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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

BEIJING 2001

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2001

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APRIL 27-292001

2001427-29

BEIJING, CHINA

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Sponsoring & Organizing Bodies:

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Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

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Philosophy Summer School in China: China Britain Australia

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Co-sponsoring & Organizing Bodies:

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School of Public Administration, Soochow University

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School of Public Administration, Yunnan University

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Funding Body:

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The Ford Foundation

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Honorary President ϯ

RU Xin

President ϯ

XING Bensi ˼

Chair, International Advisory Committee ʹίԱϯ

Sir Marrack GOULDING

Chair, Programme Committee ѧίԱϯ:

Nicholas BUNNIN

Chair, Organizing Committee ֯ίԱϯ:

QIU Renzong

General Secretary 鳤

JIANG Yi

SUN Jing

CONTENTS

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Programme -------------------------------------------------------------------5ճ--

Abstracts---------------------------------------------------------------------16

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List of Participants----------------------------------------------------------(115)

PROGRAMME

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PROGRAMME

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Thursday 26 April 2001

09:00 C 20:00


Registration

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Lobby, Jianguo Gardens Hotel

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Friday 27 April 2001

08:30 C 12:00
Registration

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Front Hall, Conference Room

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Friday 27 April 2001

09:00 C 09:30
Opening Ceremony

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Chair: Li Deshun

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09:00 C 09:12
Xing Bensi

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President, Philosophy Summer School in China: China Britain Australia (PSSCCBA)

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09:12 C 09:18
Andrew Watson

Representative, The Ford Foundation in Beijing

ػᱱ촦



09:18 C 09:24
Li Pengcheng

Deputy Director, Institute of Philosophy, CASS

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09:24 C 09:30
Nicholas Bunnin

Chair, British Committee, PSSCCBA

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Friday 27 April 2001

09:30 C 10:30
Plenary Session I: Keynote Speeches

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Chair: Nicholas Bunnin



09:30 C 09:50
Philip Pettit

Democracy as a Two-dimensional, Republican Ideal

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09:50 C 10:10
Li Pengcheng

An Outline of Philosophy of the Oriental Neo-Communitarianism

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10:10 C 10:30


Discussion



10:30 C 10:40
Tea Break

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Friday 27 April 2001

10:40 C 12:00
Plenary Session II: Justice & the Rule of Law

ڶȫ飺ͷ

Chair: Julia Tao

ˣ豦



10:40 C 11:00
Thomas Pogge

Economic Justice, National and Global
壺ҵȫ



11:00 C 11:20
Li Qiang ǿ

Issues of Social Justice in Economic Transition

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11:20 C 11:40
Gu Su

On Fundamental Principles and Factors of the Rule of Law

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11:40 C 12:00
Discussion



12:00 C 14:00
Taking Picture & Lunch Break






Friday 27 April 2001

14:00 C 17:15
Group Session AJustice

A

Chair: Zhang Xiaoming Chen Youhong

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14:00 - 14:15
Dong-jin Jang

In Searching of Justice for Global Society: A Comparison of Political Liberalism and Confucianism.

Ѱȫ壺˼ıȽ



14:15 C 14:30
Byron Kaldis

Justice and Democracy across National Borders: Ethics or Politics?

ԽҽƣΣ



14:30 C 14:45
Hon-Lam Li

Marx, Justice, and Capitalism

˼ʱ



14:45 C 15:30
Discussion



15:30 C 15:45
Tea Break

Ϣ



15:45 C 16:00
Catriona McKinnon

Social Justice: Rights, Obligations, and Self-Respect.

壺Ȩ



16:00 C 16:15
Gao Quanxi ȫϲ

Constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice--Two Kinds of Justices and their Paradox

볬塪弰



16:15 C 16:30
Wang Shouchang ز

The Conception of Justice and History of Justices Doctrine

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16:30 C 17:15


Discussion






Friday 27 April 2001

14:00 C 17:30
Group Session B(1) Public Reason & the Rule of Law

(2) Equality

B(1)뷨

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Chair: Li He Cheng Lian

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14:00 - 14:15
Lu Feng¬

Public Reason And Democracy



14:15 C 14:30
Ahmet Kara

A Paradox of Rationality in a Liberal Pluralist Democracy

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14:30 C 14:45
Sheng Chin-lai ʢ[

Some Moral Arguments against Unrestricted Capitalism

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14:45 C 15:00
Kang Phee Sengاʢ

The Limits of Public Reason

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15:00 C 15:15
Melissa S. Lane

On What Can't Be Replaced: Compensation, Security, and the Rule of Law

Щأ⳥ȫϺͷ



15:15 C 16:00
Discussion



16:00 C 16:15
Tea Break

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16:15 C 16:30


Susan Hurley

Why the Aim to Neutralize Luck Cannot Provide a Basis for Egalitarianism

ΪʹȵŬΪƽ춨



16:30 C 16:45
Jeremy Moss

Equality and Enablement

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16:45 C 17:00
Alois Nugroho

Quality and Equality: the Role of Statesmanship in a Democratic State

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17:00 C 17:30
Discussion






Saturday 28 April 2001

08:30 C 10:20
Plenary Session III: Rights

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Chair ˣAlan Montefiore



08:30 C 08:50
James Griffin

First Steps in an Account of Human Rights

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08:50 C 09:10
Lin Yu-sheng ع

A Dialogue between Kant and Confucius and Mencius Concerning Human Rights

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09:10 C 09:30
Will Kymlicka

Nation-Building and Minority Rights
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09:30 C 09:50
Han Zhen

On Historicity and Ideality of Human Rights with Comments on A. J. M. Milnes Philosophy of Human Rights

ȨʷԺԡ׶ġȨѧ



09:50 C 10:20
Discussion



10:20 C 10:35
Tea Break

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Saturday 28 April 2001

10:35 C 12:00
Plenary Session IV: (1) Equality

(2) Confucianism & Constitutionalism

Ĵȫ飺(1) ƽ

(2)

Chair: Chien Yung-hsiang

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10:35 C 10:55
Xu Youyu

A Review of Several Arguments of Equality

ƽȵĵ˼



10:55 C 11:15
Zhang Qianfan ǧ

Confucianism and Constitutionalism: On the Social and Political Functions of Li

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11:15 C 11:35
Qian Xun Ǯ ѷ

The Idea of Democracy in Ancient China

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11:35 C 12:00
Discussion



12:00 C 14:00
Lunch Break






Saturday 28 April 2001

14:00 C 17:00
Group Session C(1) Rights

(2) Governance

C(1) Ȩ

(2)

Chair: Liao Shenbai Wang Yanguang

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14:00 - 14:15
Michael Freeman

Culture, Sovereignty and Human Rights

ĻȨȨ



14:15 C 14:30
Stephen Angel

Toward a Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Rights and Interests

ȨĿĻԻ



14:30 C 14:45
Jens Hinkmann

Philosophical Justifications of Human Rights

Ȩѧ绤



14:45 C 15:30
Discussion



15:30 C 15:45
Tea Break

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15:45 C 16:00
Mollindo Charabarti

Democracy and Autonomy: Does Property Rights Regime Matter?

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16:00 C 16:15
Dudley R. Knowles

Legitimacy

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16:15 C 17:00
Discussion






Saturday 28 April 2001

14:00 C 17:15
Group Session D(1) Liberty

(2) Truth

D(1)

(2)

Chair: Jiang Yi Liu Xin

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14:00 - 14:15
Jiwei Ci ȼΰ

Freedom as a Subjective Condition of Justice

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14:15 C 14:30
Zheng Yujian ֣

Negative Liberty and Limits of Reason -- a Critical Comment on the Agonistic Interpretation of Berlins Liberalism

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14:30 C 14:45
Chen Wentongͩ

Freedom and Equality in Modern Western Political Philosophy

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14:45 C 15:00
Gong Qun Ⱥ

On Ideas of Liberty in Rawls Theory of Justice

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15:00 C 15:45
Discussion



15:15 C 16:00
Tea Break

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16:00 C 16:15
Allan Montefiore

The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals

֪ʶӵ



16:15 C 16:30


Juha Raikka

Freedom of Expression and the Argument from Truth

ɺ֤


16:30 C 17:15
Discussion



19:00 C 20:30
Workshop for Participants Speaking Chinese: Political Philosophy and China

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Chair: Qiu Renzong

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Sunday 29 April 2001

08:30 C 12:00
Group Session ECommunity & Diversity

E

Chair: Hu Xinhe Zhai Xiaomei

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08:30 - 08:45
David Archard

Community and Political Good Order

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08:45 C 09:00
David Kahane

Democratic Deliberation in Diverse Societies

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09:00 C 09:15
Daniel Kofman

Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism, and Their Limits

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09:15 C 09:30
Kwan Kai-man

A Critical Evaluation of the Debate between Michael Sandel & the Later John Rawls

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09:30 C 10:15
Discussion



10:15 C 10:30
Tea Break

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10:30 C 10:45
Dietmar von der Pfordten

Normative Individualism and Normative Collectivism in Political Philosophy and International Ethics

ѧȫй淶ĸ͹淶ļ

10:45 C 11:00
Tan Sor Hoon

Liberty vs. Community - A Confucian Perspective on Democracy's Dilemma

빲ͬ壺˼ӽƵ



11:00 C 11:15
Daniel Weinstock

The "Reasonable" as a Limit on Pluralism in Liberal Democracies

СԵġΪԪ޶



11:15 C 12:00
Discussion






Sunday 29 April 2001

08:30 C 12:00
Group Session F(1) Citizenship

(2) Perspective on Political Philosophy

F(1)

(2) ѧ

Chair: Wang Xiaosheng Lu Feng

: ¬



08:30 - 08:45
Catherine Audard

Citizenship and Moral Individuality

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08:45 C 09:00
Chen Youhong

Self-Governance and Political Order: the Role of Citizens

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09:00 C 09:30
Discussion



09:30 C 09:45
Tea Break

Ϣ



09:45 C 10:00
Discussion



10:00 C 10:15
Tea Break

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10:15 C 10:30
Cressida Heyes

Criticism from Within and Without: Wittgensteinian Reflections

ڲⲿάظ˹̹˼



10:45 C 11:00
Katia Vanhemelryck

Pragmatism and Politics

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11:00 C 11:15
Zhang BoshuŲ

Dramaturgical Action: An Analysis from the Perspective of Political Philosophy

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11:15 C 11:30
Vincent Shen



11:30 C 12:00
Discussion






Sunday 29 April 2001

14:00 C 15:00
Plenary Session V: Perfectionism & Virtue

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Chair ˣDietmar von der Pfordten



14:00 C 14:20
Joseph Chan

Political Perfectionism: Ancient and Modern

ۣŵĺִ



14:20 C 14:40
Julia Tao豦

Beyond Proceduralism: The Chinese Perspective on Sincerity as Political Virtue

Խ壺й˶ԳʵεԵĹ۵



14:40 C 15:00
Discussion






Sunday 29 April 2001

15:00 C 16:00
Plenary Session VI: People & Citizens

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Chair ˣThomas Pogge



15:00 C 15:20


Yung-hsiang ChienǮ

Some Critical Reflections on the Concept of the People in Political Discourse

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15:20 C 15:40
Ren Jiantao ν

From People, Citizens to Voters

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15:40 C 16:00
Discussion



16:00 C 16:10
Tea Break

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Sunday 29 April 2001

16:10 C 17:10
Plenary Session VII: Institutions

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Chair: Ni Huifang

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16:10 C 16:30
Kepingƽ

Toward An Incremental Democracy and Governance: Chinese Theories and Assessment Criteria

ΨDй˶һֿ



16:30 C 16:50
Mao Shoulong ë

An Institutional Analysis of the Relationship between Knowledge and Practice in the process of Political Development in China

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16:50 C 17:10
Discussion






Sunday 29 April 2001

17:10 C 17:30
Closing Ceremony

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Chair: Qiu Renzong

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17:10 C 17:25
Nicholas Bunnin

Conclusions & Reflections

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17:25 C 17:40
Li Pengcheng






19:00 C 20:30
Farewell Party


ABSTRACTS

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Toward a Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Rights and Interests

Stephen Angel

Wesleyan University, USA

In a ground-breaking article, the American philosopher and legal scholar Randall Peerenboom has argued that contemporary Chinese human rights theorists understand rights as a kind of interest. He contrasts this with the view of many American philosophers that rights are deontological, rather than utilitarian. As Peerenboom would no doubt acknowledge, though, rights and interests may have more complex inter-relations than his simple framework suggests. Spelling out these different possible relations will help us to understand what Chinese rights theorists may be saying when they link rights and interests. I show that Chinese theories can be understood along lines similar to Joseph Raz's rights theory which, I argue, is in certain ways superior to the Western theories on which Peerenboom focuses. I also suggest that Raz's alternative Western theory is vulnerable to the objection that it obfuscates the point of talking about rights at all; it can seem that talk of interests and duties may be sufficient. I conclude by urging that Chinese theorists can help Raz to respond to this objection, even while themselves learning from other aspects of Raz's view.

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һƪԵУѧҺͷѧϡײRandall Peerenboom֤˵йȨۼҰȨΪһ͡ѧҵĹ۵ּ⣬Щ۵ΪȨ񣬶ڹȻײ̹ʵسϣԵĽṹģȨܴ֮ڸӵڹϸЩܵĹйȨѧ߰Ȩһ˼ͼǣй˵ۿΪԼɪȣJoseph RazȨۣҿijԽײǿЩ۵ġҲָȵǰǺܴģΪȵʹöȨ̸Եú첻壬ƺֻ㹻ˡҵĽǣйۼҿ԰ȻӦЩȻйۼԼѧϰ۵һЩ档

Community and Political Good Order

David Archard

University of St Andrews, Scotland

The most plausible communitarian criticism of Rawlsian liberalism - versions of which can be found in Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel - holds that liberalism is unable to supply the principle of political community which is needed if the liberal political order is to be, in Rawls's phrase, well-ordered, that is regulated by principles of justice which all citizens know to apply, accept, and are motivated to comply with. The liberal response is that there cannot, given the fact of pluralism, be a political community if this means 'a society governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine' (Rawls, 1993, 42). There can however be a common aim, namely that of promoting and protecting just institutions. To many critics such an account is inadequate and the idea (to adopt Habermas's phrase) of mere 'constitutional patriotism' motivating political good order seems insufficient.

Two alternatives suggest themselves. One is the use of existing salient communities, such as nationalities, to supply the necessary civic 'fellow-feeling'. Such is the approach of David Miller and Yael Tamir. The other is to offer a plausible account of how citizens might acquire a sense of justice sufficient to underpin the required good liberal order. The paper reviews both possibilities and the problems attendant on each. In particular, in the case of the first the major problem is the extent to which those facts which do unite some body of citizens can themselves be subject to regulation by liberal principles. In the case of the second alternative the major problem is the extent to which the acquisition of a sense of justice would require a particular kind of education and a regulation of the private, especially familial, sphere of social life C in ways seemingly inconsistent with liberal principles of neutrality and legal minimalism.

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޶˹ȺʽЪ߶ģMichael Walzerʿ̩գCharles TaylorЪɣ¶Michael SandelҵЩΪ岻ṩιͬԭ򣬶ǡõġ޶˹ɱܣӦúڷӵԭƵ򣩣ιͬԭDZġĻӦǣڶԪı£ܴιͬ壬ιָͬһɹ㷺ڽ̵ġѧĻµͳεᡱ޶˹199342ĻȻܴڹͬĿ꣬ҲǴٽͱĹ˵޶˹Dzֵģңչ˹ǡ塱ٽDzġ

һִҪĹͬ壬壬ṩҪĹĹͬʶǴգDavid MillerҮա׶Yael Tamir;һַΪλṩһֿɿ㹻ΪڴõṩֿѡǸԵ⡣һַҪǣЩʵϹں޶ѭԭĿƵġڶַҪǣеĻں̶ֳҪһĽͶ˽ǼͥĸԤ⿴ԭ޷Dzһµġ

Citizenship and Moral Individuality

Catherine Audard

Department of Philosophy, London School of Economics, UK

This paper aims at examining and discussing the relations between citizenship and moral individuality in contemporary liberal and Republican traditions, in particular French and British. Very few political theories would deny the link existing between citizenship and the individual's moral needs, beliefs and dispositions that make up her moral individuality, the personal virtues that individuals normally develop among family and friends. Most would recognise that the virtues of the citizen proceed from or interact with the ideals of a moral individuality and the corresponding dialogical competences (Habermas, Scanlon) that are fashioned within the non-political sphere, but still colour the political realm. Most will insist, as John Rawls does, on the necessity of a 'political' conception of the person as an element of a theory of democracy and, more importantly, of its stability. Indeed, there exist many possible links: citizenship can be seen as a protection for the flourishing of moral individuality and of moral development in the sense of John Stuart Mill, or as a constraint on individual freedom which should be kept as limited as possible, as in the libertarian view of the minimal state. It can, differently, be contrasted with the lower 'private' virtues and interests and be seen as the ultimate expression of moral excellence in a long tradition starting with Aristotle and ending up with the Rousseauist conceptions of civic virtues or with Hegel's conception of 'objective morality'.

However I will show that, on the whole, most current representations tend to separate 'public' and 'private' moral spheres in ways that jeopardize any sense of the unity of the Self and the citizen. The poverty of current conceptions of the moral individual in political philosophy makes it difficult to ground any kind of serious commitment to democracy. What is required, by contrast, is a notion of self-identity, such as narrative identity in the sense of Ricoeur, that is rich enough to explain commitments and responsibilities towards the good polity in the long term. This might lead, of course, to supporting new specific rights, such as cultural rights, minority rights, collective rights, allowing for moral diversity and pluralism, but on grounds different from the communitarian claims.

The paper will (1) explain the moral content of citizenship both for the liberal and the Republican representations, and criticize both conceptions. (2) insist on the value of cultural membership and moral traditions for the flourishing of moral individuality, especially for the constitution of a narrative identity, and discuss ways to bridge the divide between 'private' and 'public' spheres. (3) detail the dimensions of moral individuality concerned with citizenship: the connections between self-interest or partiality and the common good, the role of civic recognition for self-identity, self-respect and self-esteem (A.Honneth, A.Margalit, C.Taylor), the conflict between pluralism and solidarity, etc. (4) suggest new conceptions of rights and duties connected with these aspects of moral individuality, and a new enriched conception of

citizenship and civil society.

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ͼ쵱͹ʹͳУڷӢΧڣ͵¸Ĺϵ۷ڹʸ͸ĵҪ͵֮ڵĹϵ߹ɵϵĸԣһڼͥзչĸ˵ԡ۳Ϲǵ¸ĹԼӦı֤˹˹(Scanlon)֮໥Ӱ죬ȻҪDZڷȴȻɫͶСԼ޶˹һͼϵĸıҪԣΪƶȶԵĻȷܵĹϵǴڵģԼ˹ͼءյϣʸԿǶԵ¸ɳ·չһֱ޹ҵ˵ʸǸɵһƣӦܵ޶෴أʸҲϵ͵˽˵ԺգǵƵʵ֣ʿ¿ʼ¬ĹԻڸĿ͹۵¸յͳС

ȻǣϽǰ֡ġ͡˽˵ġ򣬶һֻвҺ͹ͳһԵķʽеġѧеĵ¸ƶʹúΪκһֶƶȵҳϵ춨֮գҪͳһԵĸϵͳһԸָڳԶںḻԽͶõҳϺ

ƪĽ͹۵Ĺĵݣ֮Ļ͵´ͳԵ¸ɳļֵǶͳһԵļֵͨڡ˽˵ġ͡ġ֮ĺ蹵ķϸ¸ԹʸҪԣ빲ͬĹϵͬͳһԣãA.˹(A.Honneth),A.أA.Margalit,C.̩գԪ֮ijͻȵȡ¸ЩȨ¸Լµĸḻĸ

A Confucian Democracy for the Twenty-First Century

Daniel Bell

Department of Social & Public Administration

City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

In the eyes of Singapore elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew, a "Confucianist view of order between subject and ruler helps in the rapid transformation of society ... in other words, you fit yourself into society -- the exact opposite of the American rights of the individual." A modern Confucian society, that is, can provide the benefits of rapid economic growth, but it must sacrifice the democratic political rights which make government so difficult in the West. For a society reflecting on its political future, the possibilities seem to come down to two options:

Either Western democracy or Confucian authoritarianism.

Let us instead imagine that Western and Confucian political values need not be undamentally incompatible. It is rather tempting, in fact, to conceive of the possibility of reconciling the Confucian emphasis of rule by a wise and uncorrupted political elite with the democratic values of popular participation, accountability, and transparency. But this is easier said than done. What are the political institutions of a modern Confucian democracy? Either elected politicians rule, or an educated elite rules, but how can both rule in the same society? This essay proposes an answer to this dilemma: a bicameral legislature with a democratically elected lower house and an upper house composed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations.

Part I develops the argument that modern democratic regimes have an interest in accommodating the value of rule by an educated elite. Part II considers and rejects alternative proposals for combining democracy with rule by an intellectual elite such as plural voting schemes and functional constituencies. Drawing upon the ideas of radical seventeenth-century Confucian political thinker Huang Zongxi, Part III sketches out the proposal for a bicameral legislature with a democratically elected lower house and an upper house composed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations.

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¼ԪҫУڳ֮һҵĹڼתк桭仰˵ܰӦᡪἴʽĸȨĶ桱Ҳ˵ִܹṩپĺôȴȨЩȨҲʹΪѡһ˼Լǰԣƺֿܵѡ ҪôҪôҵȨ塣

Ȼһ£ĺҵμֵ۲ȫЭġʵϣֿǺջģҵĺμֵǰǿξӢͳΣעձIJ롢κ͸ԡȻ˵ѡִλأҪôѡٲμҪôܹýľӢͳΣȻͬһ߹ͬοܵģΪṩһִ𰸣һԺƵѡٲԺɾʽ˻ѡĴɵԺ һֽһ۵㣺ִɾӢֵּۡڶֿͲѡ񣬼ͨԪѡٻƺ͹ѡȷʽƺ;Ӣͨʮͼ˼һ˵˼룬ֻṴԺĽ飬ѡٲԺɾʽ˻ѡĴɵԺ

Republican Citizenship: A Qualified Critique

Daniel Bell

Department of Social & Public Administration

City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Philosophers such as Aristotle and Rousseau argued that ordinary citizens should be active participants in the political life of their community, and that they should be motivated by the common good, not by their own particular interests. This classical ideal of republican citizenship assumes (a) that the state can control the community's own destiny and (b) that people strongly identify with their own political community.

In the modern world, however, both these assumptions can be questioned. Regarding (a), the problem is that "the state is too small for the big things and too big for the small things." On the one hand, environmental disasters, regional economic upheavals, humanitarian crises, and major security threats often seem to require transnational solutions. On the other hand, welfare aid and development projects often seem to require decentralized political arrangements that give local communities and ethnic groups more political control over their own affairs.

Regarding (b), competing allegiances also seem to pull away from the state in opposite directions. On the one hand, highly educated professionals, successful entrepreneurs, and internet surfers often feel more at home among foreigners with similar interests than with their own co-nationals. On the other hand, modern states seem to be breaking up into competing centers of identity focused on ethnicity and race.

In short, the ideal of republican citizenship might seem obsolete. In his recent book, Citizenship and National Identity (Polity, 2000), David Miller courageously argues otherwise. This essay will critically evaluate Miller's defense of republicanism for contemporary liberal-democratic states. I will present arguments from three different perspectives -- liberalism, socialism, and communitarianism -- against Miller's conception of republican citizenship. Liberals will raise doubts about the feasibility of republican citizenship in the modern state, and socialists and communitarians will raise (different) questions concerning the desirability of this ideal. I will conclude by sketching a qualified ideal of republican citizenship that meets objections from all three perspectives.

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ʿº¬ѧΪͨӦڵĹͬĻߣĶӦdzڹͬdz˽ֹĹŵԤˣaܹƹͬˣbǷdzͬڵιͬ塣

Ȼִ磬ٶܹɵġΪaڡҶԵģСԵࡱһ棬ѡö˵ΣҪİȫвҪҵĽһ棬Ԯͷչ滮ȾҪǼȨʽΰţҪͬοơ

bԵҳҲɶķӹз뿪һ棬ܹýרҵʿɹҵԼ߾йͬȤ˶DZͬҵͬСһ棬ִƺڷΪͬΪĵľԪ

֮ĹƺǹʱġͬУ壬2000գDavid Millerȴᶨس෴Ľеնִйı绤ҽӽ۵յĹĹָ壬Ⱥ塣ִйĹĿԣߺȺǷֵ׷ҽճһ޶ȵĹ幫ĸԻӦӽ

Is Republican Citizenship Appropriate for the Modern World?

Daniel Bell

Department of Social & Public Administration

City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Philosophers such as Aristotle and Rousseau argued that ordinary citizens should be active participants in the political life of their community, and that they should be motivated by the common good, not by their own particular interests. However, this classical ideal of republican citizenship assumes the context of small face-to-face communities where citizens treat each other as friends, not as strangers with potentially conflicting interests. In the modern world, it does not seem realistic to expect that strangers from different classes and ethnic groups will care enough about each other's fate to allow for this kind of friendly interchange in the political realm.

Contra these doubts, the influential political theorist David Miller argues that nationality can provide the sense of mutual trust and common identity for the ideal of republican citizenship to be realized in contemporary states. This essay, however, will present arguments from three different perspectives -- liberalism, socialism, and Confucian communitarianism -- against Miller's conception of republican citizenship. Liberals will raise doubts about the feasibility of republican citizenship, and socialists and Confucian communitarians will raise (different) questions regarding the desirability of this ideal. I will conclude by sketching a qualified ideal of republican citizenship that meets objections from all three perspectives.

Democracy and Autonomy: Does Property Rights Regime Matter?

Mollindo Charabarti

Centre for Studies in Rural Economy, Appropriate Technology and Environment

Department of Economics, St. Joseph's College, India

Sustainable management of resources in general and natural resources in particular cannot be ensured in an institutional vacuum. One of such institutional requirements is a properly defined property rights regime over the concerned resource. Available literature suggests that private property rights regime can ensure optimum use of resources in the presence of 'complete set of perfect markets'. Unfortunately in countries like India, markets are neither complete, nor are they perfect. Such arguments have come in handy to prescribe a 'State' managed forestry sector in the country. Continuing the legacy of the colonial times, the Forest Department has been managing the forestry resources of the country single-handedly. The recent experimentations with Joint Forest Management (JFM) in most of the states notwithstanding, one is apprehensive of the approach's ability to bring in the people into the fold of management. Such apprehensions result from the absence of a democratic decision making mechanism regarding the use of forestry resources. The absence of such mechanism has resulted in the failure to develop a well-defined property rights regime on the forests in India. Incidentally, the demands for right to self-determination have been observed in parts of the country that are rich in forests. The present paper is an attempt to show that these regions have remained backward because of a faulty developmental policy followed in this country that subsidized the resource poor regions at the cost of the resource rich regions. Such subsidization occurred due to lack of 'democratic' institutions, which if existent, could have been effective in channeling people's aspirations in the desired directions. The experiences out of the agitation for a separate state of 'Gorkhaland' in the eastern Himalayan region have been analyzed to develop a tentative functional relationship between the management practices vis-a-vis forests and the escalation of tensions in this region in demand for right to self-determination.

ƺΣȨǷҪ

Īֶࡤǡ͵

ӡʥԼɪѧԺѧϵ

ũҵּͻо

ԴȻԴĿɳԹƶеõȷҪƶ֮һǶ浽ԴһǡIJȨơõΪڡһȫƵгϵУ˽вȨȷԴáȻҵǣӡĹУгϵȲȫģҲƵġˣⷽڹ涨һɸҵΪֳʱŲҵԹҵҵԴȻڴеġҵJFMʵȴԸͳһʾǡԴҵԴ÷ȱһľֳ߳ȱʹӡûзչһҵȨơżأҵԴḻĵӵȨҪ󡣱ľͼЩʵеĴķչ߶״̬Щ߾ԴḻĵԴƶĵֲ֮ԷΪȱĻЩĻǡķڵıķ˶ϲŵпɹGorkhalandɧҹ̣ҵʵΪҪȨµĽžƵļӾ֮佨һʵԵĻܹϵ

On Taylor's Argument for an Unforced World Consensus on Human Rights--

A Critical Review from the Perspective of Confucianism

Jonathan Chan

Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

In a recent article, Charles Taylor has proposed a framework that makes the following tripartite distinction: norms of conduct, legal forms and background justifications. On the basis of this framework, Taylor tried to argue for "a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights." On Taylor's view, an unforced world consensus on human rights would be something like the following: "[D]ifferent groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations, although holding incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, human nature, and so on, would come to an agreement on certain norms that ought to govern human behavior. Each would have its own way of justifying this from out of its profound background conception. We would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief."

In other words, the consensus in question would be something like a convergence on the norms of human rights from out of very different philosophical and spiritual backgrounds. What we need to do is to distinguish between the norms of human rights and their underlying justification. Only a convergence on the norms is necessary. Their background justifications can be very different. That is to say, these convergent norms may be justified in very different underlying spiritual and philosophical outlooks. Furthermore, these norm, according to Taylor, have to be distinguished and analytically separated not just from the background justifications, but also from the legal forms that give them force.

In the above, I have sketched briefly Taylor's argument for "a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights." If that argument were to succeed, it could provide a strong reason for grounding political theory in the norms of human rights. However, I am skeptical about that argument. In this paper, I shall raise some objections to Taylors argument. It is, nonetheless, instructive to note that I do not mean that the notion of "overlapping consensus" is problematic. I am skeptical only about its application to human rights. My main reason for this skepticism is that the norm of human rights is not philosophically neutral and therefore cannot be entirely separate from its philosophical background. It will be argued that it implies a certain moral outlook that is inconsistent with the moral outlooks of other traditions such as that of the Confucian tradition.

̩յķǿȨһԵ֤

ӽǵ

ɭ

۽ѧڽѧϵ

һƪУʿ̩գCharles Taylor˼Ԫ֣Ϊ淶ϷıʽԼΪԡֹܵĻϣ̩ͼ֤ȨϵһֳʵġǿԵһԡ̩տһַǿԵȨһӦģͬȺ塢ҡڽ̹ͬѧζѧԵиϲɵ͵ֹ۵㣬ȻΪӦѭijЩ淶һȻͬȺԲͬķʽӵıиЩ淶ԡǿЩ淶ȡһΪʲôЩ淶һϱԵĹ۵㣻Ӧ޶ȵһ棬ڱ䱳ӵIJŪ÷Ҳ 仰˵̩յһԾǸּΪͬѧ񱳾Ȩ淶ϵһ¡ҪľȨ淶Ϊԡֻй淶ϵһDZģΪԿȫͬġҲ˵ЩһµĹ淶ڼ䲻ͬѧлԡң̩յĹ۵㣬Щ淶ӦֿҲӦǿԵĺϷʽֿ ҼҪ̩չڡȨϵһֳʵġǿԵһԡ۵㡣̩յdzɹĻôΪ۵Ȩ淶ṩǿɡȻһ۵㣬ڱҽ̩յһЩע⵽һõģҲ˵Ϊ淶ϣصһԡdzġֻǻһԶȨʵӦáһɵǣȨ淶ѧϲģ˲ȫѧз뿪ĽǣȨ淶ζضĵ¹ضĵ¹ͳĵ¹Dzһµġ

Political Perfectionism: Ancient and Modern


Joseph Chan

Department of Politics and Public Administration

The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

In this paper, I discuss the similarities and differences between ancient and modern theories of political perfectionism. I'll focus on Aristotle's and classical Confucian theories to illustrate the ancient theories. I argue that while the ancient theories may be vulnerable to modern liberal critiques of perfectionism, modern theories of perfectionism may not. But there are insights in the ancient theories that can, and ought to be, preserved and developed in a modern theory. I describe the outline of what I believe to be a defensible modern theory.

ۣŵĺִ

Լɪ򡤳

۴ѧ빫ϵ

ڱ˹ŵۺִ۵ͬڹŵ۲֣ǿʿµۺ͹ŵۡΪȻŵִǰԵôִδˡȻڹŵһЩܹҲӦñִ̳кͷչһִ۵Ϊܹõ绤ġ

Freedom and Equality in Modern Western Political Philosophy

Chen Wentong

Department of Philosophy, Anhui University, Anqing, China

1. The main focus of political philosophy is to study values and their theoretical basis of one societys political life from the angle of philosophy. General concepts include freedom, equality, democracy and rule of law, etc. Among them, freedom, equality and their relationship have become hot issues in the research of modern western political philosophy.

2. John Locke first gave a detailed demonstration of value of freedom in modern history and therefore is considered Father of western traditional liberalism. Locke argued that freedom was a concept of human rights and individual freedom was the basis of the relation between freedom and order although freedom could not break out from order. J. J. Rousseau thought freedom and equality were both essential human rights, but others equality would be in danger with uncontrolled freedom. Consequently, Rousseau held that equality should enjoy priority to freedom. This idea destroyed traditional concept that freedom and equality should be given the same priority, and this idea has a deep influence on later political science.

3. In the 20th century, this issue is still under critical arguments. J. Deway presented that the freedom one actually enjoyed depended on the equality one enjoyed in political and economical life. Accordingly, he was inclined to build a harmonious order between freedom and equality. F. A. Von Hayek argued that freedom should be higher than equality and the relation between equality and individual liberty could not be in harmony. J. Rawls on the contrary thought there was no conflict between individual liberty and fair distribution of wealth, therefore in the justice of distribution freedom and equality was conformable.

ִѧеɺƽ

ͩ

մѧѧϵ

һѧҪǴѧоļֵ淶ۻμֵɡƽȡȨȨεȣɡƽȵȼϵǽִѧֵ̽ȵ֮һ

ڽˣJ. Locke꾡ɼֵĵһˣ춨ͳĻһȨ˵ĻȨ䲻򣬵ϵĻ¬J. J. RousseauΪƽͬΪȨɲƣضַ˵ƽȨݴɴƽȣƽɡһ˼ͻƽȵֵĴͳԺӰԶ

20ͣƽȺٴܵעJ. DweyΪܵȨξϵƽȨŽƽȵĺг򡣹ҮˣF. A. von Hayekϣ϶ƽɲݡ޶˹J. RawlsΪƽȷƸͻڷϣƽݵġ

Self-Governance and Political Order: the Role of Citizens

Chen Youhong

Department of Public Administration

Chinese Renmin University, Beijing, China

1.The paradox of centralization and decentralization. China's reform process has been actually a history of decentralization efforts. Though decentralization efforts have injected energy into the society, they also leave the society lost of control. In order to recontrol the society, the government has to initiate re-centralization effort. The cost was so high for the reiteration of two different ways. The dilemma of centralization and decentralization originates from the highly-centralized political order that is inefficient to cope with originates from the highly-centralized political order that is inefficient to cope with the diverse problems of various interests because the rigid system is governed by hierarchical commands without relevant rules to deal with those problems. In order to resolve the problem of centralization system, it is necessary to carry on decentralization efforts that inspire society actively. But the undesirable chaos will occur after centralized decentralization efforts because people in over-centralized system not only lack experiences and abilities to self-govern, but also are encouraged to take opportunistic actions when they have some chances.

2.Self-governance and political order. Lack of self-governance results in unsuccessful decentralization reform. Self-governing institutional arrangements must be developed if China wants to cope Self-governing institutional arrangements must be developed if China wants to cope with the dilemma of centralization and decentralization. Successful decentralization reform and institutional transformation depend on the development of various self-governing organizations that could implement self-reform to fit with social changes. The political order based on self-governance can encourage people's creativity to initiate various institutional innovations to self-govern specific public affairs so that individual not only has his right of diverse choices but takes on his responsibility for his choice. To foster self-governing institutions is a proper way to cope with the dilemma of centralization and decentralization.

3. How to develop self-governance in a centralized society. How to develop self-governance in a centralized society? According to the logic of collective action, it would be possible to have an order of spontaneous generation among people of small groups, but it couldn't occur in large groups because free-riding problems would be very serious. So self-governance should be developed from basic community first. Successful decentralization effort should be initiated at grass root level. The success of grass root self-governance is the basic condition of successful decentralization reform efforts in the society with a strong over-centralized tradition.

4.The role of citizens in self-governing political order. Citizens play an important role in a self-governing political order since any institutional innovation must come from individual's doing for benefit-seeking. Citizens play an important role in a self-governing political order since any institutional innovation must come from individual's doing for benefit-seeking. When people are not only concerned with their own benefits but also do the same for the rules of benefit-seeking among the people, individuals start to have an attribute of citizen. And when the virtues that come from personal self-interest possess the public character, it would be possible to construct political order of self-governance. Therefore, it is well reasonable to expect citizens to initiate primary rule for civilian organizations of grass roots and interest groups. And that is considered to be the real opportunities of citizen in political activities. Furthermore, on a basis of daily human life, and as the model of elementary constructions of society, to govern human relation, primary rule develop the various mechanisms to deal with conflicts, and foster positive mutually-productive human mechanisms to deal with conflicts, and foster positive mutually-productive human relationships. So, being so called "social infrastructure" or "social capital", it has the power to countervail "the realpolitik capital of bureaucracy", and it is a main force to make a breakthrough in a rigid centralized system. However, though the virtues that occur due to individual self-interest possess public character, it doesn't mean that could be consequentially to construct political order of self-governance. But citizens' consciousnesses of their rights and responsibilities have been evolved. Therefore, they would set foot in such actions as protecting property right, solving conflicts, coming to agreements, and they would finally appeal to participate to construct the frameworks of rules and institutions of higher levels, and then citizens would give crucial impetus to democratic development. Undoubtedly, not individual citizen but civil society has such power, so it is needed to probe into the course of fostering civil society. In China, civil society must be established in the background of civilian society of traditional institutions and culture, and on a theoretical basis of democratic and constitutional government.

5 To explore a new political theory based on self-governance. A new political order needs a new political theory that is based on self-governance of citizens. Human nature determines that no system could take effect and well continue if without associating with individual benefits, rights, and responsibilities.

A new political theory needs (1) to study how to develop a new political theory based on an analysis of individual citizen. It needs to clarify the relationship between individual and community, and to endow individual with an independent moral status;

(2) to study a new political theory of political order based on self-governance, which make the most use of intellectual resources and practical experiences of human civilization.

DDĽɫ

йѧϵ

һȨȨۡйĸĸ̣ʵϾ·ȨĹ̡Ȩ·ţĻҲ˸ָĻҵ⡣Ϊ˽Щ⣬ò¼Ȩ¼ȨµļȨ⡣Dzò֮ǻ಻ҪĴۡһ۵ĸԴڼȨ򡣼ȨһֽġȱĵȼϵڴʻʶԵǵĸṹʱġҪȨ⣬ҪȨһȨȻܹᣬȱ飬ȱȴмȨƶ³ڻ۵ͶͲ˼ȨһȨҵıײ ȱǼȨԳɹʵʩȨĸƶԭҪɹʵַȨĸѼȨȨۣҪƶȰţ͵֯ķչʵʩĸӦ仯Ӷ˳ʵʩƶȱǨڹдָƶȰʹ˲жѡȨҳеѡΣԻԭͻԱ϶֣ӶʹڻϵгΪϹĶƶȣǼȨѼȨȨҪ· ȨչڼȨƶȣж߼СȺԷĿܣڴȺ˵ѡڴ㳵ˣҪӻῪʼʵʩȨĿܣڴȺ˵ѡڴ㳵ˣҪӻῪʼʵʩȨĸΪУĽɫdzҪΪƶȴ¾跢ڸ˵󣬵˲˽ҹ֮ϵʱҲͷת˽¿ʼ˹Ըʱпܲϵˣеλڻ֯Ⱥڹڣڻṹϵǻճ໥ϵģʽܴٽڣڻṹϵǻճ໥ϵģʽܴٽչͻĻƣĻԻ�"?ʱ"ķչжԿ"Ȩʱ"ƼȨƵҪ˽ĵԨDDԸ"ݻ̻ʹȨʶںȨ?ͻԼϵIJ𽥳ɳѰ߲εĹƶȿܵĽ衣

ġеĽɫΪֱƶǣζűȻͨ򡣹Ϊ˵ԲԵơƺʹƼȨơԴҪֹ̽ᷢĽ̡йηչеĻӦĴͳƶȺʹͳĻȡ˼ۻΪγṩ

塢չһΪۡµҪһµۣԹΪۡ˵ıԾκ˵ȨأͲܷʵЧúͳξð

ĵ۵ǣչԹΪۣйͳ˼ԣҪΪĸᡢҵĹϵ蹫µλоĹƶȷ˼ɹٽ֯չԲѡҪоܵ˼ƶȺʹͳĻϣٽйijɳ

Some Critical Reflections on the Concept of the People in Political Discourse

Yung-hsiang Chien

Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy

Academia Sinica, Taiwan

The concept of the people is one of the most frequently used, but least examined, concept in political discourse. Given its importance in the articulation of democracy, the neglect is surprising. I want to provide a general characterization of the people in the western political traditions. Then I will try to show, following the lead of James Tully and Habermas, that in keeping with the variety of traditions in political thinking there are diverse understandings of the term. A critical examination of some of these understandings shows, finally, that we need to take the Habermasian proceduralist notion of the people seriously if we want to honor the promise of democracy in a disenchanted and pluralist age.

ڡ񡱸һЩѧ˼

Ǯ

̨оԺɽѧѧо

ʱʹãȴҲ˶˼֡мĸλ⡣ҽȶ˼ĵλȻ󣬸James TullyHabermasҽгδͳڡ񡱵IJͬ⡣ָȡԪʱҪ壬ӦHabermasйġʽ⡣

Freedom as a Subjective Condition of Justice

Jiwei Ci

Department of Philosophy

University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Members of a society become just persons largely through identification with their society's conception of justice. I will bracket the normative question of what conditions such a conception has to satisfy in order to properly count as a conception of justice. My focus is on the moral-psychological (or explanatory) question of what conditions have to obtain if members of a society are to effectively identify with what in their society counts as a conception of justice. Chief among such conditions, I will argue, is that they must be able to relate to their society's conception of justice on the understanding that they have freely decided to adopt this conception as their own. For this to happen, it is not sufficient that they enjoy a certain degree of de facto freedom; it is even more important that they understand their relationship to their society's conception of justice through the concept or interpretation of freedom. But the concept of freedom as used in this context is by no means unproblematic. Liberal thinkers sometimes take such freedom at face value and equate freedom with autonomy, whereas Marxists such as Louis Althusser point out the illusory character of such freedom and treat freedom as nothing more than misrecognition of unforced external determination as self-determination. Two questions arise: (1) under what conditions such misrecognition is possible, or how the concept of freedom and the fact of external determination can combine to produce a more or less conformist individual consciousness that nevertheless understands itself as the agent of its values, including its conception of justice; (2) whether such misrecognition is an unavoidable feature of the exercise of freedom. I will attempt to answer these questions and relate the answers to justice.

ɣΪ

ȼΰ

۴ѧѧϵ

һijԱҪͨԸ۵ֶ֧ͬΪĸ塣ҽһ淶⣺һܱ֮Ϊʲôҹעһ-ѧ⣨Ե⣩ԱЧָ֧ͬʲôΪģҵĹ۵ǣЩУҪǣԱ۱ǻɵľ񡣶ΪʹԱɵؽۣʹʵij̶ֳȵDzģҪǣԱҪֹͨͬ۵ĹϵȻʹõɸûġ˼ʱݸôʵ溭壬ɵͬͬʱ·˹ͼLouis Althusser˼ָɸʣΪʵϽǽǿԵڹ涨ΪҾ⣺1ʲôǿܵģ˵ɸͷǿϰڵڹ涨ʵνһԲһֻѭ淶ĸʶʶֵԴȪ2Ƿʵһ޿ɱԣҽͼشⲢ֮ϵ

Culture, Sovereignty and Human Rights

Michael Freeman

Department of Government, University of Essex, UK

In this paper I seek to advance our thinking about two of the most commonly discussed philosophical problems raised by the idea of human rights. The first is how the idea should be related to that of state sovereignty. The second is that of the relation between the supposed universality of human rights and the diverse cultural traditions of the world. Although much has been written about both these problems, the relation between the two problems has been largely ignored. I shall argue that clarification of this last relation is an important philosophical task. I shall argue, in support of this general conclusion, that objections to the universal applicability of human-rights standards on the ground of state sovereignty are often confused with objections on the ground of cultural diversity. I shall argue that these two objections not only have quite different logic, but also that they are mutually inconsistent, for the principle of state sovereignty is as universalist as that of human rights, and either both principles are vulnerable to objections on the ground of cultural diversity or neither are.

The next step in the argument is to clarify what is valuable in the idea of state sovereignty and what is valuable in the idea of human rights in order to reach a reasonable view of how the two ideas should be interrelated. In this section I shall argue that critics of both ideas have often failed to understand adequately the values that the ideas are intended to defend. If this is clearly analyzed, the ground may be laid for reconciling the two ideas in a way that preserves what is valuable in each.

Then a similar analysis is made of culture and human rights. Particular attention will be paid to two view of the relation between culture and human rights that have been proposed recently by philosophers. The first begins with the presumption of the universality of human rights and then seeks to incorporate into that view what is valuable in the diverse cultures of the world. The second treats culture as fundamental and investigates how human rights may be incorporated into particular cultural perspectives. These two approaches are illustrated with particular reference to Confucianism and Islam. I argue that reflection on these two approaches raises the most fundamental questions about the grounds of ethical and political thought. However, even some of the best philosophical thinking on this subject has confused philosophical with strategic political questions. This confusion is tempting insofar as philosophers are concerned with practical policies as well as pure philosophical analysis. However, a strictly philosophical analysis can clarify policy options, although it is doubtful whether it can endorse a particular solution as absolutely the best.

In conclusion, I offer an answer to the question as to whether philosophical analysis can offer solutions to questions about culture, sovereignty and human rights that could be accepted by reasonable persons in different cultural and ideological traditions, and in societies at different levels of development and placed differently in the global political system. I suggest that there are philosophical reasons for believing that there are always likely to be tensions among these principles, but that philosophy can clarify the relevant issues, advance agreement to some extent, and thereby contribute to the management within tolerable limits of practical political disputes.

ĻȨȨ

˶

Ӣ˹ѧϵ

ڱҽһ˼Ȩ˼뵼µܹעѧ⡣һȨ˼Ȩ˼ġڶνȨϲͬĻͳ֮Ĺϵ⡣ȻѾĹϵȴں̶ܴϱˡǣֹϵһҪѧΪ֧һ۵㣬ҽ֤վڹȨϷȨ׼õĻķһΪַȫͬ߼֮Ҳ˴˲һ£ΪȨԭͬȨԭһձģĻϵķԭҪôͬҪôڹ ڽҽڹȨȨмֵ˼룬Ժ˵νġһһ֤ߵ߾ûǡĹͼļֵһܹõķܹΪ춨имֵijɷ֡ ȻĻȨƵķѧĹĻȨϵϵֹ۵㽫ܵرĹעһֹ۵ԤȨԣڸĻмֵijɷУڶֹ۵ΪĻǸģͼȨĻӽСرڹ浽˼˹ʱַʽõ͡һַʽķ˼˼Ļ⡣ȻⷽһЩɫѧ˼ҲѧԵһˡֻҪѧĴѧһʵߣֻΣվͻڡȻϸѧܹѡģܷȷ֤ضֵûɵġ һΪһִ𰸣ĻȨȨϣѧܷΪȫϵͳдڲͬչ׶κͲͬλовͬĻʶ̬ͳṩɽܵĽҽѧϽţЩԭܻǴѧܳйصزij̶ֳϴһ£Ӷڿ޶ڹͿʵˡ

Constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice

--------Two Kinds of Justices and their Paradox

Gao Quanxi

The Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciecnes

The article focuses on the the two kinds of justices, constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice and their tensile relation, suggesting that the negative value of constitutional justice, as the social institutional justice, takes on the legal protection of human right, especially of the low-lined human right. The constitutionalism is based on a public sphere with negative law as rule, so that it transforms the allocation of the modern political value logically, i.e. traditionally ,only the reasonable value is legitimate, whereas in the constitutionalism, only the legitimate value is reasonable. In other words, it has changed the standard of value from the former positive logic, based on the moralization of human nature, to the negative one, based on the legalization of human nature. Rawls and Hayek demonstrate this logic conversion from different ways separately. Although constitutionalism could resist all the powerful political logic, it appeals for another transcendental value fundamentally. The article analyses the spiritual law, which has been very important in the history of western political thoughts, and points that the justice of law is human right, and the justice of god is holy love. Conclusively, the article suggests, we could find not only the paradox and the conflict of the two justices, but also their uniform linkage to guard against the political power. This paradox linkage full of tension will bring a dual foundation to the social politics in the future.

볬塪弰

ȫϲ

йѧԺоԺ

ؿ볬弰ԹϵָΪԵƶ壬ķԼֳֵȨǵȨĺϷԱϵ塣ķƶԤһԵԷΪ߹Ĺ˾ͰѽִйμֵĶλ߼Ͻһ죬ͳμֵ̬ǣֻкļֵǺϷģķƶ򷴹ΪֻкϷļֵǺģ˵Ѽֵ׼ӹȥ˵ıԵĵ廯ΪĿ϶߼תΪ˵ıԵĺϷΪķ߼޶˹͹Үͬ͵˼ҷֱӲͬĽ·չ߼תȻԿܸǿƵ߼ӸҪһֳļֵͨ˼ʷռͻλ񷨵ķָɵȨϵ۵ʥΪǿܴвǵۣԼ໥ĶͻһڵǿȨһԹֳʽΪδṩһ˫ص

On Ideas of Liberty in Rawls Theory of Justice

Gong Qun

Department of Philosophy, Renmin University of China

The Conception of liberty plays a very important role in Rawls political philosophy, as we know, it is the cornerstone of Rawls theory. The conception of liberty is political one by Rawls, and we can get the idea of liberty by negative way because Rawls defines it from such way that he says this or that person (persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so. The idea of liberty in Rawls political philosophy inherited the liberalist tradition of Constant and Isaiah Berlin. Meanwhile, Rawls emphasizes one kind of positive meaning. He says: thus persons are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain constrains either to do it or not to do it . Liberty is our action which we can do by my will and perform the decision made by ourselves and it is protected from interference by other persons, and from this meaning, liberty is individual rights which include all kind of human rights, such as the right of life, of speech, of political election, of property and so on, and which are equal and natural rights for all persons of mankind. Therefore, the subject of liberty becomes one of equal rights. Rawls argues that, first of all, equal Liberty of conscience is predominant important one, second is political election. I think that there is no question about them. However, Rawls meets problems when he deals with the right of property. Equal rights of property develop in two directions in 200 C300 years. One is that equally right of property in theory gets its legitimate status, and permits unequal possession in legality. Another is that there seeks for equality of real possession in social life. The direction origins from Jacques Rousseau, through Karl Marx and passes on communist movement. However, social practice proves that it is unsuccessful. The choice by Rawls is neither John Lockes one and nor Jacques Rousseaus one, which on the essential presupposition that economic inequality that gives the greatest benefit of the last advantaged, second distribution by state is necessary. However, the second distribution must interfere in individual rights of property. Therefore, the tendency of equality in Rawls new liberalism can not extricate oneself from a predicament of freedom and equality, both have a kind of inter-contradiction.

޶˹

Ⱥ

йѧ

ɡһ޶˹ѧռһͻҪĵλ޶˹ۻʯ޶˹ġɡһθǴϸģǿƶɵʲô޶˹һ巴ӳԹ˹Ͳֵ崫ͳ˼̳Сͬʱ޶˹ɸǿ˲ǿǰµжϣɾһȨȨȨ˼ȨȨβȨԼƲȨԼ۵Ĺ۵㿴һƽȵ츳ȨϣҲݱΪƽȨ⡣޶˹ΪɵȨ⣬Ȩƽϡ˶ƽȵѡȨܽȨȡȻڲƲȨ棬޶˹һµ̬ȡƽȨ⳯չһdzϵIJƲȨΪƽУȴھϵIJƽȡΪ׷ʵʲƲռϵƽȡΪ¬侭˼Ϊ˶׷󡣵ŷԼйľƸĸ֤ȡ˽вƲȨΪƶȻļƻƣִûһٶʵ֤׷󲢲ɹǣ޶˹Ȳʽͳ壬ͬʱҲ¬ʽƽ壬ڳϾòƽܹܻߴǰ£ǿҶܻ߸貹ԭȻٷȻַ˳еȨ޶˹ƽѲƽȵ

First Steps in an Account of Human Rights

James Griffin

Centre for Philosophy and Public Affairs, Department of Moral Philosophy

University of St Andrews, Scotland

1. The very idea of human rights

2. Different approaches to explaining rights

3. The rights tradition

4. A proposal of a substantive account

5. One ground for human rights: personhood

6. A second ground: practicalities

7. Is there a third ground?: equality

8. How we should understand agency

9. A desirable consequence: the narrowing of rights

10. Utilitarianism?

ȨĻ


ղķʿ

ոʥ³ѧѧϵѧ빫

1 Ȩһ

2 ȨIJͬʽ

3 ȨĴͳ

4 ʵһֽ

5 ȨĻ֮һ˸

6 ȨĻ֮ʵʵ

7 ƽȣ

8 Ǹ⡰ơ

9 һĺȨ޶

10壿

On Fundamental Principles and Factors of the Rule of Law

Gu Su

Department of Philosophy

Nanjing University, Nanjing, China

Although the rule of law is not an unified model, and historical conditions and cultural traditions of various countries are quite different, its basic principles and institutions are generally consistent, i.e. law is superior to administrative power, the constitution has the highest authority, and person or group should not outmatch the law; democratic legislation requires that the legislative body should be born of universal and periodic elections and its main tasks include setting up laws and supervising the administration; judicial branch is independent and has high position and authority, also practises judicial review to prevent arbitrary violation of the constitution; check and balance institutions among different branches of the government to prevent that a single branch has too much or monopolistic power.

۷εĻҪ

Ͼѧѧϵ

ִ޻һģʽʷĻͳҲ𣬵ȡĻԭƶȴһ£ҪǷɴȨܷϵȨκ˺岻ڷ֮ϣӵй㷺ԺͶѡٲƶɡල˾ӵгߵλȨʵзֹΥܵ˾ƶȣȨʵǣƽ⣬ԷֹȨ

On Historicity and Ideality of Human Rights with Comments on A. J. M. Milnes Philosophy of Human Rights

Han Zhen

Department of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China

In fact, rights have been the historical production instead of the permanent entity a priori. The rights in the Western society, which have rooted in the Western social and cultural system, are reflecting the social ideas and views of value in the Western society. The Western ideas of human rights can only be applied to Western society. As Karl Marx points out, rights can never go beyond the economic structure of the society and the cultural development of the society that has been limited by the economic structure. Even the starting and ending of life has been a controversial issue among scholars. On the issues such as abortion and euthanasia there are different ideas. We think that A. J. M. Milne misunderstood the relations between real foundation of human rights and ideal function of human rights in his dividing the standards of human rights into ideal and the lowest. Since, from the aspect of historical development, any standard of human rights is both lowest and ideal. How can we say that the standard of Western human rights is ideal and that the standard in the third world is non-ideal? The scope of the human rights will be widened, the contents of human rights will be enriched as the progress of the society. Although the basic rights are still facing various threats by now, we cannot ignore the fact that the human rights have got more protections.

ȨʷԺԡ׶ġȨѧ

ʦѧѧϵ

ʵϣȨһ㱾ʣʷIJ˵ȨӳͼֲֵۣʷĻϵͳСȨֻᣬ˼ȨԶܳľýṹԼɾýṹԼĻչʹյϣǵҲͳһͰ⣬żìܵĹ۵㡣ΪA.J.M׶Ȩ׼Ϊĺ͵ģȨʵ빦֮ĹϵΪʷչĽǶȿκȨ׼͵ģҲġ˵Ȩ׼ģı׼ԣĽȨķΧԽԽ㣬ȨҲӡֱĿǰΪֹ˵ĻȨԾָܵв˵ȨԽԽбҲDzݷϵʵ

Criticism from Within and Without: Wittgensteinian Reflections

Cressida Heyes

Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Canada

What are the limits of criticising culturally and politically different others? Some analysts say abuses of power within a society are best criticised from without, and claim this prerogative. Defenders of the practices in question say that only from within a domestic context can the practices be understood, and their legitimacy appreciated. Are the foreign critics mistakenly assuming the commensurability of worldviewssome alcultural standpoint from which to assess the justice or legitimacy of human practices? Are the defenders being overly relativistic? Does relativism obviate critique altogether?

Renewed interest in these debates among political philosophers has emerged from a literature that stresses the constructedness of political meaning. For example, Wittgenstein famously argued that following a rule is not a private, individual matter. What it means to follow a rule correctly is rather a social practice; taken together, such practices are constitutive of a "form of life." Political theorists such as Charles Taylor, Susan Hekman, and Richard Shusterman have taken up this model, showing how it might illuminate problems of contemporary democracy. This work raises two particularly pressing further questions: first, how should we theorise the coexistence and mutual (un)intelligibility of the plurality of forms of life in, for example, multicultural political societies? Second, how, given the epistemic necessity of working from within the practices that make up a form of life, can new practices be imagined and gain currency?

In this paper I argue briefly that a Wittgensteinian model provides an answer to the first question through the notion of family resemblances. No political concept has a single monolithic meaning within a form of life; rather, it consists of a series of interrelated and politically contested meanings. For example, what counts as "democracy" for some will be the simple matter of the existence of an institution for electing representatives to a legislature. For others, however, "democracy" carries much more weighty connotations of citizen equality and political participation. Clearly these are related concepts, making it possible for their respective proponents to be mutually intelligible. However, they are also sufficiently distant to make debate around this essentially contested concept more than a matter of simple clarification.

The answer to the first question also provides guidance in answering the second, a particularly pressing one in theorising political conversation among radically different nation states. Some critics have taken the intractability of this problem to provide an implicit defence of relativism (and even conservatism): if existing social practices are the only basis intractability of this problem to provide an implicit defence of relativism (and even conservatism): if existing social practices are the only basis for social criticism, then the scope of that criticism will be necessarily constrained by the very form of life it seeks to alter. Consequently, intercultural communication cannot rely on any acontextual criteria of rationality (such as a Habermasian ideal speech situation) and political concepts become at best approximate translations across difference, and at worst incommensurable.

This position, however, assumes a uniformity to forms of life that the family resemblance approach to political concepts shows to be misguided. Both within and among forms of life, controversial political views are intelligible because they tap into marginal practices not closely related to those in the mainstream. An important consequence of this argument is that central to effective political dissent is the process of building communities of meaning. There is a tradition in the west of viewing political dissent as made possible simply by the right to free speech, and writers since Mill have tended to stress the individual as the locus of political resistance. Instead, I argue, we should see conditions that foster resistant communities as most central. Thus, finally, I suggest that this approach can evade the false dichotomy between universalism and relativism in the contexts I pointed towards initially.

ڲⲿάظ˹̹˼

Ү˹

ô󰢶ѧѧϵ

Ļϳֲͬߵе޶ʲôһЩΪǴⲿһڶȨã֮ΪȨϰףȨı绤ΪֻдڲЩϰײܵõ⣬ϷԲܵõϸۡǷⲿߴؼٶ۵ĿͨԼԡһֹϰ׵ԻϷԵijĻ򣿻Щϰ׵ı绤ȫȻģǷȫųأ ǿĹԵıij֣ѧж۵ֳµȤ˵άظ˹̹dz֤˵Թѭһ˽˵ġ¼ǡ˵ԹѭһЩͬɡʽʿ̩գCharles TaylerɺտSusan Hekman¡Richard ShustermanۼҼ̳ģʽ֮͵ε⡣Ŭһȵ⣺ȣǸνڶĻжԪʽ֮Ĺ໥ԣ򲻿ԣ⣿ΣٶʽĹʶDZҪģôµĹα벢ձϵģ

ڱУһҪ֤ͨƵĹάظ˹̹ģʽΪһṩһִ𰸡ijʽڣûһθеһġ̶壻෴һ໥ϱ˴ϵСһӣе˵һ򵥵ʵĴѡһֻƵĴڡһЩ˵廹ŸҪںƽȺ͹β롣ԵأһЩ໥ĹӶԵ֧߱˴˼໥ǿܵġȻЩҲ˴˱㹻ľ룬ʹΧĸۣǶԸij塣 һĴҲΪشڶṩָһڽͼΪ֮ͬζԻԵΪȡһЩԴΪ壨DZ壩ı绤ִеΨһôеķΧͱȻͼıʽ޶ĻĶԻκοĻԱ׼˹ĻﴦڲͬĻθֻһֽƵķ룬Dzɻġ ȻٶʽһԣθļƵķһ󵼵ġʽڲʽ֮䣬໥۵֮ǿģΪЩ۵㶼漰ϵɢıԵһ֤һҪĽǣ干ͬĹɹ̶ʵʵҪġһִͳΪɵȨűÿܵģ֮ǿΪεƵijҪ֤ǣӦٳɵҪءһַܹⱾĿͷۼ֮ĴĶַ

Philosophical Justifications of Human Rights

Jens Hinkmann

Institute for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy

University of Erfurt, Germany

The debate on human rights is extremely confusing and dazzling. Mixing political, philosophical, juridicial and many other aspects stemming from a broad variety of academic disciplines the participants of the discourse are often discussing different topics with diverging methodologies. Clarification is necessary and should be the first step. Therefore, a strictly philosophical analysis (within the analytic philosophy of law) should provide a common framework or set-up for the discussion. Using ideas from Hohfeld, Thomson and some own suggestions a net of terms with precise meanings for the debate on human rights is developed and applied on the three generations of human rights.

The second step is the discussion whether there is a normative justification for human rights as universal norms. This means that they should be justified as valid claims independent of cultural or historical conditions having corresponding obligations for political communities. This debate is at the heart of every theory of political justice. By showing the illegitimacy of natural law on the one hand and some communitarian approaches on the other hand, I attempt to develop a theory justifying human rights. It is based on the idea of normative individualism and justified by means of an analysis of the rule of law concerning the individual members of a society or a state. To challenge these ideas, I then introduce the concept of descriptive holism aiming at an explanation of the difficulties typically arising in the normative and political discourse on human rights. With the simple analytic but basic matrix of normativism versus descriptivism and individualism versus holism this theory is enriching and pushing forward ideas and concepts of H?ffe, Gert, Gewirth and Rawls.

A final application on the complex of human rights and human development discussing the possible interdependence of political and economic issues within the philosophical framework (!) will argue for a reasonable link between the political and the economic sphere of human rights to enable lasting progress in both areas.

Ȩѧ绤

˹

¹شѧѧѧо

ȨıǼۻҵġڻѧġѧġѧԼԷΧ㷺ѧƵЩIJdzòͬķ۲ͬ⡣ˣijDZҪģҲӦҪġһϸѧڷķѧΧڣӦΪṩһͬĿܡͨƶ£HohfeldķɭThomsonһЩ˼ԼĿǣΪȨϵ۽һȷжϵ֮ӦȨչ׶Ρ

ڶȨǷһΪձ淶ԡζȨ֤ԼΪһȨӵӦĶιͬΣȨǶĻʷġһ۽κһ۵ĺġָȻۺһЩȺ巽IJ֮ҽһΪȨṩݡڹ淶Եĸϣ֤ͨԹ浽ҵĸԱķɹķеġΪ˼Щ˼룬ҽһԵ۸ԽȨϵĹ淶Եĺεµѡͨ淶-͸-ּҪȻķṹ۽ḻƽHoffeأGertأGewirth޶˹˵˼롣

Ȩ෢չĸ֮ӦϽѧκ;֮ܵ໥֤Ȩ;һֺĹ⽫ʹǸԵijΪܡ

'Citizen' Participation and Global Warming

Barry Holden

Department of Politics, University of Reading, UK

This paper will take as its starting point the question of what opportunities people should have to participate in making political decisions. It wiil, however, be concerned with what can be called 'political decisions' in an extended sense. Normally, political decisions are thought of as decisions about state policy. And such decisions are democratic when, or to the extent that, they are made by the people of the state in question. However, in an era of globalisation and interdependence a state is increasingly unable to control matters that affect the people within its territory. Many such matters, to the extent that they are controllable at all, are subject to decisions taken elsewhere - for example, by other states or by international bodies. In such circumstances the ideas of citizenship and democratic decision making must be re-thought and perhaps only some kind of 'global democracy' can now give real opportunities for people to participate in many of the most important decisions that affect them.

With the work of David Held and others the idea of global democracy is becoming of increasing importance. This paper will explore the relevance this idea might have for the problem of combating global warming. It will argue that, apart from anything else, a form of global democracy would help to overcome global collective action problems and would give necessary legitimacy - and perhaps be a spur - to difficult decisions that would entail short-term material sacrifices. It would also help to

deal with problems of international social justice concerning the relative contributions to be expected by the North and the South to efforts to combat global warming.

ȫů

Ӣ׶ѧѧϵ

Ľ⿪ʼӦʲôĻξߡȻ˴עġξߡڽϹ㷺ġһԣξ߱Ϊǹڹߵḷ̌Щɹҵģξ߾ġȻһȫ򻯺໥ʱԽԽ޷һЩϽΧӰ⡣ɿƵķΧڣⶼĵλĹҼŻᡣ£߸¿ǣңֻij֡ȫơΪһЩҪľṩĻᣬЩǻDzӰġ ڴϣ£David Held˵ŬȫƵĹԽԽҪĽֹԶȫůʵ塣Ľ֤֮⣬ijʽȫƽΪȫԼжҵ취Ϊ֮ṩҪĺϷԣΪijЩѾṩЩѾ߽ǣ浽ڵ档ȫҲڽṫ⣬ڶȫůŬϱϷӦĹ⡣

Why the Aim to Neutralize Luck Cannot Provide a Basis for Egalitarianism

Susan Hurley

University of Warwick, UK

1. Introduction

Cohen (1989): fundamental egalitarian aim is to neutralize influence of luck on distribution. Luck/responsibility cut. Luck-egalitarianism as developed by Cohen, Roemer, Arneson claims to make explicit key assumption implicit in egalitarian theorizing.

My claim: while this assumption may well have been thus implicit, nevertheless the aim to neutralize luck cannot provide a basis for egalitarianism, either in the sense of specification or of justification.

Minimal constraint: to count as egalitarian, a doctrine must, for some X, favor relatively more equal patterns of distribution of X over relatively less equal distributions of X, other things equal.

Preview: Distinguish what is redistributed from how it is redistributed: the currency from the pattern of distributive justice. Cannot derive how from what, or pattern from currency. Luck/responsibility can play currency role, but this does not entail an egalitarian pattern. Indeed, luck/responsibility cannot play patterning role.

2. Currency vs. pattern: the limits of the currency role of responsibility in justice and the egalitarian fallacy.

Currency role: responsibility as filter, yielding equalisandum. We only aim to redistribute what is a matter of luck, not what people are responsible for.

Limits: 1) need independent specification of good to which filter is applied, eg. resources, welfare, both. 2) Knowing what to redistribute does not tell us how to redistribute.

Parfit: equality (concerned with interpersonal relations) vs. priority, eg maximin (concerned with relation between someones actual state and other possible states he might have been in). Distinction in space of patterns, not currencies.

Aim to redistribute only what is a matter of luck: does not favor equality over maximin, even if maximin countenances differences that are a matter of luck. Equality may equally countenance samenesses that are a matter of luck. Nonresponsibility for difference does not entail responsibility for nondifference. Responsibility neither specifies nor justifies taking equality as default.

Egalitarian fallacy:

(1) It is a matter of luck that a and b are unequal does not entail

(2) It would not be a matter of luck if a and b were equal

Equality default view: equality does not need to be justified; responsibility can be used to justify departures from equality. Not guilty of egalitarian fallacy. But not a counterexample to my claim. Even if it is conceded that responsibility plays a patterning role here, it does not do so in relation to aspect of the view that is egalitarian: the assumption of equality as a default position. It plays a similar role in the inequality default view, which only permits equalities for which people are responsible and defaults to inequality.

To suggest responsibility play only currency role, no patterning role, is to concede that it does not provide basis for egalitarianism. Consistent with redistributing the currency in favor of inequality.

3. Can responsibility play a patterning role? The luck-neutralizers dilemma.

Aim to neutralize bad or good luck provides no reason to favor equality as a pattern of distribution. Bad luck ambiguous, interpersonal vs. counterfactual senses.

The luck neutralizers dilemma:

Interpersonal bad luck: my situation is worse than others, in respect of aspects of my situation for which I am not responsible. Neutralizing interpersonal bad luck specifies an equal pattern of distribution of whatever is a matter of luck. But trivial, since inequality used to identify bad luck. No independent specification; no independent justification for favoring or defaulting to equality, for countenancing equalities that are a matter of luck but not inequalities that are a matter of luck.

Counterfactual bad luck: as a matter of luck I am worse off than I might have been. Suppose it is determinate what I would be responsible for under counterfactual conditions in which factors for which I am not responsible are eliminated, and similarly what you would be responsible for. Theres no reason to suppose these positions would tend to be equal.

It doesnt help if no one is responsible for anything because responsibility is impossible: if so, equality is no less a matter of luck than inequality.

4. Can responsibility play a patterning role? Problems of interpersonal and counterfactual responsibility.

Specification, if not justification? No: counterfactual horn of dilemma leads to deeper problems: 1) the boring problem with responsibility for relations between peoples positions; 2) the indeterminacy problem about would not be a matter of luck when actual situation is a matter of luck.

1) Distinguish: Ss responsibility for her goods position (e.g. as a result of her choices) vs. Ss responsibility for the relation of her goods position to that of others.

Responsibility does not specify pattern of relations across people. What would it be for a pattern of distribution of goods not to be a matter of luck? Even when 2 people are both responsible for their respective levels of goods, whether unequal or equal, the relation between them is still partly a matter of luck for each of them, since neither is responsible for the others position. Point generalizes from actual to counterfactual relations.

2) If people are not responsible for their respective levels of goods: what would they be responsible for instead, if factors for which they are not responsible were eliminated? Luck-neutralizing aim does not tell us to move from one distribution that is a matter of luck to another that is also a matter of luck. Not just that theres no reason to think wed all be responsible for the same thing, but that what wed be responsible for, counterfactually, is in many cases simply indeterminate: no general, nonarbitrary basis for saying what would not be a matter of luck under counterfactual conditions. Not merely an epistemological problem; the very concept of responsibility does not extend determinately this far in many cases.

5. Related issues.

Defects of hypothetical choice accounts of responsibility: causal costlessness, indeterminacy. Cf. actual choice or control.

Aim to neutralize the effects of luck makes operational the regression principle, that responsibility for something requires responsibility for its causes. Under plausible assumptions, this principle makes responsibility impossible. But that would not provide a basis for egalitarianism either.

Roemers account of what it would be to neutralize luck does not provide a basis for egalitarianism either. Rather, it shows how we can reward people for efforts to behave in ways we regard as meritorious; this may or may not favor egalitarian patterns, depending on what we regard as meritorious.

ΪʹȵŬΪƽ춨

ɺն

Ӣ˴ѧѧϵ

ƶCohen(1989):ƽĻּڷϾӰ죻ݶηݶɿƶĪRoemerɭArnesonչĻƽҪƽӦʹԭȷĻ費ôֱӡ

ҵĹ۵㣺˱úȻԵϻڹ淶ԵϣʹȵּȻΪƽṩ

͵޶ijXķ䣬ΪƽۣЩƽķģʽЩԽϲƽķģʽķҲá

ԤۣӦٷʺ͸ٷģʽʹͬĹģʽֿܴӡʲôƵΡҲܴƵṹģʽοԳеʵĹܣⲢǣ浽һƽģʽʵϣβܰݽṹģʽĽɫ

2-ṹεʹܵ޶Լƽۡ

ʹܣΪҪƽȡǵĿǷᣬǷ

޶ȣ1ҪԹӦõԴȽж2֪ʲôûиӦη䡣

أParfit:ƽȣ 浽˼ʼϵֵȨ浽ij˵ʵ״״֮Ĺϵṹģʽֶʵ֡

Ŀٷ᣺ʹֵֻ֧ǾȣֵƽУҲڻȡƽȿֻ֧ͬϵĵͬԷǾȵβǣ浽ԾȵΡμȲƽȿʧҲ֤ԡ

ƽۣ

1 ƽһ⣬abƽġǣڡ

2 abƽģƽͲǸ⡣

ƽʧĹ۵㣺ƽҪԣܹ֤ƫƽĺϷԡƽ󲢷ȻҲܷҵ۵㡣ʹγеṹģʽĹܣҲƽ۵صˣΪĹǣƽʧһֹ۵Уƽʧ𣩰ƵĽɫֹ۵УǶƽΣ෴ʧġ

ΪֻеʵĹܶǽṹĹܣ֧۵㣺βΪƽ춨ڷڷƽһµġ

3 ǷܳеṹģʽĹܣߵ

ʹõĻ򻵵ĻȵŬΪڻȵķģʽṩɡĻڡ˼ʼġ͡ʵġ֮ĺĺ塣

ߵѣ

˼ʵĻ᣺ЩҲӦķ棬ҵĴȱ˵IJʹ˼ʼĻҲһֻϵƽģʽȻΪƽ廵ᣬһֲ̫мֵģʽֻ֧ƽȻǴƽʧ˵ڱЧҲڱЧĺϷ֤Ϊǽ֧Ϊƽ֧ΪIJƽ

ʵĻ᣺ͻԣұȱܵĴˡʵ£ЩҲΪ֮رˣЩӦΪ֮ĴȷģͬӦĴҲȷġûΪЩƽȵġ

ΪDzܵģΪûӦΪκ鸺ֹ۵һ㶼⣻ΪƽͲƽһǸ⡣

4ǷܹеṹģʽĹܣ˼ʼʵ⡣

֤ԣɷأܣʵ¸⣺1ΪǵĴĹϵһζ⡣2ʵʴһʱЩǻDzȷġ

1 ֣ijΪôΣ磬ΪѡĽij˶ô˵ĴĹϵΡ

β֮Ĺϵģʽʷģʽһʲôأʹ˶ΪǸԵˮ׼ˮ׼Ƿƽȣ֮Ĺϵij̶ֳȻһ⣬ΪǶΪԷĴ۵ʵʹϵӼʵĹϵ 2DzΪǸԵˮ׼ЩеεرˣǵΪʲôأĿ겢ûиǴһΪķһΪķתơΪûΪǶΪͬ鸺𣬶ΪͿԶԣЩӦΪ֮DzȷģΪijʵ²ǻֹ۵ȱձġǶϵĻġⲻһʶ⣬θ²ܺȷôԶ

εļѡȱݣϵ޳ɱԣȷԡʵѡȽ϶ԣ ʹӰ⻯Ŀڻعԭij¸ҪԸµԭźļٶعԭʹκζܡҲΪƽ춨

ĪԻҲΪƽṩһ෴أ ЩΪֵ͵ʽŬˣǿλرǣǷͬƽṹģʽȡǽʲôֵ͵ġ

Feminism and the Objects of Justice

Alison Jaggar
Department of Philosophy

University of Colorado at Boulder, USA


Central to justice is the notion of moral balance, which philosophers often express in terms of giving each her due. By this, they typically mean that goods and evils should be distributed in quantities and qualities proportionate to the desert of the recipients. Contemporary theories of social justice are usually presented as proposing rival answers to the question:
1. What should count as just deserts? That is to say, according to what principle should goods and evils be distributed in a just social system? In discussions of so-called distributive justice, this question is generally interpreted as asking for moral grounds capable of justifying state intervention to redistribute material goods; in the context of corrective justice, the question is often interpreted as one about which principles should determine the kinds of behavior that deserve to be punished by law and the kinds of legal penalties that are appropriate fitting. Feminists have proposed a variety of answers to the question of what should count as just deserts but they have also raised an additional questions, namely:
2. What are kinds or categories of things that should be distributed in a just manner? I call this the question of the proper objects of justice and, in the present paper, I show how recent work by feminist philosophers has disclosed objects of justice ignored by most other mainstream philosophers. I consider this disclosure to be one of the most significant contributions made by feminism to Western understandings of social justice.

ŮȨ֮

ɭȸ

ѧѧϵ

ĺǵƽĸѧҳáijӦõĸijˡһһζţƺͶķӦߵĹơһΪԵĴ𰸡

1ʲôܱĹ׼Ҳ˵һϵͳУƺͶķֲӦѭʲôԭνʱһͨΪѰһֵ¸ӶΪҶԴٷṩϷԣڽıУһֳΪӦһԭȷñɳͷΪԼӦķɳͽʽʲôǹĹ׼ϣŮȨѾ˷Χ㷺Ĵ𰸣Ȼǻһ⣬Ҳǣ 2ЩӦʲôҽ֮Ϊǡ⣬ŮȨѧĹĶ⣬һDZѧӵġΪŮȨ߶ҪĹ֮һ

In Searching of Justice for Global Society:

A Comparison of Political Liberalism and Confucianism.

Dong-Jin Jang

Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea

This paper is primarily concerned with whether liberalism and Confucianism have overlapping ideas to be the ground of justice for global society. By comparing Rawls' Political Liberalism with Confucianism, which may be a decent doctrine in Rawls' term, this paper attempts to defend that the two political philosophies can agree on certain principles of justice for global decent doctrine in Rawls' term, this paper attempts to defend that the two political philosophies can agree on certain principles of justice for global society, despite their differences.

Confucianism is said to be the shared cultural background in the countries in East Asia. It is still a part of life unconsciously or consciously in this region. With the surprising economic growth and the recent economic crisis in East Asia, the active debates on Confucianism began to capture prudential attention from theorists. It is seriously reviewed to be a very persuasive factor to explain the economic crisis as well as the economic growth in the East Asian countries. While Confucianism has attraction in East Asia, liberalism is the most influential ideology worldwide. It greatly influences the new order of the world, and most countries response it positively or negatively. In this situation, it is worth comparing Rawls' political liberalism, which is specified running through his books, 'A Theory of Justice', 'Political Liberalism', and 'The Law of Peoples', with Confucian conception of justice.

In order to find the overlapping ideas to be grounds for global society, this paper tries to compare the two philosophies with following points.

First, I am going to analyze comparatively Rawls' political constructivism and Confucian intuitionism. Rawls uses political constructivism to construct the just principles for the basic structure of society. Confucian political philosophy stands upon an intuitionism that there is an objective reality of moral standards or values and that we can take a grasp of them through our reflections. In spite of difference, I am going to argue that these philosophical approaches to justice should be complementarily considered in producing the grounds for the global justice. I contend that even constructivism cannot avoid intuitionism to pave the basic bedrocks for just principles.

Second, I will compare the conceptions of the person. Rawls' political conception of the person is specified by two moral powers, one to form and revise one's own conception of the good and the other, the sense of justice, to live in fair terms of cooperation with others. Confucian conception of the person is represented by the perfect person, 'chun-tzu'(or the noble person). A person can become good through the cultivation of the innate four moral virtues, humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. In Confucianism, it is argued that this morally good person can make good politics. With all the different conceptions, I contend that the underlying ideas running underneath the two share the fundamental respect of persons which may provide the starting point for the just principles for global society.

Third, I am going to compare the conceptions of society. Rawls' conception of society is characterized by its ethical conflicts among the comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious doctrines. Confucian conception of society is distinguished by its constant conflicts between powers without moral standards. These different conceptions of society lead to take opposite routes to the relationship between ethics and politics. In addition, it is important to compare Rawls' well-ordered democratic society with Confucian conception of an ideal society. Although these two conceptions of society are different, it is notable that both conceptions share one common goal to establish a good society by positing proper relations among the persons. Despite the different routes, this shared goal may be the ground for specifying the just principles for global society.

Noting these shared grounds, I attempt to defend that Confucianism and liberalism can agree on certain principles of justice guiding global society.

Ѱȫ壺˼ıȽ

Dong-jin Jang

Yonseiѧ

Ҫעǣѧ˵ǷйͬĹΪȫͨȽ޶˹壨˵Ӧ޶˹һֽϽѧ˵ѧ˵ĽΪ˼绤ֲܴѧȫijЩԭϴһ¡

ѧ˵ΪǶǹҹͬеĻȻʶʶһ֡ڶǵ˵ľľΣѧ˵ۿʼѧȫĹעǶڶǵľǾΣ˼붼ؿһǿҵյءѧ˵ڶǵȴȫΧӰʶ̬֧򣬾Ҷض֮Ӧ£Ƚҵ޶˹ģ޶˹һϵۡ塷͡ڵķɡеõġ

ΪѰΪȫĹйҪϱȽѧ

ȣҽȽϵط޶˹νṹҵֱ塣޶˹ʹνṹṹԭҵѧһֱϣֱΪ±׼ͼֵһֿ͹۵ʵڣڳ˼ֱӰյҽ֤Ϊ˹ȫĻֹѧӦصõǡţûֱĻṹ岻Ϊԭṩ

ΣһȽ˵ĸ޶˹˵θֵ涨һ־γɺƵĹĵһǶ򣬼˹ദ״̬ʶҵ˵Ĺɡˡֳӡʥ͡һܹͨڵ¼ֵΪƣڵ¼ֵʡ塢ǡѧ˵Ϊڵϵܵϵơͬҽ˵ĹĻһԣΪȫԭ㡣

ٴΣҽȽһ޶˹עڹ㷺ͬѧġµĺڽ̵֮ͻҵעصڲ漰׼Ȩ֮ľԵijͻЩͬڶεĹϵϲͬ·ߡ⣬Ƚ޶˹ġõᡱҵĹǺҪġȻDzͬģֵעǣָйͬĿ֮꣬ͨȷһ˵Ĺϵһõᡣ·߲ͬһͬĿΪȷ涨ȫ

ԭ

ͨעͬĻͼΪ˼绤ѧ˵ָȫijЩԭܴһ¡

Legitimate Foundation of Procedures in the Rule of Law: Justice or Rules?

Jiang Yi

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China

It has been a committed principle by most of Western legists and philosophers of law that procedures in the rule of law should be one of presuppositions for pushing on the rule of law. However, there are different views among them about what should be the foundation for insuring the legitimacy of procedures in the rule of law. There have been various doctrines over the problem in the history of Western political ideas, which could be divided into two kinds: one is that the foundation should be justice and moral norms in the society and thus is justified in accordance with the justice. It was initialed by Platos Republic and further signed by different versions of Utopias. Rawls On Justice is a representation of the versions in modern time. The other is that all matters in human lives must be conditioned by rules and conventions that have been committed for long time. In this view, states are formed according to agreements that are achieved in order to avoid chaos and to keep harmony in the society; establishment of rule of law is aimed at guaranty to carry out those agreements. Accordingly the foundation of rule of law should be rules instead of justice in general sense. This view was represented by Aristotles political ideas at first, Hobbes and Lock s ones later. In modern time Heykes liberalism is a powerful imagine of the views. This shows a fundamental conflict between the two kinds of view: the legitimate foundation of procedures in rule of law should be justice or rules. Different answers to the question lead to different understandings of law supreme and of validity of law by legists and philosophers.

The significant principle of dealing with the matter is not confusion of the rules of law and democracy, law and morality. Democracy as a political goal is achieved only by the rules of law and not considered as a means for the rules of law. On the first hand democracy is not a means but an ideal way of life illustrating peoples interests. On the other the goal for democracy is different from the means for it and it is wrong to replace the goal with the means or vice versa. In the same sense, law is different from morality. Conventions could not be considered as the same as good laws which are not consist with conventions which could not be come to be good laws.

The crucial key to handle this matter is clarification of the aim of procedures in the rules of law and significance of legitimacy of procedures. The principle of procedures in the rules of law is one of basic demands for liberalism, which is acknowledge of individual uniqueness and autonomy and the criteria of no-violation of others behaviors. In the West rightness or legality is an axiomatic principle of procedures in the rules of law. The conception of legitimacy contains, however, space applicable for rules. It means that procedures should be a fundamental principle on which particular cases will be base for establishing rules. Nobody will be supreme over laws.

Procedures in the rules of law is too important a content of establishment of the rules of law in China. It is only on bases of rules that legitimate procedures in the rules of law would be established and the principle that everyone is equal under law would be represented. All we encounter now is not why we should govern our country by the rules of law, but how to make our legal system more perfect. It will be more helpful for our establishment of the rules of law to have more legalities rather than free authorities.

γ򻯵ĺϷԻ壿

йԺѧ

εijDZ֤εкǰᣬѧԼѧһϵԭ򡣵ھʲôΪ֤γ򻯵ĺϷϣͬķѧҺѧҾ˲ͬĿǧ˼ʷϣǧ۹۵㣬ϿԷΪࣺһΪεĻӦ˼͵¹γ򻯵ĺϷԻȻӦԷΪ׼ֹ۵԰ͼΪиʽаִ޶˹Ϊһֹ۵ΪһǰԼĹɵЭΪģҵɾǸΪάгɵһԼεĽΪʹԼܹõִ᳹Уʹγ򻯵ĺϷԻӦǹ򣬶dzһϵ塣ֹ۵ʿµ˼Ϊл˹˵˵Ĺ룬ִ˼ԺҮ˵Ϊֹ۵㷴ӳ˵ۺͷѧ˼еһָγ򻯵ĺϷԻǹ壿ڶIJͬش𣬵˷ѧҺѧǶԷϺͷIJͬ⡣ һҪǰᣬǾܰѷ»Ϊһ̸ΪһĿģҪͨεֶδﵽģֶܱԴһ棬ֶΣִʽһ棬ʵĿﵽĿĵֶβֶͬȡĿģĿĴֶΡͬɲͬڵ£ϰһͬʣδطϰףϰҲһΪ

ĹؼҪ巨γ򻯵ĿļϷԵںγ򻯵ǰĻҪ󣬼ϸΨһԡԣԲ˵ΪΪ׼ԻԳΪγ򻯡ԵġǰᡣϷԸĿÿռ䣬εijӦΪ尸趨Ļûڷ֮ϡ

εijйνҪݡֻԹΪͱ׼ܽϷķγ򣬲֡ǰƽȡľٵⲻΪνзν裬Ӧξʹǵķɷơ෱ȸɲȨйǰķν衣

Procedures and Democracy

Jiang Yi

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China

The statue of democracy has been understood differently in both different cultural backgrounds and different ages. It was considered as political deliberation in aristocrats in ancient Greece, as monarchic constitutionalism in modern time and as wills of the majority in contemporary democracy. In ancient Chinese political ideology democracy, if any, was nothing but charity of officers to ordinary people.

Democracy would stay only in ideas when it is used as an ideal to strive for. However, it has been considered as not a simply theoretic problem or political ideal but an urgent issue encountered in practical political life. Only in certain periods of society could the democracy issue be set out as a political program; and only when politics in society has to change in one sense would the issue be more urgent for the society.

However democracy as a political practice is represented in particular political activities. It has been a crucial role in Western political ideology and practices that procedures is the main statue in representing democracy. Democratic procedures here is not a procedures characteristic of democracy. Instead, procedures itself presents democracy, or in other words, procedures is nothing but democracy. Only in establishing and following procedures could democracy be represented; only expressing opinions according to procedures could the will of the majority be guaranteed.

The establishment and following of procedures are not solved alone by democracy. It could not guarantee the legitimacy of the establishment and following of procedures. Thus democracy is not at the same level with legitimacy. There is no legitimate or illegitimate for democracy. In practical politics democracy is represented by the establishment and following of procedures, aiming at agreements among all or most of the majority. Procedures guarantee that democracy could be carried out, while democracy will make the function of procedures more outstanding in contemporary politics.

йѧԺѧ

ĻƲڲͬĻͳŲͬ⣬ڲͬʱҲŲͬʶϣǹǾܣִǶ˵־ڴͳ⽨й˼У˵ĻҲֻǹٴһʩᡣ

ֻDZΪһȥ׷ʱֻͣʶˮƽϡȻӱʼͲһ룬ʵٵļ⡣ֻеᷢչһĽ׶ΣŻᱻΪҪθֻʵij̶ֳҪ仯ʱŻԵøΪȡ

ȻΪʵھλ֮еġΪҪ˼ʵʼҪá򲢲ָΪij෴˵ֻƶѭŵֻ֣аճ˵־ŵԱ֤

ƶأܽ⡣ϳƶصĺϷԡϷԲͬһεĸںϷ򲻺Ϸ⡣ʵУͨƶֵģĿҪл֮дһ¡Թ᳹Ҳʹóִиͻֳ

Democratic Deliberation in Diverse Societies


David Kahane

Department of Philosophy

University of Alberta, Canada


Accounts of democratic deliberation in diverse societies necessarily presuppose conceptions of culture and cultural membership. I will argue that political disagreements often represent conflicts of culturally situated perspectives, construed in a particular way; against this background, democratic deliberation is best understood as a process of intercultural dialogue. After reviewing approaches to intercultural dialogue in theories and practices of 'alternative dispute resolution', I will lay out a set of questions and challenges for deliberative democratic theory, and consider the sorts of democratic mechanisms that might be adequate to challenges of cultural pluralism.


Ԫ

ô󰢶ѧѧϵ

ԪȻԤĻĻԱĸҪ֤ǣϵķ糣һⷽʽͳĻĻӽǵijͻӦֱñΪһĻĶԻ̡ҽ˽ۺʵнĻԻ;ȻЭƵһϵսҽijЩ͵еۣǿһƵǿԳ򣿣ЩеۿܺӦĻԪս

Pluralism, Nationalism, and Cosmopolitanism: Paradoxes of

Universality in Contemporary Political Philosophy

David Kahane

Department of Philosophy

University of Alberta, Canada

Cosmopolitanism is the same thing as China's theory of world empire two thousand years ago. China once wanted to be sovereign lord of the earth and to stand above every other nation, so she espoused cosmopolitanism." -- Sun Yat Sen

Political philosophers have long been preoccupied with tensions between the normative claims of the 'local' - of family, village, ethnos, nation - and the 'universal' claims of shared humanity. Yet the best of contemporary Western political philosophy shows the inadequacy of the polarities of this spectrum.

On the one hand, the insistent localism of communitarianism and of multiculturalism (when this latter is treated as a 'serial communitarianism') founders on the complexity of group boundaries: appeals to the shared understandings of a given social group -- a class or ethnicity or nation -- tend to collapse in the face of the complex intersections of identities and memberships. This collapse occurs at levels of both justification and the proper scope of moral obligation. At the justificatory level, the complexities of pluralism undermine attempts to ground normative standards in putatively shared understandings (which must either be so abstract as to be politically inert, or specific and thereby controversial within as well as across communities.) The complexities of pluralism also undermine localism applied to the scope of moral obligations: communities are not neatly bounded, and so the boundaries of any given 'we' will be contestable and contingent. As Martha Nussbaum notes in her recent defense of moral cosmopolitanism, it seems troublingly arbitrary that Americans' concern for co-nationals of Chinese ancestry should switch registers when directed at Chinese overseas.

On the other hand, dismissing the claims of the local in favor of universally-founded norms runs into problems of its own. It's not only that moral universalisms -- accounts of common human nature, interests, or goals -- have so often served as alibis for colonialist and imperialist projects (as the quote from Sun Yat Sen avers). The quest for normative foundations that speak to all rational beings faces sustained and compelling criticism from Neo-Aristotelians (MacIntyre, Taylor), Neo-Wittgensteinians (Edwards, Tully), Pragmatists (Rorty), and others. In the light of such critiques, universal accounts of morality come to seem culturally and historically particular.

So while moral localism and moral universalism have no shortage of contemporary philosophical proponents, there would appear to be a complex tension between local and universal; neither approach can be theorized away.

My paper explores this tension as it unfolds in the normative claims of nation, and those proffered on behalf of universal humanity, of cosmopolis. The paper looks, in particular, at justificatory strategies used in the contest between national/cultural sovereignty on the one hand, and campaigns for international standards (of human rights, for example) on the other. Neither simple localisms nor simple universalisms are sustainable here -- neither claims to a monolithic national sovereignty or interest or character (which are cast into doubt by internal dissent and pluralism), nor claims to universally grounded standards (which founder on the plurality of actual worldviews and moral perspectives). Surveying recent debates around cosmopolitanism (e.g. Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann 1997, Cheah & Robbins 1998, Geras 1995, Nussbaum et. al. 1996, Nussbaum & Glover 1995), I argue for a middle way that, by chastening the rhetorics of both localists and universalists, reveals the contingency and contextuality of the range of positions on offer. The contest between 'local' and 'universal' values turns out to be an intercultural negotiation, one that restores a dignity to claims to culturally specific ways, while also confronting these defenses of sovereignty with democratically-based standards of internal and external justification.

Ԫ塢壺ѧԵ

ô󰢶ѧѧϵ

йǧǰ۹һ¡йΪͳ߸߾֮ϣʱйӵ塣

ɽ

ѧҪעǵط֮ǰ߼ּͥ硢͹ҵĹ淶ȨƹеԡȻõĵѧһϵеĸ򲢲ûȱݵġ

һ棬ȺĻԪ壨߱ȺϵС̵ĵطΪȺ޵ĸԶʧˡڼȶȺ壨ײ㡢ңĹԵΪݺͳԱʸĸཻ״̬ʧЧˡһʧܷԲ͵÷ΧϡԲϣԪĴ״̬ݻͼ淶׼ڹϵĹ֮ϵЩҪô̫ϲãҪô̫ˣȺڲȺ֮䶼ģԪĴ״̬Ҳݻ˵طڵΧϵӦãȺǴһر޶κμȶġǡĽ޽ǿɵģҲDzȷġء¬ıMartha NussbaumΪı绤ע⵽ƺǼΪϵģۼ⻪ȣ˶йѪͳıӦע

һ棬ط֧ձ淶ҲԼ⡣壨е౾ԣͬĿţֳ͵۹ҵĽڣɽĻԵģѰЧĹ淶֮Ŭ˳ĺǿЩԴʿ壨̫Macintyre,̩գTaylor,άظ˹̹壨»Edwards,Tullyʵ壨޵٣RortyЩǰϵƺĻϺʷġ £Ȼµط͵嶼ȱѧϵ֧ߣ֮ȴֳӵϵûκһ;ܴϱ

ĽϵһΪĹ淶Ȩţһ¶ΪձԣǰͬĽرעĻȨʻ淶˶ȨʹõԲԡڴˣĵط򵥶嶼DzܳġȨԣЩΪڲڲĶԪܵɣŵձĹ淶Ϊʵʵۺ͵ӽǵĶԪԶʧܣͨΧ[粪Bohman¬-ʲLutz-Bachmann1997ж(Cheah)ޱ˹(Robbins)1998˹(Geras)1995¬ı(Nussbaum et.al.)1996¬ı(Nussbaum)͸޷(Glover)1995],ҽһм·ͨƵطߵ޴ǣʾڷΧϵżȻԺ;ԡطġ͡塱֮ļֵ֤ΪһĻ飬һͼĻԵijϣһڲⲿԹ淶սȨı绤

Justice and Democracy across National Borders: Ethics or Politics?

Byron Kaldis

The Economic University of Athens &

the Greek Open University, Athens, Greece

The aim of this paper is to throw some light on a particular area in which the values of justice and democracy meet. Moreover, it deals with the point at which these values meet in international relations. The central thesis (Section IV) puts forward a certain historical and conceptual relationship between ethics and two distinct types of political philosophy. It is argued that the possibility to discern such a (dual) relationship is the combined effect of the problem of moral conflict and the idea of order. The crucial question is whether (and in what specific senses) political philosophy as a theory of just order should assume the role of completing ethics otherwise left incomplete by the inherent conflict of values.

Section I broaches the subject of the two historical types of political philosophy and of the corresponding two notions of 'order' against a broader background shaped by questions about the study of 'order' as a value in general, and of the relation between ethics and politics. The latter issue is taken up more fully in Section II where a number of specific issues are raised (and solutions thereof are indicated) with regard to the problem of the logical separation of ethics from politics, especially as this is linked to the concepts of 'order' and 'conflict'. Section III spells out varieties of conflict of values and the way in which political theory is involved in this, thus paving the way for the central Section IV: there the proposed distinction between the two rival types of political philosophy as these are based on the ideas of 'natural' vs. 'artificial' order is articulated in some detail. It is shown that the two types of political philosophy (order) correspond to two different ways in which they can handle the conflict of incommensurable values as opposed to the conflict of duties. Two exemplifications of the general theme are offered in what follows: Section V examines three different but complementary modern moments in the history of political philosophy which support the general thesis: Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hume. Section VI is a critical look at a fallacy (in terms of values) in Liberalism, viewed as a theory that, purportedly, awards to itself the singular status of transcending the conflict of values. Finally in the Conclusion, I briefly put forward a number of rather general remarks about the connection between ethics and politics throwing into relief the concepts of justice and democracy across national borders brought to the forefront at various points

ԽҽƣΣ

ס˹

ϣŵ侭ôѧϣŴѧ

ĵĿdzֵּ򣬲ڹʹϵıһġĵ⣨Ľڣֲͬ͵ѧ֮һʷ͸ϵĹ֤˵ʶһ֣ԪģĿǵ³ͻϵĽؼǣǷԼʲôϣΪ۵ѧӦԤƵݵĽɫڵļֵͻ ڵһҽ⣺һѧʷԼӦ֡򡱹ЩڸıģЩȡڽΪһֵеоڶ֮Ĺϵһڵڶлõϸۣڴ˻֮߼֮һϵ⣨ӦĽ취Ҳᱻָֺ߼ر롰򡱺͡ͻĸġڽͼֵͻĶԼ۱ǣķʽɴΪĽ׼ڵĽУҪѧ֮𽫻õϸۣЩҪǻڡȻġ͡ΪġڽֲͬѧӦڽͨԼļֵ֮ijͻʱõIJͬ;Щֵͻηγɶաṩϸ֤ڿѧʷִ֧һ⣨ִֻ֣֮չ׶Σά˹ӡǶһֵۣԿ죬ΪһۣΪгԽֵͻͻλڽβҽҪضμĹһϵнһۣʱҽÿһ϶͹ֿԽҽεĹ

The Limits of Public Reason

Kang Phee Seng

Department of Religion & Philosophy

Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

Political liberals such as Rawls have a vision of an ideal society of civility and mutual respect. This well-ordered society is based upon a set of values and principles endorsed by its reasonable citizens to guide its public discourse dealing with matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. In public political debate, appealing to this set of values and principles is a co-operation on the basis of common reason and thus gives rise to civic friendship and mutual respect. To act otherwise threatens the political goods of the society. The liberal principle of legitimacy for public forum thus is bound up with the idea of "public reason" which is said to be acceptable to all in the society and is to be distinguished from "non-public" or "private" reasons which are acceptable to only some specific groups. Political liberals advocate that the limits of public reason should be observed by all reasonable citizens when engaging in public debate and action concerning fundamental political questions.

Using the recent debate on religion in the public square as a case in point, this paper will examine the concept of public reason and the limits it imposes on public forum in a pluralistic society. It seeks to argue that civility and mutual respect do not necessarily exclude "non-public" reasons in public forum. In spite of their explicit intention to be equally fair to all comprehensive philosophical or religious systems, the limits of public reason which political liberals advocate is unfair to at least some of them. Moreover, a common political basis is not the precondition for convergence in or agreement on political discussions.

ԵĽ

اʢ

۽ѧڽ̼ѧϵ

Լq޶˹(John Rawls)һɻ˴صĹɵԶǻǵĹϿɵļֵԭ򣬲ԴΪйҪּ(constitutional essentials)(matters of basic justice)Ĺ(public discourse)ָڹУЩͬļֵԭǻڹͬԵһֺΪԵǣ(political goods)𺦡ˣĹĺϷԭ(the liberal principle of legitimacy for public forum)""(public reason)ɷָгԱܵ""ֻijЩܵ"ǹ"(non-public reason)"˽"(private reason)Ӧ֡߳ǵĹӦڹԵĽڽйػĹۼж ѧ"㳡ڽ"(religion in the public square)顣Ľɴ˽ֹ̽ԵĸԶԪйľޡijԲڹнлòı۲DZų"ǹ"ȫѧڽϵͳ(comprehensive philosophical or religious systems)һͬʣĹԽ޶һЩϵͳDzƽġнߣһͬλҲЭȾ

A Paradox of Rationality in a Liberal Pluralist Democracy

Ahmet Kara

Department of Economics, Fatih University, Istanbul, Turkey

Rationality has long been a profound source of trade-offs and paradoxes in social and political theory. Some of these trade-offs and paradoxes are inextricably intertwined with two of the foundational pillars of liberal democratic discourse, namely

individual rights and democratic majority decision. Following the insights inspired by A. Sen's theorem, we will, in this paper, uncover a rationality-related perplexity involving individual rights and democratic majority decision in liberal-pluralist democracies. We show that, in a liberal pluralist democracy, there are contexts where non-rational preferences are more instrumental than rational preferences in resolving social irrationality-inducing conflicts between individual rights and democratic majority decision. Though existence of such contexts would not diminish the importance of rationality in understanding and analyzing the nature and functioning of a pluralistic polity, it indicates that the relation between rationality and democratic pluralism is more complex than it is portrayed to be in social theory. It also points out the need to pay greater attention to cases of irrationality in individual and group preferences in resolving the rationality-paradoxes of liberal-pluralist democracies

ɵĶԪе

÷ء

䷨ٺմѧѧϵ

ۺУһֱǸȨ۵ĸԴȪЩصȨУеIJɱƵʯһǾǸȨĶԭA.ɭA. SenĶĶ, ڱУǽʾɵĶԪеһصһǣ浽ȨĶԭǽһɵĶԪУһЩЩУڽһЩȺԴٳɵڸȨĶ֮ijͻԣԵѡԵѡΪЧȻĴ֮ڲܱͷԪıʺ͹ʱԵҪԣȴƵĶԪ֮ĹϵܱĸΪӡҲָˣڽɵĶԪƵʱҪԸȺƫе״Ĺע

Legitimacy

Dudley R. Knowles
Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

In this paper I examine an ancient argument, first rehearsed in Plato's Crito, to the effect that an obligation to obey the state can be derived from the proposition that citizens ought to feel grateful for the benefits they have received from the state. This argument has found few friends in recent philosophical literature. I want to defend it, arguing in the first place that it is cogent (against those who deem it incoherent or inchoate) and, secondly, I wish to consider the range of citizens to whom it applies. I don't claim either that it applies to all citizens in some states or to some citizens in all states. The conditions of its application must be carefully investigated, but this does not affect the cogency of the argument.
The argument runs as follows:
1. I distinguish the argument from gratitude from other arguments which share the initial premise of the citizen's receipt of benefits from the state, in particular, Hart's Principle of Fairness and what I dub the Argument from Reciprocity which requires that the receipt of benefits be reciprocated. I claim that some critics of the argument from gratitude (e.g. A.J. Simmons) have confused gratitude with reciprocation.
2. I insist that the argument does not establish that citizens have an obligation to feel grateful which amounts to the obligation to obey the law. I diagnose a more intricate structure, seeking to show first, that the citizen who receives benefits ought to feel grateful, secondly that the assumption of an obligation of service to the state is a proper expression of that feeling. Moral requirements enter at these two different stages of the argument, underpinning the appropriateness of feelings of gratitude, and then explaining why the assumption of an obligation is appropriate. This structure of argument obviates confusing talk of 'debts of gratitude' and deflects the various objections to which such talk has given rise.
3. I discuss these claims in turn, tackling objections raised in the literature. Objections to the first include the claim that gratitude pre-supposes motives on the part of the benefactor which cannot be imputed to institutions, the further claim that the metaphysics of the state makes the state an inappropriate object of gratitude, and the democratic intuition that the state should not be regarded as Lady Bountiful. My rejection of these objections clarifies the argument.
4. In defence of the claim that gratitude should ground the assumption of an obligation, I investigate the concept of political obligation, concluding that what are at stake are more properly thought of as the traditional duties of citizenship rather than the 'narrow' notion of an obligation to obey the law. These duties may even include the duty to break the law. I reject a competing account (A.D.M. Walker) which identifies the obligation as one not to harm the state through disobedience.
5. I conclude by considering how widespread might be the obligations thus incurred. Obviously they cannot be imputed to those who have received no or meagre benefits. But I claim further that such obligations should be repudiated by those who, like Cinderella's Ugly Sisters, are the beneficiaries of an unjust regime. Gratitude is not appropriate in respect of benefits with an immoral provenance. We should not accept any political obligations towards the unjust state.

Ϸ

R. ŵ˹

Ӣ˹ѧѧϵ

ڱҽڰͼġƪCrito,ӦʲôеõһŵۣԹҵķοԴһŶõ˵ӦΪӹеõиж֮顣һ۵ڽѧкٷ֧ߡͼΪһ۵绤ҽ֤˵һ۵ǿģЩΪDz߼ĻδõַչĵĹ۵㣩Σϣһ۵õĹķΧҼȲΪijЩҵйҲйеijЩԵõϸ죬ⲢӰ۵ŷԡ ҵṹ£

1ԴԸж۵۵㣬Щ۵㹲³ʼǰ᣺ӹл͹أHartĹԭҽ֮ΪԴԻݵ۵㣬ΪҪʱӦرΪЩԸж۵A. J. ˹A. J. Simmons ʵϻ˸ж뻥ԭ

2Ҽţж۲֤ʵĿӦижΣһжεͬطɵΡжϸжиӵĽṹҪ˵ǣһĹӦǸжģΣڹǸжһǡı֡׶еҪǣһ湮̸жеԣһΪʲôε趨ġ֤ṹųˡжծ˵ҲŤתɴ˵µַ 3۵㣬صķԵһ۵ķһֿжԤʩߵĶЩDzܹڻģһķָҵζѧʹҲΪжĶΪȻֱǣҲӦһλķˡҶЩľܳ˸ж۱

4ΪάжΪεһ۵㣬ҿһǣһйؼĶӦǡرǴͳĹطխĹЩܰɡҾܳһ෴Ĺ۵㣨A. D. M. ߶ˣA. D. M. Walkerֹ۵㽫εͬڱͨΥ𺦹ҡ

5ڽβҿԴڻԭθι㷺ġȻĸܹЩûлٻˡȻҽһָӦ󡰻ҹյĽǡIJƵܻܾжھвԴ档DzӦܷҵκ

Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism, and Their Limits

Daniel Kofman

Lincoln College, Oxford University, Oxford, UK

Critics of ethical cosmopolitanism on the grounds that there are no ethical norms of universal scope are in danger of contradiction if they also object to the imposition of norms (i.e. human rights) by some states on others. For to object to the imposition of such norms, or to denounce it as Western cultural imperialism, implies the recognition of at least one norm of universal scope: the right of self-determination; otherwise there would be no grounds to hold the imposition (however coercive) of external norms as wrong. Self-determination implies the right of groups to live according to their own standards, and that implies correlative duties on others not to interfere with each group's pursuit of its own lifestyle according to its own values.

But a universal right of self-determination must in turn be justified. What are the grounds of asserting such a right? This paper surveys several justifications, rejecting some, and defending those based on the right of individuals to autonomy and respect. The right to autonomy of individuals implies a right of groups of individuals to live according to their shared values. But since the justification is based on individual autonomy and respect, it also implies limits to the right of collective self-determination: it cannot take a form inimical to the interests of its autonomy and individual members in self-determination.

Normative limits on collective forms of self-determination, including sovereign statehood, can thus be derived from very limited or weak assumptions of universal features of human beings; the weaker the assumptions, the stronger the case for those limitations, since one need not deny vast cultural differences among peoples, and duties to respect those differences. Nevertheless, some basic universal properties of humans "thinly described" (enumerated in the paper) coupled with the historical novelty of a universal sovereign state system under which all people live today, is sufficient to imply a need for strong limitations on state power. The latter point also suggests a reply against traditionalist objections to limiting state power. Given the novelty of the modern state ("the most powerful institution ever invented", as John Breuilly called it), there are no cultural traditions in the world predating modernity that specifically endorsed such centralised power; on the contrary, as sociologist Peter Berger observed, the sheer inefficiency of pre-modern states, for instance in China before the twentieth century, created scope in which local traditions could flourish unimpeded by central power, and in which individuals could occasionally manouevre within a plurality of loci of power. In modernity, market economies and "civil society" provide diffusion of power of a sort, sometimes protecting individuals from, say, state attempts to deny them employment, but not always enough to defend individuals against the most serious sorts of abuses by states.

In the absence of robust international mechanisms of enforcement, duties of intervention sometimes fall to other states, as the international law doctrine of jus cogens or peremptory norm implies. The paper concludes, however, with some brief exploration of the possibility of developing international institutions robust enough to assume the main duties of international human rights protection, and of the prospects of advancing the voluntary acceptance of human rights norms by hitherto recalcitrant states.

ȨԼǵ޶

ӢţѧֿѧԺ

ߵǣûΧõ淶ٷɱǿӹ淶ȨôЩ߾ʹì֮СΪԹ淶ǿȽܣ֮ΪĻĵ۹壬ζųһõĹ淶ԾȨ˵վסŵģ淶ǿȽǴġԾζһȺı׼ȨҲζӦ񣺲ӦøȺļֵȺԼʽ

ǣԾձȨҲ֤ƾʲôһȨĿһЩܳ˼ɣΪЩڸȨ͸ϵ˱绤ɵȨζɸɵȺȨеļֵȻǡǡΪǵڸɺ͸ϵģҲͬʱζȺԾȨ޶ȣԾȨܳΪ𺦴Ծ״̬µĸԱ֮ɺһʽ ˣȺԾʽȨңĹ淶޶ܹԴԵձϷdz޻dzļ裻ЩԽ淶޶ȾԽΪڴ˲Ҫ֮ľ޴ĻԼЩءȻŵǶеȨϵձʷ¾һЩٵõijЩձԣڱлгΪȨҵȨҪЩҪҲӦ˷ƹȨĴͳߡִµԼ³John BreuillyĻǡȨĻִǰûһĻͳرֹ֧һ뼯ȨʽȨ෴ѧұ˵áPeter Berger۲쵽ģǰ-ִҵĵЧʣʮǰйΪȨ谭ĵطͳķչṩ˿ռ䣬ȨĶԪϵͳУԲʱѡִУгú͡ᡱµȨɢʱܹԱҰְҵȨⲢ㹻رԹҵصĿ ĹʷеǿԹ淶jus cogensָģȱȫĹǿƻƣξͳ񡣱ĽβҪؿһԽȫسеȨҪεĹʻƵĿԣԼһƽѱĹҶȨ淶Ըܵǰ

A Critical Evaluation of the Debate between

Michael Sandel & the Later John Rawls

Kwan Kai-man

Department of Religion & Philosophy, Baptist University, Hong Kong

Liberalism has long been the dominant political philosophy in the West. However, since the eighties, it has been challenged by communitarian critics like Michael Sandel (1982), Charles Taylor (1985, 1990), Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, 1988, 1990), and Michael Walzer (1983). One typical example of the liberal-communitarian controversy is the prolonged debate between Michael Sandel, a prominent communitarian, and John Rawls, a leading liberal, which has gone on for nearly thirty years. The earlier Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971) attempts to provide a universalist justification of liberalism, and argues for the priority of the right over the good. (Although it is later denied by Rawls, this is certainly how it appears to many scholars.) Sandel, in his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), argues that Rawls has presupposed a controversial and defective theory of self-identity: a conception of unencumbered self who can choose to attach to any community at will. Sandel argues instead that personal identity is at least partially constituted by his communal ties and the values he is committed to. Later Rawls moves towards a political conception of liberalism which eschews controversial doctrines, tries to be neutral towards different comprehensive theories, and builds the just political order upon the overlapping consensus alone (Rawls 1980, 1985). This culminates in his Political Liberalism (1993).

Sandel once again responded. His critique of Rawls political liberalism is summarized in a new chapter in the second edition of his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1998). His major criticisms are threefold: (i) when we deal with some serious moral issues like abortion and slavery, it is impossible to be completely neutral towards controversial moral or religious doctrines; (ii) a kind of reasonable pluralism also exists in the debate concerning the proper understanding of justice; (iii) the restriction of public political discourse to the overlapping consensus will make it impoverished. His Democracys Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (1996) is also a response to Rawls, and at the same time a defense of his favoured version of communitarianism, civic republicanism. Rawls now justifies his political liberalism mainly by claiming that it is implicit in the American political culture. Sandel (1996) contains a rich analysis of the history of American politics, the burden of which is to show that the liberal tradition has led to various problems, and that civic republicanism is also a tradition implicit in the American political culture. This book has provoked a lot of responses from liberals and communitarians alike, which are collected in Allen and Regan (1998), together with Sandels response.

In this paper, I will look at the debate between Sandel and the later Rawls, and investigate whether Sandels criticisms of Rawls political liberalism are valid. I also hope to explore the nature and foundation of the liberal society through these discussions.

ɣ¶޶˹

Kwan Kai-man

۽ѧڽ̺ѧϵ

ѧ˵(liberalism)ˣ壬άȨᳫ޵ȵȡȻ۽ʿУкܶ˶岻±(neo-conservatism)ΪңЧսȨģƽͻȺ(communitarianism)ϣ޶˹(John Rawls)Ⱥɣ¶(Michael Sandel)дԣҲʮ꣺޶˹1971ˡۡ˵˽ʮۺ磬ҲӹΪĵλɣ¶1982ġơ޶˹߶Ӧ޶˹ɣ¶ֱӦǺܶ࣬80ʼڹķиı䣬ijɹ1993ġ塷

ڵ޶˹ձĽǶάһƽ壬ɣ¶Ϊ޶˹Ѽٶһ֡޾ҹۡ(unencumbered self)ҵıdzձ壬ȫѡĿ(ǷȥͬijȺ)ġɣ¶ָһָ(ȱ)ζѧƵ(neutralism)ۡ޶˹ǿ岢һζѧεĸ޶˹ڡۡвͼȥ֤ƽȨĴڣֻǽѴڵƶȱ͡ᳫҪܿκȫԵֻۣ͸ɽʶ(overlapping consensus)ܽһϵܶΪ޶˹ɱɣ¶ڵ

Ȼɣ¶Ȼ޶˹׷ʹ1996ġIJԹѧ׷ѰʷǶطδͳָףᳫ񹲺(civic republicanism)ĸաΪɻָԼϲ£ܸšΪɵľҹ(self-government)1998ġơ°棬ȫµһǶ޶˹Сɣ¶޶˹εһΪΪεĿһЩȫĵºڽ̽ŷڣԶǺġǹעһЩصĵʱ(̥ūƶ)ڻྺڶºڽ̽УһģҲҪ⡣ɣ¶ĵڶǣ޶˹һʯǹڵºڽ⣬ĶԪʵȻ⣬ʵҲͬкĶԪۣⷽ棬Ի(the right)Ƶĸ(the good)һģ˵أɣ¶ĵָڹڵУֻкĹܽܵμֵֻʹƶų˹˼һЩҪȡ

ɣ¶ġIJԹѧ׷Ѱٻ죬Щռ飬в߶ɣ¶ӦҲɣ¶ĻظĻἯнɣ¶޶˹ľɣ¶޶˹ܷ͸Щۣϣɽһ̽ıʺͻ

Nation-Building and Minority Rights

Will Kymlicka

Department of Philosophy, Queen's Univeristy, Canada

Western states today exhibit a complex pattern of nation-building constrained by minority rights. On the one hand, Western states remain "nation-building" states: all Western states continue to adopt the sorts of nation-building policies to promote a common national language and identity. On the other hand, these policies are increasingly qualified and limited to accommodate the demands of minorities who feel threatened. Minorities have demanded, and increasingly been accorded, various rights which help ensure that nation-building does not exclude or assimilate immigrants, or undermine the self-government of national minorities and indigenous peoples. These rights often take the form of `multiculturalism' for immigrant groups, and of multination federalism or territorial autonomy for national minorities and indigenous peoples. What we see in the West, therefore, is a complex dialectic of state nation-building (state demands on minorities) and minority rights (minority demands on the state). I believe that this emerging dialectic of nation-building and minority rights is morally justifiable in principle, and in many cases is working well in practice. Modest forms of nation-building promote legitimate liberal-democratic values of justice and democracy, but have historically imposed injustices on minority groups. The rights increasingly accorded to immigrants and national minorities serve to protect them from the injustices that would otherwise arise as a result of state nation-building. The resulting package of nation-building and minority rights often represents, I believe, a fair balancing of interests, and is an improvement on earlier ways of regulating diversity in Western societies. I will conclude with some speculations about the possible relevance of this nation-building/minority rights model for other countries around the world.

ҽȨ

ķ

ôŮѧѧϵ

ұһֱȨ޶ĸӵҽģʽһ棬Ȼ彨ƵĹңеҶһֹһµĹͬԺͬҽߡһ棬Щ߲ϵܵɸܵвҪ˲ұ˸ȨЩȨȷҽƲųͬȺ壬ҲӸȺΡЩȨȺΪĻԪ塱ʽȺΪƻطΡˣģҽƣҶҪ󣩺ȨԹҪ֮һָӵı֤ţҽƺȨ֮¶ı֤ԭģҲʵúܺáº͵ҽ֧-ֺϷֵۣҲٽ壬ʷȷʵѲǿӸȺ塣ЩϸȺȨڱܲ壬ЩȨͻΪҽƵĽ֡ȷţҽƺȨ֮һӽ׳֮һֹľ⣬ҲԪԵĽ緽ʽĸĽβҽƲҶҽ-ȨģʽһЩܵʵ塣

On What Can't Be Replaced: Compensation, Security, and the Rule of Law

Melissa S. Lane

Kings College, Cambridge, UK

The paper begins by constructing an extension of Lockes argument that individuals would be permitted to punish in the state of nature. Because punishment cannot be expected fully to deter all crime, harm done wrongly to individuals needs also to be addressed outside the framework of punishment. Individuals should therefore also in the state of nature be permitted to exact compensation for injury from one another.

From a consequentialist perspective, the ultimate purpose of both punishment and compensation is the same: the prevention of unwarranted and unnecessary harm. However, both of these state of nature mechanisms are essentially backward-looking: they do nothing to prevent harm (except insofar as they deter). Moreover, both mechanisms rely implicitly on an idea of fungibility: my unwarranted suffering can be redressed by yours (punishment) or compensated for by some good (compensation, typically by money). This means that people can and often will suffer harm in the state of nature the effects of which continue to impair their physical or psychological functioning.

Establishment of a state can and should address both of these features of the state of nature. Unlike an individual, the state may be invested with a forward-looking duty to protect individuals against even compensateable harm; if so, it follows that it must be more than a minimal state in Nozicks sense, as simply enforcing rights and punishing where necessary will not provide either the resources or the wherewithal to prevent such harm. Such a duty will be even more important in cases of uncompensateable harm, for example, deprivation of adequate education: one cant fully compensate someone in any meaningful sense for the manifold disadvantages s/he will suffer from such deprivation. In such a case, the fact that something is irreplaceablely valuable supports a duty to provide it. (Contrast the case of irreplaceable value in the case of an Old Master picture, where such value provides a reason not to insure it).

These considerations must shape our understanding of the rule of law. For individuals the primary value of the rule of law lies in the security which it provides: it promises that they will be (objectively) secured against harm and therefore can enjoy the (subjective) feeling of security. But such security cannot be enjoyed with only the promise of retrospective rectification and at best a financial pay-off should it be violated. The rule of law therefore implies the duty to prevent harm, not simply by deterring it, but by (e.g.) providing the good deprivation of which would cause irreplaceable damage. Even on a proto-libertarian account of natural rights, the law must embrace duties which go beyond formal mechanisms to substantive provision.

In the final part of the paper (which might be for publication rather than for reading at the conference) I discuss the question of whether such state duty of compensation should be for only socially caused bad luck (as Thomas Nagel has recently argued) or for naturally caused bad luck (as Hillel Steiner has claimed).

Щأ⳥ȫϺͷ

ɯS.

ӢŴѧѧԺ

Ŀʼʱ˵һ۵㣺Ȼ״̬У彫ܵͷԭԼΪָͷֹһвΪЩ޹ܵ˺ڳͷԭ֮õǡȻ״̬еĸӦȨܵ˺ӱȡ⳥

Ӱӽͷ⳥ĿͬģԤͱⲻĺͲҪ𺦡ȻȻ״̬ĻƱ϶ͺԵģǶԤȱΪģǿʹΪұʵķΧڣңֻƶһ˼룺ܵIJ𺦿ܵijͷһЩʣ⳥ǽǮõ⳥ζȻ״̬ǿܾ˺Щ˺ǻϵ𺦵ġ

ҵĽܹӦȻ״̬µЩ岻ͬǣҿԱһЩǰհԵЩǿɲ˺һȻĽ۾ǣҽȿˣNozick޶ȵĹңֹҽȷȨͳͷִУṩ˺ҪԴǮһǰհζЩɲΪҪ˵ǡȨİ᣺ȨİܵĶ෽𺦣ûκʵȫIJ£Щвļֵһʵ֤ṩЩΡ෴ڹŴҵƷУЩеIJļֵǡǡΪṩЩɣ

DZȻӰǶԷε⡣ڸ˵εҪֵڷṩİȫϣγŵ˵ǽ͹۵ܵԱܵ𺦣ϽаȫСȻŵһݼĽŵڰȫʱľϵIJȻʹܰȫˣζŲֹͨΪ˺ң磩ͨṩijЩ˺Щİᵼ²ֲ𺦡ԭʼ־߶ȻȨУӦʽĻƣҾʵԵĹ涨

ڱĵ󲿷֣һ֣֮ڻԣڳ棩ҽһ⣺еIJӦֻԭµĻأ˹ɸThomas NagelŵģӦȻԭٳɵĻأϣ˹̩Hillel SteinerƵģ

Good Governance and Cultural Pluralism

Leung Man To

Department of Public and Social Administration

City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

In recent years, a common concern among political theorists is to attempt to find out a third way of organizing political, social and economic affairs in modern societies. This papers attempts to contribute to the discussion by exploring the notion of good governance and its relationship with cultural pluralism. The notion of good governance has attracted scholarly attention since it was introduced by the World Bank and other multilateral institutions as a criterion in judging which developing country is eligible for their aid programs. But the way by which the notion of good governance is used by the West is criticized as a form of cultural imperialism. Through the notion of good governance the paper argues from a theoretical point of view that as there is no single best way to govern, what we need to find out is many third ways rather than the third way. To acknowledge this is to accept the significance of de facto cultural pluralism.

Section I of the paper examines the concepts of governance and good governance. It explains why these notions may be used in normative study of how to organize modern societies. It identifies different elements in the concept of good governance. By making a distinction between various dimensions of good governance, it points out that compared to human rights and democracy, good governance is a better candidate for building up a basic platform for the dialogue between Western and non-Western worlds. Then it examines in what way the immensurability of values that exists among different cultures determines how different models of good governance may be plausibly maintained in different cultures.

One of the third ways is a Chinese way. The second section first explores the potential that Chinese philosophical traditions may contribute to the construction of a theory of good governance in the Chinese context. It then identifies the roles that different kinds of governance agencies play in achieving good governance. It concludes by providing a theoretical framework for further development in theories of citizenship, democracy and justice that draw inspirations from both Western and Chinese traditions.

ĻԪ

Leung Man To

۳дѧ빫ϵ

ѧǵһͬĹעִѰ֯εġĺ;ĵ·ͼͨĹԼͬĻԪĹϵٽۡԴк֯Ϊ۷չйǷʸǵԮĿһ׼֮һѧĹעǣʹһķʽΪĻ۹һʽͨһĽѧ۵㣺ûΨһʽҪѰ˵ǡ·˵ǡࡱ·һζŽʵϵĻԪҪԡ

ĵĵһֽĸΪʲôִ֯Ĺ淶оʹЩеIJͬأҲָȨζԣĹʺͷԻĻƽ̨Ȼ½ڲͬĻеֵּ֮IJɹʲôʽ涨ģڲͬĻУIJͬģʽάϵȥġ

ĵ·֮һйʽĵ·ĵڶȿйض£йѧͳڽһ۵ĿԡȻ½ȡĹвͬӵáĽβΪۡۺ۵ĽһչṩһۿܣֽһķչйĴͳܻݡ

Marx, Justice, and Capitalism:

"Subjective" and "Objective" of Marx and Morality

The Relevance of Thomas Nagel

Hon-Lam Li

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Marx thinks that capitalism is filled with alienation, unfreedom, misery, insecurity, and sickness. Yet, does Marx think that capitalism is an unjust system? The best scholars are evenly divided on this issue. Allen Wood relies on strong textual evidence to argue that Marx regards capitalism as just. Ziyad Husami and G. A. Cohen argues that, for Marx, capitalism is unjust, because Marx describes capitalist exploitation as "theft," "robbery," "snatching" etc. Still, Richard Miller proposes that, for Marx, capitalism is neither just nor unjust because justice, being described as "social phlogiston," does not exist.

I argue that each of these views is only an aspect of Marx's view. Marx has said inconsistent things, which amount to internal inconsistency. But Marx is inconsistent in an illuminating way. Relying on Thomas Nagel's theory that nearly all philosophical problems arise out of the clash between our subjective and objective standpoints, I show that Marx's inconsistency is also due to the clash between his objective and comparatively subjective views. As a historical materialist and an economist, Marx has always considered himself to be a scientist. It is from the detached standpoint of science that Marx views morality as a social product, whose content must be explained functionally in terms of its relation to the economic structure and the development of the productive forces as well as the ruling class interest. On the other hand, with the possible exceptions of a few Taoists or monks for whom nothing matters, perhaps no one else can consistently views moral matters from such as detached viewpoint, least of all a hot-blooded, even angry, revolutionary such as Marx. It is no wonder that Marx regards capitalist exploitation as "robbery," "theft," "snatching," etc. Since capitalist exploitation is lawful in capitalism, Marx must have meant "robbery" in an extra-legal sense. And what other sense could it be but the moral sense. To say that exploitation is robbery in the moral sense is to say that it is unjust, or something very close to injustice. I argue that Nagel's theory of subjective and objective aptly illustrates Marx's inconsistent standpoints.

Finally, I argue that Marx's problem is also our problem. I show that the dispute between the communitarians and the deontological liberals can be cast in terms of viewing morality via different standpoints. The deontological liberals adopt the "impersonal" or moral standpoint, whereas the communitarians take up a more detached standpoint to view the culture, traditions, and social meanings of other types of society.

˼ʱ壺˼ġ۵ġ͡͹۵ġ

˹ɸ۵ʵ

Hon-Lam Li

Ĵѧ

˼Ϊʱ컯ɡҡȱȫͼȻ˼ǷΪʱһַϵأϣЩɫѧ߼Դڷ硣ءףZiyad Husami G. A. ƺࣨG. A. Cohen˵˼ԣʱǷģΪ˼ʱΪ͵ԡᡱȡȵȡȻ¡գRichard MillerΪ˼˵ʱȲģҲǷģΪΪԡʵϲڡ

ΪЩԶֻ˼۵һ档˼ȷǰìܵĶڵز߼Ȼ˼һԵķʽôġ˹ɸThomas NagelΪеѧⶼΪǵ۵ĺͿ͹۵֮ijͻġ˹ɸۣҽ˼۵IJһҲԼ۵ĺԿ͹۵֮ijͻΪһʷΨߺ;ѧң˼һֱԼһѧҡǴӿѧĿ͹˼¿һµݱ뾭ýṹķչͳν׼Ĺϵлܵصõ͡һ棬ЩΪ޹ؽҪĵߺɮµܵ⣬ûһһµķʽ˳Ȼ¼˵˼Ѫģ߼ĸˡѹ˼ʱǡӡ͵ԡ͡ȡȵȡȻʱʱƶǺϷģô˼Ȼڳɵ̸֡ӡġֻǵ塣˵ڵӵ˵Ƿģ˵һַdzӽ顣ΪɸۺͿ͹ֵǡؽ˼ìܵ Ҫǣ˼Ҳǵ⡣ҽȺߺ͵֮ԽΪӲͬ;ӵ¡߲ȡˡ˸ġȺȡһָ͹۵̬ĻͳԼʽ塣

Confucian Teachings and Democratic Citizenship

Li Mei

Institute of Political Science, CASS

There is no doubt that despite the humanistic spirit, defense of peoples interests and emphasis on civic virtue, the maintenance of hierarchical social structure, the rule of men and the extreme emphasis on family value make a Confucian community different from a democratic society. However, differences do not always mean the opposition, or that the Confucian teachings are antidemocratic. If we understand Confucian teachings not literally, but more liberally, and if we understand democratic citizenship more broadly, that is to say, democratic society involves not only democratic political institution but also other institutional arrangements based on family, neighborhood, village and community life, and if citizenship involves not only legal status of individuals, but also capability of association with others to cope with problems in society, to acquire knowledge, to establish communities of common understanding and mutual trust, then Confucian teachings might have something to say to people who live in a democratic society.

The contribution of Confucian teachings to the conceptualization of democratic citizenship may be in three aspects. First, Confucian doctrine presents a viable alternative, and a challenge, to theories in which individual autonomy is overvalued. It implicitly asserts that there are serious defects in an ideology that emphasizes autonomy at the cost of cooperation. It implies that there is, within any society, a delicate balance between individuality on the one hand and communality on the other; that the development of the self can only be meaningfully sought and attained in a context wherein the common good is also emphasized. Second, Confucian articulation of the negatively formulated Golden Rule (do not do to others what you yourself do not like with) its attitudes of epistemological modesty and ethical humility are especially helpful to preserve broader space of moral choice in a democratic society with multicultural accommodation. Lastly, the Confucian disapproval of legal rationality reminds citizens in democratic society the danger of relying on command and control of Supreme Authority and provides another way of crafting democratic citizenship through evolution of public consensus on morality, common knowledge, mutual understanding, trust and accountability, by means of the rules of propriety. Of course, these possible contributions of Confucian teachings to the conceptualization of democratic citizenship does not mean Confucian teachings are perfect. It only means that through freer understanding of Confucian teachings, some of Confucian ideas are helpful for us to achieve a broader conception of democratic citizenship.

ѧ˵Ĺ

÷

йѧԺѧ

ʣܿĿеᳫϰյ沢ǿṫ£ȻбʵҪάһֵȼƵṹΣԼԼͥǸ˵ļǿ𲢲ζһֵжԵĹϵҲζѧ˵ǷġDzǴϣĴӾ˼루Ҫǿӵ˼룩ǸĹҲ˵᲻ƶȣҪڼͥׯԼƶȰţҲζŸ˵һַϵݣָĹͬԵ⣬֪ʶ͹ʶȡ໥Σìܺͳͻѧ˵Ҫǿӵ˼룩еǻǻġ

ѧ˵ĹİҪ档ȣѧ˵ڹǿԵսΪǿ˶Ӻ𺦡һ˼룬κʱ򣬱ָ֮ʶƽⶼǼҪģֻУϵͬǿĻϣпܡΣᳫġˡνʩˡԼϵѧ˵ֵʶԼϵǫѷ̬ȣڶԪĻֵDZһֵѡĹ㷺ԣdz档󣬿ӷԴķͳᣬҵӱܷɵƲãӶɥʧ߳ġеǣȨƣԼ˵ĺжԵ¡Ρ֪ʶγɹʶĹͻɥʧ

An outline of philosophy of the oriental neo-communitarianism

Li Pengcheng

Institute of Philosophy, CASS

This paper will present an idea of the oriental neo-communitarianism in political philosophy. It will be an investigation of fundamental ideas in political philosophy available to construction of socialist market economy.

The conception of the oriental neo-communitarianism represents ethical commitment and ideally political support which will be fit for and pursue socialist market economy.

The conception of the oriental new-communitarianism relies on acknowledge, reflection and reform to traditional Chinese ideology of ethics and politics.

It will argue for the ethical-political significance of massive unconsciousness in Chinese culture which is so-called identity and acknowledge of relatives.

It will describe a method which pursues transformation from traditional family collectivism to modern idea of community. It also involves abandonment of family and construction of the neo-community.

It will research ethical foundation of market economy in general as well as in China.

It will investigate impact of market on ethical ideas of neo-community and concepts of agents in market and of inter-agents.

It will research influence and demand of ethics in market to one in politics. It will also research the transformation of definitions from market agents to political agents. It will bring up the political idea of neo-community.

The conception of neo-community will be an investigation and absorption and abandonment of modern western philosophy of politics.

The conception of neo-community will show a common field and life in China market economy in the future.

Ⱥѧ۸

йѧԺѧ

1ȺѧͼԴ̽йгõĽƹӦѧĻϵͳĽ

2ȺʾһַϲҴٽгõŵ֧֡

3Ⱥڶйͳ-˼ijϡ˼͸졣

4֤йĻʶе-ݡͬ롰Ͽɡ

5ٽͳ弯ִȺת͵ķҡԭ͵롰ȺĽ̡

6̽һгõйгõ

7гöԡȺγɵĴٽгΪĸԵĸ

8гӰҪ̽гԵɹ涨ΪԵܻȺIJ

9ȺִѧĿ졢պ

10Ⱥδʷ·չйгµĹ͹

תе

ǿ

ѧϵ

ʮѧһ㶼ڷעĺǣȨƽȻϲ벻ƽڶ̶ǿԽܵģӦԺΪ۵Ļжı׼޶˹ۡŵ˵ȨֽƽȵԼڹ϶벻ƽȵĽܶһֶ͡ԷĹעطӳгùҵʵЩҵġ ǰŷԼйȴӹһ̶ȵ˽תӼƻгתĹҶԣ廹һΪҪIJ棬ƲתΪ˽˲Ʋе⡣һ漰˽вƲԴʡ޶ȼϷ⡣

˵IJƲ۳崫ͳеIJƲۣӶ̽ƲתΪ˽˲Ʋе⡣ͼָƲתΪ˽˲ƲʱҪԭӦƽԭ򡣹ƲӦ˽лоܹƽطȫԱԺļ۸ڹƽĻϹۡ ͼָǰ붫ŷ˽лвƸͷӶԼйĿǰĸйײӶṫƸδӸΥԭ

A Dialogue between Kant and Confucius (and Mencius)

Concerning Human Rights

Lin Yu-sheng

University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA &

Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

This paper explores the Confucian and the Kantian argument for moral autonomy respectively. It then elucidates the reasons as to why the Kantian argument for moral autonomy directly leads to a claim for human rights, whereas the effects of the Confucian argument in terms of benevolence not only does not give rise to a conception of human rights but also, from the Kantian perspective, often nurtures inequality and even servility.

From the Confucian perspective of inward transcendence, however, serious problems arise out of Kants rigorous bifurcation of the noumenal and the phenomenal world, upon which he argues for his idea of moral autonomy and human dignity, which inherently give rise to human rights.

During Kants advanced years, he came close to a conception of divine immanence in the soul of man. This brings Confucianism and Kantianism much closer. We can thus maintain that human rights do not have to be argued exclusively in terms of Kants bifurcation. The rest of the paper argues for the case that, while the main thrust of Confucian intellectual resources did not establish systematically a rigorous conception of human rights in the past, certain implicit notions and practices of rights and human rights are discernible in the Chinese tradition. They can provide, if recognized and accentuated, resources for developing a full-fledged modern Chinese conception of human rights with reference to its Western counterparts.

ºͿӣӣȨϵĶԻ

ع

˹-ɭѧ

ȷֱ𿼲ӺͿ¶ԵɵȻ󽫽ΪʲôµĵɵĹֱӷչΪȨĿ϶ʱ򣬿ӵġʰûиһȨĸҴӿӽǿ˲ƽūۡ

ȻҵڳԽӽǿڱ֮ϸĶԪҲص⣬ֶԪֲڵصȨ

ڿڣӽһֹ˵ľʥԵĹʹѧ˵Ϳ׽ࡣ˿˵ȨһǵԿ¶ԪֵȻ֤˵ڹȥѧ˵ԴҪûϵͳؽһϸȨȨйͳУһЩȨȨʵǿԱϳġ϶ǿĻܹΪչһֳйʽִȨṩԴйʽִȨ浽ĶӦ

Four Varieties of Ideology

Christopher Lord
Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

(Note: adapted from my book, Politics, Charles University Press, 1999, which is a general theory of politics and which I am teaching as a one-semester philosophical introduction to politics at the Philosophy Faculty of the same university.)

The term 'ideology' was originally a technical term in French philosophy, referring to a projected science of ideas. Since then, it has acquired a political meaning, and is generally understood to refer to such bodies of ideas as fascism, liberalism, feminism and so on: that is, to more or less organized systems of political ideas.
In my analysis, the term is defined even more generally as representing one aspect of the political programme. The other aspect analysed is that of institutions. Politics, in other words, is seen as the intersection of ideology and institutions. From this it follows that a theory of politics should consist of a theory of ideology, a theory of institutions, and a theory of their intersection. The first of these is attempted here.
As a preamble, it is necessary to state some assumptions of the theory. It is assumed that all human societies have some form of power-structure - that this is inherent in human society. However, there is no attempt to reduce this to some fundamental or primitive type of power, since it seems that there are radically different types of power-structures (theocratic, imperial, capitalistic...) in different types of society. The concept of a power-structure is used to construct a logical typology of ideologies, in the following manner.
1. The CRITICAL type of ideology is the simplest. It posits only the existing configuration of power relations in society. It criticises the existing system, but proposes no alternative. The example used to illustrate this type is that of the anti-communist front organizations of Czechoslovakia at the time of the Velvet Revolution in 1989 - movements which clearly failed to come up with any alternative model of society to the one they were attacking.
2. The ACTIVE type of ideology posits some future configuration of power relations. This imports something new, and included in this category would be all revolutionary movements, ethical movements, etc. The example used is the revolutionary Islam of Ayatollah Khomeini.
3. The MONOLITHIC type of ideology posits only itself. This is the ideology if the static society, and the example used is the ideology of the Chinese Emperors - say of the Han or the Tang.
4. The REACTIVE type of ideology posits the ideological complex in relation to itself. Examples are found in the Republican and Democratic parties of the USA.
From no. 4 it is seen that a new term is introduced - the ideological complex. While the examples given approach logical simplicity, it is argued that all real political configurations will exhibit features of all four types of ideology, at least in the modern world. So real ideologies are complex.
The relationship between these types or aspects of ideology is briefly analysed, and in particular it is seen that a political programme can start off as being predominantly conditioned by one variety of ideology, and soon be transformed through the practice of politics into an expression of another variety. The mechanisms of this process are exposed.

ʶ̬

˹з

ݿ˲ʿѧ

Դҵѧʿѧ 1999һѧһۣڸôѧѧϵ֮ΪһΪڰѧ۽нڡ

ʶ̬һǷѧеһרָоһſѧʱͻһκ壬һ㱻Ϊ編˹塢ŮȨȵȹϵҲ˵ٵϵͳιϵ

ҵķУﱻؽ綨Ϊμܹһ档һƶȡأñĻ˵ʶ̬ƶȵĽ档ˣһӦһʶ̬ۣһƶۺǵĽۡķ˵һ֡

ΪԣбҪ۵һЩ衣һǣеᶼijʽȨṹеġȻIJûͼЩȨṹԭΪһЩĻԭȨͣΪڲͬУƺȫͬȨṹͣȨģ۹ģʱġȨṹĸ·ʽʶ̬һ߼ϵѧ

1ʶ̬򵥵һֻ֡۶ִȨϵĽṹмȴϵȻȴṩ͵Ӿ1989ݿ˹工˸the Velvet Revolutionзǰ֯ʶ̬Ȼʱĸ˶ûҵκκģʽ

2ʶ̬趨ȨϵһЩδṹijЩµأһеĸ˶˶ܰСʹõӾǰ÷ᣨAyatollah Khomeini˹

3ʶ̬ĵһֻ趨Ǿ̬ʶ̬Ӿл۹纺۹Ƶ۹ʶ̬

4ʶ̬ķӦ趨ϵеʶ̬塣͵Ĺ͵пҵ

ӵУʶ̬µﱻˡȻоٵӾ߼ϵļԣ˵ִ磬еʵνṹֳʶ̬͵ԣʵʵʶ̬Ǹӵġ Щʶ̬ͻ֮Ĺϵõ˼ҪķرأԵǣһ־λʶ̬綨μܹܹģʵʵУֿܺܿתΪһ͵ʶ̬Ҳת̵Ļơ

Public Reason And Democracy

Lu Feng

Department of Philosophy

Tsinghua Universtiy, Beijing, China

Kant thinks that all that is needed for Enlightenment is freedom to make public use of ones reason. John Rawls thinks that reasonable pluralism is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy, but people in a society must have public reason to reach an unanimity in the political level in order to have a just society. Public reason is public in three ways: it is the reason for public; its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is public. Rawls political level can ensure peaceful cooperation to develop economy among citizens who hold profoundly different comprehensive doctrines. But it can not ensure peaceful internal cooperation to deal with the global problems. Rawls claims that his theory about justice is objective, but his objectivity is only impartiality. Even the objectivity in this sense depends on peoples certain virtues such as sincerity. To draw some ideas from Rawls political philosophy, I think we must try to cultivate democratic citizenship and foster democratic political culture in order to further democratization in China. To do this we have to finish the task of Enlightenment in China. And the motto of Enlightenment in China can still be summarized as: Have courage to use your own understanding.

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廪ѧѧϵ

ΪҪɣǹԼԵɡԼԣɳΪˡ޶˹ΪԼƽȹǵԣùȥ䲼ɡܷӶʹյȨ޶˹ΪĶԪԲʱʷ󣬶Ļһ֡᲻ͳһۺıͳһֻβͳһùԶﵽϵһ£Ӷֲ֤ͬġƽȵġԵĸ֮ĺƽЭ޶˹ѧǶִεΪִ۱׼޶˹δܳ۽磬޶˹޷ӦԽȫ⣬磬޶˹޷˶ļֵȨ⣬Ϊ˶޷ڡ֪֮Ļڱ֮µġʼλá޶˹Ϊ۾п͹ԣ˵Ŀ͹ֻƫ˽ĹԣΪﵽĿ͹Ҳ벻ǵĵԣϡǿɽº޶˹˼ȥ˼йĸĻת͡

An Institutional Analysis of the Relationship between Knowledge and Practice in the process of Political Development in China

Mao Shoulong

Institute of Public Administration, Renmin University of China

It is well argued that it is the time of knowledge economy now. But it is still safe to say that it is not the time of knowledge politics at least in China. It still remains a difficult dilemma that whether the development of political institutions can be rationally designed or only naturally evolve. This paper argues that the possible way to resolve this dilemma is innovative learning from foreign countries' experiences and innovative practice in a open public realm in China. Stating specifically, political development for China is very complicated, it is beyond human capability to understand the whole process, let alone design the whole process for a so big country.

The paper will discuss two typical ways of political development. England is a successful case of institutional evolution, USA is a successful case of institutional design. Both of them succeeded in the development of political knowledge and institutions. It is undesirable for China to copy England model for it will last too long time. It is impossible for China to copy USA model for a lot of experiences in developing countries indicate that American model is untransplantable for other countries. Copy is impossible, but innovative learning and practice are possible.

How to carry on innovative learning in China? There is no best or standard way, because knowledge for political development is complicated and has close relationship with complicated facts in specific location and time. Innovative learning needs an open realm for learning according to respective needs and available human resources and budget constraints. Open and innovative practice based on innovative learning is a possible way for sustainable political development.

The partial success of village democracy development in China is a typical case for the open and innovative practice based on innovative learning. In current China, it is very important for Chinese scholars to enlighten Chinese people for political development. But the more important is that Chinese scholars should know the limited role of scholarship in the process of political development. The most important for China is how to provide an open public realm to productively develop and allocate practical political knowledge for sustainable political development. In this situation, institutions do matter.

йηչĽ͸֪ʶʵƶȻ

ë

йѧѧо

һ㶼ΪѾ֪ʶõʱǻ˵Ѿ֪ʶεʱйˡй˵ƶܹƻֻȻݽȻһdzѵ⡣ΪһĿ;ǴԵѧϰľ飬ڿŵĹдԵʵ˵йηչĽǷdzӵģȫһ̣˵Ϊһηչˡ ĽηչʵӢηչƶݽƶƵӢɹؿʵ֪ʶʵƶȵķչйӢDzܵġΪ̫ʱ䣬ҹҲкܴIJ졣෢չйҵʵҲƶԸƵġȻ˵ѵģζ˵ԵѧϰʵDzܵġ йдԵѧϰأȻûб׼ĻõķʽΪηչ֪ʶǸӵģضʱ䡢ضصĸӵʵеĹϵԵѧϰҪһŵ򣬸ݲͬҪܹõԴԤԼѧϰԴѧϰΪĿŵġԵʵǿɳηչĿ֮·

йεIJֳɹԴѧϰΪĿŵĺʹԵʵɹӡڵǰййѧηչйǷdzҪġΪҪѧӦ֪ѧηչеȵġй˵ΪҪҪһŵĹԵؿϡȱηչ֪ʶʵֿɳηչʱԵƶǷdzҪġ

Social Justice: Rights, Obligations, and Self-Respect.

Catriona McKinnon

Department of Politics, University of Exeter, U. K.

In contemporary liberal political philosophy, rights-talk dominates. Rights are variously characterised by liberals as permissions, protections, side-constraints, or trumps which attach to individuals, and which constitute the most important social basis of self-respect. An important recent criticism of rights-talk has come from G.A. Cohen, who claims that liberal thinking which makes individual rights prior to obligations of social justice is destructive of an egalitarian ethos, without which egalitarian social justice is impossible. In my paper I show how neo-Kantian emphasis on the priority of obligations to rights in political thinking lends support to Cohen's claim that justice requires an egalitarian ethos fostered and supported from the bottom up, through the way in which members of a liberal society conduct their lives.

The neo-Kantian challenge to rights-based liberalism starts with the reflection that rights are institutional constructs. Rights can only be asserted in contexts containing legal and political procedures which support the assertion of these rights. Given that a right that cannot be asserted is a right that does not exist, no rights exist in contexts lacking this institutional apparatus. Neo-Kantians argue that when rights determine duties, the tail wags the dog. They argue that by taking our obligations to one another as basic, arguments for the construction of rights-supporting liberal institutions can be made in any context.

Making the rights a person has depend on the obligations we owe her makes rights-talk less problematical for left leaning liberals. It allows for an answer to the claim that individual obligations to live in a way supportive of an egalitarian ethos ('the egalitarian obligation') clash with individual rights not to do these things. If obligations determine rights, then when we are subject to the egalitarian obligation we cannot have a right not to meet this obligation.

Nevertheless, it might be objected that another obligation can clash with the egalitarian obligation. But what sort of obligation could this be? Given that fostering an egalitarian ethos does not demand neglecting the duties owed to loved ones, and captures what is owed to strangers, this competing obligation cannot be towards other people. Rather, the only sort of obligation which can clash with the egalitarian obligation is an obligation to oneself. The most important self-regarding obligation from a neo-Kantian perspective is the duty of self-respect. Whether this obligation can clash with the egalitarian obligation depends on how self-respect is characterised. Non-Kantian perspectives which characterise self-respect as a matter of doing better than others will allow room for clashes between obligations of social justice and duties of self-respect. I argue that this conception of self-respect as competitive conflates self-respect and self-esteem. A better conception is closer to the neo-Kantian view that achieving self-respect is a matter of membership of an egalitarian community, and that this membership is cultivated when egalitarian obligations to others are met. On this view, the egalitarian obligation and the duty of self-respect do not clash.

壺Ȩ

ȡũ

Ӣشѧѧϵ

ڵѧУȨλȨDzͬΪڸɡԼȨЩҪȨһҪG. A. ƺࣨG. A. CohenƺΪȨڶṫ֮ϵ˼ƻһƽĵ¹ȱֵ¹ĻƽDzܵġڱУҽ¿˼жȨǿ֧˿ƺĹ۵㣬ƺΪᣩҪһֵõޱֵ֧ƽ¹һijԱֵ¹ָԼ

¿ȨΪսǴ˼ʼģȨһƵĹֻзɺγֶ֧ȨҪһֻ£ȨֺܱͶ϶һָͲֻܱԵȨһʵȨȱƻĻ£Ȩ¿˵ΪȨ涨ʵʱ˳ߵˡΪǶ˵ΪĻ֧ȨƵĽκλ¶ܵõ绤ġ

˵ʹһӵеȨڱ/ʹȨ-⿴١ҲӦ۵㣬۵˵尴֧һƽ¹ƽ񣩵ķʽͬ岻ΪȨͻȨĻƽʱǾͲپвиȨ

ȻܴһַͬƽͻȻʲô͵أΪƽĵ¹ҪӶЩ׽˵ҲҪӶЩİ˵ԣЩ񲻿ָ˵ġЩƽͻΨһָ񡣴¿ӽǿҪָǷƽͻҪȡô綨ġ¿彫Ϊȱøá⽫Ϊṫ͸֮ijͻءҽ־͵ʵǻˡ롰Ըһ¿ҲõĸΪһƽĹͬijԱʸ񣬸óԱȡڶԱ˵ƽ֮Сֹ۵㿴ƽβͻ

The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals

Allan Montefiore

Balliol College, Oxford, &

Centre for European Philosophy, Middlesex University, UK

This is the third time that I have tried to write about the political responsibility of intellectuals. The first was in my contribution to a book of that title, of which, together with the late Peter Winch and Ian MacLean, I was one of the joint editors, and which was the outcome of a long-term project bringing together 'intellectuals' from what was then still known as East and West Europe under the aegis of the Institut fr die Wissenschaften von Menschen in Vienna. The second much more recent attempt was that of my contribution to a conference devoted to the work of Peter Winch, which was held in Bristol in September 2000; in that paper I took advantage of the occasion to pick up the threads of a debate which Winch himself had initiated in his Introduction to the 1990 book, in which he criticised one of the arguments central to my own contribution to that book. In the present paper I try to rethink my views on this important and difficult topic from the beginning, as it were, without looking back in any detail to my earlier formulations.

In this paper I take the domain of the political to be that of public policy; and the domain of public policy to be that of such policies as may in principle affect all or any members of the relevant collectivity and which may therefore be said to be of their proper concern. The term 'intellectual' I take to refer to all those who have a committed interest in the truth or validity of ideas.

My first main thesis is that all those who have a committed concern for the truth and/or validity of ideas have a responsibility to see to the maintenance of respect for these norms in the public sphere of whatever the collectivity or collectivities to which they way belong - with the further gloss that this is by definition a political responsibility. The second is that virtually everyone has some sort of committed interest in the maintenance of an overall respect for the norms of truth and validity: that everyone may to that degree be held to have something of the intellectual in them: and that everyone thus has a certain share in the political responsibilities of the intellectual. I seek to support these theses by reference to three types of argument. The first is based on certain typically Kantian considerations, the second on considerations drawn from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and the third on the writings of Vaclav Havel. Finally, I am brought to recognize that, underlying all this, I have in effect been trying to rehabilitate a version of a normative account of human nature.

֪ʶӵ

طƶ ӢţѧѧԺ׵¶˹ѧŷѧо

ҵͼд֪ʶӵΡһΪһͬṩ£ѹʵƤء棨Peter Winch֣Ian MacLeanҹͬ༭ģһĿĽ롰֪ʶӡһ𹹳˵ʱȻġŷĿĿõάҲɵѧоڶ飬ҶԼƤء湤Ļύģû20009ڲ˹жСڸУҽ˻汾1990ĵһۣҶԸṩºܹؼһ֤ڱУһһʼ˼ҶҪѵĻĹ۵㣬ȥͷٿԭ֤

ڱУҰǹ򣻶ѹֿһ򣬼ԭϿܻӰ쵽ؼгԱκγԱҲ˵ǵרȤá֪ʶӡʣָЩԹԻɿŲжεȤˡ

ҵĵһҪ۵ǣЩԹԻɿԾвжεˣδǸЩĹΧڵҪ淶һ˵εĶ塣ڶ۵ǣÿʵ϶ԻɿԵ淶ijֲжΣÿ˶ij̶ֳϿԱǾijЩ֪ʶӵÿ˶ֵ֪ʶӵΡͼ֤֧Щ۵㡣һǻijֵ͵Ŀʽ˼룬ڶάظ˹̹ѧ˼룬ǸڡάVaclav HavelұϣЩıһֱŬͼָԵĹ淶

Equality and Enablement


Jeremy Moss
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics

University of Melbourne, Australia.

Recent debates about equality in political philosophy have typically tried to answer the question "Equality of what?" by reference to one of three distinct positions. These three positions, welfarism, resourcism and Amartya Sen's capability approach all face serious difficulties. My aim in this paper will be to argue that a version of Sen's position offers the most promise, only it must be made to account for the importance of individual preferences if it is to be plausible. In defending my position, which I call equality of enablement, I will also consider recent "prioritarian" objections to equality.

ƽ

סĪ˹

ĴīѧӦѧ͹

ѧйƽȵҪͼش𡰹ʲôƽȣ⣬֮һ塢ԴͰšɭAmartya Senŵ·صѡĵĿͼ֤ɭһᷨṩõĿԣȻҪȫ뿼ǵƫõҪԡΪ˱绤ҵƽȵҲῼƽȵԡǿȴɡս

Quality and Equality: the Role of Statesmanship in a Democratic State

Alois Nugroho

Faculty of Administrative Science
"Atma Jaya" Catholic University, Jakarta, Indonesia

To paraphrase Hegel's remark on historicity, Dewey maintains that the task of a philosopher is to solve particular problems that arise in particular situations, very much like that of a lawyer or an engineer. The particular situations to be handled are ones in which the language of the past is in conflict with the needs of the future. Furthermore, Rorty points out that there is an example of such conflicts coming from political experience, that is, the emergence of what he calls "mass democracy". Indeed, democracy has been interpreted as popular sovereignty since John Locke. Such sovereignty has further been delegated and divided into executive, legislative and judicative bodies, following the Trias Politica of Montesquieu and not of Rousseau. The value-assumption of democracy as popular sovereignty is that freedom and equality are good in themselves and that democratic participation in ruling enhances human dignity. Equality really matters in understanding and applying democracy. But, the emphasis on equality could easily neglect another important aspect of democracy, that is, the quality of politicians in general and political leaders in particular. This can happen in a country learning to live in a democratic system as in the case of Indonesia during the recent years. The issue of statesmanship is particularly important due to the fact that the character of "modern democracy" is ever more representational. This amounts to say that the quality of a democracy depends also on the quality of its "human resources", namely, who run the Trias Politica bodies. It is particularly relevant in discussing the issue, Plato's remark that a statesman, if he is to be truly such, must know what the state is and what its life ought to be; otherwise he runs the risk of bringing the state and its citizens to shipwreck and proves himself to be not a statesman but a bungling politician. A truly statesman should not be driven merely by the loyalty to his (or her) own party, ethnicity or religious denomination; instead, he or she should also be driven by the loyalty to the "general will", to the nation as a whole and the human values as well. A truly statesman should not proceed simply on the basis of responsiveness to public opinion. He or she has a responsibility to proceed on the basis of true knowledge (episteme).

Ʒƽȣƹμҵ

˹Ŭ޻

ӡǰ-̴ѧѧϵ

ΪڹͺڸʷԵ˵編ѧһ߹ʦһѧҵǽضвľ⡣ЩٵضУȥδҪ˴˴ڳͻ֮С޵ٸһָЩͻһӾξ飬ֳֵľ֮ΪơʵϣһֱΪȨȨϵ˹¬ġȨģʽһίкͷֽΪ˾ΪȨƵļֵɺƽȱֵ׷ģܴٽϡʵʩ˵ƽȵȷҪȻǿܺ׺ƵһҪ棬ǾλIJܡӡѧϰĹ˵ȷǿܷġΪִƸдμҵҪġҲ˵ƵƷҲͬġԴҲЩŰȨԭλˡ۰ͼ۵ʵģһμұ֪ʲôҵӦģпðսҼ乫ѣ֤Լһμңֻһֱŵ͡һμҲӦԼڽɱҳ෴ҲӦԹ⣬ΪĹҺֵҳһμҲӦڶԹ۵ķӦĻж֪ʶepistemeȡж

Democracy as a Two-dimensional, Republican Ideal

Philip Pettit

Research School of Social Sciences,

Australian National University, Australia

The state has a coercive power of interference in peoples lives: it imposes taxes, it makes and enforces law, and it punishes law-breakers. How can people be assured that the power of interference which the state possesses is only used, and can only be used, to promote matters of common interest? How can they be assured that the state is there to serve them, not to impose an alien will? The only hope would seem to lie in ensuring that people have an effective power of voice specifically, a democratic voice in relation to the state and this paper explores how such a power of voice might be organised. The argument is that it has to be organised on two different dimensions, electoral and contestatory. Electoral democracy is needed to ensure that certain interests get to be identified in a more or less reliable process as matters of truly common concern. And contestatory democracy is needed to guard against the possibility that electoral process, or the process of implementing electoral policy, is manipulated so as to allow sectional or personal interests to be advanced by those in power.

ΪԪġ

ա

ĴǹѧѧоԺ

иǿȨǿԵ˰ƶʵʩɲҳͷΥߡα֤еĸȨֻܹܱٽͬĸأܱ֤Ϊڷģǽһ־ǿ֮ϣΨһϣȷҵĹϵһЧķȨһķȨĿַԵȨɡ۵ǣȨֲͬάɣѡٵĺģ۵ģάȡҪѡٵ֤ΪͬĹעضһٵֵijеõȷϡҪž¿ԣѡٳѡߵʵȨ߲ݴӶijЩɱ˵档

Normative Individualism and Normative Collectivism

in Political Philosophy and International Ethics

Dietmar von der Pfordten

University Erfurt, Germany

The core question in political philosophy is: What political decisions are justified? In accordance with our weltbild (belief system) we can distinguish four alternatives to answer this question, refering to: god, natural law, communities and individuals. Religious and natural law justifications lost their force to convince on account of their problem in justifying metaphysical foundations and falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy. This holds especially true in international ethics because of the religious and cultural plurality of man and peoples. So I will confine my discussion to the alternatives of normative individualism (e. g. social contract theories) and normative collectivism (e. g. Hegelian theories) and characterise these. We can define

Normative individualism: All political decisions find their final justification in the agreement, the manifest interests or the concerns of the individuals, i. e. C when one leaves animals to one side C the affected humans, affected by the respective decision.

Normative Collectivism: All political decisions find their final justification in the agreement, the manifest interests or the concerns of a political (or at least with political legitimacy conferred) group, i. e. the State, the Nation, the People, the Race, the Society, the City, the Neighbourhood etc.

To reach ethical ground we have now to find an ethical justification for a decision between normative individualism and normative collectivism. Normative collectivism will e. g. in international ethics more sufficiently back the principles of sovereignty and self-determination and will therefore be hostile to humanitarian intervention and secession, while normative individualism will be hostile to a too rigid principle of sovereignty and self-determination and will back a robust defence of human rights even by humanitarian intervention or secession. The paper will discuss justifications for normative individualism and normative collectivism and present applications according to the decision for normative individualism in international ethics like secession, humanitarian intervention, human rights etc.

ѧȫй淶ĸ͹淶ļ

ٶ롤ո

¹شѧ

ѧĺǣξõ绤ǵͼϵӦڻشһʱֳܹѡ񣬼ϵۡȻͬ͸ˡ֤ζѧĻʱԼΪȻĥڽ̵ĺȻ֤ʧȥǺڽ̺ĻϵĶԪԣȫˡˣһҵѡ񷽰ڣ淶ĸ壨Լۣ͹淶ļ壨ڸۣǵص㡣 ܹ淶ĸ嶨ΪеξЭлյԣ壨ﱻһߣָܸԾӰǣ͹ͬĹע

淶ļɱΪеξЭлյԣһεģϱ˺ϷԵģȺ壬ҡ塢塢ᡢǰȵȵԵ͹ͬĹע

Ϊ˻ǻΪ淶ĸ͹淶ļľѰһϵԡȫй淶ļ彫㹻֧ȨԾԭ򲢷˵˵룻ͬʱ淶ĸ彫һֽȨԾԭ򣬲Ϊ˵͸Ȩǿı绤ĽΪ淶ĸΪ淶ļ֤ȫΪݹ淶ĸľĸ롢˵Ȩȵṩ硣

Economic Justice, National and Global

Thomas Pogge

Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, USA

It is widely thought that citizens, insofar as they have influence on the basic social rules of their society and on the interpretation and application of these rules, ought to use this influence impartially. They should seek to make the social order fair to all citizens, rather than seek to shape it to the advantage of persons of their own social class, gender, ethnicity, religion, native language, or whatever. It follows, in particular, that the more affluent citizens should not use their greater political influence to shift economic institutions in their favor, thereby depriving the poor of the benefits of national economic growth and prosperity. My question is whether a similar duty to impartiality is plausible on the global plane. For example, should the more powerful members of the WTO, now including China, strive for international trading rules that are fair to even the poorest and weakest countries or should they press the interests of their own society without regard to the interests of others? This question is of great significance in our world where, despite enormous progress in China, some 800 million persons worldwide still lack secure access to adequate nutrition.

壺ҵȫ

˹

ױǴѧѧϵ

һֹ㷺رܵĹ۵ΪȻĻԼЩĽͺӦöӰ죬ȴӦطӰ졣ӦʹеĹ񶼹ƽʹ֮Լײ㡢Ա塢ڽ̡ԻӦأرЩΪԣĹDzӦǿӰʹûķı䣬Ӷƶܹ񾭼ͷĺôҵǣǷȫķΧƵĶԹҲǺģ˵ó֯ЩΪǿijԱھҪйӦΪһʹЩСƶĹ˵ƽĹó׹ŬأӦƽ棿ڵ磬йȡ˳Ľչ緶ΧԼ˿ȱϣҪġ

The Idea of Democracy in Ancient China

Qian Xun

Humanities College, Tsinghua University

Is there any element of the idea of democracy in the traditional political thoughts in China ? If the answer is affirmative, then ,where is it?

Mo Zis theses of the agreement with the virtuous and the agreement with the superiors cannot be identified with the idea of democracy. Although the doctrine of the agreement with the virtuous somewhat contains negative effects to the patriarchal heirachy, it cannot be said to be an idea of democracy. What reflects the essence of Mo Zis thought is the doctrine of the agreement with the superiors, which requires the unconditional obedience of the whole nation to the ruler, it is indeed a theory which served to an autocratic government. The inner logic of this line of thought was further developed by the Legalists.

The Confucian idea of regarding the people as the foundation of the state (Min Ben) cannot also be identified with the idea of democracy. Mencius suggested that people are more precious than the king , Xun Zi proposed a famous analogy with people as the water and the king as the boat floating on it. Both of them had the intention to reinforce the power of the ruler as their starting point and ultimate objective. Huang Zongxi , the famous thinker of the late Ming Dynasty,had criticized and attacked their theses with profound insights.

But all these did not lead to the conclusion that there is not any element of the idea of democracy in traditional China. Shang Yang said that , given that to rule the world (Tian Xia) in favor of the world as a choice, and to exploit the state and to make use of the power for ones own benefits as an alternative to it , the contrast between the two choices (public spirit and selfishness)was just too crucial for the survival of the state.

The chapter The Tao of Tang and Yu of the Guodian Findings contends that , it is the core of theTao of Tang and Yu that to serve the people all over the world without selfish caculations, which can be said the culmination of benevolence (Ren). This kind of idea that the ruler was appointed to serve the people has some points common to the democratic idea of modern government. It is the quintessence of the idea of democracy in ancient China. But unfortunately ,it was abandoned and forgotten without any development in the later ages.

Two thousands years later, Huang Zongxi restated the idea that the ruler was appointed to serve the people, he also brought to light the essence of the traditional politics which take the whole nation as the private property of the ruler. Confronting with this reality, he suggested that the status of the ruler and the ruled should be changed reciprocally, the ruled should be the host (not guest), and the ruler should be the guest(not host). Huang Zongxi resumed the element of the idea of democracy of the Pre-Qin period , furthermore , his idea that the ruler and the ruled should change their status reciprocally provided a traditional resource with illuminating insights to which we can appeal. We must start (but not retreat) from the position of Huang Zongxi.

йŴ˼

Ǯ ѷ

廪ѧѧԺ

йŴͳ˼û˼룿Уʲôط

īӵͬ˼벻˼롣͡ͻڷȼƣҪƽȵ壬˼롣ӳī˼ʵǡͬͬĺҪͬӣһ֮ͬ壬רġ˼ڷõչʵС

ҵ˼Ҳ˼롣ӵۻӵľˮۣԹ̾ȨΪռĿꡣԴ˻̵С

йŴû˼롣ǡΪ¡ǡһܹ֮֮أԱ˽˽֮ǡ֮֮Ҳһ¶֮˵¶Ҳ֮ҲΪ˼룬Ϊ˼ͨģǹŴ˼ڡֻϧûеõ̳кͷչԺķչбˡ

ǧΪ˼룬¶ǧ۹µıʡԼµʵλ˼룬ҪӾΪΪͣıΪΪΪ͡˼벻ָʱڵ˼룬λ˼ǽζԴͳµIJͣôͳԴΪҲкõӦôӻ˵ĻϼǰӦôˡ

Freedom of Expression and the Argument from Truth

Juha Raikka

Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, Finland

The so called argument from truth has dominated the literature of free speech. According to the argument, free speech is particularly valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth. The argument from truth was originally formulated by John Milton and later defended by John Stuart Mill. In recent discussion the argument from truth is discussed for instance by Thomas Scanlon, Kent Greenawalt, Susan J. Brison, Frederick Schauer, Alvin Goldman, C.L. Ten, H.J. McCloskey, Stanley Ingber, J.P. Day, Jonathan Riley and Roger Crisp. In my paper I would like to briefly evaluate some arguments against the argument from truth. In particular, I would like to ask (1) whether the notion of truth in the argument from truth is dependent on an implausible theory of truth, (2) whether the way "free" discussion works in practice contravenes the open market of ideas that the argument from truth assumes, and (3) whether the argument from truth can be rejected simply on the grounds that all consequentalist justifications of free speech are mistaken. The overall aim of my paper is to clarify the discussion around the argument from truth.

ɺ֤


ͼѧѧϵ

ν֤йɵ֤֮رмֵΪɽڷ֤Լܶ٣John MiltonȷеرΪԼ˹ͼءգJohn Stuart Mill绤Уֱ֤˹˹ףThomas Scanlonء߶أKent GreenawaltɺJɭSusan J.BrisonϣФգFrederick SchauerҡAlvin GoldmanC.L.ڣC.L.TenH. J.޴ĻH.J.McCloskey˹̹סӢ񲩣Stanley IngberJ.P.£J.P.DayԼõJonathan Riley޸˹գRoger Crisp̸ۡڱУҽҪЩ֤ķرأҽ⣨1Ƿ֤еһôɿۡ2Ƿʵжԡɡ̸۵ķʽ֤Ĺгִ3Ƿ֤ܽݶܳ⣺ӽĽǶȶɵ֤ǴġĵҪĿdzΧ֤һϵۡ

From People, Citizen to Voter:

The Connection of Statue of Subjects in Political Affair and Social and Political Situations

Ren Jiantao

College of Politics and Law, Zhong Shan University

People, citizen and voter are key words for modern politics. They are frequently used with high degree in modern Chinese terms of politics. However, unlike the case in the western academic circle, the three words have been not analyzed clearly in Chinese academic circle. They are just used frequently in practical activities in politics. There is no room in researching on their significance, relation and the connection to social and political situations in modern society. However, these words are very key to modern politics and political practice.

1, People as a foundation of validity in politics.

The principle of Peoples Sovereignty is one of fundamental principles of modern politics. Rousseau theory and early libertarians had both differences and similarities. There has been also a Marxist interpretation of the issue. Thus there have been bipolar trends on the principle of Peoples Sovereignty. On the first hand, it is the trend that intends to practice assignments in politics and regards the principle as intelligent guide to those assignments, by laying it on a series of more detailed assignments of political modern systems. On the other, it is the trend that intends to consider the principle to be a non-systematical way of thinking in criticism of existing system of politics and in providing a theory for revolution, and thinks of the principle as a political philosophy of revolution.

The Peoples Sovereignty sharpened system and function in two straits of thinking and different arrangements of systems. The concept of people has been out of its significance and fictional with its being descent in capitalism. In contrary, it has been filled with full validity with political activities, i.e. it has been one of the key words in socialist politics, which shows its ascent in politics.

As a whole, people as an abstract concept in politics has two functions: one is the final ground for validity tightly more to modern politics. The other is an appeal for validity of modern politics, especially for validity of criticism of unfair in politics.

The concept of people is used in socialism as following: (1) it is a prior foundation for validity and legitimacy of politics. (2) It is a prior ground for rationality of assignments by the political system without any argument. (3) It is the evident criterion for political practices and policies to be accepted or argued for. (4) It is the natural unity of moral support of political governance and political support of moral embodiment. (5) It is the basic criterion for the effective and ineffective of governance.

2, Citizen as a subject of modern political community.

The problem of confirmation of subjects in modern political community, like the one in ancient time, is a crucial question for possibility of right undertaking of politics. However, the title citizen common to the two communities has quite different significance and political goals.

Citizen in the ancient system of political community refers mainly to agents who participate directly in political affair in such a circumstance of uniting ordinary life of politics and political choices. It was the basis where subjects of ancient democracy was born. In such political community, (1) the difference in politics among subjects was neglected, (2) the common was presupposed, (3) the interaction was straight, (4) the social strata was unclear, (5) the self-identity of subjects was out of doubt.

Citizen in modern system of political community was born under different conditions. (1) It is the agent who consists of the distinguished nation-state community. (2) It is products of social divisions and stratum. (3) It is based on differences in politics. (4) It is divergent in self-identity. (5) The interaction among subjects is complicated and the disorder in norms is considered as a normal case.

There are obviously quite differences between ancient and modern self-confirmation and confirmation of political community in citizenship or membership. In the former the confirmation of citizenship was necessary, and it was not difficult to distinguish citizens from slaves. Accordingly, the citizenship was not crucial to shake the political community. However, it is a problem for modern society that the citizenship or membership will effect existence of the political community. Once it is confirmed, it will be in reference to not only trivial arguments in politics but also an amount of legal procedures and changes with which members in different communities bring on self-identity of political community, and the social order with which the changes bring.

With this the ideology of communitarianism and individualism will be more influential on world modern political practice, not only in the priority of subject issue in modern society but also in the future of political practice.

3, Voter as agent of liberal democratic politics.

The debate of priority of a community or an individual in political community between communitarianism and the new liberalism has been involved in a fundamental problem on what expectation in politics will be used for consisting political agents. However there is no difference between them in validity of basic institutions in modern politics. Thus the debate can be transformed into the other one that what statue of agents will be enough to support their political doctrines. In other words, if modern system of liberal democratic politics were presupposed commonly by speakers of politics in the main stream, the problem would be what the supporting agents for this kind of political system should be like.

There might be two alternative ways to the debate. One is from idealism which is respectable, the other from realism which is workable. For the former, idealists would like to argue for moral agents as political agents with stronger feeling of morality, so that it makes political life more energetic with power to lift people up. But idealism is so harm to political practice that it could not work in reality. For the later, realists would like to consider matters in political practice without any stimulation in ideal politics supplied for people. They used to put their political interests in the very issue of how it is possible to consider politics as a relatively fair bargain.

Here was born the problem of voter. A voter is not an independently individual political agent. It is evident that he has some characters such as convergence and dynamic. And it is very significant for liberal democratic politics that the amount of voters is countable. First, in the view of integrality of political agents, it means the normative process in politics from cut heads to press heads and count heads. Second, in the view of structure of political agents, it means disappearance of the agents with energy and appearance of ones with more practice. Third, in the view of interaction of political agents, it means the situation in which a political arrangement with bargain in interests and distribution of powers replaced the simplified connection of interests and powers, and in which the end of political governance and the control of life are unified. Fourth, in the view of expectation in politics of political agents, it means direct connection between the expectation and activities in politics, and transformation from the holy to the worldly in the expectation. Fifth, in the view of attitude of life of political agents, it means that supreme of politics in life is broken through and an agent would like to choose a way of life she likes.

4, Political idea and situation.

No doubt all concepts of people, citizen and voter are fundamental political ideas which grant for modern politics to put into practice without any obstruction. Obviously, these ideas are not just trivial, at least in two ways. Firstly, it is very important for the trend in politics. Secondly, it has more complicated and deep impact on practical way in politics.

It is supported by political ideology formed in twentieth century, in which it is related with political tragedy. The high-key idea of people was married with totalitarism in twentieth century, the acquisition and usurpation of citizenship was related with various debates in politics in the century, and the trend of citizens choice and the future of mass politics was connected with evaluation for politics in the century. All these are evidences of closely connection between political idea and situation.

It is of most importance to analyze the fundamental modern political ideas with a long history. And it is also very important to farewell the grand myth of people in the century and to be free from mystery in politics by treating politics as man. All these will be crucial to develop politics healthily. Post-myth time will be corresponded internally with a self-determination time.

It is also very important to distinguish citizens as individuation and collectivity of political community, because the nation-states as organs of political practice will united with political trends of individualism and patriotism as well as focus on individual and common virtues with political significance.

The research on citizens as political practical agents should not be a topic in science of politics with more strengthened try in computation. Treatments of voters in the view of normative meaning of political theory will be helpful for us to distinguish formal and material meaning of politics, and to standout brightly differences of qualities in both ancient and modern politics. In doing so, it will be free politics from myth, i.e. from political enchantment to disenchantment. We should consider politicians as professional experts rather than magician with mystery. It also makes politics more active so that every citizen and voter could participate in. By this we can be free from political nightmare which had been based on mystic enchantment in twentieth century.

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ɽѧѧԺ

񡢹ѡ񣬾ΪִѧĹؼʡִĻУǵʹƵҲǷdz֮ߵġǣѧ粻ͬǣںѧУ񡢹ѡִѧĹؼʣûеõܺõѧֻʵιƵʹšǵѧ̺Σ֮Ĺϵִθ֮ĹǷͬǸѧհסȻЩȴִִѧӦرܵ⡣

һΪԵ

Ȩԭ֮ΪִεĻԭ¬ߵͬҰ˼IJ͡ɴ˲ȨԭھλţԭΪְŵľ򣬶ȨԭʵΪһϵеִƶȰšڽȨԭΪһֳƶȣΪṩݣȨԭΪһָѧķƶȻ˼ Ȩԭ˼·ԼγɵġֲͬƶȰµƶȼЧáʱ̺黯Լֱ̺֮ںijʵ֮Ϊεһȡֳص㡣

ԣ֮Ϊ湦ܣһΪеִԽݡΪִεǶβƽеݡ

龰еʹãһΪϷԵԻΪƶȰźԲ֤ݡΪ;ξٴĻýֵܻ֧ĵȻ׼ģΪͳεĵ֧Ϊ廯֧ŵȻͳһ壬ΪͳЧʧЧĻ׼

ִιͬȷ

ִιͬȷ⣬ͬŵιͬȷһһοܵͬҪ⡣ֻͬΪιͬνġ񡱣൱ͬĺָ

ŵιͬϵеĹҪָճξһǰ£ֱӲߡǹŵԵĻιͬڲһβDZԵġĹͬԤŵġĻǼֱߵġģֲDzġ壬ͬûġ

ִιͬϵеĹڲͬıһǽ塪ҹͬ幹ߡֹͷֲIJǽβԻġģǾͬԵġ壬ĻǸӵģ淶еһֳ̬

ŵִ״̬µĹʸԱʸȷιͬȷ֮䣬Ǿشġǰ߶ڹʸԱʸȷϣһȻȻ⡣ڹū֮䣬ʲôѵļ⡣ˣʸ⣬һԶҡιͬĻ⡣ִγΪһιͬĹһӰιͬĹʸԱʸȷ⡣һȷϣ漰ѧ֤漰һ׷ķɹ̡ԼͬιͬԱιͬͬıǨֱǨ⡣

ɴ˲Ĺͬ壨Ⱥ壩ʶ̬ţڵӰ죬ԲֹԵӦȴȺ򣬶δɣؽṹԵӰ졣 ѡεΪ

ȺιͬȺȻǸȵۣ漰һֿеִΣʲôĻ⡣ǣ߶ִεĻƶȰŵԣûоԷġˣǵۣҲͿתʲô״̬֧ǵ˵ִ֮ʽһΪѧͬŵԤĻôʽ֧壬Ӧô⡣

ĽҲ˼·һ˼·һʵ˼·ǰ߿ɾ߿СɾΪΪǿҵ¸ֵ֧ĵΪ֮ΪΪĵ̱绤ʹһϵĶǣʵкġΪʵʵεǶȥģṩ̼˵˷ܼҪԼ˼ά˷ܵ㣬֮ΪһԹƽĽ׻οܵϡ

ǣѡ͵ˡѡһֶĸ廯壬ͬԽṹĶ̬ԴԶ׼ġѡĿԼʣвС塣һζŴӡͷѹͷٵͷĹ淶˶̡ĽṹζżԵΪ˳ʵΪĵĻζ潻ȨθȡȨļ򵥹Լ֧֧϶Ϊһľ档ģζΪֱӣζʥƷƷתģ̬ζϵֱƣһѡԼʽĿԡ

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ɣ񡢹ѡ񣬶漰ִ˳еĻȻЩ޹ʹġмشӰ죺һ˼ӰΪشεʵУȫ桢̶Լá ʮθγɵʶ̬֤ʮαij֣Ҳһ𡣸ߵʮ͵ļȨʸĻݶʮ͵ηĹԼѡΪʹεǰ;ʮ۵أ֤ξĽϵ

ھдͳԨԴִش塣ʮΰ񻰡񻰣ڽظУõˡλԴд˺εĽȫչйؼԵáʱ׵ʱǾںӦϵġ ڹ֮Ϊιͬĸ廯״̬뼯Ⱥ״̬֣ͬش塣ΪΪִĻ塪ң밮빫º͹µIJأԼֲؾеЧãճһġ

ѡ֮ΪִεʵΪоӦǿοѧ⡣ڹ淶۵϶Դѡ⣬԰εʵʽ塣ʹǽִε봫ͳεʣ͹֡ӶڽȡΡȡȵμҷŵְҵμλϼʶʹεʵʽ룬ԳΪѡɽĻӶʮͽȵĻϵجΡ

Some Moral Arguments against Unrestricted Capitalism

Sheng Chin-lai

Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan

In this paper I present some moral arguments against unrestricted capitalism. By unrestricted capitalism I mean the economic system in which entrepreneurs and business people are completely free in dealing with industrial and commercial transactions, with no governmental intervention and regulation at all. This is the ideal society of Robert Nozick, for which he proposed his entitlement theory of distributive justice. I try to argue from a new socialism from a utilitarian theory of distributive justice. And concentrate on criticizing the theory of distributive justice of unrestricted capitalism from moral point of view. In sections following the introduction I examines the issues such as human nature of risk aversion, randomness of the free market, unearned income is unreasonably large, the inadequacy of procedural justice and the necessity of afterward regulation, money can buy power, a properly system conforms to income distribution according to contribution respectively. In conclusion I maintain that unrestricted capitalism is a very bad economic system, at least from the moral point of view. As for how to check, control, or regulate capitalism, it is beyond the scope of this paper.

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ڱɷ޽ʱĵ֤޽ʱָһ־ƶȣҵҺпȫɵش¹ҵҵףûĸԤ͹ơ޲ءŵ˵ᣬΪ˷乫Ȩۡͼӷ乫Ч֤һµ壬ҽڴӵ¹۵޽ʱķ乫ۡڵԺҷֱ𿼲յԡгԡǹ벻ضࡢIJºصıҪǮɹȨԼ׷ƶȵ⡣ڽΪٴӵ¹۵㿴޽ʱһdzľƶȡνơƻʱ壬ҵѳķΧ

Liberty vs. Community - A Confucian Perspective on Democracy's Dilemma

Tan Sor Hoon

Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore

Republic of Singapore

The battle cry of the French Revolution, "Liberty, Egality, Fraternity was an important inspiration for modern democracies. Liberal democratic theories have emphasized the first two, often at the expense of the third. Communitarian critics of liberalism have often been preoccupied with its neglect of community (which we might say is the contemporary equivalent of, and certainly includes, fraternity. Such criticisms have led to greater awareness of the importance of community among liberals who, however, remain concerned about the potential threat to liberty posed by certain forms of communitarianism.

There is undoubtedly a tension between the values of liberty and community. What is the nature of this tension and how should it be resolved within a democracy? The paper explores these questions from a Confucian perspective.

Many agree that Confucianism is a communitarian philosophy, though there is no consensus on what kind of communitarianism and what are its implications for democracy. Some see Confucianism as inherently anti-democratic because there is no room for individual liberty. I shall argue a different Confucian perspective, focusing on the pre-Qin texts. Although the problematic of liberty vs. community is not germane to pre-Qin philosophical discourse, those texts could still provide a different perspective on this contemporary dilemma of democracy, and perhaps inspire new approaches to deal with the tension between liberty and community.

빲ͬ壺˼ӽƵ

Tan Sor Hoon

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ɡƽȡ͡ЩսںִƵһҪԴȪ۳ǿǰߣɺƽȣ˵ߣȺָģʽ˹ͬ壨ǿ˵ͬDzڵĵͬҲ˲ЩʹѧǶԹͬҪ˸õʶȻЩѧȻעijЩȺʽɵDZв

ʣɺ͹ֵּ֮ͬһıʲôϵͳνĽҵӽЩ⡣

˶ͬѧ˵һȺѧȻʲô͵ȺԼƵĺʲôϲûдһЩ˼ڵؾǷģΪûΪ¿ռ䡣ͨǿıҽһֲͬӽǡ-ͬѧأЩıȻܹΪִƵṩһֲͬӽǣҿΪ빲֮ͬṩµ;

Beyond Proceduralism: The Chinese Perspective on Sincerity as Political Virtue

Julia Tao

Centre for Public Policy and Administration

University of City, Hong Kong

Contemporary democratic politics emphasizes voluntary participation by free and equal citizens who make collective decisions on fundamental political questions. This has led to a common concern in contemporary Western democracy theories to derive a standard of procedure to justify the legitimate exercise of political power over citizens of diverse interests and backgrounds. They tend to rely on justification in terms of an ideal procedure of political deliberation as a means to motivate democratic citizens to go beyond private self-interest and to deliberate fundamental questions from the civic standpoint of public interest and public good.

Rawls in particular has argued for an ideal of public reason as a standard of free enquiry and deliberation and also as a moral duty of the democratic citizen. Rawls defines the ideal of public reason as a willingness to listen to what others have to say and being ready to accept reasonable accommodations or alternations in ones own view. He further argues that a principle of public reason and a conception of political justice are mutually sustaining , and that they constitute the essential foundations for the stability and sustainability of a modern democracy. The former provides the procedure while the latter provides the content which justifies the legitimacy of democratic politics. In Rawlss views, once the ideal of public reason is firmly established in its citizens conduct, it will support a view about voting in the political process as ideally expressing opinions regarding the best alternatives to advance the common good rather than mere personal interests and preferences.

Drawing on resources from ancient Chinese political and philosophical traditions, this paper wants to argue, however, that political justice and public reason are insufficient for justifying legitimacy and grounding a moral duty of civility. Scholars who study the origin, nature and development of the Covenant (Meng) in Ancient China suggest that what actually creates, sustains and legitimates the covenant ( meng) is not so much the content or the procedure of covenant (meng) but the spirit of covenant (meng). In the Chinese Conception, the spirit of covenant (meng) is the spirit of xin, faithfulness, or sincerity in following the moral requirements of li (principles) and de (virtue). It is the spirit of xin, sincerity, which makes it possible for agents to enter into covenant or establish meng, and to integrate individual self-interest with the demands of moral requirement. Covenants are meaningless without sincerity or good faith. In this sense, the root of civility, in the Chinese conception, lies in the virtue of sincerity. What is expressed, established and valued is the mutual trust that others are equally motivated and sustained by the same commitment to good faith or sincerity in the political process.

The value of sincerity as a political virtue also has a central place in the Confucian political philosophical tradition. Sincerity or xin, is the real spirit of democratic deliberation and it is trust in others sincerity or xin which makes public reason possible. In fact, Rawls himself has also remarked on the importance of conceptions of virtue which make public reason possible. The paper concludes by arguing that the justification of democratic politics is not grounded in the procedure of deliberation but in the possibility of public reason in a democratic polity. What gives deliberation its moral force is not the principle of public reason but the spirit of sincerity which makes the ideal of public reason a possibility.

Խ壺й˶ԳʵεԵĹ۵

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ǿƽȵĹԸ룬ǶԻ⵼˵еһֹͬעһֳ׼֤ȨڸֹͱĺϷԡȥ֤ǴʹѸ˽ʹӹ빫ƵĹȥ˼һֶΡ ޶˹֤˹Ե̽˼ı׼ҲĵΡ޶˹ѹԵ붨Ϊ˵Ը׼ԼĹ۵ܺĽѡΪԵԭĹศɵģǹִȶ־õĸڡǰṩ˳򣬶ṩ֤κϷԵݡ޶˹һԵڹΪеõȹȷͻְ֧ιеѡٿرĹ۵㣬ЩΪõѡƽƣֻǸ˵ƫá ȻйŴκѧͳԴҪ֤͹Բ֤ϷԺȷǵεĻоŴйԼԴʼ䷢չѧΪʵάʹϷԼȫԼݻ򣬶Լľ񡣸йĿԼľǡšʵľ񣬰Ŷԡԭ򣩺͡¡ԣĵҪǡšʵľʹΪ߿ܴԼȷԼѸ˽͵ҪûгʵԼûġɴˣй֮ڳʵĵԡԡֵĶ໥Σͬɶʵͬŵõͳ־á ʵεԵļֵѧͳлкĵλʵš˼˵ijʵšʹùԳΪܡʵϣ޶˹ҲָʹԵԿܵġ˼롱ҪԡΪε֤ǻij򣬶ǹеĿԡԵIJǹԵԭ򣬶ʹԵΪһֿܵijʵ

Pragmatism and Politics

Katia Vanhemelryck

K.U.Leuven, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte Mercierplein, Belgium

What can be the role of pragmatism in contemporary democratic politics? Richard Rortys version of pragmatism opens up interesting perspectives on democratic politics. He shows how pragmatism can make ethnocentrism step outside of the limits of the ethnos, without leaving the centrism behind. Rorty's moral and political pragmatism does this not by joining the old and the new, the present and the possible, the soil and the flower, in a theory, but in stories of how our life is and how it could be better.

Pragmatism as a post-metaphysical philosophy roots itself in the ethnos as if it were a soil to dig. Rorty suggests to consider the ethnos as a narrative, as the story one could tell about how things are and how one copes with them. His pragmatism opens up this ethnocentrism by seeing how small narratives of what is give way to small narratives of what could be. The ethnos is opened, but not in favor of neutrality or universality for example. Pragmatism favors an openness conscient of the "centrism".

A narrative of what could be is a reformulation of an existing, meaningful vocabulary. The reformulation doesnt replace that vocabulary with some completely different one, but uses it as its soil of meaning. After the new way of speaking has become common, a change of purpose can with some completely different one, but uses it as its soil of meaning. After the new way of speaking has become common, a change of purpose can be noticed within this new vocabulary. The way a political or a moral community describes itself, can be subject to the same changes in vocabulary. Pragmatism opens up the space for change. The redescription of the political or moral community establishes an outlook, from within a rooted position in a social context, to possible new life forms with new purposes.

The first question I would like to deal with in this issue is how this pragmatism can be of interest to democracy? It is a two way street. New vocabularies and changing ways of speaking need an opportunity to be heard in public. Here is where democracy steps in. We can consider democracy as the best way to promote new ways of speaking in the debate, but also, being open to new ways of speaking is the best way to defend and enlarge democracy. New vocabularies are brought up, discussed, compared, criticized in the public debate. This is the locus of democratic selfcreation. In a Rortyan post-metaphysical culture, the background for the debate consists of no external foundations, nor of democratic selfcreation. In a Rortyan post-metaphysical culture, the background for the debate consists of no external foundations, nor of universal principles, but simply of one more narrative next to others. The pragmatic approach describes democracy not so much as a thing, but more as a constant selfcreating happening by giving space and according importance to new vocabularies.

What are the consequences of this political pragmatism on the institutional level? Rorty puts his trust in the existing democratic institutions as the basis for democratic change, but changed circumstances and the changed narratives of political and moral communities might need new ways of institutional co-operation. So here the second question comes in: how can the pragmatic interpretation of democracy be of interest in times where we have to face the problems of globalisation? Can ethnocentrism, even when it favors openness, have any meaning on a worldscale? In my opinion the way pragmatism assumes an openness to possible new life forms, can be a democratic and feasible political answer to the politics of globalisation.

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ʵڵеʲô¡޵٣Richard Rortyʵ忪˶εһȤӽǡʵʹ֮⣬ͬʱֲûнºһߡ޵ٵĵºʵһ㣬ǿһнɵĺµġʵĺͿܵġͻһ𣬶ͨһЩǵʲôԼοܱøõĹʵֵġ

Ϊһֺζѧʱѧʵһھһ֮С޵ٽ齫忴һϵУһ£ܹԼǿδġͨϳӡʵʲôϵλڡܹʲôϵУʵΪԣṩ˿ռ䡣˵ԣ屻ˣȻǿʹ֮ڿ͹ۻձ黯ʵͬһֶºɸĿš

ԡʲôϵǶִġ³һ³һЩȫͬȡԭ㣬ǽԭΪµ˵ʽͨʱµеĿĸıܱע⵽һλ¹ͬķʽҲѭͬĸı䡣ʵΪṩ˿ռ䡣λ¹ͬ˴һᴦĹ̶ĿµĿģʽǰհչ

ڱҽĵһǣʵοܶкôһ˫еµ͸ı˵˵ʽҪڹбĻᡣƾͱǣܽƿƶµ˵ʽƶȣȻµ˵ʽĿҲDZƵ÷ڹУµ㱻ύۡȽϡܵƵҴij޵ٵĺζѧĻУ۵ıȲڵĻҲձĹ淶һϵСʵķ˵ƿһ˵֮һҴ¼ϵУиԿռӦҪԡ

ڻʵĽʲôأ޵ȷִƵĻƸıĻȻκ͵¹ͬĸı˵Ļ͸ı˵ϵҪЭµ;˲˵ڶ⣺DzòȫʱƵʵοʹ֧һֿԣȫӽκôҿʵԿܵʽĿԵ趨ʽǶȫεһġеλӦ

The "Reasonable" as a Limit on Pluralism in Liberal Democracies

Daniel Weinstock

Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada

The concept of the "reasonable" occupies a central function in the work of many contemporary political philosophers concerned with justifying liberal democratic political institutions in the context of widespread moral and political pluralism. On the one hand, pluralism renders otiose the kind of monistic foundationalism which had characterized the political philosophy, mainly Kantian in inspiration, of an earlier era (e.g. Gewirth, early Nagel, early Rawls). But on the other hand, the thought is that not just any differentialist claim can be accommodated within a liberal democratic political ethos, even one that has opened itself up in important respects to pluralism. The reconciliation of these two desiderata in much contemporary political philosophy has made use of the notion of "reasonableness": only the claims made by cultural groups or adherents of conceptions of the good that are "reasonable" will be accommodated by the theory and practice of liberal democracy.

But a threat of circularity threatens to vitiate the notion of reasonableness, at least as it has been developed in the work of thinkers such as the later Rawls, Larmore and the later Nagel. Indeed, one can show that for these thinkers, reasonableness amounts to the willingnesss to abide by the terms of the theory of justice they propound.

My intention in this paper is to attempt to define a conception of reasonableness which avoids this kind of circularity. The hypothesis I will develop is that a political actor counts as "reasonable" if she places compromise and the cessation of conflict higher in her utility schedule than continued conflict aimed at securing greater gains, as measured by the ability to secure the totality of her group's political claims, or by the ability to have one's conception of the good shielded completely from the norms of the broader society. This view places no a priori limits or restrictions on the content of the compromise, and thus avoids the circularity alluded to above in other conceptions.

I will also describe in very simple game-theoretical terms some of the institutional mechanisms which liberal democracies can put into place in order to alter agents' utility calculuses in the direction of greater "reasonableness", as defined above.

СԵġΪԪ޶

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ձڵĵºζԪ崦£ѧҹע֤ƵλƵ⣬Եġһǵźĵáһ棬ԪʹһԪ۵ĻԵö࣬ЩҪܿӰһԪ۵Ļ屾ʱѧĻأGewirth,ڵɸNagelڵ޶˹Ȼһ棬ʹһҪԪ屣ֿԵƵμֵУҲÿһ۵㶼ܵõɡڵѧУĵͣʹˡԡһֻеЩĻȺƵĸ֧ǡԵġʱŻᱻƵۺʵɡ

Ȼѭ֤вһ޶˹ĬLarmoreͺɸ˼ҵУѭ֤˼Ѿչˡʵϣ׿Щ˼˵ǡǡͬԸѭ۵

ڱҵͼǽ綨һֿԱѭ֤Ըļ˵ǣһΪ/ЧñΪȷ潫Эֹͻάֳͻ֮ϵĻͱԵģЩЧñȷҪģԼƵĸȫܸ㷺Ӱġֹ۵㲢ûжЭݼκ޶ܹἰѭ֤⡣

Ҳ÷dz򵥵IJ۵һЩƳ򣬶ƿʹЩƳʹΪߵЧŸΪԡķı䡣

Historical Distance and Human Rights

Xiao Yang

Philosophy Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, USA

"Time," he said, "is the best Censor:

Secret movements of troops and guns, even,

Becoming historical, cease to concern."

Robert Graves

The standard objection to a historical approach to human rights is driven by the anxiety that historical approach necessarily leads to relativism. When one deals with the issues concerning, for example, population change, or artistic styles, aesthetic taste, a historical approach, as even those who make the objection may acknowledge, is certainly the most adequate. However, so goes the objection, a historical approach to human rights will inevitably lead to a historical relativism, which is that human rights are historically contingent, socially constructed (which implies that they did not exist before being socially constructed), relative to certain historical time and space. If we take what has just been said above as the definition of historical relativism regarding human rights, I believe it is a perspective we cannot escape by simply going back to the ahistorical perspective. I want to say that we are all relativists now. In a review criticizing Thomas Nagel's ahistorical universalism, Bernard Williams says, "The basic idea that we see things as we do because of our historical situation has become over two hundred years so deeply embedded in our outlook that it is rather Nagel's universalistic assumption which may look strange, the idea that, self-evidently, moral judgement must take everyone everywhere as equally its object." We now all agree that it is a historical fact that the idea of human rights has a history. I shall call this "descriptive relativism of human rights." However, unlike relativists, I also want to add that the story does not end here. Many people believe, mistakenly, that, having accepted this relativism, we must lose our confidence in the ideal of universal human rights. I shall use "skepticism of human rights" to mean a lack of confidence in the ideal. It is simply a fallacy to say that the descriptive relativism of human rights implies skepticism of human rights. The relativism to which historians of process are drawn does not condemn them to the corrosion of their own values. Nevertheless, in the literature on relativism, most people confuse the two. This is why I believe that it is a temporary (and unhappy) phenomenon that so far historical approach, has resulted in -- or more accurately, has been misinterpreted as having resulted in -- skepticism of human rights. In this paper, I want to argue for two related claims: 1) the ahistorical approach that is called "philosophy of human rights" is an impossible project; 2) historical approach does not necessarily lead to skepticism of human rights; relativism appears to imply skepticism because "historical distance" is not being taken into account. The anxiety about relativism is caused by a false belief that relativism implies the loss of our confidence in human rights. Historical distance is -- to borrow Robert Graves' phrase -- "the best censor" that will stop us from loosing our confidence. This paper is divided into two parts. Part I is a historical critique of the ahistorical rationalist philosophy of human rights; I also shall also introduce the concept of historical distance and show how it can help us see what goes wrong in MacIntyre's argument against human rights. In Part II, I shall first try to articulate the concept of historical distance in more details on the levels of both individual persons and groups, drawing on some of Derek Parfit's ideas; and then I will give examples of how some Chinese scholars use historical distance to make normative judgments about human rights.

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˵ʱõļ٣ӺܶöʷӰ졣

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ȨУʷ巽ľҪԴĵģʷ巽Ȼᵼ塣ʹЩʷ巽Ҳϣ漰˿ڱǨȤζʱʷ巽ȻǡġȻЩ˵Ȩʹʷ巽ʽʷ壬ΪȨʷؽżȻģṹģζڱṹǰȨڣضʷʱͿռġǽ˵ΪȨʷĶĻȷһضӽǣӽDzܽͨصʷӽǾͿӱܵġ˵ǣǶߡ˹ɸThomas Nagelķʷ۵Уɵ¡˵ǵʷֻٶѾظֲǵ̬Уԣɸļ迴ԵЩİ֣ΪĵжϱȻǶÿһطÿһ˶ͬЧڶͬһʷʵȨĹʷҽһʵΪԵȨ塱Ȼ߲ͬǣһüһ㣬鲢Ϊ˽˴ţ壬ǾͱȨĹҽʹáȨϵĻֶָۡȨȱʧ뷨һȨζȨϵĻۡʷѧȤ岢ȨӶԼļֵȻ׶ԣ˽߻һˡΪʲôŻһʱģҲDzģΪֹʷ巽ǵȨϵĻۣ߸ȷе˵ؽΪᵼȨϵĻۡڱУҽص۵㣺1֮ΪȨѧķʷ巽һֲܵļƻ2ʷ巽ȻȨϵĻۣ֮忴ƺζŻΪʷࡱûеõǡҪһִĹɵģֹΪζŶȨȱʧ޲ء˹Ļʱõļ١ʷཫʹDZȱʧķΪ֡һǶȨϷʷѧһʷҲʷĸܰǿ̩MacIntyreȨıĶ˴ڵڶУһڸȺϸسʷһʱˡأDerek ParfitһЩ˼룻ȻһһЩйѧʷóȨϵĹ淶жϵӡ

Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice

Xu Xiangdong

Department of Philosophy, University of Columbia, New York, USA

It has been claimed that any adequate theory of moral demands in general and distributive justice in particular must leave a sufficient degree of latitude for the commitments, relationships and attachments that are of special importance for individuals. Any moral theory that fails to accord a separate consideration to the personal point of view is intrinsically flawed. Rawlss theory of justice is said to acquire its relative superiority over utilitarian theory because it integrates the insistence on the separateness of persons by insisting on the priority of the right over the good.

The leading purpose of this paper is to show that the prevailing claim, that utilitarianism in particular and consequentialism in general cannot accommodate such important moral notions as autonomy, fairness and justice, is basically mistaken. It is wrong because of the following reasons. In the first place, it gives a mistaken understanding of the separateness thesis, seeing separateness of persons as meaning that no moral sacrifice needs to be made. In the second place, it pays insufficient attention to the complexities of moral motivation. In particular, it ignores the important fact that moral motivation is conditional on social structure and human conditions. In the end, a dynamical analysis of moral rightness is largely lacking in theorists who hold the claim. Having thought of deontological constraints as sui generis, they not only usually fail to justify such constraints, but also lack adequate resources to resolve moral conflicts.

The claim in question, nevertheless, is intelligible with regard to its presence. For it basically draws its origins from a critique of the classical, hedonist version of utilitarianism, which, as I had argued, is completely unacceptable. But rejection of it does not mean that we must also fundamentally give up what are both theoretically plausible and morally significant implicit in utilitarianism as a teleological kind of moral theory. I had primarily shown how we could drawn on Mills moral theory to develop a plausible alternative to the classical version of utilitarianism. The moral theory I had been recommending shares the teleological structure of moral reasoning with hedonistic utilitarianism, whereas it is distinctively committed to an objectivist theory of human value. The theory of value permits us to regard certain sorts of the good necessary to the realization of higher capacities as trumping the promotion of lesser intrinsic and extrinsic goods. It can thereby meet the challenges the critics of utilitarianism address to a teleological kind of ethics.

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ױǴѧѧϵ

¹۵Ϊ֪κһǡĹڵҪǹڷ۱ΪԸҪԵijŵϵȤ㹻Ŀռ䡣κζԸûи⿼ǵĵ۶ڵȱݵġ޶˹֮ԱΪԽڹۣΪͨȨƶ뽫IJԵĹ۵Լۡ

ĵҪĿҪһ۵ӸϾǴģ۵Ϊǹ岻ɡҪĵ¸ֹ۵֮ǴԭȣԲһִ⣬ΪIJԲζҪϵΣûжԵ¶ĸԸ㹻ĹעرǣһҪʵ¶ṹԼġֹ۵ij߷dzȱԵȨĶ̬ǽԼһsui generisȴͨû֤ЩԼԣҲȱǡķ³ͻ

Ȼɵ۵ڶȴǿġΪԴڶԹŵġĹĹ壨֤ģȫɽܵġȻܳĹ岢ζҲӦΪһĿ͵ĵ۵Ĺ̺Ϻĺ͵ҪԵءƼĵͬĹһڵϾкĿԵĽṹȻĹ岻ͬǣȴŵһֿ͹ֵֵۡΪЩǸʵƵЩǹеġڵƵ͡ˣֵܹӦ߶Ŀ۵ս

A Review of Several Arguments of Equality

Xu Youyu

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

A tense between freedom and equality has existed since modern times. The main challenge liberalism has faced comes from, roughly speaking, .the pressure of demanding equality. In contemporary times, political philosophers such as John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen and Will Kymlicka formulate their points of view on the issue and argue with others.

This thesis reviews main theories and arguments of above philosophers, then explores the possibility of construction of a liberal theory of equality based on individual freedom and right.

The thesis discusses first the egalitarian tendency implied in Ralws difference principle and the criticism of it by Nozick. The thesis maintains that Rawls argument is not sound when he tries to draw an egalitarian conclusion from original position, veil of ignorance and maximin rules by means of rational construction. There is something reasonable in Nozicks argument refuting it. In addition, Rawls point of view that peoples natural talent is social goods and they do not deserve benefits from it is implausible.

On the other hand, Cohens arguments are not tenable so far as he debates with Nozick when he tries to refute the idea of self-ownership and defend his egalitarian position.

After examining expositions of Dworkin and Kymlicka on equality, this thesis maintains that the line of thinking of drawing conclusion of equality by means of pure rational argument wont work. Equality is a problem of practical rationality. The reason why equality has been an eternal appeal of human being is related with peoples perceptual intuition vividly expressed by Chinese traditional conceptions such as cannot bear to suffering and compassion. That the dimension of rational argument is insufficient and the dimension of natural intuition is necessary indicates the nature of controversy caused by issue of equality.

ƽȵĵ˼

йѧԺѧ

ڽִƽɵһֱڡҪսϾƽҪѹڵJohn Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen Will Kymlicka ѧҶƽµļ⣬̵ۡ

Ŀѧҹƽȵźܷ֮ۡ̽񽨹һֻģԸɺȨΪƽȹۡ

RawlsڲԭƽȹۣԼNozick ˵RawlsͼôԽķӡԭ״̬֪֮ĻСֵƵƽȵĽۣDzȫģNozickķһ⣬Rawls˵츳ӦΪƷΪˡӦáĹ۵㣬ҲǾ𿼲ġ

һ棬G. A. CohenͼСĹӶƽȵNozickսԣվסŵġ

ڿDworkin Kymlickaƽȵ֮Ϊô֤ķƵƽȽ۵˼·Dz걸ġƽʵԵ⡣ƽ֮һֻ֮ȥ˵ĸֱйأйͳѧ֮ġ֮ġһάIJ㣬ֱһάıҪ˵ƽʡ

Incremental Democracy and Good Governance

A Chinese View on Democracy and Governance

Yu Keping

China Center for Comparative Politics & Economics(CCCPE)

The article elaborates the most development of Chinese democracy and governance in theory and practice since the reforms with orientation toward the market economy. It analyses recent development in theory and practice of democracy and governance in China. The article generalizes the practice and theories of democracy and governance in China as the Incremental Democracy, which means that 1)political reform and democratic development should have enough stock, that means necessary economic and political foundation. In other words, political reform has to keep its step with social and economic development. 2) the reform and change must show a political progress by breaking through the given political reality more or less. And 3) the process of this reform is gradual and incremental. It is a political development with a breakthrough, but not a political revolution. Meanwhile, the author tries to develop a theory and assessment criteria to explain and evaluate good governance whose elements should include 1) legitimacy; 2)transparency; 3)accountability; 4) the rule of law; 5)responsiveness; 6) effectiveness; 7)order; and 8) stability.

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ƽ

ֱȽ뾭о

壬йľΣIncremental Democracy and Good Governanceĸⶨһεľ׼ΪͳΣgovernmentgovernanceת䣬ִһձͳĹͬڣ״̬£߶Ȩά޶ȵ档ҪҪ㣺ͳεȨֻһأȨж֣أҲϣ֯ȨзͬͳεȨԴֱΪһ϶µģȨƽΪһ¶ϻġָҪǣĸ㹻ġʵΡúͷɻ߱ѧϵĺϷԣlegalityչγµԡͻƣͻƷϾԸ߱ѧϵĺϷԣlegitimacyչһḶ́·ΪӦ¼ҪأϷԣlegitimacy͸ԣtransparencyԣaccountabilityΣthe rule of lawӦԣresponsivenessЧ棨effectivenessorderȶstability

Dramaturgical Action:

An Analysis from the Perspective of Political Philosophy

Zhang Boshu

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China

The original sense of the term dramaturgical action is self-directing and self-performing as when an actor presents himself to others. It is a basic character of all kinds of dramaturgical actions to conceal, for some purposes, the internal world of actor himself from the public. Politicized dramaturgical action, on the other hand, might be the unique phenomenon in authoritarian societies.

Two different kinds of politicized dramaturgical action might be distinguished: one occurs in the group of intellectuals who, motivated by evading social taboo, present themselves in a way which is against their own will; another occurs in the group of officials whose actions aim in most cases at the power and the interests in a corrupt circumstances. Both could be imputed to the scarcity of a true democratic system and to the distortion of institutional modernization. From the individual perspective, politicized dramaturgical action makes human beings alienated; and from social perspective, it makes a society based upon pseudo-intersubjectivity, dividing overt and covert systems in an authoritarian condition.

Up to now, the study of politicized dramaturgical action is just at the beginning. We have enough reason, however, to predict that the study would enrich critical theoreticians definition on strategic action and communicative action. At least, it would prove the plurality of action classification and the complexity of interactions between individuals or different groups. We also hope the study could contribute to the exploration of political philosophy on the historicity of individual freedom, human rights as well as the democratization in authoritarian societies. The existence of politicized dramaturgical action proves that freedom is never abstract; the precondition of realizing true democracy would be to reform the social structure and institutions, rooted on which such psychological and social phenomena could become understandable.

糡ΪѧĹ۵㿴

Ų

йѧԺѧ

糡ζűݡ˵ΪΪ˿ʱΪ;бݵʡijĿĶڱΣо糡ΪĹͬ糡ΪλȨ

ڱѹֵġұҪľ糡Ϊ֪ʶΪǨλѡҪľ糡ΪԹԱΪֲͬʽľ糡ΪԴȴͬģƶ̵ִŤѷӸǶȽ糡ΪӱȵԾḶ́ӳԵ컯ŤὨǶȽ糡Ϊٳɷαϵķģʹƶʽεƶʵڻ ĿǰԾ糡ΪоڼĽ׶Ρоḻ۹ڡսΪΪĴͳ綨ͣ٣֤Ϊ뻥ϵĶ븴ԡǻоΪȨиɡȨʷԼ̵ѧ̽ṩصӽǣΪԾ糡ΪĴڸǣԶdzģҪʵȨͱŤɵṹƶзʽ

Confucianism and Constitutionalism: On the Social and Political Functions of Li

Zhang Qianfan

School of Law, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China

Ever since the market reform China has come to realize the central significance of rule of law. A common tendency, however, has been to mistake the traditional Confucian "rule of etiquette" (Lizhi) as rule of man, which is to be wiped out and replaced by "rule of law" (Fazhi). This paper disputes this view and argues, rather, that the Confucian Li had served as a constitution that bound the traditional society together for paper disputes this view and argues, rather, that the Confucian Li had served as a constitution that bound the traditional society together for generations. Specifically the paper will focus on the Confucianist-Legalist lines of arguments about the relevance of basic moral norms to social order and prosperity. By reviewing the dilemmas of narrowly rational society--primarily the Prisoner's Dilemma and the related collective action problem, I seek to provide a partial defense for the crucial functions of traditional social rules and norms as embodied in the Confucian system of Li. Following Mencius, I argue that a cooperative society presupposes a set of basic and widely subscribed rules and norms governing the behavior of its members, which I broadly designate here as the "constitution of society", written or unwritten, and that Li was precisely such a constitution that had held the traditional Chinese society together. The history of both traditional and modern China has refuted the Legalist belief that a narrowly rational state can be sustained solely by laws and punishments tailored to human interests. The social dilemmas revealed by the modern rational choice theory further discredit Legalism as an infeasible political program. Aiming to resolve the pervasive social dilemmas, I argue that the cultivation of personal virtues through the common practice of Li seems to be necessary for holding a society together and bringing about requisite cooperative actions. Indeed, Confucian Li had become such a vital part of the Chinese culture that, by seeking to abolish the entire body of Li, the radical modernization efforts which culminated in the May-Fourth Movement necessarily undermined and eventually destroyed the binding force of the constitution of the traditional Chinese society, and created decades of war and turmoil. The paper is concluded with a discussion on the relevance of Li as a living constitution to our global society today.

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ڸĸ↑źгʱйѾʶεҪԡȻһձǰѴͳĻεͬڱ뱻˷ġΡĶԴͬΪͳʵijЩ֮ͬƪֻط֤ܷʽϵԣڴ˽֤ʵϵĹԣǶӵҪϹܡĽѽ㼯巨ҳ۵Ļ¹淶뷱ٵҪԡָͨϵġᡱڵ⡪뼯ж⣬ͼΪĴͳ¹淶ṩһֱ绤ӵ˼·ΪҪһױձܵĻ򣬲۳׻ڴ˾ͱΪġ¡ҵһ۴ͳй¡йĹŴʷ˷Ҳʵʵ涯ķɼƲþάϵһҡִѡʾһ֤ġ塱DzеšΪ˽Щ޴ڵ⣬ͼ֤ͨѬնγɵĸ˵ԶάϵᲢΪıҪԡĿԣԼΪܷȫʱкƽĻͻҪԡ

Negative Liberty and Limits of Reason

-- a Critical Comment on the Agonistic Interpretation of Berlins Liberalism

Zheng Yujian

Philosophy Department, Lingnan University, Hong Kong

John Gray, in his forceful philosophical exegesis of Berlin, expounds the deep and conflicting sources of Berlins political outlook -- what he calls agonistic liberalism. The crux of such a liberalism, unlike the dominant liberalisms of our time, lies in its vehement denial of the attainable harmony or compatibility of fundamental liberties, rights or claims of justice as well as in its tragic and subversive quality with regard to the optimism or perfectionism of many versions of liberal thought since the Enlightenment. Without disputing Grays exegesis part of the argument, Id like to take issues with some of his defensive points on behalf of the historicist Berlin in asserting that liberal institutions can have no universal authority, and that liberalism can be best conceived as a particular form of life, with no universal claim on reason, foundation in human nature or privileged place in history.

Granted that the agonistic value-pluralism is the bottom line in Berlins thought, the crucial issue is then whether there can be any universal justification for some version of liberalism on that ground. Despite Berlins well-known stand on negative liberty, Gray tries to demonstrate that the historicist turn of Berlins thought is more central to his overall project or concerns. But if such an interpretation is sound, the status of Berlins achievement as bona fide liberalist will be in serious doubt. Again, my focus in this paper is not exegetic, but rather on the validity of argument from value-pluralism to (non-)liberalism and/or (non-)universalism.

Apart from raising doubts on Gray/Berlins claim that many illiberal ways of life in human history (e.g., Hindu, Shinto, Jewish Orthodox etc.) are equally worthwhile in the sense that there can be no commensurable, rational criteria to discriminate among them, I also advance some positive arguments to the effect that certain universal justification may be found for a type of liberalism mainly based on negative freedom. By appeal to some seminal ideas of Hayek, which are congenial to certain parts of Berlins thought, I will in particular argue that from the limits of individual reason (such as inexorable imperfections in individual knowledge) as well as the feasibility (or economic stability) of maintaining a closed and highly authoritarian (or vastly paternalistic) regime under the open (with fast growing information of various kinds) environment, certain minimal liberal establishments, such as certain basic rights guaranteeing some scope of negative freedom for the people to exercise their free choice as they see fit themselves, are inevitable in a universal sense for the long-sustainable human flourishing in any particular culture or form of life.

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

ANGLE, Steve C.

Dr., Assitant Professor

Wesleyan University

350 High Street, Middletown, CT 06459, USA

Tel.: 1 860 685 3654

Fax: 1 860 685 3861

Email: [email protected]

ARCHARD, David William

Dr., Reader

Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland KY16 9AL, UK

Tel.: 44 1334 46280

Fax: 44 1334 462485

Email: [email protected]

AUDARD, Catherine

Ms., Visiting Fellow

Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Philosophy Department,

London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK

Associate Researcher, CREA, 1 rue Descartes, 75 005 PARIS, France

Tel.: 44 207 937 7708

Fax: 44 207 938 4257

Email: [email protected]

Bunnin, Nicholas

Dr., Director

Centre for Modern Chinese Studies

University of Oxford, UK

Tel.: 0 1865 28038

Fax: 0 1865 280431

Email: [email protected]

CHAKRABARTI, Milindo

Dr., Director & Senior Lecturer

Centre for Studies in Rural Economy, Appropriate Technology and Environment

Department of Economics, St. Joseph's College, P.O. North Point, Darjeeling, West

Bengal, India, PIN: 734 104

Tel.: 91 354 70340, 91 354 70555.

Fax: 91 354 54330 (attn. Milindo Chakrabarti, ph: 70340).

Email: [email protected]

CHAN, Jonathan

Department of Religion & Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, 224 Waterloo Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Email: [email protected]

CHAN, Joseph C. W.

Dr., Associate Professor

Department of Politics Administration, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
Tel.: 852 2859 2393, 2857 8361
Fax: 852 2858 3550
Email: [email protected]

CHEN Junquan

Professor

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6513 6980

CHEN, Wentong

Department of Philosophy, Anhui University, Anqing 230039, China

Tel.: 86 551 510 6146

CHEN, Youhong

Associate Professor

Department of Public Administration, Renmin University of China, Haidian District,

Beijing 100872, China

Tel.: 86 10 8290 1204(H), 6251 1027(O)

Email: [email protected]

CHENG, Lian

Ph.D., Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

Tel.: 86 10 6275 9139 (H)

Email: [email protected]

CHIEN, Yung-hsiang
Dr., Research Fellow
Academia Sinica, Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, History of Thought Divison, Nankang, Taipei, Taiwan 11529
Tel.: 886 2 2782 1693
Fax: 886 2 2785 4160
Email: [email protected]

CI, Jiwei

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong

Email: [email protected]

FREEMAN, Michael Anthony

Dr., Reader

Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK

Tel.: 44 1206 872509

Fax: 44 1206 873598

Email: [email protected]

GAO, Quanxi

Associate Professor

The Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100102, China

Tel.: 86 10 6438 1318

Email: [email protected]

GONG, Qun

Professor

Department of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China

Tel.: 86 10 6841 2465 (H)

Email: [email protected]

GRIFFIN, James

Professor
Centre for Philosophy and Public Affairs, Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AL, Scotland; Social And Political Theory, Research School of Social Sciences, Coombs Building No. 9, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200 Australia
Tel.: 44 1334 462486
Fax: 44 1334 462485
Email: [email protected]

Email: [email protected]

GU, Su

Professor

Department of Philosophy, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China

Tel.: 86 25 420 9636

Email: [email protected]

HAN, Zhen

Professor

Department of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China

Tel.: 86 10 6220 9326

Fax: 86 10 6220 6019

Email: [email protected]

HEYES, Cressida

Dr., Assistant Professor

Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T5H

3R5

Tel: 1 780 4929031

Fax: 1 780 492 9160

Email: [email protected]

HINKMANN, Jens

MA in philosophy, MSc in Economy, CPhD, Research Assistant

University of Erfurt, Institute for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Nordh?userstra?e 63, D C 99006 Erfurt, Germany

Tel.: 39 361 737 4040

Fax: 39 361 737 4049

E-mail: [email protected]

HU, Xinhe

Professor, Chair

Department of Philosophy of Science & Technology, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6726 3301 (H)

Email: [email protected]

HURLEY, Susan L.

Professor

University of Warwick, UK

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JANG, Dong-Jin

Associate Professor of Political Science

Yonsei University, Seoul 120-749, Korea

Tel.: 82 2 361 2950

Fax: 82 2 393 7642

Email: [email protected]

JIANG, Yi

Associate Professor, Dr., Chair

Department of Contemporary Foreign Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6472 6571 (H)

Email: [email protected] or [email protected]

KAHANE, David

Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G

2E5

Tel.: 1 780 492 8549

Fax: 1 780 492 9160

Email: [email protected]

KALDIS, Byron

Dr., Lecturer

The Economic University of Athens & the Greek Open University, Greece

Tel.: 30 1 7219446

Fax: 30 1 3286434

Email: [email protected]

KANG, Phee Seng
Dr., Associate Professor
Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, 224 Waterloo

Road, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Tel: 852 2339 7295
Fax: 852 2339 7379
Email: [email protected]

KARA, Ahmet

Assistant Professor of Economics

Department of Economics, Fatih University, Hadimkoy 34900, Buyukckemece,

Istanbul, Turkey

Tel.: 90 212 889 1177

Fax: 90 212 889 0901

Email: [email protected]

KNOWLES, Dudley Ross

Mr., Senior Lecturer

Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK

Tel: 44 141 330 5376, 339 5370 (H)

Fax: 44 141 330 4112

Email: [email protected]

KOFMAN, Daniel

Dr., Lecturer

Lincoln College, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 3DR, UK

Tel.: 44 1865 280509

Fax: 44 1865 279802

Email: [email protected]

KWAN, Kai-man

Dr., Assistant Professor

Department of Religion & Philosophy, Baptist University, 224 Waterloo Road,

Kowloon, Hong Kong

Tel: 852 2339 7291

Fax: 852 2339 7379

E-mail: [email protected]

KYMLICKA, Will
Professor
Department of Philosophy, Queen's Univeristy of Kingston, 99 University Avenue, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6
Tel.: 1 613 533-6000 (ext 77043)
Email: [email protected]

LANE, Melissa Sharon

Dr., Lecturer

Kings College, Cambridge CB2 1ST, UK

Tel.: 44 1223 331 441

Fax: 44 1223 331 315 to Dr M. Lane

Email: [email protected]

[email protected]

LI, Deshun

Professor & Acting Director

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6256 1107 (H)

Fax: 86 10 6513 7826

Email: [email protected]

LI, He

Editor-in-chief & Associate Professor

The Journal of International Philosophy Today, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6404 8491 (H)

Email: [email protected]

LI, Hon-Lam
Associate Professor,

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

[email protected]

LI, Hong

Dr. & Lecturer

Department of Philosophy, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China

Tel.: 86 351 701 9940

Email: [email protected]

LI, Mei

Dr.

Institute of Political Sciences, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 8290 2953

Email: [email protected]

LI, Pengcheng

Professor & Deputy Director

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6498 2382 (H)

Fax: 86 10 6513 7826

Email: [email protected]

LI, Qiang

Professor

Department of Political Science, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

Email: [email protected]

LIAO, Shenbai

Professor, Chair

Department of Ethics, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6288 2283 (H)

Email: [email protected]

LIN, Chun

Department of Government, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, UK

Tel.: 44 20 7955 7197

Fax: 44 20 7831 1707

Email: [email protected]

LIN, Yu Sheng

Professor of History
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 455 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706, USA
Tel.: 1 608 263 1857, 263 1800
Fax: 1 608 263 5312
Email: [email protected]

LIU, Xin

Lecturer

School of Philosophy & Arts, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610066, China

Tel.: 86 28 541 8962 (H)

Email: [email protected]

LU, Feng

Professor

Department of Philosophy, School of the Humanities, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Tel.: 86 10 6277 1460 (H), 6278 2777 (O)

Email: [email protected]

MAO, Shoulong

Dr. & Professor

Institute of Public Administration, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100092, China

Tel.: 86 10 6251 1027 (O), 8290 2953 (H)

Email: [email protected]

MCKINNON, Catriona

Dr., Lecturer in Political Theory

Department of Politics

University of York

York YO10 5DD, UK

Email: [email protected]

MONTEFIORE, Alan

Professor; Emeritus Fellow, Balliol College, Oxford; Visiting Professor, Centre for

European Philosophy, Middlesex University.

Home address: 34, Scarsdale Villas, London, W8 6PR, UK

Tel.: 44 20 7937 7708

Fax: 44 20 7938 4257

Email: [email protected]

MOSS, Jeremy
Dr., Research Fellow
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia.
Tel.: 61 3 844 5091
Email: [email protected]

NI, Huifang

Professor, Vice President

Yunnan University, Kunming 650091, China

Tel.: 86 871 518 3540

Mobile: 1918610135

Fax: 86 871 514 7713

Email: [email protected]

NUGROHO, Agus

Faculty of Administrative Science
"Atma Jaya" Catholic University, PO Box 2639 Jakarta 10001, Indonesia
Tel.: 062/21/5708967
Fax: 062/21/5708967

Email: [email protected]

PETTIT, Pettit
Professor, Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences, GPO Box 4, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia

Tel.: 61 2 6249 1012, 6249 2632
Fax: 61 2 6249 0599, 6247 8522
Email: [email protected]

PFORDTEN, von der, Dietmar

Prof. & Dr.

University Erfurt, Chair for Philosophy of Law- and Social Philosophy, PF 3 07,

D-99089 Erfurt, Germany

Tel.: 49 361 737 4040

Fax: 49 361 737 4049

Email: [email protected]

POGGE, Thomas
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York, NY 100027, USA
Tel.: 1 212 854 8534
Email: [email protected]

QIAN, Xun

Professor

School of the Humanities, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Tel.: 86 10 6278 6264

Email: [email protected]

QIAN, Zhenming

Doctor in Philosophy and Medicine

School of Public Administration, Suzhou University, Suzhou 215006, China

Tel.: 86 512 530 3316

QIU Renzong

Professor

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6750 2263

Fax: 86 10 6750 2264

Email: [email protected]/cn or [email protected]

R?IKKA, Juha

Dr., Head of the Department, Lecturer

Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, FIN-20014 Turku, Finland

Tel.: 35 823336339

Fax: 35 823336270

Email: [email protected]

REN, Jiantao

Professor

School of Law and Political Science, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

Tel.: 86 20 8403 4429 (H), 8411 3193 (O), 8411 0991(O)

Fax: 86 20 8403 6326

Email: [email protected]

RU, Xin

Professor

Centre for the Studies on Democracy

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

SHENG, Chin-lai

Professor

Tamkang University

Taipei Campus, 5 Lane, 199, King Hwa Street, Taipei 106, Taiwan

Tel.: 886 2 2391 0195

Fax: 886 2 8631 3214

Email: [email protected]

Sun, Jing

Professor, Chief

Office of Scientific Research, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6513 8373

Email: [email protected]

TAN, Sor-hoon

Dr., Assistant Professor

Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, 3 Arts Link, AS3/509,

Singapore 117570, Republic of Singapore

Tel.: 65 874 6290

Fax: 65 777 9514

Email: [email protected]

TAO, Julia

Associate Professor

Centre for Comparative Public Management and Social Policy, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Tel.: 852 2788 8903

Fax: 852 2788 8926, 2784 4288

Email: [email protected]

VANHEMELRYCK, Katia

Researcher

K.U.Leuven, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte Mercierplein 2, B 3000 Leuven, Belgium

Tel.: 32 16 32 32 62

Fax: 32 16 32 30 88

Email: [email protected]

WANG, Shouchang

Professor

Institute of Philosophy, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510631, China

Tel.: 86 20 8521 3327

Email: [email protected]

WANG, Xiaosheng

Professor & Dean

School of Public Administration, Suzhou University, Suzhou 215006, China

Tel.: 86 512 526 5667

Email: [email protected]

WANG, Yanguang

Associate Professor

Department of Ethics, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6882 9345 (H)

Email: [email protected]

WEINSTOCK, Daniel

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, CP6128 succursale centre-ville

Tel.: 1 514 343 7345

Fax: 1 514 343 7899

Email: [email protected]

WU, Liexing

Journalist

Women Friends Magazine

Tel.: 86 10 6238 1524

Email: [email protected]

XIAO, Yang

Assistant Professor

Philosophy Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA

Tel.: 1 510 848 4285

Email: [email protected]

XIA Hong

Lecturer

Department of Law & Political Science, Shaoguan University, Shaoguan 512000, China

Tel.: 86 751 821 8567 (H)

Email: [email protected]

XIE, Dikun

Professor & Deputy Chair

Department of History of Western Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6775 5708 (H)

Email: [email protected]

XU, Xiangdong

CPh.D.

Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, USA

Email: [email protected]

XU, Youyu

Professor

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6775 5677

Email: [email protected]

YANG, Xuan

Correspondent

Chinese Education Newspaper, Beijing 100088, China

Tel.: 86 10 6223 6795, 10 6225 7722-426

Email: [email protected]

YAO Dazhi

Professor & Dean

School of Philosophy and Sociology, Jilin University, Changchun 130012, China

Tel.: 86 431 892 2331-2930

YU, Keping

Professor

Centre for Comparative Studies in Politics and Economy, Central Bureau of Editing and Translation, Beijing 100036, China

Tel.: 86 10 6612 0874

Fax: 86 10 6612 0847

Email: [email protected]

ZHAI, Xiaomei

Associate Professor

Capital University of Medical Sciences, Beijing 100054, China

Tel.: 86 10 6305 1165 (O), 10 6026 5351 (H)

Email: [email protected]

ZHANG, Boshu

Dr. & Associate Professor

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Mobile: 13011865097

ZHANG, Jiangang

Professor

Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6435 9087 (H)

Email: [email protected]

ZHANG, Qianfan

Mr., Professor

School of Law, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China

Tel.: 86 25 359 5845

Email: [email protected]

ZHANG, Xiaoming

Professor, Chair

Department of Cultural Studies, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China

Tel.: 86 10 6487 9208 (H)

Email: [email protected]

ZHANG, Xingjiu

Department of Politics & Public Administration, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China

Tel.: 86 27 8768 2876 (O)

ZHENG, Yujian

Dr., Assistant Professor

Philosophy Department, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, N.T., Hong Kong

Tel.: 852 2616 7481

Fax: 852 2496 2091

Email: [email protected]