopted constitutional search and seizure provisions
with the precise aim of ensuring the protection of person and house by
prohibiting legislative approval of general warrants.
Davies, supra
note 70, at 590.
[77]
Id. at 736.
[78]
Id. at 591.
[79]
Id. at 576-89. For other historical works describing colonial reaction to
discretionary searches and seizures, see generally Cuddihy, supra note
72, at 459-527, 757-825; William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House
Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371 (1980); O.M. Dickerson, Writs of
Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939); Joseph Frese, Writs of Assistance in
the American Colonies (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University); JOSIAH QUINCY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVIDENCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 1761-1772, app.I at
395-540 (1865) (Horace Gray's notes); M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE
(1978).
[80]
Davies, supra note 70, at 591.
[81]
Id. ("[R]easonableness was not used as a standard for assessing searches or
arrests in framing-era legal sources, and there is also no persuasive evidence
of the use of any such standard during the framing of the state or federal
constitutional provisions.").
[82]
Id. at 600. But cf. Sklansky, supra note 75, at 1780 ("The
term `unreasonable' . . . almost always meant in the
late-eighteenth-century what it means today: contrary to sound judgment,
inappropriate, or excessive. That is the usage suggested by dictionaries in use
at the time. That is also how the term was used in political rhetoric. In The
Federalist Papers, for example, `unreasonable' means either excessive or
implausible--it never means illegal or condemned by common-law courts."
(footnotes omitted)).
[83]
See Cuddihy, supra note 72, at 1546-47 ("In 1787-88, commentors on
the Constitution denounced general warrants and searches not just because they
were general but because they abridged the security that houses afforded from
unwelcome intrusion. That houses were castles was the most recurrent theme of
those commentaries."); see also Maclin, Informants,
supra note 69, at 578 ("When the Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791,
the unreasonable searches and seizures that preoccupied Americans primarily
involved forcible intrusions into homes by officials under the authority of
general warrants and writs of assistance." (citations omitted)).
[84]
Cf. Cuddihy, supra note 72, at 1546 ("The concern with warrants, in
short, embraced a concern with houses, which encapsulated still deeper concerns.
The amendment's opposition to unreasonable intrusion, by warrant and without
warrant, sprang from a popular opposition to the surveillance and divulgement
that intrusion made possible."); Davies, supra note 70, at 736 ("The
Framers never meant to create a relativistic notion of `reasonableness' as a
global standard for assessing warrantless intrusions by officers. Rather, they
banned general warrants in order to prevent the officer from exercising
discretionary authority. . . . There is no reason to think
they meant for `reasonableness' to be understood as a flexible, relativistic
standard for the exercise of discretionary authority." (footnote
omitted)).
[85]
Maclin, Informants, supra note 69, at 585 n.53.
[86]
Cf. Davies, supra note 70, at 747-48 (noting that "[t]he reality of
deep change since the framing means that the original meaning generally cannot
directly speak to modern issues," and that pragmatically speaking, "the central
issue in modern Fourth Amendment doctrine is the degree to which it is possible
and/or desirable to constrain discretionary police authority by a regime of
rules, or at least partial rules . . . . The issue is
not whether we will allow any discretionary police authority, but how much
discretionary authority will be conferred and in what circumstances." (footnote
omitted)); David A. Harris, Car Wars, supra note 17, at 578 (1998)
("Police need discretion to do their work; indeed, it is impossible to imagine
eliminating it. The questions are how much discretion comports with the Fourth
Amendment, and how this discretion might be channeled most wisely." (footnote
omitted)).
[87]
Davies, supra note 70, at 736.
[88]
Id. (footnote omitted).
[89]
See id. at 736-37. Davies writes, "framing-era common law resisted the sort
of discretionary authority that `reasonableness' analysis confers on modern
officers. The modern notion of `reasonableness' would have been distinctly ill
suited to the Framers' concerns; it is such a soft, subjective, contentless
notion that it fosters and enhances, rather than curbs, discretionary
authority." Id. (footnotes omitted).
[90]
See, e.g., Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(expressing the "understanding that history is meant to inform, but not
automatically to determine, the answer to a Fourth Amendment question"); 1 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1(a), at 6 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that reliance
on the Framers' original intent "is of limited utility"); Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 401 (1974)
(noting that technological advances, an expanding, urbanized population, and the
"increased dangers of crime in an automated age" prevent reliance on the
Framers' view of what the Fourth Amendment was specifically designed to
accomplish; therefore, even if today's society "wanted to take exclusive counsel
of the framers on the problems of our time, we could not do so"); Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
823-24 (1994) (arguing that an interpretation that focuses on the intent of the
Framers ignores two crucial changes since the Fourth Amendment was adopted:
first, the development of the armed, quasi-military professional police force,
and second, the "intensification of inter-racial conflict" within society and
the various ways "in which this conflict has intersected with law
enforcement").
[91]
434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
[92]
519 U.S. 408 (1997).
[93]
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[94]
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5, at 79 (3d ed. Supp. 2000).
[95]
Id.
[96]
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 423 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The "risk of
arbitrary control" that Justice Kennedy described will not be limited to the
exit orders specifically approved in Mimms and Wilson. As is true
with most Fourth Amendment axioms articulated by the Court, police officers will
consistently push the reach of these rules and test the judiciary's willingness
to limit police discretion. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("We must remember that the extent of any
privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers
interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit."). Police officers
(or their legal advisors) have interpreted Mimms and Wilson as
grounds not only to order motorists out of their vehicles, but also as authority
to detain motorists inside or outside their vehicles. See, e.g.,
Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming the
district court's finding that officers may order passengers to remain in a
vehicle during the administration of a field sobriety test, especially where the
officer is alone or concerned for his safety); United States v. Moorefield, 111
F.3d 10, 13 (3rd Cir. 1997) (finding that officers may lawfully order passengers
to remain in vehicles with their hands raised because such an order is a
"minimal intrusion on personal liberty"); Wilson v. State, 734 So.2d 1107 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting officers' argument that they may routinely order
a passenger to get back into a vehicle and remain inside for duration of traffic
stop), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1996 (2000); People v. Gonzalez, 704
N.E.2d 375 (Ill. 1998) (holding that police may detain a passenger who exits and
attempts to leave the scene of a traffic stop, even absent reasonable suspicion,
but leaving open the question whether police may detain a passenger for the
entire duration of a traffic stop), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 75 (1999);
Tawdul v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that police may
detain passengers who attempt to exit a lawfully stopped vehicle until the
officer has dispelled concerns for his safety), reh'g denied, 735 N.E.2d
226 (Ind. 2000); State v. Scimemi, No. 94-CA-58, 1995 WL 329031, at *3-4 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 2, 1995) (holding that an officer may briefly detain and order a
passenger to remain in a vehicle during a traffic stop if the officer finds such
an order necessary as a safety precaution, but declining to address the
permissible period of detention of passengers).
[97]
Cf. Harris, Car Wars, supra note 17, at 564 ("The operative
parts of [Wilson] are nothing but policy judgments dressed up as
principled judicial decisions.").
[98]
The following is an excerpt of some questions posed during oral
arguments:
Question: General Reno, you want no reasonableness limitation on
this. I suppose that means that a police officer could stop a bus and say,
everybody off the bus. Or--you know, does vehicle size come into it?
General
Reno: Yes, Your Honor. That might be a more difficult question for the Court,
but-
Question: Well, not for you. You want no reasonableness
limitation.
General Reno: Again, the bus situation can be an unknown
situation for that officer, and he needs the opportunity, under our position, to
be able to size up the situation, to determine and observe the people involved,
and he may determine that he wishes them to stay in or to exit. Police practices
indicate that both are appropriate, depending on the stage of the traffic stop
and depending on the circumstances of the traffic stop. We are submitting that
under the--this Court's rule in Mimms, it is the persons seated in the
vehicle that create the danger and the approach to that danger, and a police
officer should not have to calibrate what is in--critical and what is not
critical. He should be able to size up the situation, determine who's there, get
full view of them when appropriate, get them out of the car to neutralize the
situation, to get them away from the gun, and we submit that the intrusion is de
minimis.
Question: Well, why isn't Terry enough? I mean, your argument
is that he ought to be able to size up the situation. Terry gives him a
chance to size up the situation.
General Reno: Terry might not have
given, if the passenger had been in the same situation as Mimms with a
gun in his--under his sports coat, he might not have been able to see that
seated in the car.
Question: Well, then I think what you're really arguing,
and I think this was what the Attorney General from Maryland was really arguing,
is you really don't so much want him to size up the situation. You simply want
to have the right to get him out of the car, period. It's not going to be a
question of judgment. It's going to be a question of routine practice, I
assume.
Oral Argument of Janet Reno on Behalf of the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (No. 95-1268), 1996 WL 721111,
at *21-22.
[99]
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 (1994) (characterizing the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment doctrine as "not merely complex and contradictory, but often
perverse"); Amsterdam, supra note 90; Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of
the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985) (discussing the large
number of critics wrangling over the inconsistency of Fourth Amendment cases and
the misconception of the doctrine); Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the
Fourth: On Allen's "Process of `Factualization' in the Search and Seizure
Cases", 85 MICH. L. REV. 427, 439 (1986) (remarking that "the course of true
law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has
not . . . run smooth" (quoting Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Luna, supra note 66, at
790-802 (arguing that Fourth Amendment law should be overhauled and proposing a
theory that "delineate[s] the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment within the
Constitution and a concomitant method of enforcement").
[100]
Even in cases where the defendant receives a favorable judgment, the Court's
reasoning in a particular case sometimes results in the expansion of police
power. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
Dickerson involved a seizure of contraband narcotics taken from the
defendant's pocket after a police frisk for weapons. The Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected the prosecution's claim that the Fourth Amendment permitted the seizure
of illegal narcotics under a "plain feel" theory. Although the Court affirmed
the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court, it explained that plain feel or
plain touch seizures were proper under the Fourth Amendment. The Court affirmed
the state ruling because the officer's testimony revealed that he did not
immediately recognize the contraband in Dickerson's pocket. After
Dickerson, officers rarely make the same mistake; officers now testify
that while frisking a suspect they immediately recognized the feel of contraband
drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Mattarolo, 209 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2000) (accepting officer's testimony that "little chunks" in defendant's
pocket had a "distinctive feel" and were immediately known to be contraband);
United States v. Walker, 181 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging officer's
testimony that identity of contraband hidden in defendant's pants was
immediately apparent prior to and during frisk); United States v.
Proctor, 148 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 1998) (accepting officer's testimony that bulge
in defendant's jacket pocket was immediately determined to be marijuana upon
pat-down); United States v. Craft, 30 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying
plaintiff's motion to dismiss based on officer's testimony that bulges around
the ankles were immediately identifiable as controlled substances); State v.
Toth, 729 A.2d 1069 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (accepting trooper's
testimony that cocaine enclosed in paper bag was immediately identified during
frisk despite officer's inability to articulate the "tactile sensation" leading
to his belief). Tailored testimonies are becoming increasingly problematic. In
some cases, even judges are finding officers' testimonies too incredible to
accept. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 832 F. Supp. 1073 (N.D.
Miss. 1993) (rejecting officer's testimony of his ability to immediately
identify crack cocaine beneath layers of plastic, fabric, paper, and leather).
Courts and scholars have acknowledged the practice of conforming testimony to
validate searches. See, e.g., State v. Wonders, 952 P.2d 1351, 1364 (Kan.
1998) ("We are not unaware that experienced, knowledgeable law enforcement
officers know the `magic words' to be related when their searches and seizures
are challenged."); Kevin A. Lantz, Casenote, Search and Seizure: "The
Princess and the `Rock'": Minnesota Declines to Extend "Plain View" to "Plain
Feel," 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 539, 577 (1993) (finding plain feel standard
problematic due to the "fashioning of testimony to make otherwise invalid
seizures comply with a more traditional standard."). However, as one scholar
notes, the hazards of the plain touch doctrine extend beyond the practice of
modifying testimony. Professor Dery warns:
Due to the inexact nature of the
sense of feel, police may strain to establish a plain touch justification when
one is not warranted by the facts. Officers may inappropriately reach for plain
touch by one of two ways: police may rush to a conclusion of probable cause
before the nebulous sense of touch merits it, or they may be tempted to prolong
their patdowns in order to increase their ability to form probable cause on the
basis of touch.
George M. Dery, III, The Uncertain Reach of the Plain
Touch Doctrine: An Examination of Minnesota v. Dickerson and Its Impact
on Current Fourth Amendment Law and Daily Police Practice, 21 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 385, 402 (1994). Thus, although the defendant in Dickerson won his
case, the upshot of Dickerson has been expanded search and seizure power
for the police.
[101]
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997).
[102]
Id. (emphasis added).
[103]
525 U.S. 113 (1998).
[104]
The Court noted that Knowles did not contend that "the statute could
never be lawfully applied." Id. at 116. As noted by one student
commentator, Knowles "neither approves of nor rejects the [law
authorizing the search]. It simply prohibits a certain interpretation of it."
Carolyn J. Zambelli, Note, A Band-Aid for the Fourth Amendment: Knowles
v. Iowa and the Supreme Court, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1217, 1243 (1999).
Although Knowles left open the possibility that a search under Iowa's
statute might be upheld in a different context, it is difficult to imagine what
type of search the Court had in mind.
[105]
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117.
[106]
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414.
[107]
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117.
[108]
Id. at 118.
[109]
See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
[110]
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
[111]
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
[112]
Under Belton, if a motorist is arrested for speeding, a search of a
briefcase or purse is valid, even though there is no cause for the search.
[113]
Craig M. Bradley, Supreme Court Review: Protection for Motorists--with a
Loophole, TRIAL, Feb. 1999, at 85, 86.
[114]
See id. ("[T]he criterion for whether a car can be searched should
depend not on the nature of the crime or on the fact of arrest but on whether
the police have the requisite level of suspicion that the driver has weapons or
evidence in the car."); see also Visser, supra note 17, at 1694
(noting that when the Court's search-incident-to-arrest rule is applied to
motorists, "police officers have the equivalent of a general warrant to search a
motorist and the interior of his or her car subsequent to any lawful arrest for
a traffic offense"); cf. David E. Steinberg, The Drive Toward
Warrantless Auto Searches: Suggestions from a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 545, 561 (2000) ("Courts should require a warrant prior to any auto search
unless police face immediate danger or an imminent loss of evidence.").
[115]
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-42, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998) (No. 97-7597) (counsel for the State conceding that police could arrest a
motorist for a traffic violation in order to effectuate a search); Bradley,
supra note 113, at 86 ("Until the Court closes the loophole left open in
Knowles, the effect of the decision will encourage more arrests and
greater intrusions on personal privacy than is currently
allowed . . . . The way to stop such shenanigans is to
require probable cause to search automobiles and abandon the special category of
searches incident to arrest."). Because the result in Knowles is easily
avoided by arresting the driver, and because a search incident to arrest need
not precede the actual arrest, see Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111
(1980) ("Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged
search of petitioner's person, we do not believe it particularly important that
the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa."), some have called for
the Court to limit the authority of the police to arrest drivers for minor
traffic offenses. See Oliver, supra note 17, at 1453 ("The
unanimous decision in Knowles simply would make no sense if probable
cause to believe an offender had committed a traffic offense alone justified
taking him into custody."). In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, No. 99-1408
(cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. June 26, 2000)), the Court will
address whether the Fourth Amendment imposes any limitations on the authority of
the police to make custodial arrests for a fine-only traffic offense.
[116]
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. at 117 (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412
(1997) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per
curiam))).
[117]
See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (upholding a suspicionless
search for the vehicle identification number during a routine traffic stop);
Belton, 453 U.S. at 454.
[118]
See, e.g., Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 ("Passengers, no less than
drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property
that they transport in cars, which `trave[l] public thoroughfares,' `seldom
serv[e] as . . . the repository of personal effects,' are
subjected to police stop and examination to enforce `pervasive' governmental
controls `[a]s an everyday occurrence,' and, finally, are exposed to traffic
accidents that may render all their contents open to public scrutiny."
(citations omitted)); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467
(1999) (per curium) (reiterating that under the "automobile exception" it is
unnecessary to make a separate finding of exigency in addition to a finding of
probable cause to justify a warrantless automobile search).
[119]
See Francis X. Clines, Police-Killers Offer Insights into Victims' Fatal
Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at A1 (describing incidents where
motorists killed officers who had not paid close attention to the actions and
movements of their killers). In a different context, a few lower courts have
upheld suspicionless frisks of motorists and their passengers. See, e.g.,
State v. Barrow, No. 1998CA00299, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2788 (Ohio Ct. App. June
7, 1999) (passenger may be frisked before being detained in a police cruiser);
Moore v. Commonwealth, 487 S.E.2d 864 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that
suspicionless frisk may be permissible in context of police-citizen encounter
requiring investigation of suspected criminal activity or protection of the
public safety); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670 (R.I. 1999) (holding that
officer's frisk of intoxicated passenger prior to driving him home was a minimal
intrusion and not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment). But cf.
State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998) (rejecting blanket rule that would
allow officers to routinely frisk motorists placed in police cruiser); State v.
Lozada, Case No. 98-P-0098, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6135 (Ohio App. Ct. Dec. 17,
1999), appeal docketed, No. 99-2316 (May 17, 2000) (rejecting
routine practice of frisking motorists in traffic stops prior to entering patrol
car in absence of reasonable and objective grounds that the subject is
potentially dangerous).
[120]
As Justice Scalia noted in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987),
because the Amendment protects against both searches and seizures, "neither the
one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser
protection. We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the
two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the
reasonableness of police action . . . ."
[121]
See Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 356 ("The words `searches and
seizures' . . . are terms of limitation. Law enforcement
practices are not required by the fourth amendment to be reasonable unless they
are either `searches' or `seizures.'" (footnote omitted)).
[122]
Id. at 388.
[123]
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
[124]
Stuntz, Distribution, supra note 17, at 1269.
[125]
Id.
[126]
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 774.
[127]
Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 377.
[128]
As Professor Yale Kamisar notes, the Fourth Amendment serves as "the
centerpiece of a free, democratic society." Yale Kamisar, The Fourth
Amendment and Its Exclusionary Rule, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1991, at 2.
[129]
See Maclin, Informants, supra note 69, at 573-77.
[130]
"To most lay people, looking for evidence of crime is a `search,' regardless of
what that term may mean under the Fourth Amendment." Slobogin, supra note
69, at 22 n. 65. In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), the
Court concluded that police could seize and examine opaque, sealed garbage bags
left for collection at the curb of a home without triggering Fourth Amendment
protections. In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), the Court ruled
that helicopter surveillance four hundred feet above a greenhouse located near a
private home was not a search. The result in Riley was supported by the
earlier ruling in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), which held
that police observation of a backyard from an airplane flying in navigable
airspace did not constitute a search. For a critique of these rulings, see
Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment
Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 744 (1992) (asserting that "the Court's
arguments in Riley and Greenwood defy common sense").
[131]
Cf. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 760 ("Judges,
especially the Justices on the Supreme Court, are unlikely to have experienced
any type of police intrusion, much less the type of intrusion they are asked to
analyze in a particular case. Thus, they are likely to evaluate intrusiveness
from a Third Person perspective. Yet intrusiveness is probably more
appropriately viewed from the First Person perspective; privacy and autonomy are
constructs that are, almost by definition, intimate, subjective, and
experiential. In short, courts may suffer from a `distancing effect' in
evaluating intrusiveness." (footnote omitted)).
[132]
Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 396.
[133]
Cf. id. ("When the policeman shines his flashlight in the parked car
or listens at the tenement door, what else is he doing than searching? When he
climbs up a telephone pole and peers beneath a second-story window shade, what
on earth is he doing up that pole but searching? What is a police spy used for,
but to search out suspected wrongdoing that would otherwise evade the scrutiny
of the authorities? Unless history restricts the amplitude of language, no
police investigative activity can escape the fourth amendment's grasp.");
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Our intricate body of law regarding `reasonable expectation of
privacy' has been developed largely as a means of creating [exceptions to the
warrant requirement], enabling a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment
`search' and therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement.").
[134]
Stuntz, Distribution, supra note 17, at 1275 (noting that the requirement
of judicial authorization before police may search a home "make[s] for better
house searches").
[135]
See id. ("A police officer with no more than a hunch that cocaine can
be found in my basement will not likely look for it there. His hunch alone will
not support a warrant, and without a warrant any cocaine he finds will be
suppressed. This state of affairs should lead the officer to gather more
evidence, which will either permit him to get a warrant or lead him to discard
his hunch. The result is that officers will tend to search houses like mine
when, but only when, they have good reason to believe they will find cocaine, or
something similarly serious. This is the usual Fourth Amendment story; its
essence is the law's tendency to produce better quality searches.").
[136]
See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 385 ("In the end, the basis
of the Katz decision seems to be that the fourth amendment protects those
interests that may justifiably claim fourth amendment protection. Of course this
begs the question. But I think it begs the question no more or less than any
other theory of fourth amendment coverage that the Court has used.").
[137]
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
[138]
According to Justice Scalia, "the only thing the past three decades have
established about the Katz test (which has come to mean the test
enunciated by Justice Harlan's separate concurrence in Katz) is that,
unsurprisingly, those `actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy' `that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable," bear an uncanny resemblance to
those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." 525 U.S. at
97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
[139]139
120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000).
[140]
Carter, 525 U.S. at 88 (emphasis added).
[141]
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
[142]
Carter, 525 U.S. at 89.
[143]
Id.
[144]
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
[145]
Id. at 141-45.
[146]
Id. at 143.
[147]
495 U.S. 91 (1990).
[148]148
Carter, 525 U.S. at 90.
[149]
Id. at 84.
[150]
See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) ("At the risk of
belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to
recognize as justifiable.")
[151]
See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90 ("While the apartment was a dwelling place
for Thompson, it was for these respondents simply a place to do
business.").
[152]
See, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 ("Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be
vicariously asserted." (citations omitted)).
[153]
See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Your Place or Mine? Privacy of Presence Under the
Fourth Amendment, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 273 (noting that there is "nothing
in the amendment itself to support such a distinction" and that "conventional
understandings do not support the view that business activities in general are
less private than social activities; the range and variety of both are too great
for any such generalization").
[154]
The weight that the Court's analysis in Carter placed on the purpose of
the defendants' presence in the home is reminiscent of Justice Brennan's
concurrence in Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). In
Lewis, an undercover officer misrepresented his identity and obtained
permission to enter Lewis's home to purchase illegal narcotics. The Lewis
Court ruled that while a private home is normally "accorded the full range
of Fourth Amendment protections," those protections did not extend to Lewis.
Id. at 211.
[Where a home] is converted into a commercial center to
which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that
business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a
store, a garage, a car, or on the street. A government agent, in the same manner
as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon
the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.
Id.
In other words, by conducting a commercial transaction in his home, Lewis had
"waived" the Fourth Amendment protection normally given to his home. In his
concurrence Justice Brennan made explicit what the Lewis Court implied:
["Lewis's] apartment was not an area protected by the Fourth Amendment as
related to the transactions in the present case." Id. at 213 (Brennan,
J., concurring). According to Justice Brennan, a homeowner can "waive his right
to privacy" and does so "to the extent that he opens his home to the transaction
of business and invites anyone willing to enter to come in to trade with him."
Id. For a critique of Lewis and the Court's other informant cases,
see Maclin, Informants, supra note 69, at 615.
By emphasizing
the purpose of the defendants' presence in Carter, perhaps the
Carter Court intended to invoke the "waiver theory" espoused by Justice
Brennan. More likely, by emphasizing the commercial purpose of the defendants'
activity, the Carter Court meant to subtly draw attention to the
illegal nature of the defendants' conduct inside the home. The problem
with this approach, however, is that the Court's precedents have already
rejected the notion that the criminal nature of a defendant's conduct is a
relevant criterion in deciding whether he possesses a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a home. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union et al. at 14-15, Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (No.
97-1147) ("If [the prosecution's] theory is correct that the criminal nature of
a defendant's activity is relevant when measuring one's Fourth Amendment
standing, then guilty people would never have standing." (footnote
omitted)).
[155]
Carter, 525 U.S. at 90.
[156]
Cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) ("A search is a search, even
if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.").
[157]
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 19,
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (No. 97-1147); Weinreb, supra
note 153, at 262 ("If a man and a woman meet at a party and leave together,
when one of them says, `Your place or mine?' the answer will determine which of
them can count on what happens thereafter remaining beyond the scrutiny of the
police--unless, at least, they make a night of it. Those consequences rest on
the Court's assertion that none of those persons has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in what is said or done in those circumstances."). Interestingly,
Carter does not consider the two-prong inquiry of the Katz test.
As noted above, supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text, that test
entitles a person to Fourth Amendment protection if he, first, shows a
subjective expectation of privacy and, second, convinces the Court that his
expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to consider as
reasonable. Applying that test to the facts in Carter and to the above
sexual partner hypothetical, the defendants' legal positions in both instances
appear strong. First, in both cases the defendants sought to preserve their
privacy by locating themselves in a private home. Second, society would surely
regard the defendants' subjective expectations regarding the privacy they shared
with their hosts as reasonable. This is because "[w]e will all be hosts and we
will all be guests many times in our lives. From either perspective, we think
that society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his host's home." Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). This is
even more obvious with respect to the sexual partner hypothetical, given that
society traditionally regards sexual behavior as highly private.
[158]
Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464.
[159]
Id. at 1465.
[160]
Id. at 1465 n.2 (emphasis added).
[161]
Id. at 1465 (emphasis added).
[162]
Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[163]
Id. at 1464.
[164]
Id. at 1465.
[165]
The issue would be different if instead of putting the bag in the overhead bin,
Bond kept his bag in his lap. In the latter case, Bond could plausibly assert
that he had a reasonable expectation that his bag would not be felt.
[166]
508 U.S. 366 (1993).
[167]
Id. at 375.
[168]
Id.
[169]
Id.
[170]
Id. at 377.
[171]
Id. ("The seizure of an item whose identity is already known occasions no
further invasion of privacy.").
[172]
The Chief Justice's opinion does not even cite Dickerson.
[173]
Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464.
[174]
Id.
[175]
Id. at 1465.
[176]
Id. at 1465 n.2.
[177]
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment
analysis."); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (same); Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) ("[E]venhanded law enforcement is best
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than
standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.").
[178]
See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 n.2 (1986)
(stating that an officer's purpose in focusing on defendant's marijuana crop
from aircraft was irrelevant since the plants were exposed to the public).
[179]
Transcript of Oral Argument, 2000 WL 268547 at *27, Bond v. United States, 120
S. Ct. 1462 (2000) (No. 98-9349).
[180]
Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1465. See also Craig M. Bradley, The Limits of
the Frisk, TRIAL, Aug. 1, 2000, at 69 ("But where the issue is `Was there a
search at all?' the motive of the police may matter. If a DEA agent on vacation
moves a bag in the plane-luggage compartment to make room for his own and, when
the bag emits a puff of marijuana-scented air, arrests the bag owner, there was
no `search.' He was simply acting as a private individual. But if, while moving
the bag, he squeezes it to see if it contains a `brick' of metamphetamine or
emits the scent of marijuana, his `investigatory motive' makes this a search, as
in Bond.").
[181]
Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1465. Cf. Anne Salzman Kurzweg, A
Jurisprudence of "Squeezes": Bond v. U.S. and Tactile Inspections of
Luggage, 27 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 73, 77 (Nov. 2000) (arguing that
Bond "suggests that it will be difficult to make appropriate analytical
distinctions between law enforcement motive and the objective consequences of
challenged official conduct").
[182]
See Weinreb, supra note 153, at 266-69 (arguing that Carter
diminishes the "privacy of place" and "privacy of presence" that individuals
expect while on the private premises of another).
[183]
See Carter, 525 U.S. at 107 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A
homedweller places her own privacy at risk, the Court's approach indicates, when
she opens her home to others, uncertain whether the duration of their stay,
their purpose, and their `acceptance into the household' will earn
protection.").
[184]
See id. at 108 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("As I see it, people are
not genuinely `secure in their . . . houses . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures,' U.S. CONST. amend. IV, if their
invitations to others increase the risk of unwarranted governmental peering and
prying into their dwelling places.").
[185]
See Brief Amicus Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union, et al. at 12,
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (No. 97-1147).
[186]
In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969), the Court
established that a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs when officials
"unlawfully overhear[] conversations of a petitioner himself or conversations
occurring on his premises, whether or not he was present or participated in
those conversations." In a footnote, Alderman explained that "[t]hose who
converse and are overheard [by illegal electronic surveillance] when the owner
is not present also have a valid objection unless the owner of the premises has
consented to the surveillance." Id. at 179 n.11. Alderman's ruling
on the standing of a defendant to contest illegal wiretapping or eavesdropping
that monitors his conversation while in the home or office of another person
paralleled the holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)
(ruling that the right to be secure in a home was violated when petitioners'
conversations were overheard by a "spike" microphone that invaded the walls of
private premises), and it reflected the earlier views of Justices Harlan and
White. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 103-04 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("I would conclude that, under the circumstances here, the recording
of a portion of a telephone conversation to which petitioner was party would
suffice to give him standing to challenge the validity under the Constitution of
the [eavesdropping device installed in another person's office]."); id.
at 107 (White, J., dissenting) ("Since Berger was rightfully in Steinman's
office when his conversations were recorded through the Steinman eavesdrop, he
is entitled to have those recordings excluded at his trial if they were
unconstitutionally obtained."); see also Weinreb, supra
note 153, at 262, 267 n.48 (making the same point).
[187]
Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464.
[188]
Id.
[189]
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
[190]
Legal commentary on the application of the Fourth Amendment to automobiles is
extensive. For a sample listing of the scholarship that has assisted my thinking
on the subject, see 3 LAFAVE, supra note 90, § 7.2, at 458-508; Forrest
R. Black, A Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1068
(1929); Dery, supra note 8; Martin R. Gardner, Searches and Seizures
of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations in a
Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1983); Joseph D. Grano,
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
603 (1982); Harris, Car Wars, supra note 17; Yale Kamisar, The
"Automobile Search" Cases: The Court Does Little to Clarify the "Labyrinth" of
Judicial Uncertainty, in 3 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
69 (1982); Yale Kamisar, United States v. Ross: The Court Takes Another Look
at the Container-in-the-Car Situation, in 4 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 71 (1983); Lewis R. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished
Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557 (1982); David
A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271.
[191]
In both Houghton and White, the concurring opinions expose a
division within the majority on the proper scope of the warrantless searches and
seizures in question. For example, although Justice Breyer concurred in the
Court's judgment in Houghton, his comments indicated his discomfort with
certain aspects of the majority's opinion. See Houghton, 526 U.S.
at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting, without explanation, the rule adopted
by the Court "applies only to automobile searches" and suggesting that a
different result would be necessary "if a woman's purse, like a man's billfold,
were attached to her person"). Similarly, in Florida v. White, Justice
Souter wanted a narrower ruling: he was unwilling to construe the Court's
holding as a license to conduct any seizure simply because the State has
arbitrarily designated the item as contraband. See White, 526 U.S.
at 566-67 (Souter, J., concurring).
[192]
See Bradley, supra note 113, at 85 ("The Supreme Court, it would
seem, is experiencing `America's love affair with the automobile.' The Court's
interest, however, is not in the driving of cars, but in the searching of
them."). Houghton has already generated commentary that is critical of
the Court's result. See, e.g., Magnus Andersson, Note, Wyoming v.
Houghton The Supreme Court Moves One Step Closer to Abandoning the Warrant
Requirement, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 121 (1999/2000); Dery, supra note 8;
Meadows, supra note 9.
[193]
267 U.S. at 150-51. Carroll explained that "[t]he Fourth Amendment is to
be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure
when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as
well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." Id. at 149.
Professor Sklansky has noted that the history cited by the Carroll Court
"had little to do with common law." Sklansky, supra note 75, at 1768.
Instead, Carroll emphasized "legislation shedding light on what searches
and seizures Congress thought were reasonable, particularly Founding-era
statutes that authorized customs officers to search ships without warrants."
Id. (footnote omitted).
[194]
According to Professor Davies, "[i]n late eighteenth-century thought, ships were
neither `houses, papers, and effects [or possessions]' nor `places.' They were
ships." Davies, supra note 70, at 605-06 (footnote omitted).
[195]
Davies, supra note 70, at 732 (footnote omitted). Professor Davies is not
the first legal scholar to question the historical and legal credentials of
Carroll. Shortly after Carroll was decided, Professor Forrest
Black sharply criticized the historical and legal basis of the case. See
Black, supra note 190.
[196]
Davies, supra note 70, at 748 n.572.
[197]
267 U.S. at 153.
[198]
See The Collection Act of 1789. The Collection Act actually authorized
customs officers to use two different types of warrantless searches. First,
section 15 of the Act permitted warrantless, suspicionless searches of ships.
See Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 15, 1 Stat. 29, repealed
by Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178. Second, section
24 of the Act authorized warrantless searches of ships where customs officers
"shall have reason to suspect" taxable goods may be on board. See
Collection Act, § 24, 1 Stat. at 43; see also Cloud, supra note
71, at 1743 (discussing early congressional legislation authorizing ship
searches).
[199]
267 U.S. at 149. The Court explained:
On reason and authority the true rule
is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable
cause . . . that an automobile or other vehicle contains that
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are
valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed
an unreasonable and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will
conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens.
Id. Of course, Carroll did not mention that the
warrantless search authority given to customs officers in 1789 was aimed at the
smuggling of foreign goods across America's international border, whereas the
search in Carroll involved an ordinary police operation within the
interior of the country. Congress has plenary power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises," and "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 3. The Constitution, however, does not
grant either Congress or Executive Branch officers equivalent authority to
police the interior of the nation. See Black, supra note 190, at
1075 (conceding Congress's power to routinely stop and search at the
international boundary, but noting that "no constitutional authority can be
cited for such a summary procedure when applied to motorists driving within the
boundaries of the United States on a public highway").
[200]
Davies, supra note 70, at 607. According to Professor Davies, Americans
during the framing-era accepted broad regulation of ships and searches of ships,
and "no late eighteenth-century lawyer would have imagined that ships were
entitled to the same common-law protection due "'houses, papers, and effects.'"
Id. at 605 (footnote omitted).
[201]
Id. at 607.
[202]
Id.
[203]
Id. at 608.
[204]
267 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
[205]
Davies, supra note 70, at 732-33.
[206]
Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion in Carroll was described by Taft's
biographer "as one more sign that `there were no lengths to which the Chief
Justice would not go, and along which he would not attempt to lead the court, in
his determination to uphold prohibition enforcement.'" Sklansky, supra
note 75, at 1766 (quoting 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT 989 (1939)). But cf. KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 71-73
(1994) (arguing that Prohibition's impact on the Court's Fourth Amendment
doctrine was ambiguous: "Commentators who called attention to the impact of
prohibition generally failed to notice the doubts about enforcement that were
creeping into Fourth Amendment doctrine by the end of the [1920's]. Not only did
the leading prohibition decisions produce dissents, but defendants even won
occasional victories during the second half of the 1920's.").
[207]
Davies, supra note 70, at 733-34 ("[Carroll] undertook to expand
the ex officio authority of the police to facilitate social control, and
thus marginalized the warrant process . . . . Despite the
interlude of the Warren Court, search and seizure doctrine since Carroll
has evolved increasingly to favor police power over the security of the citizen.
Indeed, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have rather consistently expanded
discretionary police authority under the modern rubric of `reasonableness.'"
(footnote omitted)).
[208]
See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 564 (1999) ("[Carroll's] holding
was rooted in federal law enforcement practice at the time of the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment."); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)
("[Carroll] concluded that the Framers would have regarded [a warrantless
search of a car] as reasonable in light of legislation enacted by Congress from
1789 through 1799--as well as subsequent legislation from the Founding era and
beyond--that empowered customs officials to search any ship or vessel without a
warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it contained goods subject to
duty.").
[209]
Although Professor Davies is critical of Carroll's interpretation of the
Framers' thinking regarding searches of ships, William Cuddihy is cautious about
deriving the Framers' intent from actions regarding ship searches for a
different reason. Cuddihy notes that early congressional legislation on ship
searches may not be the best source for deriving the Framers' thinking on the
constitutionality of searches of movable vessels and vehicles. See
Cuddihy, supra note 72, at 1491 n.256 ("The documentation on the
Collection Act mentions no debates of its sections concerning search and
seizure. In other words, that act does not offer a back-stairs approach to the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment because debates of those sections
either never occurred or were not recorded."). Cuddihy also notes that the
framing-era thinking regarding the constitutionality of searches of ships or
vehicles is inconclusive. See id. at 1548-50 (noting that
warrantless searches of ships were allowed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted
but that the "extent to which other vehicles were [subject to warrantless
search] is unknowable, however, for neither case law nor legislation had
significantly illuminated the subject" (footnote omitted)).
[210]
Davies, supra note 70, at 748 n.572 (noting "the broad endorsement of
discretionary authority implied in [Carroll's reasonableness] standard
was inconsistent with the Framers' larger purpose of foreclosing officers from
exercising discretionary authority").
[211]
Professor Davies's analysis of the Framers' views on ship searches is generally
consistent with that of Professor Cuddihy, although Professor Cuddihy does not
take the categorical position espoused by Professor Davies that ship searches
were outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection. Professor Cuddihy
cites a 1780 ruling by the McKean Court of Pennsylvania as the "only firm
precedent on ship searches in American case law." Cuddihy, supra note 72,
at 1549 n.387 (citing Letter from Chief Justice Thomas McKean to Joseph Reed,
who was President of the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council (July 10, 1780),
reprinted in 8 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 403-04 (1853)). That ruling denied a
request from the French consul for a general warrant to search any ship in
Philadelphia's harbor and to seize any person suspected to be a seaman deserted
from a French ship. Professor Davies counters that the 1780 ruling did not
extend constitutional protections to ships, but instead reaffirmed the
illegality of a general arrest warrant. See Davies, supra note 70,
at 750 n.377.
[212]
See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that
history should be used "to inform, but not automatically to determine, the
answer to a Fourth Amendment question").
[213]
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
[214]
Id. at 50.
[215]
Id. at 51-52.
[216]
As Justice Harlan's dissent noted, Chambers not only authorizes a
warrantless search of a car at the scene of the arrest, but "appears to go
further and to condone the removal of the car to the police station for a
warrantless search there at the convenience of the police. I cannot agree that
this result is consistent with our insistence in other areas that departures
from the warrant requirement strictly conform to the exigency presented."
Id. at 62-63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(footnote omitted). See also Katz, supra note 190, at 566
("[Chambers] extended the warrant requirement waiver to a situation where
it was demonstrably unnecessary.").
[217]
Unable to decide which police power is more constitutionally obnoxious for the
citizen, the search or temporary seizure, Chambers "authorizes both."
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 63 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). As Christopher Slobogin has noted, the Chambers
Court's "rationale is specious." See Slobogin, supra note 69, at
21 n.64. If the Court was truly unable to decide which police power was more
offensive, it should have allowed the citizen the opportunity to decide for
herself which is more intrusive. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 64
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that a
citizen who does not want the car to be detained to await the magistrate's
judgment regarding probable cause "always remains free to consent to an
immediate search, thus avoiding any delay" or detention of the vehicle).
[218]
See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 64 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Circumstances might arise in which it would be
impracticable to immobilize the car for the time required to obtain a
warrant--for example, where a single police officer must take arrested suspects
to the station, and has no way of protecting the suspects' car during his
absence. In such situations it might be wholly reasonable to perform an
on-the-spot search based on probable cause.").
[219]
In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), Justice Stevens sought to
defend the reasoning of Chambers that trivialized the difference between
searching a vehicle on the roadway at the time of an initial seizure and
searching an impounded vehicle while awaiting the sanction of a warrant.
Id. at 807 n.9. In accordance with Chambers, Justice Stevens
implied that so long as probable cause supported the search at the time of the
initial seizure, a suspended warrantless search of an impounded vehicle would
not offend the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 807. Nine years later, the Court
once again adhered to the rationale of Chambers in California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), and noted that regardless of when an officer
chooses to search the vehicle, the existence of probable cause, whether
determined by a magistrate or an officer, would support a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 570 ("Following Chambers, if the police
have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a
public roadway, they may conduct either an immediate or a delayed search of the
vehicle."). However, by employing the rationale of both Ross and
Acevedo, officers are free to exercise their own discretion in deciding
whether the requirement of probable cause has been fulfilled. Instead of
pursuing a warrant, officers will increasingly rely on their own determinations
of probable cause. See Dery, supra note 8, at 561 ("The very
assumption that an officer's probable cause determination is sufficient, even
absent the exigency that exists during a vehicle stop on the road, could
undermine the rationale for a warrant requirement itself. If an officer need not
obtain a warrant when an arrestee is securely in custody and his or her car is
safely immobilized, why require prior judicial approval in any event?"). By
abandoning the preference for the warrant in car searches, the inevitable result
is an increase in arbitrary police intrusions that conflict with the very
protections that the Fourth Amendment sought to preserve. See id. ("Thus,
in its first attempt at explicitly defining the scope of the automobile
exception, the [Chambers] Court cast a shadow over the fundamental Fourth
Amendment protection of the warrant preference.").
[220]
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
[221]
500 U.S. 565 (1991).
[222]
Compare Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (ruling permissible the
general search of a car ), with United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977) (ruling impermissible the warrantless search of a 200 pound footlocker
that was found in the trunk of a car) and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979) (ruling impermissible the warrantless search of a suitcase found in the
trunk of taxicab).
[223]
See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 90, § 7.2(d), at 492-93 (noting that
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), had not definitively resolved
the issue, while the search-incident-to-arrest rule adopted in New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), "made the issue important only as to containers
located other than in the passenger compartment or in vehicles other than those
as to which an occupant was contemporaneously arrested").
[224]
Ross, 456 U.S. at 823.
[225]
Id.
[226]
See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 90, § 7.2(d), at 497. In Ross the
Court explained that,
[c]ertainly the privacy interests in a car's trunk or
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable container. An
individual undoubtedly has a significant interest that the upholstery of his
automobile will not be ripped or a hidden compartment within it opened. These
interests must yield to the authority of a search,
however . . . .
456 U.S. at 823.
[227]
456 U.S. at 821 n.28 ("Arguably, the entire vehicle itself (including its
upholstery) could be searched without a warrant, with all wrapped articles and
containers found during that search then taken to a magistrate.").
[228]
Id.
[229]
Id.
[230]
Id.
[231]
Id. at 824 (noting that although the Court has "rejected some of the
reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in that case.").
[232]
500 U.S. 565 (1991).
[233]
Id. at 579.
[234]
Id.
[235]
Id. at 580.
[236]
Id.
[237]
Ross, 456 U.S. at 820.
[238]
Id. at 821 n.28.
[239]
Id.
[240]
Id. at 838 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he defendant, not the police,
should be afforded the choice whether he prefers the immediate opening of his
suitcase or other container to the delay incident to seeking a warrant.").
[241]
Id. (If police "are looking more generally for evidence of a crime, the
immediate opening of the container will not protect the defendant's privacy;
whether or not it contains contraband, the police will continue to search for
new evidence.").
[242]
Cf. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 90, § 7.2(d), at 498 ("The conclusion
reached here--albeit somewhat reluctantly--is that Ross was correctly
decided within the framework of then existing Fourth Amendment law because it is
more akin to Chambers than to Chadwick. This is to say no more,
however, than that Ross is as solidly grounded as is the earlier
Chambers decision; both cases together raise fundamental questions about
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.").
[243]
Cf. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(stating that the Acevedo holding is not "some momentous departure, but
rather [i]s merely the continuation of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has
been with us for years.").
[244]
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n.14 (1979) (citation omitted).
[245]
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52.
[246]
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575 ("To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders
rule protects privacy, its protection is minimal . . . .
`Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, we
can assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming
majority of cases.'" (citation omitted)).
[247]
Id. at 576.
[248]
See Maclin, supra note 130, at 776-86.
[249]
See, e.g., Davies, supra note 70, at 736 ("[The Framers] banned
general warrants in order to prevent the officer from exercising discretionary
authority.").
[250]
Amsterdam, supra note 25, at 88.